2.1 Theories of the firm
In a private enterprise industrial economy the business firm is the basic unit for the organization of production. The greater part of economic activity is channelled through firms. The patterns of economic life, including the patterns of consumption as well as of production, are largely shaped by the multitude of individual decisions made by the businessmen who guide the actions of the business units we call firms.
(Penrose 1959: 9)
The importance of firms can hardly be questioned: they are central to both the economy and economic theory. In this section we concentrate on the way in which economics has considered firms.
When one looks at the firm through the lens of economic theory the impression one gets is that what we are actually using is not a lens, but a kaleidoscope, so that the image is made up of continuously changing patterns. Things are difficult because of the many aspects which characterise firms (ownership, internal organisation, amount of output to be produced, cost structure, employment relationships, obsolescence and investment decisions, where the boundary of the firm lies, knowledge and others) and because any theory has its needs in terms of consistency.
Ronald Coase was aware of the fact that
When one tries to provide taxonomies, be it by schools of thought, by themes or any other criterion, one ends up with a picture that is never complete and rarely satisfactory. It is not difficult to find attempts aimed at systematising the contributions to the theory of the firm: examples are Foss (2000a), Gibbons (2004) and Ricketts (2008); older reviews, of course, can easily be found (e.g. Boulding 1942). The problem is what one means by a firm, and the consequent dimensions which have to be considered.
For instance, Foss refers to the theory of the firm as that body of economics that addresses the existence, the boundaries and the internal organisation of the firm (Foss 2000a); Holmström and Tirole besides considering these three aspects explicitly tackle the firmâs capital structure and the role of management (Holmström and Tirole 1989); Cyert and Hedrick examined the existing works from the standpoint of the generation of new knowledge arising from theoretical models, considering four variants of the neoclassical model and non-maximising models (Cyert and Hedrick 1972).
None of the authors ever claim exhaustiveness while controversies â in terms of classification, theoretical content and relevance â always arise. Given the many dimensions of which a firm is made up, the role of the observer is fundamental as he or she can concentrate on one or more different ones, e.g. make-or-buy, division of labour, learning within production and so on.
Results of the analysis can also be affected by sectoral considerations: too often theories have as their background firms producing manufacturing goods. However, the service sector is heavily predominant â tertiary employment in advanced economies takes more than 70 per cent of total employment â and firms belonging to it may sometimes need different tools of analysis. Let us just hint at two specific problems: first, marginal cost is often too close to zero to be a principle according to which pricing can be put in place; second, given that in capitalist economies innovation is a driving force, innovation in services may require service-specific tools of analysis (Miles 2005).
Juridical aspects combine with economic ones: different analyses and results may be obtained when we consider owner-run small-sized firms on the one hand, and joint-stock companies on the other hand â within the latter the divide between ownership and control creates problems in terms of incentives.1
In this section we do not want to review once more the characteristics of the various approaches â one can refer to the works indicated up to now â but simply to point out two critical points that, we believe, deserve more attention than has been previously given to them. The first consists of the need to reconsider the contribution of classical economists to the theory of the firm; the second point has to do with the non-market relationships that often develop between firms.
2.2 Theory and historical perspective: a reassessment of the classics
Many authors emphasise the fact that the theory of the firm has developed without considering real firms. Cyert and Hedrick (1972) wrote that none of the problems of real firms could find a home within the dominant neoclassical model, and that the controversy over the theory of the firm had arisen over a non-existent entity â the maximising firm which gets information from the market. Despite the fact that this criticism has been partly superseded by the most recent theoretical developments â bounded rationality, principal-agent, incomplete contracting, etc. â there remains some truth in it.
A fundamental problem, in fact, lies in the willingness to have a nineteenth-century physics-like theory made up of principles which can be applied everywhere at any time â and the principle of maximisation or the representation of production in terms of a production function lead in this direction. Firms, however, do not lend themselves to be studied in this way. Furthermore, we have to note that it has become a commonplace to say that âhistory mattersâ, but one finds little evidence of the fact that this importance has been actually taken into account in economic studies.
Neither criticism, though, applies to classical economists. Before considering some of their contributions let us point out that when one reviews the contributions to the theory of the firm it is quite difficult to find analyses concerned with classical economics, and it is not unusual to find comments such as âclassical economists did not elaborate such a theoryâ.2
The first principle relevant for the theory of the firm that we have to consider consists of Adam Smithâs division of labour. He refers to at least two types of division of labour, which have been defined as vertical (or manufacturing division of labour, or intraoccupational differentiation) on the one hand, and horizontal (or social division of labour or occupational differentiation3) on the other hand.
As an example of vertical division of labour we can refer to Smithâs original example of pin manufacture. He noted that even such a âtrifling manufactureâ could be divided into eighteen distinct operations, and that by organising the work process in such a way that one worker performed only one operation overall productivity and production would increase dramatically. He noted that: