The Evolution Of U.s. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 1945-1980

John P Rose

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367291969
• eBook ISBN: 9781000301229
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Política

The development of U.S. Army nuclear doctrine—policies, plans, procedures, tactics, and techniques—since World War II, its impact on Army forces, and its role in future wars is the subject of this policy-oriented analysis. The definition of Army nuclear doctrine advanced by the author clearly implies a distinction between policy for the employment of nuclear weapons as determined by the president and the role adduced by the Army. Dr. Rose suggests that developments—both nuclear and conventional—in U.S. Army tactical doctrine have been more responsive to political preferences held by national authorities than to the real nature of the potential threat and rigors of the nuclear battlefield. Further, he argues that the type of war preparations favored by U.S. political authorities over the last fifteen years and the type of war for which the Soviet Union is preparing differ markedly, making the U.S. Army poorly prepared for a major war.

1
The Two Worlds of Military Policy

The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting … The seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure … will observe that changes in tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons, which is necessarily the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement in weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class? but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change by careful study of the powers and limitations of the new … weapon, and by a consequent adaption of the method of using it to the qualities it possesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at pains to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great advantage—a lesson in itself of no mean value.

—Admiral A. T. Mahan¹

Since 1945 United States military policy in support of American foreign policy and worldwide commitments has been dominated by the fear of making a misstep which could lead to a nuclear holocaust. In the nuclear age concern for the destructive power of nuclear weapons has led some to conclude that war is now impractical if the use of nuclear weapons is contemplated. Another view holds that nuclear weapons are not absolute weapons although they may be more potent than any other developed to this point in time. To some, nuclear weapons are essentially weapons with increased striking power, destructive ability, and increased speed. They are not the inherently teratical weapons that popular hysteria has made them out to be. They are subject to usage in the same general manner as conventional weapons; that is, to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy’s war-making ability with the minimum amount of collateral destruction. Possession of them will neither prevent war nor ensure victory. They are not an ultimate weapon.

Future military threats may or may not employ nuclear weapons against United States armed forces. However, the U.S. Army cannot afford the luxury of choice in the matter. The failure to develop and practice tactics and techniques appropriate to nuclear technology is courting defeat on the nuclear battlefield.

Army forces must be trained and equipped to counter nuclear and conventional weapons and to accomplish the assigned mission. At the same time the Army cannot afford to become defensive minded, that is, it cannot hide behind the nuclear bomb as if it were a protective shield. The French shield in World War II—the Maginot Line—was bypassed in a few days because it lacked the properly trained, equipped and disposed force to defend France. Army forces must not only be trained to carry out defensive missions but also trained in the counterattack to seek out and destroy the threat.

The objective of avoiding nuclear war on any level has wide support among current Western political leaders. The strongest possible central control over the use of nuclear weapons is maintained. Theories of deterrence that separate deterrence from a nuclear warfighting capability or traditional military concepts of defense and denial have captivated the Western intellectual and politician for some time. In spite of present preferences, however, one should not discount the idea that the Commander-in-Chief may some day direct the use of nuclear weapons by the Armed Services regardless of whether the enemy has nuclear weapons or has used them against United States forces.

If an enemy should be armed with nuclear weapons in a future war, even should he be disinclined to use them, what assurance is there that his restraint would hold under the stress or risk of tactical defeat and impending loss of the war? In that no adequate answer exists the Army must be prepared for combat operations in a nuclear environment.

However, at present. Army nuclear doctrine can only be described as vague, general and undetermined. A reason may be that politics has so dominated thinking about warfare in a nuclear environment that the military has never felt comfortable about publishing an official doctrine pertaining to the employment of nuclear weapons on the battlefield for fear of being “out of step” or of stirring up concern over its own intentions. Nevertheless, the Army has long thought about fighting in an atomic/nuclear environment.

At the time of this writing, there is an active effort within the Army to re-think, formulate, and rewrite nuclear doctrine. One may wonder why such a serious effort has waited some thirty years. Perhaps because the other services are not yet making such an effort is an implicit answer. This essay will examine the change taking place with a view toward reconciling the reluctance to plan seriously for a nuclear war environment versus the necessity to face the possible use and utility of nuclear weapons on the battlefield.

