Soviet Military Doctrine

Continuity, Formulation, And Dissemination

Harriet Fast Scott, William F. Scott

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367303709
• eBook ISBN: 9781000312546
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

The purpose of this book is to document from basic Soviet sources the development of Soviet military doctrine and its impact upon the Soviet Armed Forces. Soviet military doctrine is defined as the military policy of the Communist Party. In one way or another, this policy affects the lives of all of us-as a possible threat to free institutions and political processes as well as to our economic life and well-being. Generally we approach Soviet military policy in terms of military balances and weapons: comparisons in the number of men under arms, the speed of aircraft of the Soviet bloc versus that of NATO aircraft, the number of ballistic missiles and their throw-weights. Studying such balances is of critical importance in defining, to some degree, existing forces. But it is only through a deep and thorough study of the military policy of the Communist Party, which translates directly into military doctrine, that we can obtain the background that might aid in negotiating with the Soviets on arms control matters or in making decisions that will enable those nations outside of the Soviet bloc to deter future Kremlin military moves.

Part 1
Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine

1
The Background of Soviet Military Doctrine

War has been the constant companion of humanity for all of recorded history. Many people fatalistically assume that wars will continue. Others, more idealistic, sincerely believe that eternal peace could be achieved if only nations of the world would do this or that. Some attribute the cause of war to the territorial instinct to defend one’s turf with blood if necessary. Others feel that fighting in itself is a permanent element of human nature.

Marxism-Leninism provides its followers with an exact answer to the question of war. It holds that “with private ownership of the means of production, society was divided into antagonistic classes and exploitative states were created.”¹ How can war be eliminated? Marxists-Leninists believe that “the inevitability of the transition of all countries and nations to communism is the historical prerequisite for elimination of war from the life of society and establishing eternal peace on earth.”² But this communist Utopia has not yet arrived. Nor have relations between “fraternal” communist countries over the years augured well for a peaceful future.

One of the greatest military philosophers of modem times, Karl von Clausewitz, wrote a monumental work entitled, simply, On War. This book had an important influence on Vladimir I. Lenin, who copied a number of sections from the text and made extensive marginal notes. Lenin seized on Clausewitz’s definition of war as a continuation of politics and elaborated on it thus in his article “War and Revolution”:

We all know the dictum of Clausewitz, one of the most famous writers on the philosophy and history of war, which says: “War is a continuation of politics by other means.” This dictum comes from a writer who reviewed the history of wars and drew philosophic lessons from it shortly after the period of the Napoleonic wars. This writer, whose basic views are now undoubtedly familiar to every thinking person, nearly eighty years ago challenged the ignorant man-in-the-street conception of war as being a thing apart from the policies of the government and classes concerned, as being a simple attack that disturbs the peace, and is then followed by restoration of the peace thus disturbed, as much as to say: “They had a fight, then they made up!” This is a grossly ignorant view, one that was repudiated scores of years ago and is repudiated by any more or less careful analysis of any historical epoch of war.

War is a continuation of policy by other means. All wars are inseparable from the political systems that engender them. The policy which a given state, a given class within that state, pursued for a long time before that war is inevitably continued in that same class during the war, the form of action alone being changed.³

At the time Lenin was absorbing Clausewitz’s concept of war, the Russian Army, like many others, did not have a precise concept of “military doctrine.” That term was not even listed in the old Russian Military Encyclopedia.⁴ The Czar and the leaders of his army did have a definite array of ideas on war, however, which were reflected in regulations and other military documents.

After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 the Czar’s military theoreticians conducted, for a time, an active discussion of military doctrine. However, little information about the discussion was made available to the West, other than what was said about foreign military forces. Later, in an article entitled “The Fall of Port Arthur,” Lenin sought to establish the relationship of the proletariat and its state to war and the military organization of socialism. This relationship was reflected in materials of the 7th to 12th and later Party Congresses and Central Committee Plenums. Today Soviet spokesmen assert that these materials have guided the Soviet Armed Forces from its very beginning.⁵

Lenin and his followers seized power in 1917. Immediately, the new government of Soviet Russia was in trouble. The Marxist idea that capitalism was fated to be replaced by socialism put the new socialist state at odds with the world. Soviet ideologists portrayed a class struggle between workers supported by peasants on the one side and the exploiting bourgeoisie on the other. Hopes of having the workers of other countries rise up against their governments remained an empty Soviet dream. The Bolshevik-led government stood alone. The Civil War erupted in 1918 and officially lasted until 1920, though resistance continued in many areas for much longer. Posters at the time depicted the nation surrounded by a ring of fire. The threat of capitalist encirclement was to dominate the thinking of the country’s leaders for decades.

Lenin had spent his years in internal and external exile reading and writing about war and the kind of army that would be needed to bring about the revolution. The basis of what is known as the political side of military doctrine is described in Lenin’s voluminous writings. This foundation forms part of the present Marxist-Leninist teachings, which include both the ideological and methodological basis of Soviet military doctrine and Soviet military science. After the 1917 October Revolution, when the new socialist state began its attempt to hammer out the “military-political” side of a military doctrine, there was opposition from all quarters. Equal opposition met the attempt to formulate the “military-technical” side.

