The Military And Security In The Third World

Domestic And International Impacts

Sheldon W. Simon

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367294021
• eBook ISBN: 9781000303513
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book explores two of the most important dimensions of the military as an institution in Third World politics: its role in domestic power structures and internal development, and its impact on the formation and execution of the security aspects of foreign policy. These internal and external orientations are compared here across selected Third World countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The authors are area experts and specialists in comparative and international politics. Part 1 focuses on how the interaction of military and civilian elites creates a specific domestic political climate. The socioeconomic characteristics of these elites are compared and related to their policy preferences. An examination of military establishments in regimes ranging from communist (Cuba) through business-oriented (Indonesia) reveals whether military similarities persist among differing types of government. In Part 2 the contributors examine the role of military force in the Third World through a general empirical treatment of military behavior in developing countries; an assessment of the security policies–with emphasis on their military components–of several Middle Eastern and Asian states; and an evaluation of the U.S. experience in supporting anti-communist Third World security efforts.

Part 1
Military Elites and Domestic Politics in the Third World

1
A Political Perspective on Military Power in Developing Areas

Sam C. Sarkesian

Scholarly interest in the role of the military in developing areas has uncovered a number of issues that considerably expand traditional perspectives on the military institution. First, it is increasingly recognized that a sharper definition of military regime is needed. In the past, labeling a regime "military" was sufficient to presume that among other things, the military controlled, administered, and legislated at every governmental level. Too often, the label also suggested that "politics" was separate from the military. It seems clear now that the military rarely if ever rules alone—there is usually a coalition of military and civilian elites. Similarly, one rarely finds a "total" civilian regime in developing areas—one that is completely divorced from military power. Equally important, politics is as intense in military as in civilian-controlled systems. Moreover, in defining military regimes we need to note that several developing countries have "services" other than the army. Although the ground forces play crucial roles in military intervention and subsequent rule, it does not always follow that the other services do not play important roles.

Second, little scholarly attention has been given to paramilitary and national police forces in their relationship to the military in developing areas. Such forces are generally deeply involved in internal politics, provide an alternative to the military, and are usually stationed in sensitive areas of the country. There is a need to examine the politics of such forces and the impact they have on military systems and politics.

Third, military intervention is too often seen as intervention by a cohesive and monolithic military institution. On the contrary, most military institutions are not cohesive, much less monolithic. In developing areas, military institutions have internal disagreements, disparate loyalties, and differing perceptions of their role. Moreover, coups do not necessarily require intervention by the total institution. Indeed, a handful of determined officers and men is sufficient to overthrow existing regimes in a number of developing countries. The essential element of successful military intervention is for the coup perpetrators to insure the backing, neutrality, or at least indifference of the rest of the military (or at least a sizable part of it).

Fourth, the military in developing areas tends to be viewed in terms of Western models. Thus professionalism in the armies of developing countries is assessed in terms of Western professionalism, thus establishing Western stereotypes that presume an apolitical orientation. Needless to say, this is an unrealistic perspective, which distorts scholars' views of the military role in developing areas.

Fifth, only recently have some scholars turned their attention to other aspects of the military role, i.e., to the "return to barracks" phenomenon. For example, under what circumstances do military men relinquish formal control of a country and return to their "traditional" role, that of leaving politics to politicians? This phenomenon raises interesting questions about the "veto" role of military who are in the "barracks," about civil-military relationships, and about the degree of civilian control. More specifically, does anything change after a coup and the military's "return to the barracks"?

In light of the above, there clearly is a need to review existing perspectives on the military's role in developing areas. Its multidimensionality must be considered in any comprehensive assessment.

A New Perspective

This chapter will examine the consequences and implications of this broader perspective, with particular reference to the approaches suggested by Sam C. Sarkesian and José Z. Garcia, whose chapters in this volume analyze African and Latin American military systems, respectively.

