The Russian Revolution

James Mavor

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9781317276845
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Russian History
• Index: History

The revolutionary movements of 1905-1907 formed the first stage of the Russian Revolution, followed by an interval of peace and economic prosperity, but the outbreak of WWI and social unrest led to further revolutionary action in 1917 resulting in the abdication and murder of Tsar Nicholas II and the creation of the Soviet Union. Originally published in 1928, this volume traces the course and the consequences of the Revolution with Mavor emphasising the economic aspect of the Revolution as the main cause of the upheaval, considering political and military affairs in so far as their relation to the course of economic development. This title will be of interest to students of history and economics.

BOOK IV

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION AND ITS PROBLEMS

CHAPTER I

THE CHARACTERS AND IDEOLOGY OF THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR POLICY

THE leaders of the Bolshevik faction of the Social-Democratic party differed in character, intellectual ability, and political sagacity, both from the conspicuous figures in the revolutionary movements of former epochs, and from the leaders of the several political parties by whom the struggle for power in 1917 was waged.

The heroic figures of the Dekabrists have no modern counterpart, nor have those of the group of Slavophils who threw themselves into the anti-governmental movement preceding the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. Among revolutionary leaders of recent times, Lavrov (1) and Mikhaelovsky (2) may be regarded as the descendants of the philosophical socialists, as contrasted with Lenin and Bukharin, who, skilful enough in party management and political tactics, are merely philosophical speculators of undeniably inferior intellectual ability.

The parties of the Right (3)—Octobrists, Constitutional-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and minor groups—all of which were in opposition to the Bolsheviks, were composed of men of ability somewhat above the general average of the intelligentsia, while some of the members of each of the parties had either superior intellectual qualifications, or long experience in central or local administration. A few had occupied important academic positions, most of them belonged to superior social strata, though some were of humble origin, and all comprised men of irreproachable integrity; the discreditable elements in the extreme Right had ceased to have any position or influence.

The Bolshevik leaders may be divided into distinctive intellectual groups. Probably the only Bolshevik of outstanding intellectual capacity was Lunarchasky, whose dramas disclose ability of the first order. Although Lenin assumed a contemptuous attitude towards his colleagues when they discussed questions of principle, his own excursions into the field of economics or social philosophy are generally neither original nor illuminating. It is clear from his essays on these subjects that, while he was an omnivorous reader, the absence of systematic training induced in him an essentially non-critical attitude and a lack of proportion, though had he possessed first-rate abilities he would probably have risen above his disadvantages. While positive evidence of intellectual capacity of a high order is certainly wanting in the case of Lenin, a large measure of tactical sagacity must be allowed him. Evidently this quality was absent in his colleagues, for his influence over them arose from their having constantly to refer to him at critical moments; indeed, his reputation for sagacity was mainly due to the shrewdness of the advice he gave them. Lenin’s power over an audience seems to have been directly attributable to his ringing voice and habit of demagogic denunciation, always energetic, generally clear, though often verbose, and sometimes vulgar. Trotsky appears as a clever, quick-witted, but vain person, who, as the Brest-Litovsk negotiations show, was easily imposed upon. He organized the Red Army with energy and skill, but otherwise his influence upon the course of events does not seem to have been very great. For some reason not yet clear, he fell out with his colleagues, and in 1924 they got rid of him for a time. The writings of Trotsky are those of a vivacious journalist, whose thesis is the dullness and selfishness of all who engage in politics, commerce, industry, or agriculture. Although he had not a highly developed talent for literary criticism, and the absence of positive standards renders such as he had spasmodic and rhapsodical, the essays which comprise his book Literature and the Revolution are interesting and suggestive, and are probably the only products of his pen which are destined to survive.

