Marx, Marxism and Utopia

Darren Webb

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9781351763318
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This title was first published in 2000: This engaging book suggests that Marx was right to reject 'utopian socialism' on the grounds that it undermined the principles of proletarian self-emancipation and self-determination. As a theoretician of the proletarian class, Marx sought to capture the spirit of revolution in a manner which precluded the need for utopian philanthropy and the messianic elitism which invariably accompanied it. In a powerful and original central argument, the book suggests that the categories which together define Marx's own 'utopia' were nothing more than theoretical by-products of the models employed by Marx in order to supersede the need for utopianism. As such, Marx was an 'accidental' utopian. Rather than legitimating utopianism, however, the author argues that this conclusion reinforces the need to develop Marx's anti-utopian project further. Emphasising the contemporary relevance of Marx's original critique, the conclusion suggests that the future of socialism lies in its ability to harness, not the spirit of utopia, but the spirit of adventure.

1
Marx’s Critique of ‘Utopian Socialism’

Introduction

Commentators on Marx seem to have reached a broad consensus about something. Such a momentous event would call for celebration were it not for the fact that the consensus is based around the strangest interpretation of Marx. The ‘something’ about which there is general agreement is that Marx’s critique of‘utopian socialism’ did not — repeat did not — involve, incorporate or encompass a critique of ‘utopianism’. So peculiar do I find this claim that I spend the first part of this chapter trying to understand it and the latter part disputing it. What I argue in its place is that Marx not only did criticise ‘utopianism’ but that he also attached a great deal of importance to his critique of it. For understood as both a theoretical framework and a political tool, utopianism only served to undermine the principles of proletarian self-emancipation and self-determination, principles which, if anything, helped define what Marx himself was trying to do.

As a starting point I fully accept that Marx’s critique of ‘utopianism’ seldom found expression outside his rather more specific attack on the ‘utopian socialists’. As Ruth Levitas correctly observes: ‘The term utopia is in fact hardly ever used by Marx or Engels other than as the adjective ‘utopian’, generally in the terms ‘utopian socialism’ and ‘utopian communism” (1990, pp.35–36). What I argue against, however, is the idea that Marx divorced the adjective ‘utopian’ from the noun ‘utopianism’. Instead, I believe that Marx’s specific attack on those whom he used the adjective to describe was part and parcel of a more general attack on the activity to which the noun refers. I also believe that this will become clear if we consider carefully i) what Marx meant when he used the term ‘utopian’ to describe a particular group of socialist thinkers and ii) why he considered the utopianism so ascribed to be worthy of critique. Before I offer my own considerations, let us see what other commentators have had to say on the subject.

The Means/Ends Dichotomy Consensus

A substantial number of writers have challenged the very idea that Marx was ‘anti-utopian’. None go quite so far as to deny that Marx criticised the utopian socialists, nor do they deny that Marx criticised them for what he considered to be their utopianism. Their point of contention, however, concerns the nature of what Marx meant by the term ‘utopianism’ and their basic argument is that his critique of it, however paradoxical this may sound, had nothing at all to do with a critique of the construction of utopias. I have termed the approach in question ‘the means/ends dichotomy consensus’ and the basic argument is this:

It was not the ends that the utopian socialists sought that made them “utopian” in the Marxist sense, but rather the inadequacy of the means proposed to achieve those ends (Meisner, 1982, p.8).

The difference between Marxism and utopian socialism does not & rest on the existence or otherwise of an image of the socialist society to be attained, nor even on the content of that image. It rests upon disagreements about the process of transition (Levitas, 1990, p.45).

With regards to the first of the questions posed above — what Marx meant when he used the term ‘utopian’ to describe a particular group of socialist thinkers — the answer is clear: because the term referred neither to the ends that the utopian socialists sought nor to the content of their images of the socialist society to be attained, their supposed utopianism bore no relation whatsoever to their utopian descriptions of socialism. The term ‘utopian’ referred instead to the means by which the Utopians hoped to achieve their ends and their ideas concerning the process of transition. The second question — why Marx criticised the utopianism of the ‘utopian socialists’ — then becomes inextricably tied to the first. For the means proposed by the ‘utopian socialists’ were only deemed by Marx to be ‘utopian’ because they were ‘inadequate’, so that Marx in effect offered a critical definition of utopianism: ‘utopian socialists’ were utopian because they forwarded an ineffective theory of the transitional process and inadequate means of attaining a set of ends with which Marx himself was in broad agreement.

