Pakistan

The Politics of the Misgoverned

Azhar Hassan Nadeem

• Publisher: Routledge India
• Year: 2020
• eBook ISBN: 9781000076264
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Education General
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the state of political institutions, the military establishment and political parties in Pakistan. It provides a nuanced understanding of the practices of disenfranchisement by theocratic governments in the country which has relegated the people to the margins of their society.

The volume provides an in-depth account of the political history of Pakistan focusing not only on national politics and foreign policy but also on their congruences with subnational systems of governance, the criminal justice system, bureaucracy, the electoral system and the police. It discusses challenging issues plaguing the country such as the continued dominance of the military, lagging economic development, lack of accountability within political institutions, sectarianism and terrorism. The author dissects and critically examines Pakistan's hegemonic politics and underlines the need for a new social contract based on the principles of inclusiveness and equality.

The volume offers fresh perspectives on the multifaceted problems in Pakistan's politics. It will be of great interest to policy practitioners and to academics and students of politics, law and governance, sociology, international relations, comparative politics, Pakistan studies and South Asia studies.

1
INTRODUCTION

Structure and design

Stanley Wolpert, in his book, Jinnah of Pakistan, noted, “Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three.”¹ Jaswant Singh, similarly in his work on Jinnah and the creation of India and Pakistan, gives the entire credit of creating a new nation-state to Muhammad Ali Jinnah alone.² It is true that Pakistan came into existence as an independent country on 14 August 1947 as a result of the political struggle by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan. It is, however, more important to emphasize and highlight the fact that this struggle was strictly under the umbrella of a constitutional framework and within the ambit of law. Never ever did Jinnah deviate from the constitutional and legal course. This book seeks to look at the history of law and governance in Pakistan from the time of its creation to its present state. From Jinnah’s vision of dynamic, progressive and democratic polity based on the universal principal of parliament’s supremacy to the explosion of the garrison and theocracy it is important for us to look at the frameworks of the politics in Pakistan for us to base and judge our analyses and Pakistan’s historical narrative.

Jinnah died on 11 September 1948, and Pakistan was not able to follow the idea originally enshrined in the philosophy of a separate homeland for Muslims in the sub-continent. The “Objective Resolution,” in the words of Qazi Faez Isa (Judge Supreme Court of Pakistan), is the “first constitutional document and has adorned each constitution of the country.” The Objective Resolution was tabled by Pakistan’s first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and approved by the Constituent Assembly in 1949, which included many stalwarts of the Pakistan Movement and other distinguished personalities.³ The promise of the “Objective Resolution” was, however, not fulfilled, and in subsequent years, religious elements were given free rein to exploit it. This brought forth new ideas and interpretation, making room for retrogressive policies which could enable the exclusion of minorities and marginalize the progressive forces in Pakistan.

Pakistan was able to frame its first constitution in 1956, which came into effect on 23 March of the same year. Under this constitution, Iskandar Mirza became the president and swore to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution.” He did not, however, honour his solemn pledge, and on 7 October 1958, he issued the following proclamation.⁴

For the last two years, I have been watching, with the deepest anxiety the ruthless struggle for power, corruption, and the shameful exploitation of our simple, honest, patriotic and industrious masses, the lack of decorum and the prostitution of Islam for the political ends. The mentality of the political parties has sunk so low that I am unable any longer to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal situation and enable us to form a strong and stable Government capable of dealing with the innumerable and complex problems facing us today. We cannot get men from the Moon. It has become fashionable to put all the blame on the President. A wit said the other day. If it rains too much it is the fault of the President and if it does not rain it is the fault of the President.

The person who was supposed to preserve and protect it threw away the constitution, which was being enacted after a lot of struggles and with great difficulty, extending over about nine years, calling it “unworkable” and “full of compromises.” His prescription was that “the country must first be taken to sanity by a peaceful revolution” by “patriotic persons” whom he would select and task, “to examine our problems in the political field and devise a constitution.” He implied that democracy was incompatible with Islam and wanted to enact a constitution which would be “more suitable to the genius of the Muslim people.”

