Soviet Central Asia

The Failed Transformation

William Fierman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367288174
• eBook ISBN: 9781000312461
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia mondiale

This book would never have materialized without the cooperation of all of the contributors, each of whom, certainly, also has a list of people to thank for help. As editor, however, I have the privilege of naming a few whose contributions were especially important. My understanding of Central Asian society has benefited enormously from the opportunities I have had to work and conduct research in the region, especially in Uzbekistan. I would therefore like to thank the International Research and Exchanges Board and the University of Tennessee for making several stays in Central Asia possible over the past few years.

Part One
The Setting

1
The Soviet "Transformation" of Central Asia

William Fierman

Pre-Soviet History and Revolution

Western visitors to Soviet Central Asia frequently hear complaints from the indigenous Muslim population about local Russians' ignorance of Central Asian culture and lack of respect toward it. These are signs of Central Asians' resentment toward Russians who think the conquest of Turkestan and the arrival of Europeans brought Central Asia its first "civilized" culture.

Revealing their own insensitivity, many Russians exhibit a sense of frustration with the "inscrutable" indigenous peoples who still retain many of their "archaic" or "feudal" traditions. These Russians feel that Central Asians' reluctance to give up their old ways has stood in the way of their modernization. Indeed, the history of Soviet power in Central Asia can be viewed as a series of Russian attempts to transform the region. Although superficially many of these efforts were successful, the problems which plague Central Asia today bear witness to the fact that the transformation was not taking place along the lines which Moscow desired.

One of the reasons for this failure was the unattractiveness of the Russian Soviet model which the Soviet regime so strongly promoted. Although for many years they dared not make the comparison, to many Central Asians the accomplishments of Soviet society paled before the exploits of their own ancient civilizations. Almost a millennium before the Russian conquest of the region, the Central Asian cultural centers of Bukhara and Khorezm produced such important scholars and philosophers as Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (980-1037) and Abu al-Raihan Biruni (973-1048). The achievements evident today in the ruins of Afrasiyab in Samarkand and the Mausoleum of the Samanids in Bukhara attest to the great civilizations built by the ancient inhabitants of Central Asia. Although the Mongol invasion laid ruin to these centers, two of Genghis Khan's successors in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the rulers Tamerlane and Ulughbek, oversaw the development of a prosperous economy and a high level of culture in these same places. Following the fifteenth century, however, the importance of the silk routes crossing Central Asia declined, and Central Asia, along with its traditional centers of high civilization, entered a period of cultural and economic stagnation. Nevertheless, as Central Asians today often proudly point out, they are heirs to a rich cultural tradition.

Because of Russia's other territorial ambitions, and because of the great distances and dangers, as late as the eighteenth century Russia had established only very limited contacts with Central Asia. True, even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was substantial trade between Russia and Central Asia. But only in the early 1800s did the tsars begin to extend their administration over the populations of the Kazakh steppe. When Kazakh resistance movements arose in the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, they were crushed by superior Russian might. The penetration of the steppe was important for the future of Central Asia because it broke down the barrier between Russia and the Central Asian khanates of Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva (Khorezm).

Russia's eventual conquest of Central Asia was facilitated by internecine disputes among local leaders and frequently shifting alliances. Kokand was the first of the three states to lose territory to Russia. Adding to some other parts of the khanate conquered at the beginning of the 1860s, tsarist forces took Chimkent in 1864 and Tashkent in 1865. In 1867 the General-Governorship of Turkestan was established with Tashkent as its center. It was through this General-Governorship that Russia ruled much of today's Soviet Central Asia until after the Bolshevik Revolution. (A number of changes in administrative divisions were made, some of them to incorporate subsequent conquests.) Russia's Governor General had jurisdiction over all of the territory of the former Kokand Khanate, and parts of Bukhara and Khiva. Nevertheless, the latter two survived in truncated form as distinct states dependent on Russia until after the Bolshevik Revolution. Parts of present-day Turkmenistan were the last area of Central Asia to be brought under Russia's control. Here the tsarist forces encountered some of the fiercest opposition. In fact, in 1879 they were defeated by Teke Turkmen tribes at Gök Tepe. Two years later, however, the tsarist forces overcame fierce resistance by the Turkmens in the famous Battle of Gök Tepe. (Aside from its importance for the expansion of Russian power in Central Asia, this battle deserves mention because of the massacre by General Skobelev's forces of the local Turkmen tribes.) The rest of what was once called Transcaspia (in present day Turkmenistan) submitted without force to the Russians in 1884. Following expansion into this zone, most of the border between Russia's territories and British-dominated Afghanistan was drawn in 1887.