This chapter is based on three underlying premises, premises that evolve from our earlier discussion on the need for a broader intellectual perspective on the role of the military. First, the military's role in developing societies is not coterminous with its implementation of a coup or with the number of seats it occupies in the official structure of government. Rather, the power of the military rests primarily in its continuing ability to influence the process and policy of the political system regardless of its formal political role. Thus, we need a framework that goes beyond the sterile concept of "military government" or "military regimes." Historically, these labels were applied only after a military man came to power as the leader of the state or after a military j unta became the executive. But the military in fact exerts power even when it is "in the barracks."

Second, we must consider the interaction between military and civilian elites. The military's impact on the political system is determined in no small measure by coalitions between military and civilian elites. Moreover, the military institution is best seen as several competing internal factions, just as in civilian elites. The more realistic focus, therefore, is to examine coalition building and factional politics within the military and civilian elite groups and between military and civilian factions. The character of the factional alliances determines in many respects the military's strength within the political system and the policies that will emerge from it.

Third, the performance of the military must also be viewed in these broader political-military terms. That is, the military is not the sole determinant of the performance of the political system, even when it does occupy the formal seats of power. The relationships between military and civilian factions have an important impact on performance. Moreover, the performance of civilian regimes— regimes in which civilians occupy the official seats of power—is not solely determined by civilians. Military behavior has an important impact on the performance of any type of regime. Therefore, to arbitrarily categorize regimes as military or civilian misses the fundamental mix of military and civilian elites in developing states.

By applying the military-civilian mix, as suggested by Sarkesian, one can easily transcend national boundaries and focus on common political factors that cut across regimes. This is not to deny the need to be aware of the unique qualities of various regions or the uniqueness of military systems from country to country. Nevertheless, all militaries may be compared through certain common characteristics.

The focus on factional alliances and conflicts between and within civilian and military elites, as suggested by Garcia, provides insight into internal military-civilian elite dynamics. Moreover, this perspective suggests that the dissolution of factional alliances leads to coups as a means of transferring power in Latin America.

Africa and Latin America: Regional Characteristics

To clarify these perspectives, however, there is a need to identify distinctions between the two regions. The differences between African and Latin American military systems are attributable to the nature of the colonial impacts, external influences, and the character of society. In Latin America, the colonial presence generally lasted more than 150 years, institutionalizing colonial practices to an extent unknown in Africa. But in most of Africa, official colonial rule began more or less with the Berlin conference at the beginning of the twentieth century. In Nigeria, for example, British rule became effective in about 1914 and ended in 1960. Moreover, Latin American society has developed distinct class structures and institutions that reflect colonial practices. The concept of class remains elusive in Africa. In Africa, as contrasted to Latin America, the military still tends to be based on tribe rather than on class. Though Africa is "rid" of its colonizing elements (except of course in southern Africa), Latin America still has a "creole" group—a fact that has important factional and political implications in the military system. Furthermore, Latin America has been influenced militarily and politically by a relatively cohesive U.S. presence and policy over the past two generations. In Africa, U.S. influence has been more diffuse and has competed with the influence of England, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Portugal. Latin American militaries are more developed (using this term in both its military and political sense) than African militaries and can thus focus on sophisticated weaponry and external missions, e.g., border conflicts and historical claims against neighbors. Moreover, Latin American military men have been in official seats of government much longer than African military men have. Generally speaking, the latter have occupied the official seats of government for only about a decade, but the former have held official power as far back as the nineteenth century, to the very founding of the independent Latin American countries.

Data on recent military systems in Latin America and Africa also reveal some common characteristics. Since 1961, two-thirds of all the Latin American countries have experienced military coups d'etat resulting in a change of chief executive, with a military man or group of military men occupying the official seats of government. There have been twenty-seven coups in thirteen different countries, i.e., two per country—but Argentina alone accounts for five of these. The countries that did not suffer such extraconstitutional transfers of power during this period are Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela. Moreover, the type of government does not necessarily correlate with military takeovers.

Since 1960, fifteen countries in black Africa have experienced military coups, some more than one. In Nigeria, for example, the military takeover in 1965 was followed by three countercoups. Many more countries have ex...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Introduction
• Part 1 Military Elites and Domestic Politics in the Third World
• Part 2 Military Policy and Third World Security
• The Contributors