PART ONE
CONCEPTS
CHAPTER ONE
Changes in the Philosophy of Geography
E. A. WRIGLEY
Lecturer in Geography, University of Cambridge
It is perhaps a platitude that a perennial problem of geography, true of many subjects but felt very acutely in geography, has been to find a satisfactory way of organizing the welter of observational material with which geographers commonly deal. It may prove helpful to look back to some solutions to this problem offered in the past as a background to contemporary developments, and to pay especial attention to the writings of Vidal de la Blache, since both his successes and his final failure are very instructive.
âCLASSICALâ GEOGRAPHY
Modern geography is often said to begin with two important early nineteenth-century German scholars, von Humboldt and Ritter.1 These two men saw eye to eye in many things and agreed in pouring scorn on their predecessors because they dealt with geographical information in such a haphazard and unsystematic fashion. They gave clear expression to a view of geographical methodology which remained dominant for most of the nineteenth century. It was still the guiding principle of Friedrich Ratzel, at least in his earlier writings in the 1880âs, and was shared by many who were not geographers. It is indeed a pointless exercise at this comparatively early date to distinguish between those who were geographers and those who were not. Humboldt would not fit any label conveniently. Buckle in the early chapters of his History of Civilisation in England (1857â61) gives a succinct account of the new attitude.
This conception of the organization of geography, which may conveniently be labelled the âclassicalâ1 view since it held sway during the formative period of modern geography in the nineteenth century, was straightforward and simple. Men like Humboldt and Ritter considered the writings of earlier geographers to be defective because they were largely descriptive and were in their view very ill-organized.2 They considered the scientific organization of knowledge to be a two-stage affair: a first stage which consisted of the careful assembly of detailed and accurate factual material; and a second in which the material was given coherence and made intelligible by being subsumed under a number of laws which should express the relationships of cause and effect to be found in the phenomena as simply and concisely as possible.3 The vital feature of any science was this second stage. Without it any branch of learning was simply pigeon-holing and antiquarianism. This was a first main characteristic of âclassicalâ geography. Status in the world of learning depended on the successful formulation of laws enabling the material to be organized and made intelligible. If geography were to be worthy of ranking with the sciences it must succeed in establishing such laws. It must go on, as Ratzel put it, airing his Latin tags, rerum cognoscere causas,4 to know the causes of things.
1 This claim is conventional and perhaps convenient, but it is quite possible to argue the case for a later date; for example for the work of Vidal de la Blache.
A second chief prop of the âclassicalâ view of geography was the conviction1 that in the final analysis there was no difference methodologically between what would now be called the social and the physical sciences. In both cases the ultimate aim was the formulation of laws expressing the universal operation of cause and effect.2 It was widely agreed that the subject matter was vastly more diverse and complicated in the study of societies than, say, in physics and that it might be much longer before satisfactory formulations of laws could be made, but the Newtonian model was assumed, though often implicitly rather than explicitly, to be appropriate. The denial of the methodological unity of all knowledge, and particularly the assertion of a special position for the study of social change and functioning in the writings of men like Dilthey and Max Weber, still lay in the future. This is important because it largely obviated a difficulty which has been much more keenly felt by geographers in the last two generations, namely the problem of running in harness, as it were, physical geography and social geography. Since the methodology of the social sciences is now very commonly held to be different from that of the physical sciences (for example, the possibility of formulating universally valid laws descriptive of social functioning is often denied, and Weberian âidealâ types and middle-order generalizations advocated in their stead), there are clearly problems in asserting the unity of geographical knowledge and particularly of geographical methodology. During the period of âclassicalâ geography no difficulties could arise on this score because the general methodology of all branches of the subject could be held to be the same.
1 The term âclassicalâ is used here in a different sense from that employed by Hartshorne for whom the deaths of Humboldt and Ritter in 1859 mark the end of the âclassicalâ period.
2 E.g. âA systematic organization of material is seldom to be found in them (the older type of geographies). ⌠They contain at bottom only an arbitrary, unorganized and unsystematic compilation of all sorts of noteworthy phenomena, which in the different parts of the globe appear to be especially striking. ⌠The description of Europe is begun with either Portugal or Spain because Strabo began his narration in this order. The facts are arranged like the pieces of a patchwork quilt, now one way, now another, as if each disconnected piece could stand by itselfâ (Ritter, 1862, pp. 21â2).
3 E.g. âIn proportion as laws admit of more general application, and as sciences mutually enrich each other, and by their extension become connected together in more numerous and more intimate relations, the developments of general truths may be given with conciseness devoid of superficiality. On being first examined, all phenomena appear to be isolated, and it is only by the result of a multiplicity of observations, combined with reason, that we are able to trace the mutual relations existing between themâ (Humboldt, 1849, Vol. 1, p. 29).
4 âBut this deeper conception (of geography) cannot possibly remain content with description but must, following the irresistible example of all natural sciences, within whose sphere it developed in the most intimate relationship, go on from description to the higher task of âRerum cognoscere causasââ (Ratzel, 1882, Vol. 1, p. 5).
