Thinking and doing, after childhood
This book seeks to set out a range of ways for thinking about children, and doing childhood research, after childhood. Taken as a whole, the book offers concepts, methods and modes of narration for scholars of children and childhood from a range of disciplines, but especially the social sciences. Without wishing to claim that it constitutes a âradicalâ departure from the conventions of childhood studies â not least because it draws to an extent on already existing literatures in what is a large, diverse, cross-disciplinary field â the book nevertheless puts forward and exemplifies a range of novel frames that might feel challenging, uncomfortable but hopefully exciting and generative for childhood scholars. In one sense, the bookâs principal reason for existing is to attempt to push even further the notions of âchildâ and âchildhoodâ than even some of the most recent new materialist, post-humanist literatures have done. On the other hand, and despite my attachment and commitment to the field, it is born of a sense of frustration with some of those literatures, and with childhood studies more generally. Whilst social-scientific studies of childhood have achieved much in the past few decades, there is still much to do: not least in developing theories, methods and forms of interdisciplinary collaboration that might broach the kinds of challenges â and the injustices, illnesses and traumas associated with them â so briefly indicated by the two cases that began this chapter.
The examples from SĂŁo Paulo and Denmark are intended to be indicative of two key problems, which this book seeks to broach. On the one hand, they nod to the complex, knotty, intractable challenges that affect particular communities in particular places, wherein it is not particularly clear where one would even begin in attempting to address them. In SĂŁo Pauloâs favelas, although singled out as a key cause, climate change is not the only driver of poverty, or lack of safety, or vulnerability: the challenge is multifaceted, encompassing urban immigration, education, gang cultures, the provision of infrastructures in informal urban settings, the interactions between slopes and ad hoc housing structures, and far more besides. In Denmark (and the United States), the drivers of mental health issues are complex, taking in genetics, the interactions between environmental pollutants, the respiratory tract and the brain, transport planning and reliance on the car, socio-economic inequalities, bullying and, again, far more besides.
On the other hand, this book does not purport to âsolveâ these intractable, complex challenges. Yet it seeks to look again at how children are positioned within them â as I ask in Chapter 3: where are children located, precisely, in complex nexuses of resources, institutions and more-than-human interactions? Moreover, it seeks to construct an argument that one of the best ways to understand, analyse and respond to these intractable challenges â and childrenâs position within them â is to recognise that, sometimes, we cannot start with children (or childhoods) at all. For, in a very simplistic sense, the two examples that began this chapter are not just about children or childhoods. As I argue, this means, to differing extents, a loosening of control: perhaps decentring childhoods (Spyrou, 2017); perhaps allowing childhoods to move out of focus; perhaps engaging (after Tsing, 2015) in arts of (not) noticing; and, ethically and politically, as I argue throughout the book and especially in conclusion, holding apparently contradictory conditions such as silliness and trauma in productive tension. For conceptual, methodological, political and ethical reasons, as I argue, this does not mean going beyond childhood. Rather, as I demonstrate in Chapter 9, it means engaging with the ethical and political possibilities (both speculative-playful-silly and marginalising-violent-traumatic) constituted by thinking and doing, after childhood.
At this early stage, I want to be clear that I see the idea of thinking and doing, after childhood, as at once a starting point for a series of (sometimes perhaps esoteric) thought experiments and a way of responding, differently, to the very real challenges experienced by diverse children and young people, in different places, in different ways, around the world â without making any claims to universality. Thus, before moving on, it is helpful to clarify just some of the ways in which I seek to understand and theorise the term âafter childhoodâ, which are in turn woven through this book.
Firstly, and most straightforwardly, the term âafterâ denotes a series of temporal logics. Although diverse, the notion of childhood is â and arguably always has been â characterised by a temporal logic that places children in generational orderings (Alanen and Mayall, 2001; Punch, 2002). Herein, children have often been viewed as future adults â as becomings â upon whose shoulders rest a range of hopes and fears (Uprichard, 2008; Evans, 2010). In these logics, even if any given childrenâs childhoods come âafterâ those of the previous generationâs, childhoods are most frequently understood to come âbeforeâ adulthoods and are defined by what adulthood is not (maturity, physical size, status, etc.).
These debates will be familiar to many childhood studies scholars; thus, throughout the book I ask what work the term âafterâ might do in twisting some of these apparently simple, modernist temporalities. Certainly, several childhood studies scholars have sought to query and/or queer the teleologies inherent in the age-old âbeings-becomingsâ debate. Yet the possibilities for questioning these linear generational orderings and temporalities have not been exhausted. Thus, for instance, via concepts like âhyperobjectsâ (Morton, 2013), I examine the phasing of material stuff and processes â like plastics â into human lives over a much longer temporal frame. This is in turn key to my concept of âinfra-generationsâ (Chapter 6), although I take a very different stance from those (like Postman, 1985) who write on the social status and experience of childhood over time. Mine is not an argument that childhoods are either changing or disappearing, although both might be happening, in different ways, in different times and places, as the final provocation in Chapter 9 makes clear. Rather (for example), drawing on archaeologies of childhood, and starting with found objects â which immediately bring to mind a much longer chronology than the usual frames of childhood studies â the term âafterâ can be understood in a different light. Some of the âtoysâ uncovered in Chapter 5 were played with by children after they had been thrown away by adults, reversing the usual ways of things (i.e. where adulthood comes âafterâ childhood). The toys, bones and other objects found in âcutsâ were found after the death of the subjects who played with or were constituted by those objects, requiring rather different modes for deducing and analysing âchildhoodsâ than notions of voice or agency. Indeed, as I come to below, this latter observation, when taken to its most logical conclusion, imagines a world without humans (and, hence, without children). Using the term âafterâ as a springboard, throughout the book I toy with various temporalities and chronologies â fast and slow, big and small, linear and, especially, non-linear.