The purpose of this investigation is to examine the development of the U.S. Army warfighting doctrine for nuclear combat to determine the extent to which change has occurred in Army thinking from 1945 to 1980. Army nuclear doctrine is the set of principles and general rules (policies, plans, procedures, tactics, and techniques) that have emerged for the employment of, and defense against, nuclear weapons used in land combat operations. Nuclear doctrine should provide direction for Army ground forces on how to fight, survive, and win in a nuclear environment. The definition of Army nuclear doctrine advanced in this essay clearly implies a distinction between policy for the employment of nuclear weapons as laid down by the President and the role adduced by the Army for nuclear weapons in land combat, should anyone see fit to order the Army to use nuclear weapons.²

Importance is added to this study if one accepts the proposition that the present political military situation is comparable to that of Britain between 1936 and the outbreak of war in 1939.³ While there may be little resemblance between Brezhnev and Hitler, one essential comparison is apt. On one side there is an authoritarian state arming in every field to a degree far beyond what is necessary for self-defense. On the other side is a rich, mature and powerful democracy whose people are disillusioned by recent experience in war and whose leaders clearly hesitate, due to political expediency, to explain the magnitude of the threat facing the country.

The hypothesis of this essay suggests that liberal democracies faced by the mobilization of a totalitarian state—as in Great Britain in 1936–39—respond to the threat not necessarily in terms of the political reality that governs, but by the image created. Further, the more centralized the political control of military planning the less the services may be able to prepare to respond to a persuasive and obvious threat. What the government should do, what the government would like to do, and what the government does may be very different. All too often politically, situations are described to fit preconceived solutions, notions, and methods rather than a harsher reality—that is, guided more by image than fact.

What is implied is that Army tactical doctrinal developments—both nuclear and conventional—have been responsive more to political preferences held by national authorities than to the real nature of the threat and the rigors of the nuclear battlefield.⁴ Were the two congruent there would be no problem. But the evidence is overwhelming that the type of war preparations favored by United States political authorities over the last decade and a half and the type of war for which the principal enemy is preparing differ markedly. Hence, to the extent that training and doctrine have followed the former instead of the latter, the Army may be poorly prepared for a major war with that opponent.

This is not a “how to win the war” essay but a how the Army is going about the business of preparing for future land battles essay. Winning a war is not simply a technical problem that can be resolved by a general staff or by field commanders. The course of war depends on the enemy and his choices, as well as ours, on happenstance, and on unpredictables, however much one should try to bring order to the chaos of warfare. Strategy and tactics are an art, not a science—it is a thinking man’s game. The central issue in this essay is not whether there will or will not be a war. Rather, it is a matter of how the Army will accomplish its mission if war comes.

This essay looks at the development of Army doctrine and training from the standpoint of the theater and tactical nuclear realm. This is at once the greatest danger and the type of war for which the Soviet Union is preparing its armed forces.⁵ Assessments of United States and Soviet military capabilities are made from this perspective. Although issues and military capabilities at the strategic level cannot be ignored, the primary emphasis is on nuclear doctrinal developments and its impact on land combat operations.

A country must be strong militarily to ensure the rights of its citizens and to defend the freedoms of the country. Indeed, it is the obligation of a constitutional government to defend the rights of the citizenry from those who would violate those rights, whether domestic or foreign. However, when faced with the issue of winning the next war, which to some is thinking the unthinkable, one sees that the conduct of war and victory is the result of a multiplicity of factors. The isolation and discussion of several important issues—doctrine, military preparation, nuclear weapons, the threat, characteristics of atomic/nuclear warfare, and nuclear doctrinal developments—is the focal point of this treatise.

