1 The theoretical foundations of collaborative law and alternative dispute resolution
Introduction
In beginning to examine the effectiveness of any process, it is important to consider the theoretical perspectives upon which it is based. In the past, much criticism has been levied against âalternativesâ to the courtsâ system. Twining, for example, commented that the âthe vast bulk of mediation literature is atheoretical.â1 Many see the paper given by Frank Sander at the Pound Conference in 1976 when he spoke about the idea of a âmulti-door courthouseâ as the beginning of a change in thinking.2 Another important milestone was the publication of Getting to Yes3 in 1981, addressing the potential benefits of negotiating settlement rather than taking an adversarial approach. As Menkel-Meadow4 notes, however, in taking either of these approaches, we may be:
failing to pay enough serious attention to earlier âintellectualâ founders of ADR â those who provided the key ideas, concepts or organizing frameworks from which we have built our modern movement of theories, practices, policies, and institutions.5
This book, in addressing the origins and development of collaborative practice and in presenting the results of original empirical research undertaken into the process,6 will begin by examining the theoretical underpinnings of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and the writings of these âintellectual foundersâ. Specifically, this chapter will explore the concept of âconflictâ and the extent to which it can be a positive rather than a negative force.7 It will highlight the importance of examining the âecology of human developmentâ,8 the way in which society forms into âgroupsâ and the manner in which tensions and hostilities are addressed and disputes transformed, within and between those groups.9 Next, the importance, if any, of the âprocessâ10 used in resolving these disputes and issues surrounding the concept of âprocedural justiceâ will be discussed. Central to this is the move from more traditional forms of resolution, namely: adjudication by the courts, to âordinary lawyer negotiationâ11 within the courtsâ system; the role that clients and their lawyers play in âadding toâ or âcooling downâ the dispute; and the place of collaborative practice within this dispute resolution continuum. The chapter will conclude by addressing the extent to which collaborative law or collaborative practice can be considered to be part of the âcomprehensive law movementâ12 and the wider âfield of inquiryâ that is therapeutic jurisprudence.13
The theory of alternative dispute resolution and the importance of understanding conflict
Menkel-Meadow, in seeking to identify the theoretical frameworks from which the field of alternative dispute resolution or conflict resolution emanates, opines that the field of ADR is âricher for multiple sources of insights and sensitivity to the interactive effects of law and legal institutions with other social institutions.â14 She notes that alternative dispute resolution is âsituated in the broader intellectual space of the sociology or philosophy of the role of conflict.â15
While initial perceptions of conflict may have portrayed it in a negative light, referring to it as having âdisruptive, disassociating and dysfunctional consequences,â16 Coser, in examining the âfunctionsâ of conflict comments that:
groups require disharmony as well as harmony, dissociation as well as association; and conflicts within them are by no means altogether disruptive factors ⌠Far from being necessarily dysfunctional, a certain degree of conflict is an essential element in group formation and the persistence of group life.17
Simmel and Coser, âsee conflict as variable: sometimes âdestructive,â but sometimes âconstructiveâ or even creative ⌠an opportunity for learning and growthâ18; a positive force, enabling problems to be aired leading to creative problem solving. Mary Parker Follett also spoke about âconstructive conflict.â19 She noted that:
As conflict â difference â is here in the world, as we cannot avoid it, we should, I think use it. Instead of condemning it, we should set it to work for us ⌠The music of the violin we get by friction ⌠We talk of the friction of mind on mind as a good thing. ⌠we have to know when to try to eliminate friction and when to try to capitalize it, when to see what work we can make it do. That is what I wish to consider here, whether we can set conflict to work and make it do something for us.20
For Follett there were three ways to deal with conflict: through domination, compromise or integration. She favoured the idea of integration, finding a solution that was conducive to all and not one in which any party would unduly compromise or dominate. In promoting integration, she also highlighted the importance of taking an interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approach in how issues are resolved.