Fredric Jameson argues along the same lines when he suggests that ‘the indispensable feature supplied by the Utopian socialists to the Marxism-to-be of Marx’s and Engels’s time was simply their vision of the future itself (1976, p.53). What made the utopian socialists ‘utopian’, however, was not the nature of their vision of the future but the inadequacy of the ‘mechanism’ they chose ‘for implementing their vision’ (ibid.). Richard T. De George offers a similar argument when he states that:

The term “communism” is used by Marx (and Engels) in three different, although related ways. The term signifies a doctrine (communism_d), a movement (communism_m), and a stage of historical development (communism_s) (1981, p.11).

He then tells us that ‘Communism_d consists of a description of communism_s and a theory of how communism_s is to be achieved’ (ibid., p. 12), arguing of the latter that:

It is this portion of Marxist theory that, according to Marx and Engels, raises communism_d as a theory from the status of a utopian ideal to the status science. This distinguishes scientific socialism from utopian socialism (ibid., p. 15).

What distinguishes Marx from the utopian socialists, then, is not the fact that the former refused to describe the future, for such a description was an essential feature of communism_d. It is rather Marx’s ‘theory of how communism is to be achieved’. Marx’s theory can be distinguished from utopian socialism, in other words, by virtue of his analysis of the means required to achieve his description of communism_s.

As to why the means proposed by the ‘utopian socialists’ were inadequate and henceforth ‘utopian’, Ruth Levitas supplies the answer:

The real dispute between Marx and Engels and the utopian socialists is not about the merit or otherwise of goals or of images of the future but about the process of transformation, and particularly about the belief that propaganda alone would result in the realisation of socialism (1990, p.35).

Morris Zeitlin also says of the ‘utopian socialists’ that ‘Marx and Engels disputed not their vision of life in socialist society but their unrealistic belief that propaganda alone would bring it about’ (1996, p.23). According to both Levitas and Zeitlin, then, the ‘utopian socialists’ were utopian ‘in the Marxist sense’ because they believed that ‘propaganda alone would result in the realisation of socialism’. Propaganda alone was deemed an ‘inadequate’ means of realising socialism and anyone who considered it adequate was ‘utopian’.

Does this mean, therefore, that when one talks of Marx’s anti-utopianism one is talking merely of an opposition to propaganda as a means of realising socialist visions of the future? Levitas herself casts doubt on this when she suggests that ‘Marx rejected as utopian all those plans for the future which are not realisable because they are not rooted in a correct analysis of the present’ (1979, p.20). For here it seems that the term ‘utopian’ is used by Marx to refer to the Utopians’ ‘ends’, i.e., their plans for the future. Utopias subsequently become those plans which, by virtue of not being ‘rooted’ in a correct analysis of the present, are unrealisable. Vincent Geoghegan also subscribes to this view, arguing that: ‘What is under attack here is not anticipation as such, but rather the failure to root this anticipation in a theoretical framework cognizant of the essential dynamics of capitalism’ (1987a, p.27). The implication here is that Marx did not reject as utopian those plans for the future which were rooted in a correct analysis of the present and were cognizant of the essential dynamics of capitalism. His dispute with the Utopians thus becomes a dispute concerning the way in which their ends or goals were derived. Darko Suvin reiterates this point when he remarks that:

What matters & is not the fact that the “utopian socialists” built a system from their head: Marx did so too. But he, as different from them, NOT ONLY used reason, his head, principles, etc., BUT ALSO took into account reality, facts, and historico-economical processes (1976, p.61).

It is suggested by each of these writers that Marx defined ‘utopia’ as a system built using ‘reason, one’s head, principles, etc.’, and that Marx did not consider a system built using these things AND a correct analysis of the present based on ‘reality, facts and historico-economical processes’ to be a utopia. In short, it was the ends that the Utopians sought — or at least the type of ends that they sought — that made them ‘utopian’ in the Marxist sense.

Nonetheless, when it comes to the question of what planning for the future using a theoretical framework that is cognizant of the essential dynamics of capitalism actually means, the answer is still formulated in terms of a means/ends dichotomy. Thus states Geoghegan:

What emerges is that the utopian socialists are criticized by Marx and Engels for the highly abstract nature of their speculations — the lack, in other words, of any genuine connection between ends and means. Unaware of the real nature of society, overly subjective dreams are spun, detailed visions of other-worldly paradises constructed, but with no connection with any of the real tendencies at work in society. Under attack here is not anticipation of future conditions as such but rather the failure to ground this anticipation in a theory of effective political and social change (1987b, p.39).