Contact with Russia brought major changes to the economy of Central Asia. The greatest change was the expansion in cotton cultivation and its export to Russia. Russia became interested in the cotton-producing potential of the region as the U.S. civil war cut off supplies of the valuable raw material from America. The very limited beginnings of industrial growth in Central Asia also revolved around cotton. At the same time, Turkestan became a market for raw and manufactured products (including cotton textiles) from metropolitan Russia. The tsarist regime invested in transportation in the region, constructing the Trans-Caspian and Orenburg-Tashkent railroads. Although less extensively than in Kazakhstan, the tsarist regime gave expropriated lands in Turkestan to newly arriving Russian settlers.

Despite these important economic and political changes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in contrast to their Bolshevik successors, the tsarist colonial administration of Turkestan did not attempt to alter the traditional social structure or assimilate the local nationalities. The tsarist regime sought to weaken Islam in the region, but during most of this period, especially under the direction of Turkestan Governor General von Kaufman (1867-82), it attempted to do this by ignoring rather than attacking the religion.

The tsarist administration's cautious approach was also apparent in its educational policy in Turkestan. Russia did not disturb the traditional Islamic schools (maktabs), which were attended by the overwhelming majority of children of the indigenous nationalities who attended school. The tsarist administration supported the opening of only a small number of schools in which most of the tuition was in Russian for the native population; these were intended to introduce some of the elite to the Russian language and Russian culture. The only other significant educational innovation during tsarist colonial rule were the new method (usul-i jadid) schools; the reform-minded Muslims who organized these sought to prepare the next generation of Muslims to operate in a much more modern world. Although the colonial administration tolerated some of these schools, it did not support them. The colonial regime's suspicion of these schools was shared by the ulema (the traditional Islamic religious leaders), who saw these institutions as a threat to the religious and social status auo.

The jadid movement was an extraordinarily important source of literati and reform-minded political leadership in Central Asia both in the last years of tsarist rule and the first years following the Bolshevik Revolution. Many jadidist ideas came to Central Asia either directly or indirectly from the Tatars of Crimea and the Middle Volga, indeed, many of the movement's leaders in Central Asia were Tatars.

After the revolution, Central Asians with jadid roots served in top republic leadership positions in the region until as late as 1938. Jadids, though most were observant Muslims and all were loyal to their Islamic culture and heritage, felt that social reform was needed in order for Muslim society to progress.

Trade, industry, railroads, and farming all brought new Russian settlers to Turkestan, But the Russians and members of the indigenous nationalities did not mix, and typically in the towns where Russians settled, the local nationalities inhabited a separate quarter. The Russians looked upon themselves as bearers of a superior civilization, unattainable by Central Asians save possibly through assimilation. For their part, the indigenous population looked upon the Russians as infidels and intruders.

Muslims and most other non-Slavic peoples in tsarist Russia were classified as inorodtsy (aliens) and thus were not considered full citizens of the Russian Empire. As such, they did not enjoy the same privileges as Russians, nor did they face the same obligations; for example, they were not subject to military service.

Clumsy acts by the tsarist administration heightened Central Asians' dissatisfaction with the colonial regime and occasionally provoked violent disturbances. One such incident took place in Tashkent in 1892, when Russians ignored local custom in the measures they used to control a cholera epidemic. A series of uprisings, all led by religious leaders, occurred in the Fergana Valley in 1885, 1891, 1892, and 1898. The last, known as the Andizhan rebellion, was led by a Nakshbandi sufi (mystic) under the banner of "holy war." The Russians were very alarmed by this uprising, seeing it as an attempt to seize control of the entire Fergana oblast.¹ The most serious challenge to tsarist rule took place in the summer of 1916. Although the immediate cause of the uprising was a government order drafting Muslims for non-combatant military service, the roots were much deeper: the economic sit...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Foreword
• Acknowledgments
• Note on Spelling and Transliteration
• Introduction
• PART ONE: The Setting
• PART TWO: Politics
• PART THREE: Identity and Religion
• PART FOUR: Socioeconomic Issues
• Glossary
• About the Editor and Contributors
• Index