Foreign Diplomacy in China, 1894-1900

A Study in Political and Economic Relations with China

Philip Joseph

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138495036
• eBook ISBN: 9780429874147
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

This book, first published in 1928, examines the first diplomatic contacts between China and the West. China had not always been isolated from the Western world, as travellers had visited China in the Middle Ages, but it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that efforts were first made to establish regular relations with China. This book traces the development of diplomatic relations from the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 to the start of the twentieth century.

CHAPTER X

THE THIRD INDEMNITY LOAN: NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ANGLO-RUSSIAN UNDERSTANDING

The Russian demand—Its basis—The Russian Chargé d’Affaires’s statement—Rumours—Russian fleet sails into Port Arthur, December 14, 1897—Russian duplicity—Baron A. de Wolff’s account—Kuropatkin made Minister of War—His views—A guaranteed loan—The quid pro quo— The security provisions—Assault upon British commerce in China from the North—China’s request of Britain—British terms—Their purpose—Balfour’s speech at Manchester, January 10, 1898—His speech to the Manchester Volunteer Guards—Count Hatzfeldt’s assurances—M. Hanotaux’s assurances—“Disapproval of an isolated guarantee”—Lord Salisbury turns to Russia, January 12, 1898—M, de Staäl’s comments upon British ships at Port Arthur—Lord Salisbury’s reply—Russia’s warning to China—French action threatened—China’s stand—Assurance to Britain—The issue—Mr. Hicks Beach’s speech to the Swansea Chamber of Commerce—German assurances—Britain’s demand for post of Inspector-General of Customs, January 17, 1898—The new plan—Its advantages—Instructions concerning Talienwan—H.M.S. Iphigenia withdrawn—Instructions to approach M. Witte for an Anglo-Russian understanding—Russia’s attitude concerning Talienwan—Britain’s attitude—Sir N. O’Conor approaches Count Muravieff for an Anglo-Russian understanding, January 19, 1898—Count Muravieff’s reception of the idea—An element of suspicion—Sir N. O’Conor cautions the British Government—Discussions with M. Witte, January 22, 1898—Russian claims—Concessions to Britain—Britain’s attitude towards a permanent occupation of Port Arthur—British Ambassador’s reply—M. Witte’s attitude towards the “Alliance”—Lord Salisbury’s tentative proposal, January 25, 1898—Its conflict with Russia’s ambitions in China—The chances of success for an understanding—Russia’s protest against proposed Anglo-Chinese loan—French support—China’s decision—The Czar’s attitude towards the negotiations for the Anglo-Russian understanding—Anglo-Russian divergence of views on the limits of the understanding—Stubborn adherence to these views—Insincerity of Russians?—Britain takes steps to secure her objects in China without Russian understanding—Britain’s warning to China—Britain’s demands—China’s attitude—The Yangtze non-alienation declaration—Britain’s motive—The assurances concerning a British Inspector-General of Customs—Britain’s motive—Nature and purpose of the concessions—Negotiations for the Anglo-Russian understanding dropped—The preliminary agreement for the £16,000,000 loan—The final agreement, March 1, 1898—The security provisions—Their general effect—An interpretation—Resolution of the British Parliament, March 1, 1898—Mr. Curzon’s statement of British policy—Count Muravieff’s determined attitude concerning Talienwan and Port Arthur—Sir N. O’Conor’s protest—He defines the issues for Lord Salisbury—Essence of Mr. Curzon’s speech—The three principles of British policy—The British attitude towards spheres—The effect of the conclusion of the Anglo-German Loan, March i, 1898, upon the Czar, and opinion in Russia—The Czar’s explanation for the failure of the “Understanding” negotiations—Mr. Joseph Chamberlain’s explanation—France and Russia demand compensation from China.

THE British Government felt the effects of Russia’s assertion of a sphere of influence in China as early as the month of August 1897. During that month the Russian representative in Peking had demanded the dismissal of a British subject named Mr. Kinder, from the post of Engineer-in-Chief of China’s northern lines.(¹) The British Government took exception to this discrimination against its subjects,(²) but upon investigation was informed that Russia’s demand was based upon a promise made to her in 1896 by the Chinese Government that Russian engineers and capitalists would be consulted first, if the Chinese Government should at any time desire to continue the northern line.(³) This was the legal justification for the Russian Government’s attitude. But the motive behind it was apparently the desire to assert certain political preferential rights in the territory through which the northern line was to run.