This was in sharp contrast to the idea of Pakistan envisioned by Jinnah, who, while addressing the members of the Karachi Bar Association, said that,

The Prophet was a great teacher. He was a great lawgiver. Islam is based on the highest principles of honour, integrity, fair play and justice for all … equality of manhood is one of the fundamental principles of Islam. … The qualities of equality, liberty and fraternity are fundamental principles of Islam. … Thirteen hundred years ago he laid the foundation of democracy.⁵

Iskandar Mirza, who had dismissed the central and provincial governments, dissolved the parliament and provincial assembly and then proceeded to abolish all political parties and declared martial law in the country by appointing General Muhammad Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. He was responsible for turning away from the constitution, and this was the event which became the fount of the problems of bad governance and misrule in Pakistan. General Ayub Khan made Iskindar Mirza leave the country on 27 October 1958 and Khan himself assumed the office of the president. This disenchantment of the people of Pakistan had consequences which became evident when East Pakistan decided to secede from the country. And Pakistan subsequently saw a line of military dictators like Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf assume power.

It is in this background of the ascendancy of power politics over the constitutional path and adherence to the rule of law that the need for writing this book arose. Those who violated the Constitution of Pakistan with impunity did not keep in mind the following observation that Muhammad Ali Jinnah made while addressing officers of the Staff College in Quetta.⁶

During my talks with one or two Officers, I discovered that they did not know the implications of the oath taken. … I would like you to take the opportunity of refreshing your memory by reading the prescribed oath to you. … I solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I owe allegiance to the Constitution and the Dominion of Pakistan’ mark the word Constitution. … I should like you to study the Constitution … understand its true constitutional and legal implications when you say that you will be faithful to the Constitution.

Added to these factors was the fact that when Pakistan came into being, Punjab became a hegemon for the reason that the Punjabis were the dominant component in the army and because Punjab possessed perennial irrigation systems and introduced a uniquely authoritarian method of governance, known in colonial bureaucracy as the “Punjab school of administration.”⁷

This hegemonic block offset East Pakistan’s demographic majority with the refrain that democracy could wait in lieu of defending the country from the neighbouring countries. Landed and other influential politicians in Sindh, Balochistan and then NWFP (presently KPK) sided with the Punjabi and Urdu-speaking combine, who were given a share of the government, while others were deemed seditious and criminalized in the greater national interest.⁸

Furthermore, Punjabi land-owning politicians, in collaboration with the bureaucracy, put out their lot with the civil-military state apparatus to thwart democratic rule.

Counter hegemonic social forces in East and West Pakistan demolished both the material and discursive foundations of the oligarchic project in the 1970 election. Yet even after the eastern wing seceded, the Punjab-centric establishment refused to budge, now armed with demographic power whilst continuing to be the “guardian of the country’s physical and ideological frontiers.”⁹

This book attempts to analyze the multiplicity of economic, social, political and security problems facing the country, with reference to the institutional setting theories articulated by Douglas North, which emphasized the role of culture and ideology in helping or hindering the economic growth of a nation. This book will also use the theory of inclusive institutional framework propounded by Acemoglu and Robinson, which explains how the prosperity and poverty of states depends on their ability to develop inclusive political and economic institutions. My main point of contention is with the failure on the part of Pakistan to develop inclusive institutions and the continuation of extractive institutions, which are mainly responsible for Pakistan’s current problems.

The second chapter, in the context of the earlier-mentioned theoretical perspective, reviews Pakistan’s predicament through a brief chronological overview of Pakistan’s institutions and the multiplicity of economic, social, political and security problems resulting therefrom during various regimes.

