Negotiating the New Europe

The European Union and Eastern Europe

Dimitris Papadimitriou

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138738102
• eBook ISBN: 9781351732772
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This title was first published in 2002: Offering a new and challenging perspective on how the European Union (EU) sought to structure its relations with Central and Southeast Europe after the Cold War, this volume draws upon key debates in both politics and international relations. A historically and theoretically informed examination of the EU's engagement in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, the book combines conceptual rigour with clear empirical analysis, firmly grounding the study of the European Union's current enlargement process in established theoretical perspectives. The book is written in an engaging and accessible way, which will appeal to academics, students and practitioners alike.

Part I
The Negotiation of the First Wave of Europe Agreements

1 Putting the Association Agreements into Theoretical Perspective

The existing literature on the Association agreements

In the decade following the conclusion of the first wave of Association agreements, an extensive literature has been published on the subject. Despite the large number of studies available however, our knowledge in this field remains somewhat fragmented. Employing some degree of simplification, the existing literature on the Association agreements can be divided into four broad categories:

Studies that challenge the economic and political rationale of the EC’s Association strategy

As far as economics is concerned, the EC's strategy during the Association negotiations is no stranger to criticism (see, for example, Winters, 1992; Messerlin, 1993). Perhaps the most authoritative study in this field has been conducted by Rollo and Smith (1993). Modelling the effects of complete trade liberalisation between the EC and Eastern Europe in the so-called sensitive sectors, the two authors concluded that the gains of the EC's taxpayers and consumers (as a result of increased competition, lower prices and subsidies) far outweighed the losses of the EC's producers. Consequently, in addition to the gains it would have brought to Central and East European producers, such a trade liberalisation would also have been beneficial for the EC economy, even in the event that the EC had to fully compensate its producers for their losses (Rollo and Smith, 1993:155). A year before, Baldwin et al. (1992) reached a similar conclusion and argued for the reciprocal benefits of the CEECs being included in a European Economic Space which would involve free trade, but not labour mobility (1992: 91). Nevertheless, while making a convincing case as to why the EC's trade protectionism in the Association negotiations was unnecessary (since such a practice was damaging for both the EC and the CEEC economies), most of these studies shed little light on the fundamental question of how and why such a policy came about.

A similar criticism can also be directed towards studies that concentrated on the political aspect of the EC's Association strategy Bonvicini et al (1991: 81), for example, argued that the Association agreements should prepare the CEECs for EC membership within a decade. Inotai (1994) also criticised what he regarded as a defensive and counter-productive EC strategy during the Association negotiations. In addition to his criticism against the EC's lack of generosity in relation to trade concessions and financial assistance to the region (1994: 29-32), Inotai vigorously attacked the EC's refusal to offer a clear membership commitment to the newly emerged democracies in Eastern Europe (1994: 35) which he regarded essential for both economic/political and psychological reasons. Like Rollo and Smith, Inotai did, in fact, offer a well-substantiated critique of the EC's early strategy in the region. Nevertheless, the dynamics behind the formation of such a strategy were once again either disregarded or identified in very general terms by reference to the EC's 'self interest' and the EC's 'lack of imagination and strategic planning'.

Studies that look at the legal technicalities of the EAs and studies that concentrate on specific aspects of the EAs

In the first category one can include the works of Maresceau (1993, 1997: introduction) and Muller-Graff (1997) both of which analysed the legal basis of the Association agreements and gave an overview of the provisions of each of their chapters (i.e. Political Dialogue, Trade, Competition, Movement of Workers, Establishment and Supply of Services, Payments and Capital). Notwithstanding the fact that references to EC law such as the legal basis of the EAs and the Court of Justice rulings in previous Association agreements are essential for the understanding of the content and character of the Europe agreements, these studies shed little light on the politics behind the CEECs' Association to the EC. Once again, the motives behind the initiation of the EAs negotiations as well as the factors that shaped the EC's position in them are largely overlooked.

The same can also be argued about the studies that concentrated on sectoral aspects of the Association agreements. Here amongst the plethora of studies available, one should distinguish the works of Tracy (1992) on the agricultural arrangements of the EAs; Sedelmeier (1995) on the process behind the formation of the EC's Association strategy in relation to steel products; Van den Bossche (1997) on the similarities and differences of competition provisions in the EA's with each of the CEECs; Cremona (1997) on the EAs provisions in relation to free movement of Persons, Establishment and Services; and Van den Hende (1997) on the EAs' safeguard clauses. Despite their usefulness in explaining the implications of the EAs' provisions in specific sectors of the EC's and the CEECs' economies, their scope and explanatory power remain rather limited.