Military Doctrine, First Stage (1917-1928)

The Beginning of Soviet Military Doctrine

In 1969, Voyennaya Mysľ (Military Thought), the restricted journal of the Soviet General Staff, carried an article by General of the Army Semyon P. Ivanov, then commandant of the Academy of the General Staff.⁶ Entitled “Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy,” the article was addressed to generals, admirals, and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces. In it Ivanov discussed “the origin and development of Soviet military doctrine and strategy, the principles of modem military doctrine, views on the character of a possible war and requirements for preparing the country and the Armed Forces for such a war.”⁷

Ivanov gave the following periodization for military doctrine:

First period, 1917-1928: Civil War to industrialization

Second period, 1929-1941: industrialization to the Great Patriotic War

Third period, 1941-1945: Great Patriotic War

Postwar period, 1946-1953: end of war to death of Stalin

Recent period, 1954-1960: revolution in military affairs

Present, 1960-: new military doctrine

Ivanov credited Lenin with having laid the foundations of Soviet military doctrine and military science. Following the Civil War, Soviet military doctrine was further developed by Mikhail V. Frunze. In particular, it was Frunze who stipulated that military doctrine had two parts: political and technical. Ivanov did not mention the contribution to Soviet military thought made by Leon Trotskiy, the brilliant leader of the Red Army during the Civil War. Other authors writing in the open press confirmed Ivanov’s statements.

The idea of “military doctrine” surfaced on the pages of the journal Voyennoye Delo (Military Affairs) in August 1918⁸ in an article by then chief of the All-Russian Main Staff Aleksandr A. Svechin (1878-1938), one of the military specialists from the Czarist army who worked for the new regime. Svechin, later a professor at the Academy of the General Staff, is best known for his book Strategiya.⁹ He thought that doctrine should be limited to a “tactical outlook.” Many opinions about military doctrine were expressed over the next few years, but it was not until 1920 that the debate heated up in earnest.

M. V. Frunze, a Civil War hero, was a prime mover in the debates.¹⁰ He had joined the Communist Party in 1904 when he was nineteen years old and soon became a professional revolutionary. For his part in various uprisings he was arrested, exiled, and twice sentenced to death. During the Civil War he organized and fought successful campaigns on the Eastern and Southern fronts. In March 1924, soon after Lenin’s death, Frunze was made deputy chairman of the Revvoyensovyet USSR and deputy commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. A month later, he was named chief of staff of the Red Army and head of the military academy that now bears his name. In January 1925, Frunze succeeded Trotskiy as commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and chairman of the Revvoyensovyet USSR. In February, he became a member of the Council of Labor and Defense (STO), the forerunner to the present Council of Defense. His military reforms of 1924-1925 are considered by Soviet historians as critical to the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Although he died at age forty, following a botched operation in the Kremlin hospital, he is now enshrined in Soviet folklore.¹¹

During the debates on doctrine, Frunze explained that prior to the twentieth century wars might have involved but a small segment of the population and only part of the total resources of the state. But under the conditions of the 1920s, when Frunze was writing, he pointed out that a future war would demand multimillion-man armies. The entire resources of a nation might be engaged in carrying out the struggle. Under these conditions, there must be an overall plan for the conduct of war and strict coordination when the war was in progress. He expressed a concept that was repeated in later years by Soviet military leaders as military doctrine: “The state must define the nature of overall and, in particular, military policy beforehand, designate the possible objects of its military intentions in accordance with this policy, and develop and institute a definitive plan of action for the state as a whole, one that would take account of future confrontations and ensure their success by making prudent use of the nation’s energy before they take place.¹²”

Based on this overall concept, according to Frunze, the armed forces must be organized in a manner that will meet the general tasks of the state. Members of the armed forces must be united from the top down by common views on the nature of the missions themselves and on the means for carrying them out. This objective requires unity of thought and will, which in itself is a complex and difficult achievement. Such unity can be reached only when the leaders of the armed forces follow a plan that rests on clearly formulated premises sanctioned by the opinion of the country’s ruling class.

Frunze then tried to sum up the significance that a “unified military doctrine” would have for the nation and, in particular, for the further development of its armed forces. The primary question doctrine must answer, according to Frunze, “is the nature of the military confrontations awaiting us.” Once this has been determined, the next question for doctrine is to determine what action the nation must take in building up its armed forces. Should the nation concentrate on passive defense, or should it develop a force capable of offensive actions? This question is basic to any military policy, and how it is answered will determine how the armed forces will be organized, how the force will be equipped, and how military personnel will be trained. The answer to this question also determines how the nation will be “educated” with respect to military affairs. All teaching must follow a unified plan and must express the unified will of the social class in power.

Frunze then discussed the two sides of military doctrine: the technical and the political. The technical side would be concerned with the training and education of military personnel, the organization of the armed forces, and the methods of solving combat problems. The political side would deal with the relationship of the armed forces “with the development of the overall structure of state life, which defines the social environment in which military work must be conducted and th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Preface
• List of Acronyms
• Part 1 Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine
• Part 2 Formulation and Dissemination of Soviet Military Doctrine
• Appendixes
• Bibliography
• Name Index
• Subject Index