A third general point on which the writings of the âclassicalâ geographers show agreement in the main is that a prime object of geographical study is to investigate the ways in which the physical environment affects the functioning and development of societies.3 This is not to suggest that this was the main theme of all their works. There were many in which it appeared rarely; some of a specialist nature in which it did not appear at all; and in some works of geographical methodology it was firmly rejected. But, from a general view, this appears to be the third necessary support of the âclassicalâ attitude to geography.1 It gave point to all the subsidiary lines of investigation and it made it perfectly clear why geography must have both a physical and social side. Some knowledge of both is obviously vital to any attempt to understand this matter. Given the first two main characteristics of âclassicalâ geography, the belief in the necessity of formulating laws expressing relationships of cause and effect and the conviction that the basic methodology of both social and physical sciences is the same, it is very reasonable to feel that one of the most promising lines of investigation to pursue is the explanation of social change and function by reference to features of the physical environment. In the early decades after the publication of the Origin of Species this type of work, while it might be modified, was also encouraged and strengthened by a flow of new concepts, as may be seen in much of Ratzelâs large output.
1 Shared of course by many contemporaries, for example A. Comte and J. S. Mill.
2 âIn regard to nature, events apparently the most irregular and capricious have been explained, and have been shown to be in accordance with certain fixed and immutable laws. This has been done because men of ability and, above all, men of patient, untiring thought have studied natural events with the view of discovering their regularity: and if human events were subjected to a similar treatment, we have every right to expect similar resultsâ (Buckle, 1857, Vol. 1, p. 6).
3 âOnly having a firm methodological principle can protect it (geography) from going astray: the clear commitment to the central theme of the relationship between the forms of terrestrial phenomena and mankindâ (Ritter, 1862, p.28).
The Erdkunde gained Humboldtâs warm approbation because of its success in showing the influence of the environment âon the migrations, laws, and manners, of nations, and on all the principal events enacted upon the face of the earthâ (Humboldt, 1849, Vol, 1, p. 28).
Ratzel subtitled his great work Anthropo-geographie: oder GrundzĂźge der Anwendung der Erdkunde auf die Geschichte.
The story of the decline and fall of the âclassicalâ conception of geography is a most interesting chapter in intellectual history. By the end of the century it was widely attacked for its rigidity, because it was wedded to what came to be called geographical determinism (although this was not an accurate criticism to level at the major figures of the group), and because the new ideas about methodology in the social sciences made its whole approach to the understanding of social action and social change seem unrewarding.2 âClassicalâ geography has left a considerable legacy. It can be seen, for example, in the continuing arguments about what are usually termed âpossibilismâ and âprobabilismâ, which are rooted in the âclassicalâ attitude to the subject, and are open to much the same objections as the âclassicalâ system. Or again, it can be seen in the layout of many textbooks which begin with such things as solid geology and climate and progress through vegetation and soils to settlement, agriculture, industry and transportâa perfectly logical sequence of exposition in âclassicalâ terms,1 but less so if the âclassicalâ view is abandoned.
1 It is interesting that Hettner once wrote to Joseph Partsch that what first attracted him to geography was the idea of the dependence of man on nature and described his surprise at discovering how little this entered into his teaching when he went to study under Kirchoff at his first university, Halle (Heidelberger Geographische Arbeiten, 1960, p. 77).
2 It is interesting to note that Hettner knew Max Weber in the years when both men were at Heidelberg.
âREGIONALâ GEOGRAPHY
The reaction against âclassicalâ geography took many forms: some essentially a development from it, like the writings of Hettner; some in opposition to it, like Brunhesâ ideas;2 some developed along new lines without close reference to it. The work of Vidal de la Blache falls best perhaps in the last category.3 It is of the greatest importance and may serve as an introduction to the âpost-classicalâ world, and to what may be termed the âregionalâ view of the nature of geography.
Vidal saw that it made little sense to set the physical and social environments of man over against one another, as it were, and examine the way the former influenced the latter, still less to do this in a systematic fashion in the hope that general laws describing the relationships could be discovered. Instead he propounded a different idea. Whereas in the âclassicalâ view the study of the physical environment and the study of society were riveted to each other because a main purpose of geographical study was to investigate the conditioning of society by environment, in Vidalâs scheme they were linked because they were inseparable. Any physical environment in which a society settles is greatly affected by the presence of man, the more so if the society has an advanced material culture. The plant and animal life of France, to take an obvious example, was vastly different in the nineteenth century from what it would have been if there had been no settlement there by man. Equally, the adjustment of each society to the peculiarities of the local physical environment, taking place over many centuries, produces local characteristics in that society which are not to be found elsewhere. Man and nature become moulded to one another over the years rather like a snail and its shell. Yet the connexion is more intimate even than that, so that it is not possible to disentangle influences in one direction, of man on nature...