Governance, Resistance and the Post-Colonial State

Management and State Building

Jonathan Murphy, Nimruji Jammulamadaka

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781134842193
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

The manifestation of the colonial nation-state as a legal-bureaucratic-police structure – an exploitation tool – undermined customary modes of governance in colonies. When post-World War II independence of colonies transferred ownership of the state structure to the colonized elite, electoral and civil society politics battled for capture of this post-colonial state. Meanwhile, the state was also forced to build its legitimacy in the face of customary governance practices seeking rehabilitation and decolonization in the midst of civil wars and strife. This "state-building social movement" was further complicated with the global spread of neoliberalism and neocolonialism, and herein lies the significant difference between the post-colonial nation-state and the Western nation-states.

This book fills the gap in literature and argues that it is necessary to foreground discussions of the nature of the post-colonial nation-state in examining resistance and provides a window into the dynamics of the post-colonial state and its implication in everyday organizing and resistance.

1 Governing and managing the post-colonial

Nimruji Jammulamadaka and Jonathan Murphy¹

The rise in populism in most parts of the world highlights that the state is far from dead, despite the reign of neoliberalism. The state is an essential feature of this global world. This very same populism infused with contestations around identities also suggests that it is not just a universal neoliberal state, but states; states which have evolved in highly diverse contexts and carry with them varying sets of expectations. A fundamental feature of these different evolutions is the distinct trajectories of post-colonial states and European² states. What do these different trajectories imply in the post-colonial situation? Unlike Eurocentric nation-state theories that posit the state as a guarantor of rights, the colonial nation-state manifested as a legal-bureaucratic-police structure was the colonizer’s instrument for exploiting the colony. This structure undermined customary modes of governance in the colonies. The post–World War II independence of colonies transferred ownership of the state structure to (post)-colonialized elites.

On one hand, electoral and civil society politics has battled for capture of this post-colonial state structure; on the other, this state itself has been forced to build its legitimacy in the face of customary governance practices seeking rehabilitation and decolonization in the midst of strife and even civil wars. This “state-building social movement” of the post-colonial condition is further complicated with the global spread of neoliberalism in a context of neocolonialism. Herein lies the significant difference between the post-colonial nation-state and the Western nation-states, a difference that suggests important implications for everyday organizing, and for alternatives and resistance to capitalist control.

For critical scholars of management and organization studies to surface such implications, it is necessary to foreground discussions of the nature of the post-colonial nation-state in examining organizing, governance and resistance. This edited book is an attempt to fill in this gap in literature and to provide a window into the dynamics of the post-colonial state and its implication in everyday organizing and resistance.

The essentially political nature of the post-colonial state derives from the different interests, influences and dynamics at work in constituting the post-colonial state. We outline in particular four such influences – customary forms of governance, incumbent bureaucracy, nation-building and the rise of neoliberal ideology. While these influences appeared in a chronological order, in the contemporary world they coexist and simultaneously influence the state.

Customary forms of governance

In all pre-colonial societies, there were customary forms of governance of social life and conduct. Customary does not imply that these forms of governance were necessarily rigid, totalitarian or unchanging. These societies were constituted of diverse communities sharing different civilizational experiences, resulting in governance systems more or less flexible, responsive and open to contestation and transmutation (Birla, 2008). The colonial state adopted different strategies in establishing its governance over these societies and furthering imperial interests; ranging from essentializing custom, delegitimizing custom, co-opting custom and even attempting to destroy both custom and peoples (Mamdani, 1996; Birla, 2008). European modernity entered the colonies through these governance processes (Chatterjee, 1986; Kaviraj, 2009) and such colonial governance even helped constitute European modernity (Mignolo, 2012). While these strategies have done much to subjugate the colonized, customs have survived in various forms including as hybrids (Bhabha, 2012) and in subterranean social life waiting for expression at opportune moments (Nandy, 1989). Modernity also influenced struggles for independence, wherein nationalists drew on certain elements of customary resources and pride in constructing images of the native nation as the other of the colonial state and paradoxically as justification for the foundation of a modernizing post-colonial state. For example, Nehru, the first prime minister of India, characterized institutions of modern scientific and industrial development such as the Bhakra Nangal Dam as “temples of modern India.” Independence has also been construed as a means of rehabilitating silenced customary practices.