There is no evidence that any of the other leading Bolsheviks possessed exceptional intellectual gifts. Some of them, Rykov, for example, were men without education or ability, but who showed that they possessed energy, courage, swift power of decision, and unyielding obstinacy. That they were ruthless, unscrupulous, and on the whole extremely short-sighted, there seems no doubt. Their incompetence as administrators is proved by their own reports and admissions. There have been in all countries incompetent members of governments; but, in democratic nations, these governments have been chosen by the people from such candidates as were available, and when their incompetence manifested itself with sufficient clearness, they have been quietly and without violence replaced. The Bolsheviks were not chosen by the people; they thrust themselves into power, and coerced the people into obeying their orders; they therefore stand upon a wholly different footing, and for that reason their deficiencies cannot be excused on the plea that all governments are more or less incompetent. There was among them an ostentatious contempt for and disregard of bourgeois standards of conduct and morals; indeed, it is not too much to say that many Bolsheviks had “a dark past.”

In February, and even as late as July, 1917, the anti-Bolshevik parties were acting together, and were collectively much stronger and more numerous than their opponents. They had power in their hands, but they allowed it to slip through their fingers, and cannot therefore be acquitted of the charges of inertia and of fatuous optimism which have been brought against them. They grossly under-estimated the energy, strength, and unscrupulousness of the Bolsheviks, and by so doing brought about their own downfall. (4) They may be regarded in fact as victims of their own good-nature and lack of perspicacity.

On the other hand, when the Bolsheviks found themselves in the saddle, they made no such mistake. They accused their opponents of promoting a counter-revolution, the very offence which they were themselves committing, and without hesitation, scruple, or mercy, they hunted down the members of all the other parties, shot them without form of law, or frightened them into the dangerous expedient of trying to escape from the country, whereby many were killed by the frontier guards. The Bolsheviks hypnotized their antagonists by sheer terror. (5) By so doing they imitated the Government of the Tsar, which in 1882, after the assassination of Alexander II, and in 1907, after the revolutionary episodes of 1905–1907, instituted a reign of terror that depressed and took the heart out of its opponents. The inertia and despair, which characterized the intelligentsia in the periods immediately succeeding both 1882 and 1907, made their appearance again during and after the Bolshevik terror of 1918 and succeeding years, with the result that the intelligentsia in general lapsed into helplessness, while those of the educated classes who were socialists, after suffering the loss of their illusions, exhibited a tendency towards mere reaction. They had seen the magnificent edifice of their dreams crumble before their eyes; this new socialist régime was like the old Tsardom, only worse, more brutal and degrading, and with less regard for human life; but the power with which to combat it was no longer forthcoming.

This decline of spirit among the intelligentsia appears in many recent memoirs, and may be supposed not merely to have unfitted the Constitutional-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries for effective opposition to the Bolsheviks, but also for the task of establishing a government either of a moderate socialist or of a democratic character. After three years of unsuccessful struggle they gave up the effort, and the way was thus left clear for the Bolsheviks. The dispersal of the intellectuals contributed further towards this depression and inertia. The hardships endured by professional men, writers, and artists in foreign countries, where their special talents could rarely be employed to advantage, exhausted the spirit of those who escaped abroad; albeit greater trials were undoubtedly experienced by those who remained in Russia. (6)

While impartial judgment must impute guilt to the Bolsheviks for the methods adopted by them in seizing and retaining power, it must not be forgotten that, while some of the intellectuals had the courage to withstand Bolshevism and suffered death in consequence, in general they lacked the energy and political and strategic sagacity to contend successfully. Thus, although the political parties in opposition to the Bolsheviks greatly exceeded them in number, they were defeated by the superior adroitness, activity, and political sense of the Bolshevik leaders.

Numerous memoirs show that neither working men nor peasants fully grasped the meaning of Bolshevism or believed in it in so far as they did grasp it, while the peasants certainly rejected wholesale what little they knew of it. The attitude of the leading Bolsheviks was from the beginning hostile to them, and this hostility was not lessened by their increasing resistance. In fact the conquest of power by the Bolsheviks was not in any sense due to their doctrine, but rather to the skill with which they took advantage of the revolutionary state of mind of both working men and peasants.