Studies that focused on the Association agreements between the EC and a particular Association applicant or a group of Association applicants belonging to the same wave

Stawarska (1992), in her analysis of the negotiation of the Polish Association agreement with the EC, offered perhaps the most authoritative work in this category. The negotiation as well as the impact of the Hungarian and the Czech Association agreements with the EC have also been examined by Janacek (1992) and Drabek (1993) respectively. As far as the second wave applicants are concerned, Wallden (1993) offered a general account of the Bulgarian and Romanian Association agreements with the EC, while Eskenazi (1993) and Wallden (1993b, 1994b) looked in more detail at the Bulgarian strategy and expectations during (and after) the negotiation of the country's Association with the EC.

Whilst providing useful insights into the interaction of certain CEECs with the EC, these studies normally lack a comparative perspective and do not address the crucial question of the EC's alleged discriminatory treatment against certain (waves of) Association applicants. Most importantly, they fail to capture the evolutionary character of the EC's Association strategy in Eastern Europe and often ignore important internal and international factors that shaped the EC's policy in specific phases of the Association negotiations.

Studies that look at the Association agreements as part of a broader examination of the EC’s relations with Eastern Europe

This is the largest category in the existing literature. Within it, one can identify three sub-categories. Firstly, those studies whose chronological scope stretches from the outbreak of the Cold War to the negotiation and conclusion of the Association agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1991. Perhaps the most influential example of such studies can be found in the work of Van Ham (1993) who offered a comprehensive narrative of East-West relations during the Cold war and attempted an interesting conceptualisation (through a neo-Realist and neo-Liberal institutionalist perspective) of the new multi-polar post-Cold war setting and its effects on the EC's relations with Eastern Europe. Distinguished, though more descriptive, examples in this sub-category can also be found in Pinter (1991) and, for the EC's relations with the Balkan region, in Wallden (1994).

A second sub-category includes works whose chronological scope stretches from the 1988 EC-CMEA Joint Declaration but ends before December 1995 when the Madrid European Council set a concrete timetable for the EU's eastwards enlargement for the first time. Here, the works of Reinicke (1992) and Kramer (1993) offered useful insights into the problems surrounding the crystallisation and execution of the EC's strategy vis à Eastern Europe, while Sedelmeier (1994) successfully captured the conflict between the EC's political and economic objectives in the region. Baldwin (1994), on the other hand, highlighted the disadvantages of the 'hub and spoke' nature of the EC-CEECs economic relations and argued for the benefits of greater trade liberalisation as well as for the inclusion of all of the CEECs who have signed EAs with the EC into an 'Association of Association Agreements' (AAA).¹ Guggenbuhl (1995) also provided an interesting narrative of the making of the EC's Association strategy. Moreover, at a theoretical level, his conception of the Association agreements as an attempt on behalf of the EC to reduce 'negative externalities' (1995: 214) coming from Eastern Europe carried significant explanatory power. Finally, Sedelmeier and Wallace (1996 and 2000) offered perhaps the most authoritative and systematic attempt to identify the disjointed nature of the EC's strategy in Eastern Europe and analyse the main dynamics behind the EC's policy formation in this area.

The final third sub-category includes more recent publications which are strongly influenced by the opening of the enlargement negotiations. Here, the most important examples include the works of Van den Bempt and Theelen (1996), Maresceau (1997), Mayhew (1998), Van Brabant (1999), Mannin (1999), Gurzon Price et al (1999), Baun (2000), Tang (2000) and Lord (2000). In the studies of this sub-category the Association agreements are largely treated as the starting point of a process which will come to an end with the Union's eastwards enlargement (which remains their main research focus). While crucial for understanding the evolution of the EU's strategy in Eastern Europe during the last decade (and before), studies with such broad chronological scope inevitably fail to examine the Association agreements in much depth. As a result, in some cases (e.g. Maresceau, 1997; Van Brabant, 1999; Tang, 2000) the EA negotiations are largely ignored. In others (e.g. Kramer, 1993, Mannin, 1999; Baun, 2000), the treatment of the EA negotiations between the EC and the CEECs as 'identical' misses important aspects of each Association applicant's interaction with the EC.