Incumbent bureaucracy

To varying degrees, the colonial state introduced a bureaucratic apparatus that enabled it to exploit and govern the colonized societies. These bureaucratic structures were elaborated according to the perceived importance of the colony in the empire. Transfer of power at the dawn of independence meant transferring this bureaucracy and civil-police structure into native control. Given the colonial administration’s repression of pre-existing governance structures, this bureaucratic and civil-police structure represented the only vehicle for the newly independent nations to govern themselves. Newly independent countries varied widely in the sophistication, complexity and power of these inherited bureaucratic structures. For instance, in parts of West Africa the inherited bureaucratic structure was extremely sparse, whereas, on the other hand, the Indian subcontinent had a very elaborate bureaucracy with a separate class of civil service officers. To the extent that the inherited structure was sparse, it affected the stability of the post-colonial state and its ability to manage internal conflict and strife. And in cases like the Indian subcontinent, bureaucracy achieved an autonomy largely independent of electoral politics (Alavi, 1972; Kumar, 2005). Throughout the postcolonial world, “the elites that the colonial education created inherited the government following independence and continue to use their privileged position to monopolize the control of African states” (Ntiri, 1993).

Thus, on one hand, post-colonial states inheriting skeletal state structures have faced difficulties implementing a development and nation-building agenda and have frequently been subject to instability and state capture by factions such as of armed forces. On the other, states with well-developed structures such as India have been able to quickly implement a developmentalist agenda, but also have encountered bureaucracy as a self-interest-driven, entrenched power centre. These different post-colonial bureaucratic inheritances have resulted in divergent and path-dependent development trajectories and outcomes.

Nation-building

Picking up the pieces in the aftermath of colonial plunder, the newly independent nations embarked on a grand journey of nation-building, particularly emphasizing industrialization. Given the tall order of the task, scant domestic private capital and poor industrial base, industrialization was necessarily driven by the state, largely through state-owned enterprises in various fields. Private domestic capital welcomed and at times demanded such participation. For instance, in India in 1944, respected native industrialists came together in anticipation of independence and proposed the Bombay Plan for economic development. In this Plan “the state was to play a critical role as a central directing authority. It was to exercise control over the distribution of industries, to minimize regional disparities, to develop public utilities and basic industries, and to undertake nonremunerative enterprises” (Kudaisya, 2014: 124). The state-owned enterprises which were consequently set up had very clear agendas of social development, redistribution of wealth and self-reliance in addition to the usual economic objective of wealth creation (Bhattacharya, 2006). For instance, the 1956 industrial policy of India spells out state-owned enterprise objectives as “to promote redistribution of income and wealth, to promote balanced regional development, save and earn foreign exchange for the economy” (cited in Bhattacharya, 2006: 40). In some countries, these state-owned enterprises emerged as the largest and most powerful enterprises and also employers. By 1975, the jute sector of Bangladesh which provided employment to 25 per cent of the population was entirely under public-sector ownership (Alamgir, 2013). These state-owned enterprises need to make profits in order to survive and provide for the government, but their mission is not to maximize financial return. State enterprises also help in establishing state presence through outposts of state departments/enterprises throughout the national territory. This is particularly important because the moment of independence drew arbitrary national boundaries that often cut across traditional communities (Englebert, 2000). Post-colonial states therefore often have a daunting challenge in maintaining state integrity.

Despite substantial external pressure to comply with Washington Consensus strictures on privatization and marketization, the state-enterprise sector remains important to post-colonial states as a source of employment, as a tool for political control and as a tool of national sovereignty. In addition to completely government-owned enterprises are hybrid public-private enterprises as well as privately owned but nationally significant corporations. While these companies are in one way part of the “private sector,” their strategic and historic importance results in their being provided explicit or implicit protection to assure continuity and the integrity of the national project.

Rise of neoliberal ideology

From the 1970s, Keynesian economic ideology was gradually supplanted through the rise of neoliberal ideas initially associated with Hayek and the Mont Pelèrin Society, and the Chicago University economics school. Whereas the approach of Keynesianism was in many ways consistent with the national economic development strategies adopted by the newly independent post-colonial states, neoliberalism – which privileges free market transnational trade and a reduced role for the state – challenged the nation-building and welfarist ideologies of these states. Neoliberals emphasized transnational economic growth, leading to the development of global value chains. A number of post-colonial states slowly emerged as the shop-floor of the world, although the bulk of added value continues to be realized in Western countries, particularly through their dominance of the financial sector and control of intellectual property (Smith, 2012). Indigenous knowledge also has been captured and privatized by transnational corporations (Brush, 1993).