So soon as the pressure of the police was removed by the collapse of the Imperial Government, the peasants knew very well what to do. They needed no guidance and wanted no other government, until they had fully satisfied their craving for land; anarchy suited them perfectly, for it enabled them with impunity to take what they wanted and to destroy what they did not want. A similarly covetous state of mind impelled the workmen to seize the factories.

Any government would have found grave difficulty in dealing with revolutionary workers. The Bolsheviks, previous to their accession to power, encouraged this revolutionary spirit as subversive of the Provisional Government; but when they were established in authority they turned upon proletarian and peasant alike, and soon obtained mastery over them. Such was the effect of their political acumen, energy, ingenious and well-organized propaganda, and by no means least of all, the terror.

They talked glibly about “the materialistic interpretation of history,” “the inevitable course of the class struggle,” “the dictatorship of the proletariat,” “the bankruptcy of capitalism and of imperiocratism,” and “the leadership of Russia in the world revolution,” but their opinions on such subjects had little to do with their political advancement. Although intellectually and morally less worthy of public confidence, the Bolsheviks possessed to a greater degree than the opposing parties the lust for power, and the skill and courage indispensable for its satisfaction. Their ascendancy did not depend upon their social doctrines, nor upon their methods of carrying these into effect, for their doctrines and their methods were alike fluctuating and inconsequent, and were often repugnant to the mass of the people: their position depended rather upon their strategic skill in politics, upon the relative weakness in this respect of their opponents, and upon the primitive stage of culture of the people. Their ability enabled them to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by a revolution which they had a very slender share in bringing about, and this same ability also helped them afterwards to master the unquiet elements, and to bring order of a kind out of chaos. (7)

In these facts lay the reasons for their successful seizure of power. In their own phrase they dealt with “realities”; and they adapted themselves to every change which came with the swift progress of events. They cherished certain doctrines which they could make much of on occasion; but their most conspicuous characteristic was the facility with which they executed dialectical manœuvres, when these were necessary to reconcile their dogmas with their practice. They were not even above taking over the plans and schemes of those whom they were hounding to death, as, for example, when they destroyed the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and then appropriated to themselves, and subsequently applied, the agrarian policy of that party. (8)

The Bolsheviks fully recognized their numerical inferiority. Even in the Soviets they were outnumbered by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, as they were also in the Constituent Assembly. They saw clearly that, if they were to gain power, they must first hypnotize the garrison of Petrograd, and then the plastic mass of the working men of the capital. They also knew that by different methods they must if possible obtain the acquiescence of the peasants, and if this acquiescence was not forthcoming, the peasants would probably yield to pressure from the army and the working men.

While the Bolsheviks neither obtained nor retained their power by virtue of doctrine, they have with much insistence expounded a policy by which they allege themselves to be usually guided; it is expedient therefore to examine the character and origin of their tenets.

The leading ideas in the programme of the Bolsheviks, (9) viz. “liberation from the yoke of capital,” and “dictatorship of the proletariat,” or “the taking possession by the working classes of the political power in any given country,” are to be found in the programme, issued in 1885, of the first definite social democratic organization in Russia, Osvobojdenie Truda (Emancipation of Labour). (10) This document was drawn up by G. V. Plekhanov, (11) who recognized the organic character of the process by means of which alone he considered the working class could not only acquire power, but also adopt such methods of administration as would ultimately result in an ideal commonwealth. (12) It was obvious that since this process was composed ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Preface
• Contents
• Introduction
• Book I The Interval of Peace, the European War, and the Collapse of the Dynasty
• Book II The Dual Authority of the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies
• Book III Military, Social, and Political Disintegration in Russia and the Rise of the Bolsheviks
• Book IV The Social Revolution and its Problems
• Book V Economic Crisis, Collapse of Communism, and the New Economic Policy
• Bibliography of Books, Periodicals, etc., Used by the Author
• Index