The problem of theorising the Association agreements

Despite attracting a great deal of empirical research, the EU's relations with Eastern Europe (including the process of the EU's eastwards enlargement) has remained a largely under-theorised field of the EU's activities. With few exceptions (see Van Ham, 1993; Guggenbuhl, 1995; Shaffer, 1995; Friis, 1998), the Association agreements have followed this rule. In addition to the more general problems relating to the theory-building on the EU (see, for example, Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991:chapter 1; Risse-Kappen, 1996; Caporaso, 1996; Wallace and Wallace, 2000: chapters 2, 3 & 19), the application of a theoretical straitjacket to the Association negotiations entails further difficulties:

The treaty base of the Association agreements

The EC's Association strategy in Eastern Europe was formed on the basis of Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome according to which: "The Community may conclude with a third State, a union of States or an international organisation agreement establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures". Article 238 stipulated that after receiving an Association application "the Council shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the Assent of the European Parliament...". Moreover, when new institutions are established under an Association agreement (i.e. when an agreement is 'mixed' as was indeed the case with the EAs), then "...this agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contacting states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements".²

The treaty base of the Association agreements differs quite substantially from other areas relating to the EC's external relations. Unlike foreign and security policy which formed a separate intergovernmental pillar under Maastricht, Association remains a fully 'communitised' policy where the Commission retained its exclusive role as the EC's policy initiator and international negotiator. Moreover, unlike the EC's common commercial policy (the procedure of which is set in Article 113) where the EC's negotiating position is decided by the Council on the basis of qualified majority voting (QMV), the EC's position in Association negotiations requires a unanimous decision by the Council. The conclusion of Association agreements is also different from trade agreements signed under Article 113. The application of the Assent procedure under Article 238 (as compared with the consultation procedure under the Article 113) strengthens the role of the European Parliament which, in Association agreements, becomes a constitutionally vetoholding player. The number of veto players is further increased by the need for ratification of the Association agreements by 'all contracting parties', meaning in this case the twelve (in 1991-92) national parliaments, the parliaments of the Association applicants as well as the European Parliament.

The treaty base of the Association process points to a complex network of relationships between its main actors which can be captured by a variety of theoretical perspectives. The unanimity required within the Council as well as the need for ratification of the EAs by national parliaments point, for example, to the literature on intergovernmentalism and its main proposition on the supremacy of national governments over the EC's decision making process (Moravcsik, 1991, 1994, 1998). Yet, the fully 'communitised' nature of the Association process, in particular the Commission's role as policy initiator and negotiator with the Association applicants as well as the European Parliament's increased powers under the Assent procedure, can point in the opposite direction. An extensive literature exists on how the EC's supranational institutions (Bulmer, 1994a, 1994b; Peters, 1994; Tsebelis, 1994; Pollack, 1997) and their leaders (Nugent, 1995b; Dyson and Featherstone, 1997) can potentially act as effective policy entrepreneurs and thus have a crucial impact on the agenda setting and the outcome of the EC's internal bargaining.

The need for a three-level analysis

The final shape and content of the Association (Europe) agreements were the products of bargaining at many different levels. At the international level, the Association agreements were negotiated bilaterally between the Commission (on behalf of the EC) and the government of each of the Association applicants. In theoretical terms, the striking power asymmetries between the participants of the Association bargain as well as their very different exit costs from the Association process lends itself to a Realist-inspired explanation (e.g. Wright, 1946; Morgenthau, 1978). However, a full-blown Realist explanation of the Association negotiations fails to account for the identity of the actors involved and the dynamic and complex interaction between them. In this sense, to view the Association negotiations as a 'traditional' inter-state bargaining or, worse, to regard its participants as monolithic 'black box'-like actors would be misleading.

Since the late 1950s a large number of scholars have argued for the interdependence between domestic politics and international behaviour. Waltz's 'second image' (1959), Rosenau's 'linkage politics' (1969), Katzenstein's work on international relations and domestic structures (1976) and Gourevitch's 'second image reversed' (1978), for example, all point to the weakness of the Realist 'black box' thesis. More recently, Putnam (1988) has described the interaction between domestic politics and international behaviour as a 'two level' game whereby negotiators are engaged in simultaneous bargaining with their international counterparts and their domestic constituencies. In the case of the Association negotiations (and the EU's international presence in general), however, another layer of analysis may be required to supplement Putnam's paradigm. This refers to the EU level where national preferences are mediated within the largely consensus-driven Council and subjected to the influe...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• PART I: THE NEGOTIATION OF THE FIRST WAVE OF EUROPE AGREEMENTS
• PART II: THE NEGOTIATION OF THE SECOND WAVE OF EUROPE AGREEMENTS
• PART III: THE EUROPE AGREEMENTS, EASTWARDS ENLARGEMENT AND THE EU's STRATEGY IN THE BALKANS
• Bibliography
• Index