The Utopians’ anticipations were highly abstract and overly subjective because they were not connected to any of the real tendencies at work in society and therefore lacked any genuine connection between means and ends. The abstract nature of the Utopians’ ends is thus explained in terms of the inadequacy of their means. It subsequently follows that establishing a genuine link between means and ends would rescue the ends themselves from the realm of abstraction. The key to avoiding utopian ends, in other words, lies in one’s being able to find the genuine means to realise them.

When Geoghegan suggests that utopianism (in the Marxist sense) is a form of anticipation which lacks solid roots in a theoretical framework cognizant of the essential dynamics of capitalism, it is not, therefore, the anticipations themselves, i.e., the ends, that he is calling utopian. It is rather the fact that the ends, which Marx and Engels shared, were unrealisable, i.e., utopian, because the Utopians had yet to discover the means by which they could be realised. This is also what Suvin means when he argues that Marx built a system using his head AND reality, facts, and historico-economical processes. For such a system is constructed at the point where ‘utopia and knowledge meet’ (Suvin, 1976, p.68), so that utopian ends meet a knowledge of reality which in turn produces a knowledge of the appropriate means by which the ends can be realised. Marx thus rescues his system from the clutches of utopianism by virtue of having discovered the means to realise it. For Suvin, then, as for the other proponents of the means/ends dichotomy argument, what distinguishes Marxism from utopian socialism is the fact that his project involved an adequate understanding of the means by which his ends were to be realised. As such, the ‘differentia specifica’ between Marxism and utopian socialism is described by Suvin as ‘the basis, center, and purpose of Marxist socialism: it is revolution’ (ibid.). Similarly, although Levitas fails to develop the idea that utopias were deemed by Marx to be plans which are unrealisable because they are not rooted in a correct analysis of the present, her general subscription to the means/ends argument would indicate that she means that utopias are plans that are unrealisable, not because as ends they can never be realised, but once again because the Utopians’ incorrect analysis of the present had yet to reveal the means by which they could be realised.

This complex relationship between ‘utopian’ ends and ‘utopian’ means is neatly captured by Keith Taylor when he argues that:

Marx adopted the already established socialist view of the future as a stage when harmony, association, community and co-operation would be achieved; but he disagreed with his predecessors when it came to stating how this future stage was to be reached. He knew that his strategy could not be reconciled with what he considered to be their naive (because it was unscientific) conviction that an intensification of the class struggle could be avoided. For him the class struggle was everything, and a realistic as opposed to utopian (in the sense of impracticable) strategy demanded that the proletariat must liberate themselves through the class struggle and not by merely wishing it away (Goodwin and Taylor, 1982, pp.166–167).

Marx adopted the Utopians’ ends as his own, disagreeing only when it came to the means by which these ends were to be realised. Because the Utopians had failed to take into account reality, facts, and historico-economical processes when building their systems, they lacked a framework cognizant of the essential dynamics of capitalism and consequently believed that an intensification of the class struggle could be avoided. This led them to adopt a utopian (in the sense of impracticable) strategy. Marx, on the other hand, was cognizant of the essential dynamics of capitalism and realised that his system could be realised only through the class struggle. He was therefore anti-utopian in the sense that he adopted a realistic (in the sense of practicable) strategy for realising his system. Simply put, class struggle and revolution were considered ‘realistic’ means of achieving socialism whereas propaganda alone was dismissed as the ‘utopian’ alternative.

Some Problems with the Consensus

The most striking feature of the arguments contained within the means/ends dichotomy consensus is that they imply a complete misunderstanding of the term ‘utopia’ on Marx’s part. In fact, if the commentators discussed above are to be believed then it would appear that Marx redefined ‘utopia’ to such an extent — from a description of certain ends that people advocate to a notion almost entirely divorced from any consideration of ends — that one must seriously question why he chose to use the term in the first place.

This is, in fact, what many writers have done in the past. Rather than examine Marx’s critique of ‘utopian socialism’ in any great depth, they merely dismiss it as unhelpful nonsense founded on a misguided notion of what utopianism is all about. Marie Berneri, for example, argues that prior to the intervention of Marx and Engels ‘utopia was considered as an imaginary ideal commonwealth whose realisation was impossible or difficult’, but that subsequently it ‘included all social schemes which did not recognise the division of society into classes...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Marx’s Critique of ‘Utopian Socialism’
• 2 Marx’s Description of the Lower Phase of Communism
• 3 Marx’s Description of the Higher Phase of Communism
• 4 Materialistically Critical Socialism
• 5 Marx the ‘Accidental’ Utopian
• Conclusion: Marxism and Utopia
• Bibliography
• Index