Secondly, given its complex etymology in English, the term âafterâ also implies something perhaps subtly, perhaps more radically different than the prefix âpost-â, which extends beyond temporality. As a preposition it denotes repetition and circularity (âtime after timeâ) and attendant responsibility (âclean up after yourselfâ) rather than only consequence and linear chronology. It signals that which comes behind (âshut the door after you leaveâ) and is, like my deployment of the related prefix âinfra-â in Chapter 6, somewhat modest (âplay often comes after education and health in priorities for policiesâ) yet also a pursuit for something more (âchasing after a dreamâ). âAfterâ implies allusion or imitation (âafter the style of this musicianâ): an impulse that finds expression throughout this book in the deployment of speculative fabulation (Haraway, 2011), listing (Latour, 2005), metaphor (Bogost, 2012) and a call for âradicalâ, experimental forms of interdisciplinary childhood studies (see, especially, Chapter 7). And, finally, it denotes a consistent double logic (sometimes referred to as a âpull focusâ) throughout this book of the âafter-allâ: after all, the world goes on and will exceed childhoods (and all humans); but, after all, children and childhoods matter, in that ongoingness, in ways that require much more thought and action. Ultimately, unlike some brands of post-(humanist) thinking, mine is never a position that endorses a way of thinking and doing without humans (or without children) and the things that concern us (and them). That would be unsustainable in a book about childhood. Thus, in certain places I do stray far from children and childhoods and sometimes speculate about worlds without humans. However, my commitment to the âpull focusâ means that children and childhoods â and sometimes fairly conventional ways to understand their voice, agency or mobilities â are woven (back) into the narrative, even if in oblique or apparently belated styles (Chapter 8 being a case in point).
Thirdly, the idea of looking âafterâ evokes decades of âpost-â thinking: of attempts to go âbeyondâ (Bryant, 2014; Jackson, 2015). The prefix âpost-â does not just imply that which follows chronologically, but of attempts to complicate, exceed, subvert or question: to go beyond the â modern, the â colonial, the â structural, the â truth. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, this book aligns with what some have termed a ânew waveâ (Ryan, 2012) of childhood studies or, more explicitly, theories of the âposthuman childâ (Murris, 2016) or âpost-childâ (Aitken, 2018) that are slowly gaining traction.
However, as implied above, the prefix âpost-â brings forth a range of connotations that are, admittedly, semantic â but which go beyond mere wordplay. On the one hand, it is loaded: it now implies a range of modes of theorising that, however generative and progressive, have also become associated with a continual search for newness, with a sometimes white, and/or masculine and/or middle-class and/or European impulse and aesthetic. As I highlight in the next chapter, in some forms, the impulse to go âbeyondâ can â perhaps unintentionally â have the effect of reinforcing privilege and marginalisation. Although writing from the perspective of yet another white, middle-class, European male, I find the term âafterâ â or rather I want the term âafterâ â to feel somewhat more modest, humble and cognisant of, if not a challenge to, these modes of marginalisation. Thus, limited by both my positionality and skill, I attempt throughout the book to engage meaningfully and consistently with feminist, queer and critical race theorisations of difference and matter that sit alongside and in tension with certain forms of âpost-â child thinking (including deployments of actor-network theory (ANT) and new materialist theory).
On the other hand, the idea of the âpostâ is both too much and not enough, all at once. When coupled with childhood, the effects of post-child thinking (especially in the most popular, feminist/new materialist/post-human brands) are to attempt to âdecentreâ children and childhoods in favour of non-human animals and materials (Spyrou, 2017). This decentring is not enough: the very language implies an anthropocentrism that starts-with the human and with analyses and politics that âstill preserve humanity as a primary actorâ (Bryant, 2014: 7). It also tends to decentre childhoods for certain kinds of non-humans â animals and neatly bounded objects like toys â such that other messier, less tangible, less object- (or subject-)like stuff (like plastics, digital media and energy) is effaced. And this decentring is too much: at least as things stood when I wrote this book, it enabled a range of more generous stories but, bizarrely, seldom lived up to the promise that post-human approaches could have in broaching some of the intractable challenges facing children (such as the two that preface this chapter). Not only am I troubled by the prefix âpost-â and the concept of âdecentringâ politically, then, but, as I argue throughout this book, that decentring is not (yet) sophisticated enough to grapple with childrenâs positioning in resource nexuses (Chapter 3), their visualisation and circulation in digital media (Chapter 5), or their knowledge and experiences of energy (Chapter 7). For me, this requires a double manoeuvre that both exceeds and is more modest than the notion of âdecentringâ: what I term a âpull focusâ or, following Tsing (2015), âarts of (not) noticingâ.
Fourthly, the term âafterâ brings with it a specific meaning when it comes to matter and materiality: the very stuff of new materialist or post-human childhood studies. Alongside the generative approaches of feminist, queer and critical race theorists, this particular interpretation of thinking and doing âafterâ requires a foray into speculative-realist and object-oriented ontologies (OOO). 1 These theories are introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 â but perhaps at this point three key contentions of OOO are important to note: that the world can exist after human finitude (i.e. the sense that the world has existed, and can exist again, without humans); that âobjectsâ can and do exist and operate outside of relationships with humans (i.e. a landslide can happen on a remote mountain without humans witnessing it, and it will have happened whether or not we discover the aftermath); and that the relations between objects do not exhaust their very being (i.e. a human could look at a mountain from many angles but never âseeâ the whole mountain, insides and all, without totally dismantling it). OOO theorists are sometimes known as anti-correlationists because they push against the widely held view â central to both modernism and post-modernism â that the world only exists as humans perceive, understand and represent it (i.e. ârealityâ only exists insofar as it correlates with human perception). For many conte...