Similarly, Chapter 3 explains the concept of “rule of law” and the objectives it intends to achieve. Thus, this chapter, through the theoretical framework of rule of law, examines the pivotal role that the superior judiciary in Pakistan played in determining the shape of various institutions, particularly when the country failed to develop politically determined constitutional parameters. The most recent example of this trend is the determination of the terms and conditions of reappointment or extension in service of the Chief of Army Staff by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The apex court, on 26 November 2019, during the hearing of a petition that was converted into a suo motu case against the extension in service of General Qamar Javed Bajwa, suspended the federal government’s notification of 19 August 2019 for the extension or reappointment of the Chief of Army Staff for another term of three years after completion of his tenure on 28 November 2019. The Court allowed for the extension or reappointment of General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Chief of the Army Staff, for another six months. At the same time, the apex court shifted the onus to the parliament when it asked the government to determine the tenure, terms and condition of service of the Army Chief through legislation within the same period (i.e. six months). While some quarters expressed their concern that the apex court had asked parliament to adopt a particular course within a specified period on the ground that this was against the principles of the sovereignty of the parliament and the separation of powers, others termed the order courageous and laudable as it had saved the institution of the army from being completely vulnerable to political maneuvering and absolute control in perpetuity by those powerful individuals who occupied the Chief’s slot at any given time.¹⁰ The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, stated on 29 November 2019 that the Supreme Court verdict, allowing a six-month extension to Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa’s tenure, was disappointing to those expecting or hoping for a clash of institutions, external enemies and mafia within the country.¹¹ “I have the greatest respect for CJ Khosa, one of the greatest jurists produced by Pakistan,” he tweeted.¹² The superior judiciary in Pakistan therefore had to intervene and adjudicate on matters pertaining to important issues facing the state in the absence of clear-cut constitutional and legal provisions. They had to evolve new concepts of legitimacy. No wonder most of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan are based on pragmatic considerations.

In Chapter 4, I discuss the four-tier network of the judiciary, administration, police and other ancillary institutions. The chapter critiques the systems of criminal justice and administration in Pakistan by examining the deficiencies of the lower judiciary, administration, police, the prison system and the medico-legal services. The chapter makes it clear that the criminal justice administration system in Pakistan, barring the recent improvements in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police, has become marginalized and alienated from people in the community. This has led to conditions in which the lower judiciary, the police, the prisons, the medico-legal services and the prosecution are involved in illegal and corrupt practices. These practices, which have become routine, generate discontent with the law and lead to more crime. The failure of the four tiers of administration I discuss and the mismanagement of the system of rule in which these indulge result in poor service delivery and a loss of legitimacy and authority in the public eye. It also provides cause for extra-constitutional forces to enter this space and manipulate and create systems which are deviations of the rule of law.

Chapter 5 analyzes the civil–military spat by considering the problematic working relationships between various institutions and argues that a fresh understanding between institutions to return to their original constitutional domains is the only solution for Pakistan’s multidimensional problems. Pakistan is a country ruled by a military bureaucracy; its political parties can be described as personalized institutions/family dynasties having no arrangements for internal debates on vital issues. Generally, there is a merit-based system of promotion from the junior rungs of the ladder to the top echelons in any institution, but this system in Pakistan is conspicuous in its absence. The political parties do not have a system of conducting research or evolving solutions to problems like sustainable growth, social development, housing, health and education. Elected representatives generally treat their constituencies as family fiefdoms with members of the same families being elected at the tehsil, district, provincial and federal levels year after year. The prime purpose is the maintenance of status quo and ensuring the continuation of the process of the people’s exclusion from the decision-making and legislative bodies in the state. In certain areas of the country, the people are treated as bonded voters and are expected by the local political lords to cast ballots every few years in elections that are at best partly fair.

In order for any change to be constituted, all institutions of power and politics in Pakistan have to recognize that the constitution envisages a separation of powers. The political parties need to abandon the culture of dynastic leadership and make room for a system of political leadership emerging from the lowest to the highest office on the basis of merit determined by experience, hard work and co...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• CONTENTS
• List of tables
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction: structure and design
• 2 Pakistan’s predicament
• 3 Rule of law and superior judiciary: an overview
• 4 Criminal justice administration system
• 5 Political parties, army and politics
• 6 Local government
• 7 Civil society
• 8 Terrorism and the state response
• 9 Socio-economic scenario in Pakistan: a story of missed opportunities
• 10 Conclusion: a way forward
• Appendices
• Bibliography
• Index