Significant, also, in Follettâs work was her appreciation of the differences that may lie between an individualâs âdeclared motivesâ for the conflict and their âreal motivesâ and the need to âget underneath all the camouflage, to find the real demand.â21 She was acutely aware that in some instances this deception may be deliberate but that it may also âexist unconsciouslyâ22 to the person in dispute; these âunconsciousâ reasons may, in modern alternative dispute resolution terms, be considered the partiesâ âinterestsâ. Follett acknowledged the need for differing approaches once such âmotivesâ have been uncovered: on occasions to break a problem down into its constituent elements and, in other instances, to view it as a whole. Negotiation may then begin by addressing the âcostlessâ or less important concessions first, before moving on to the more contentious issues with a view to creative problem-solving.23
Coser however, cautions that left to their own devices, some social conflicts may be infinite. To âprevent their struggle from becoming a zero sum game in which the outcome can only be total defeat or total victory,â24 feuding parties need to have a âcommon interestâ in agreeing âexplicit provisionsâ as to what constitutes the end of the conflict.25 Once these parameters or âsymbolsâ26 are in place, â[t]ermination of conflict becomes a problem to be solved by both parties.â27 It will be argued throughout this work that the ability to appreciate the need for such parameters, and to be able to set realistic goals, effectively determines feuding partiesâ ability to engage in different forms of dispute resolution mechanisms along the continuum.
The social context
What impacts on disputantsâ ability to set these parameters? Conflict, as already noted, is a social construct. Thus, in examining its role, it is necessary to explore the societal factors that impact on its development and resolution. Some of these matters are within disputantsâ control. Others, perhaps not.
An understanding of what Bronfenbrenner describes as the âecology of humanâ development helps to understand the way societies operate, the multi-layered web into which disputants are born.28 Bronfenbrenner usefully described a series of âsystemsâ which, in his view, allows humans to develop in a manner similar to a âset of nested structures, each inside the next, like a set of Russian dolls.â29 The first system he identified was the âmicro-systemâ. This, he believed, represented the immediate relationships that people have in their lives. For example, the relationship between a parent and a child, between a child and a teacher. The next level, Bronfenbrenner described as the âmeso-systemâ, namely, the relationships between differing âmicro-systemsâ: the childâs home and school environment combined and how they may influence each other. Beyond these immediate relationships, Bronfenbrenner noted how factors outside of an individualâs direct environment, what he termed the âexo-systemâ, may also impact on their lives: a parentâs relationship with their work environment may impact on the family, in a situation where a parent, perhaps, becomes unemployed. Losing a job may not be relevant to the immediate issues at dispute but will obviously affect how matters are resolved. Finally, wider social policy and developments, at national or international level, form part of what Bronfenbrenner referred to as the âmacro-systemâ, or societyâs plan.
In conducting his research, Bronfenbrenner focused on examining human behaviour not in a laboratory-controlled environment, but in a way that explored how people actually live their lives. This corresponds to a phenomenological approach: the study of âhuman lived experiencesâ;30 particularly relevant in family law matters, in which each familyâs circumstances are unique. Bronfenbrenner was also cognizant of the impact of time. Douzinas, too, as a postmodern legal scholar, notes that the â[t]ime of justice differs from the time of interpretation.â31 Issues that have caused hurt or conflict when a relationship breaks down may be less relevant when a case comes to a court hearing or settlement.
Coserâs work on the functions of social conflict, referred to earlier, is also insightful in understanding the importance of âgroupsâ32 that tend to form naturally within these âsystems,â and in understanding the extent to which groups will seek to protect and maintain their members. When a threat arises from something outside of the group, the group tends to mobilise to protect itself.33 âFamilyâ, with its varying definitions,34 is possibly the most immediately recognisable âunit groupâ within society, and has been recognised as such at national and international level. Recognising that there can be âa directing of antithetical feeling (affectionate and hostile) toward the same personâ35 within close personal relationships, if the actions of one of the parties threatens the preservation of the group, the conflict is often more deep-seated and difficult to res...