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, neoliberal ideas had come to dominate the international development banks which had previously provided significant capital resources for the industrial and infrastructural development of the post-colonial states. Under neoliberal ascendency, the international development banks replaced infrastructural lending with “policy-based lending,” in other words, loans to be provided in return for governments agreeing to implement neoliberal reforms. The menu of required neoliberal reforms-known as structural adjustment – became increasingly codified until congealed into the universal policy prescription of the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2000). Most post-colonial states adopted some or all aspects of the neoliberal prescription. State-owned enterprises which earlier were viewed as indispensable for nation-building came under attack for inefficiency and unfair competition with transnational corporations, leading to pressures for divestment.

The actual implementation varied considerably across states. The more powerful ones were able to negotiate protection for certain sectors, retention of state-owned enterprises and extended implementation periods for reforms. Even where states were not in a position to directly confront the new orthodoxy, policies were often implemented more on the surface, leaving the deeper mechanisms intact (Gervais, 1992). The more powerful states were more or less able to instrumentalize neoliberal policies in order to further national interests. Whereas countries such as China and India have been able to gain access to Western markets without generally relinquishing the ability to protect their own strategic industries, smaller and poorer countries have been forced to relinquish even food security in order to orient their economies towards export crops. For example, Mali and other West African cotton-producing countries have become highly dependent on food imports at the same time as they are forced to compete in cotton exports against major powers, including the United States and China, which heavily subsidize their own cotton farmers. Therefore, neoliberalism has become part of the pastiche of pressures on the state and a tool that some post-colonial states have been able to strategically incorporate.

In the face of these multiple and sometimes contradictory influences, the post-colonial state is subject to constant and varying expectations and pressures, leading to tensions within the state itself, between the state and citizens, and between the state and global forces. Post-colonial states have displayed varying abilities and strategies to successfully manage these tensions. Some of these strategies might hold broader lessons for states and citizens outside the post-colonial world as they too attempt to cope with the tensions unleashed by neoliberalism and globalization.

Expectations of the post-colonial state

Expectations of itself

The state itself as an organization seeks to perpetuate and reproduce itself (Selznick, 1949; Perrow, 1970). Given that the post-colonial state is an external implant, it faces constant legitimacy threats on one hand, while on the other, neoliberalism seeks to reduce its relevance; in the face of these challenges, the state attempts to preserve and reproduce itself. It seeks to do this by expanding its influence and control of public life through technologies such as active redistribution, guaranteeing security and maximizing its surveillance and governmental capacities.

Resistance of the bureaucratic state to external reform is often presented as a weakness; however, the self-perpetuation of the state also provides the possibility and the space for preserving autonomy from domination of transnational capital and hegemonic states. In an ironic way, this makes the state’s preservation and bureaucratic self-perpetuation a pre-condition for political and economic independence; two examples follow.

When the South African government licensed the distribution of low-cost generic antiretroviral therapies in 1997, it not only engaged in redistribution, creating access and protecting its citizens from profiteering of transnational corporations, but it was also justifying its existence and relevance. This decision asserted South African sovereignty vis-à-vis the new World Trade Organization which was attempting to force developing countries to provide global pharmaceutical companies with long-term patent protection (Hoen et al., 2011). Similarly, almost twenty years later another post-colonial state was symbolically justifying its existence as a punisher of lawbreakers – “looters” in popular parlance. In November 2016, the prime minister of India, Modi, announced the demonetization of high-value currency as a “war on black money.” The policy’s ability to actually combat black money³ was seriously suspect – most is in the form of non-cash assets. The policy also severely inconvenienced the poor, rural and informal sector workers dependent on cash who constituted almost 50 per cent of the population; it disrupted their ability to fulfil their daily needs. Nevertheless, the policy appeared to receive general public approval as the gesture was seen as punishing lawbreakers, thus demonstrating the symbolic efficacy and utility of the state.

Expectations from people(s)

As for all nation-states, post-colonial states provide a platform for public dialogue and arbitration of diverse group interests. This process can be particularly challenging in post-colonial societies which are building a sense of both identity and diversity from the repressive legacy of colonialism. For example, language policy and languages used in education are frequently a thorny subject. In many post-colonial states, choosing a national language was a fundamental early interrogation. There was a tension between the choice of a language which would be shared by the entire country – which was almost inevitably the language of the former colonizers – an indigenous language which would not be spoken by all of the country’s citizens or would be perceived as favouring one language group over the others. In most former French colonies in Africa, the French language was chosen as the official language and the language of education, but this increased disparity between the post-colonial elite (who had usually been schooled in French) and the masses of the population who di...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Governing and managing the post-colonial
• Part I Knowledge struggles
• Part II Legitimacy challenges
• Part III Making/unmaking governance
• Index