The Russian Chargé d’Affaires at Peking made this unmistakably clear to the British Minister at Peking on October 18, 1897. He told him “frankly that the Russian Government intended that the provinces of China bordering on the Russian frontier must not come under the influence of any nation except Russia.”(⁴) In reading the allegation of M. Witte quoted at the beginning of the preceding chapter it will further assist in a proper appreciation of its fidelity to the facts if it is remembered that these unequivocal words of the Russian representative were uttered some time before the occupation of Kiaochau by the German fleet.(⁵)

This was the first official intimation which the British Government received from the Russian Government of its intentions in respect of any portion of Chinese territory. It was soon followed by a number of rumours and reports of larger Russian plans concerning China. Principal among these reports were two to the effect that Germany intended to support Russia in obtaining the appointment of a Russian as the successor to the Britisher, Sir Robert Hart, the Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, and that the Russian Government was to have a port opened to Russian commerce which would not be open to the traders of other nations, or which would be open to them only subject to a higher tariff than the one governing Russian trade.(⁶) The first rumour was denied by the German Government on the 29th of November, 1897.(⁷) The second, if true, was a serious matter for the commercial interests of Great Britain. Indeed, it would involve a breach of Articles XXIV and LIV of the Treaty of Tientsin which assured to Britain most-favourednation treatment.(⁸)

The Russian Government proceeded with the development of its plans, and in the middle of December 1897 its fleet sailed into the harbour of Port Arthur.(⁹) In this it had the consent of the Chinese, who were led to believe that such action was necessary to protect China from Germany, and that, having no desire to seize Chinese territory, the Russians would leave when Germany left.(¹⁰) By this bit of duplicity the Russians, under cover of assisting China, were enabled to take possession of a port out of which their Admiralty and Foreign Office had determined as early as the previous November to make a Russian port.(¹¹) The Russian Government were merely quickening the speed with which they proposed to bring China under their domination. M. Witte preferred the slower method of economic conquest. Count Muravieff and Vannovski were, however, able to persuade the Czar against the advice of M. Witte to undertake a more active programme for the absorption of China. It was they who had proposed the occupation of Port Arthur.(¹²)

There is, however, another version of the Port Arthur incident which has never been offered before, which, if true, lends some justification to the action of Russia’s opposition to the acquisition of Kiaochau by Germany. Baron A. de Wolff, former Vice-Director of the Russian Foreign Office, says in his unpublished Memoirs that the railway contract concluded in 1896 between China and Russia provided for a port which was to be the terminus of the railway. But he explains that “the name of the port which was to be the terminus of the line was left blank. There was some hesitation, since it was designed to find some spot equally advantageous commercially and strategically. Having chosen this spot, it was necessary to await a favourable time to seize it, since naturally one wished to give the thing an appearance of legality. The ambitions of a diplomatic official hastened the dénouement. It is evident that these investigations were enveloped in deep mystery; not even the Minister at Peking was admitted into the secret, with the result that he, suspecting what was happening, wished to show his zeal, and, at his own risk, entered into negotiation and discussions for the cession of a sea port which might serve as a base for our Pacific squadron. But since he was obliged to bring several people into the secret, it was not guarded for long, and...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Dedication
• Author’s Preface
• List of Maps
• Introduction
• I. Early Treaties with Foreign Powers
• II. Commercial Privileges of the Foreigner
• III. The Sino-Japanese War
• IV. The Peace Negotiations
• V. The Intervention of The East Asiatic Dreibund
• VI. The First Indemnity Loan: A Cleft in The Dreibund
• VII. The Russo-French Programme
• VIII. Russo-French Co-Operation in Korea and China
• IX. The German Acquisition of Kiaochau
• X. The Third Indemnity Loan: Negotiations For an Anglo-Russian Understanding
• XI. The Russian Acquisition of Port Arthur
• XII. British Policy After Port Arthur
• XIII. Britain’s Further Alliance Overtures
• XIV. Britain’S Efforts For Recognition of Her Sphere
• XV. The Modified “Open-Door” Policy
• XVI. Mr. Chamberlain’s Bid For American Support
• XVII. The Anglo-Russian Railway Sphere Arrangement
• XVIII. Triumph Of The Modified “Open-Door” Policy
• XIX. A Retrospect
• Bibliography
• Index
• Index1
• Index2
• Index3