Doctrine

“Any organization formed for the execution of specific tasks or functions must have some core of beliefs or convictions about the nature of the tasks or functions to be performed.”⁶ In any military organization this core of beliefs is known as doctrine. Doctrine grows from conclusions about the relationship of events over an assessment of those events. Without doctrine there can be no common framework from which reality can be studied or a common base established upon which to make policy.⁷

In Army Regulation 310–25, “Dictionary of Army Terms,” Department of the Army defines doctrine as follows:

Fundamental principle by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.⁸

Not to be implied by the phrase “in support of national objectives” is that tactical doctrine presupposes political decisions at the highest national level. The Army requires no preceding set of conditions with which doctrine must conform nor is it constitutionally required to do so.⁹ In broad terms, doctrine is to ensure that the organization is responding in a way that is controlled and consistent with policies established within its own organization.

Mission

It is the Army’s job to be prepared for war. It must ultimately be able to engage in successful land warfare, that is, to close with and defeat the nation’s enemies in land combat.

The array of responsibilities that rests upon the Army in areas such as weapons development, training, organization, and tactical doctrine allows for the development of maximum power and flexibility to ensure that it can get the troops where they are needed, when needed, and with the firepower needed to win.

The Army must plan and prepare for the courses of action most likely to be followed and to ensure success if hostilities should break out.¹⁰ It must plan for the best use of available resources and facilities in case war occurs now. Experience shows that the army which creates an organization, armament and tactics corresponding to the future forms of war will secure for itself decisive advantages.

What will be the nature of the next war? There is no generally accepted description. Many possibilities exist. While various schools of thought reflect prejudices for or against the use of nuclear and/or conventional weapons, others distinguish among various levels of warfare—general, limited, or guerrilla, and yet others distinguish among possible uses of nuclear weapons. The possibility of a limited, rationally conducted nuclear war at the strategic level should not be ruled out. The Army does not accept as fact that decisive battles of the future will be fought against production and warmaking potential rather than against soldiers on the battlefield. The Army advances the position that soldiers must be trained, stockpiles created, doctrine updated, and all other activities associated with a build-up accomplished before the war breaks out—not after. To be unprepared may quite possibly result in defeat.

Deterrence is not a military objective but rather a function derived from a strong and powerful military force. It may be the intent of the nation to use its military establishment to avert or deter war? however, this is dependent on the military’s capability to fight and win. Implied here is the notion that the preservation of peace is enhanced through a warfighting and warwinning capability.

A new urgency exists within the military. In the past, conflict revealed deficiencies in overall military posture which provided the impetus to change organization, tactics, and doctrine to meet the threat. The pace of events in times past usually allowed for time to adjust as war approached. This may or may not be so for the next major war, but it cannot be counted on and prudent preparation must look to sudden, intense and possibly short warfare. The type of war envisioned by the Army for the future—as reflected in the Army’s newest tactical operations manual, FM 100–5 (July 1976)—is a “short, intense war—the outcome of which may be dictated by the results of initial combat.”¹¹ Noting that this circumstance is unprecedented, the operations manual adds:

… we are an Army historically unprepared for its first battle. We are accustomed to victory wrought with the weight of materiel and population brought to bear after the onset of hostilities. Today the U.S...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• PREFACE
• THEME
• 1. THE TWO WORLDS OF MILITARY POLICY
• 2. MILITARY DOCTRINE AS A THEORY OF COMBAT
• 3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS: IMAGE VERSUS REALITY
• 4. THE ATOMIC BATTLEFIELD OF THE 1950s AND 1960s: FROM AN INVITATION TO THINK TO STAGNATION IN THINKING.
• 5. NUCLEAR DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS VIA THE ARMY’S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
• 6. VISION OF THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD
• 7. THE BATTLEFIELD THREAT: SOVIET CONCEPTS, DOCTRINE, AND STRATEGY
• 8. “HOW TO FIGHT” DOCTRINE AND THE THREAT
• 9. NUCLEAR BATTLEFIELD DOCTRINE: PAST AND PRESENT
• 10. CONCEPT FOR A NUCLEAR WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
• 11. MYTHS AND MILITARY REALITIES
• ADDENDUM: THE NEED FOR OFFENSIVE GROUND COMBAT OPERATIONS
• SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY