The Nationalities Factor In Soviet Politics And Society

Lubomyr Hajda, Mark Beissinger

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367294250
• eBook ISBN: 9781000303766
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

The editors express their gratitude to the John M. Olin Foundation for its financial assistance and to the Harvard University Russian Research Center for the facilities and staff support that made this project possible. We wish to thank those who contributed their invaluable scholarly advice, including Vernon Aspaturian, Abram Bergson, Steven Blank, Walker Connor, Robert Conquest, Murray Feshbach, Erich Goldhagen, Richard Pipes, and Marc Raeff. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver with Soviet demographic data used throughout the volume. Susan Zayer and Karen Taylor-Brovkin provided able administrative help. For skillful technical assistance with the manuscript we are indebted to Jane Prokop, Elizabeth Taylor, and Alison Koff. Catherine Reed, Susan Gardos-Bleich, Christine Porto, and Alex Sich helped generously in diverse ways. Finally, the editors profited at every stage from the congenial working atmosphere and the encouragement of colleagues at the Russian Research Center too numerous to mention. To all of them goes our deep appreciation.

CHAPTER 1
The Imperial Legacy and the Soviet Nationalities Problem

Roman Szporluk

What is meant when one speaks about the legacy of Imperial Russia in the nationalities problem of the contemporary Soviet Union?¹

The most visible legacy of Imperial Russia is the territorial configuration and ethnic composition of the USSR. The resemblance becomes even more striking when one compares the world map of 1913 with that for 1990 and notes the absence from the latter of the colonial empires of Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal, with their vast possessions in Asia and Africa. The contours of Russia then and the USSR now, in the meantime, have hardly changed. Admittedly, neither Helsinki nor Warsaw lies within the USSR, but their loss has been compensated by gains of areas that in 1913 had been known as Galicia, Bukovina, and the Ruthenian counties of Hungary. Then they belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire— of which no trace remains today.

That the Soviet Union is a multinational state, territorially largely coterminous with the former Russian Empire, does not in itself prove the existence of an "imperial legacy" in Soviet politics, however. More important is the question whether the Soviet Union is just "another name" for the Russian Empire or a fundamentally new kind of polity. To attempt an answer to this question it is essential to identify the specifically political points of similarity and contrast between the two states.

The first and perhaps most important issue concerns the relationship between state and society in the pre- and post-1917 eras. It is the contention of this essay that the nationalities problem is defined by the nature of this fundamental relationship. Thus we need to examine the structure of state-society relations under the Tsars and compare it with that in the Soviet period.

The nature of this relationship between state and civil society will emerge more fully in the course of our discussion. At this point suffice it to say that the autocratic Tsarist state, which in its origins was based on a religious and dynastic legitimization, failed to adjust to the modern political principle of constitutionalism, let alone that of sovereignty of the nation. It also took the state in Russia much longer than elsewhere in Europe to accept the principle of private property and the related distinction between the Tsar's authority as sovereign and as owner of property. In Tsarist ideology and practice the Tsar was the owner and master of his realm, not merely a ruler in the public sphere. Nonetheless, a civil society had emerged in Russia by the early twentieth century. In the Bolshevik revolution, however, not only the state, which had been a legacy of Tsarism, but that very civil society was destroyed, and the new rulers, the Bolsheviks, proclaimed an entirely new concept of social organization.²

The second question, in a sense the obverse of the first, concerns the status of Russians in the Tsarist and the Soviet state. How does the Soviet Marxist-Leninist state relate to the Russians as a nation? And, vice versa, how do the Russians, in terms of their national aspirations, relate to the state? The Tsarist Empire ultimately did not succeed in establishing a modus vivendi with the Russian nation as it was represented by the emerging civil society and failed to gain acceptance as a Russian national state. We shall try to determine whether the Soviet state is accepted as "Russian" in a sense in which its imperial predecessor was not.

At this stage, by way of establishing an agenda for discussion, it should be noted that the empire never became a Russian nation-state. Instead, in the words of Ladis K. D. Kristof, it promoted "Rossification," which meant "the development of an unswerving loyalty and direct attachment to the person of the tsar, by God's will the sole power-holder (samoderzhets) and head of the Church." The essence of "Rossification" lay in Orthodoxy, not in Russianism. "The Orthodox idea, not the Russian tongue or civilization, was the spiritus movens of the Tsardom. Russia was first of all Holy, not Russian."³ This explains, for example, why the Tsarist authorities approved the publication of Orthodox texts in Tatar to promote the "Rossification" of the Muslims. In this respect "Rossification" resembles the postrevolutionary policy of Sovietization, with its principle of "national in form, socialist in content."

"Russification," on the other hand, aimed at making the non-Russian subjects of the state Russian in language and identity. This was the goal of Russian nationalists, whatever their other differences. Although, in its last decades especially, Tsarism also promoted "Russification" policies, one may agree with Kristof's notion of a discrepancy or conflict between the "state idea" of the imperial regime and the "national idea" of the Russians. Kristof recognizes that in reality "the difference between the state and national idea is rather subtle, a matter of shades," but he believes that in Russia it became more acute than elsewhere and found reflection in the "dichotomy between narod and gosudarstvo—the aims and ideals of 'the people' and 'the state'." Even the language recognized "the distinction between russkii and rossiiskii, between what pertains to the (Great) Russian people and what to All-the-'Russias'." The German, French and Spanish nations had "their" empires, Kristof continues, but the Tsarist Empire was not officially "Russian." Its formal name was Rossiiskaia Imperiia, not Russkaia Imperiia, and the Tsar likewise was not russkii, but vserossiiskii imperator. Admittedly, certain Russian statesmen supported the russkaia (i.e., the national) idea, while others preferred the rossiiskaia (i.e., the state or, rather, imperial) idea; "still others tried to fuse the two."⁴

Thus, we may conclude that before the Revolution, the Russians themselves were not of one mind about what kind of country they wished Russia to be. Their search involved not only a political debate, but also an important debate about the geographical shape of Russia, for it was understood that geography, culture, and politics were intertwined. Kristof distinguishes at least four different ideas or models of "Russia" in Russian political thought: "Kievan," "Muscovite," "St. Petersburg," and "Eurasian."⁵ (We shall return to the topic of models of "Russia" when we discuss the "Russian problem" in the USSR.)

The Russian problem, albeit unique in kind, was only one of the nationality problems in the empire. The empire encompassed many other ethnic and national groups, and their treatment by the state, and by Russians of different persuasions, depended on a variety of factors. Among these were religion (the Jews were the worst treated), and attitudes toward Russian rule (the Poles were the least willing to accept Russian domination and suffered severe repressions, but as a nation with a long tradition of independent statehood, they also enjoyed certain privileges that others lacked). The Ukrainian problem posed a special challenge to the state and to Russian nationalists. For historic reasons—including religious, as the Russians interpreted them—the Ukrainians were viewed as a branch of the Russian nation. Precisely because they were thought to be closer to the Russians than any other group (save the Belorussians), expression of Ukrainian distinctness was especially subject to persecution. Still another category of ethnic groups was represented by the so-called diaspora peoples, including, besides the Jews, the Germans and Armenians. Only Finland was actually recognized as a political nation; but as Russian nationalism gained ascendancy at the imperial court, the Tsarist government began curtailing Finland's autonomy, despite that nation's loyalty to the throne.

In the end, Russian nationalism failed to transform the Tsarist Empire into a liberal, democratic Russian nation-state. Nor did the nationalists among the non-Russian nationalities, with several exceptions, succeed in establishing their own states by secession from Russia. (These important exceptions— Finland, Poland, and, for about twenty years, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia— need, however, to be kept in mind.) Those who won the Russian civil war advanced a program that claimed to transcend the nationalist way of thinking altogether. Since it is their ideological and political heirs who rule the Soviet Union today, it may be useful to cite Lenin's assessment of the nationalities problem prior to World War I.

Throughout the world, the period of the final victory of capitalism over feudalism has been linked up with national movements. For the complete victory of commodity production, the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, and there must be politically united territories whose population speak a single language, with all obstacles to the development of that language and to its consolidation in literature eliminated. Therein is the economic foundation of national movements. Language is the most important means of human intercourse. Unity and unimpeded development of language are the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commerce on a scale commensurate with modern capitalism, for a free and broad grouping of the population in all its various classes and, lastly, for the establishment of a close connection between the market and each and every proprietor, big or little, and between seller and buyer.

Especially important for our purpose is his conclusion:

Therefore, the tendency of every national movement is towards the formation of national states, under which these requirements of modern capitalism are best satisfied. The most profound economic factors drive towards this goal, and, therefore, for the whole of Western Europe, nay, for the entire civilised world, the national state is typical and normal for the capitalist period.⁶

Lenin's assessment of the nature of nationality under the conditions of capitalism—no matter how one judges his analysis of capitalism—can serve us as a point of reference today. It prompts the question whether under Soviet-style socialism, especially now, in the period of perestroika, the introduction of elements of market economy will tend to intensify ethnic identities. Is "the tendency of every national movement . . . towards the formation of national states" also operative under "socialism" of the Soviet kind? This critical question in the "state-nationalities" area at the present time is attended by a host of others. What will the non-Russians do now as they search for their own options, and as they consider, in this search, the behavior of the Russians? Will they view the Russians' national aspirations today as a legacy of the Tsarist, imperial era? Will they define their own aims in a manner Lenin had considered in 1914 as normal, legitimate, and consistent with the historical process itself?

One final point that requires consideration is the Tsarist Empire's—and the Soviet Union's—standing in the world. As we shall argue later, the legitimacy of the Tsarist regime within the state, whether among Russians or non-Russians, was determined among other factors by the state's performance abroad as a Great Power. Will the same apply to the Soviet Union, and will its peoples' perception of the Communist party and the Soviet state's legitimacy be influenced by how they judge the Soviet Union's status in the world at large?

By way of introducing all these questions as they arise today, let us consider the current Soviet political agenda, and then see where on this agenda the "nationality question" fits in.

Gorbachev's Revolution

According to Mikhail Gorbachev, there is a revolution under way in the USSR today. "We are talking about restructuring and related processes of the thoroughgoing democratization of society, having in mind truly revolutionary and comprehensive transformations in our society." Gorbachev acknowledges that "this fundamental change of direction" is necessary because the Soviets "simply have no other way."⁷

On more than one occasion Gorbachev has admitted that unless the Soviet Union carries out the necessary revolutionary changes in its economy, political system, and culture, its standing as a great world power will be in danger as it slips further behind the advanced countries of the capitalist world. (There is no more talk of catching up with and surpassing "the West.") How serious is the condition of the Soviet Union was evident from the general secretary's 28 June 1988 address to the Nineteenth Party Conference. The greatest accomplishment of the new course over the past three years, said Gorbachev, consists in that "through the efforts of the party and the working people, we managed to halt the country's slide toward a crisis in the economic, social, and spiritual spheres."⁸ But Gorbachev warned his audience and the Soviet public at large that much more remains to be done, because "the revolutionary transformations" have not yet become irreversible.⁹

Gorbachev and his supporters now admit that the economic improvement necessary for keeping up with the West is impossible without deep political and social, as well as cultural and intellectual, changes in the Soviet Union. This is the major difference between the present approach and the Soviet reform efforts of the 1950s and 1960s, which were limited to the economy. This recognition of the centrality of political reform was restated by Gorbachev at the Party Conference; The "crucial" question is that of reforming the political system.¹⁰

Thus, Gorbachev identifies the source of the Soviet Union's problems in the model of state-society relations established after the Revolution, although he prefers to speak about Lenin's death as the time when things took a wrong turn. That model is not effective and, indeed, it is now admitted, has never suited the Soviet Union. Gorbachev thus virtually repudiates the whole Soviet historical experie...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1 The Imperial Legacy and the Soviet Nationalities Problem
• 2 Nationality Elites and Political Change in the Soviet Union
• 3 Nationalities and the Soviet Economy
• 4 Nationalities and the Soviet Military
• 5 Some Factors in the Linguistic and Ethnic Russification of Soviet Nationalities: Is Everyone Becoming Russian?
• 6 Readers, Writers, and Republics: The Structural Basis of Non-Russian Literary Politics
• 7 Nationalities and Soviet Religious Policies
• 8 Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia: Imperial Integration, Russifiation, and the Struggle for National Survival
• 9 The Baltic Republics: Stagnation and Strivings for Sovereignty
• 10 Transcaucasia: Cultural Cohesion and Ethnic Revival in a Multinational Society
• 11 Central Asia: The Reformers Challenge a Traditional Society
• 12 Russian Nationalism and Soviet Politics
• 13 Nationalism and Reform in Soviet Politics
• Index