The Cia And The U.s. Intelligence System

Scott Breckinridge

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367290870
• eBook ISBN: 9781000315462
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Foreign policy—including economic policy and national security policy—and the appropriate planning, decisionmaking, and execution of that policy depend upon foreign intelligence, which must be collected on a global scale, checked, compared, sifted, analyzed, and coordinated. The collection, analysis, and delivery of this body of information require

Part One
Background, History, and Organization

1
The Role and Nature of Intelligence

Nam et ipsa scienta potentas.

(Knowledge itself is power.)

—Francis Bacon

There is nothing novel in the relationship of governmental intelligence activities to international affairs. Throughout history national leaders have gathered information about other peoples and lands to guide their decisions. Without adequate information, they often have had to act on instinct and general familiarity with a situation, but when they had relevant facts, their judgment was more likely to be correct. Sometimes the best available knowledge can tell a leader only that there is no sure road to his or her objective, but the decisions made by this leader are at least informed, better balanced, and less subject to chance.

The history of mankind is filled with examples of both religious and secular leaders gathering information about a potential enemy and using it as best they could. A short trip through history helps illustrate the point.

The Book of Numbers in the Bible tells that Moses sent twelve men to explore Canaan and report back on the sort of land it was. He dispatched them into different parts of that land, instructing them:

See what the land is like, and whether the people who live there are strong, few or many. See whether it is easy or difficult country in which to live, and whether the cities are weakly defended or well fortified; is the land fertile or barren, and does it grow trees or not.¹

Most of Moses' spies felt that the land was too rich and its people too strong to be conquered by the Israelites. There was an inconclusive debate over evaluation of the information. A decision to attack Canaan was made only after Moses received guidance from on high. Those who counselled caution were punished by banishment and plague.

That ancient story contains most of the elements of strategic intelligence. The intelligence "requirements" included information on the economic qualities of the land, the vitality of its people, and their military strength as a basis for policy judgments. That this information produced disagreement emphasizes the historic uncertainties of major decisions.

Some 800-1,000 years after the conquest of Canaan by the Israelites, knowledge of the organization and fighting qualities of a foe made it possible for another greatly outnumbered army to win a historic victory. In 490 B.C. Athenians faced a Persian force that outnumbered them more than two to one. An Athenian general, Miltiades, who had served with the Persians, knew that they were lightly armored and relied on relatively undisciplined mass formations. He reasoned that if the Athenians did not fight immediately, the Persians would break out of the coastal plain on which they were gathered and overrun the area. He believed that the relatively heavily armored Athenians, with their long spears and disciplined formations, could defeat the Persians at that spot. Miltiades' views prevailed and the Battle of Marathon is remembered as one of the fateful engagements of history, allowing the culture of Greece to flower and to leave its mark on Western civilization.²

More than a thousand years after Marathon, the Prophet Mohammed fled from Mecca to Medina. In 624 authorities at Mecca gathered some 10,000 armed men to attack and destroy him. Mohammed had left behind in Mecca agents who reported these plans to him. He ordered defensive works to be built at Medina—a surprise to the army that marched against him. As the enemy camped outside the walls and debated their course of action, heavy rains so disrupted the camp that the army dwindled and finally departed without making an assault. But for Mohammed's intelligence about his enemies, and the lack of comparable intelligence on their part, Islam might not have survived to become a force in world affairs.³

Nearly a thousand years later, another historic event demonstrated the effect of intelligence on history. The rulers of the Ottoman Empire learned that there had been a major fire at the powder factories in Venice, with vast explosions that destroyed the Venetian fleet. A decision was made to move against Venice while it was weakened, and to deliver an ultimatum to the Venetians. In fact, although there had been a fire and explosions, only four galleys of the large Venetian fleet were lost.⁴ On receiving the ultimatum the powerful Venetians enlisted support from other European powers. In 1571 a European naval force met the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto and defeated it decisively. The Ottoman Empire continued as a power for many years, but that event marked the end of its uninterrupted westward expansion.

The Turkish campaign originated with inaccurate information that could have been corrected with the communications of modern times. Lest one seek comfort in the thought that modern communications now afford a form of protection from major adverse developments, it is appropriate to consider the problem of timely warning today, given the fewer than thirty minutes between the launching of an ICBM and its arrival on target half a world away.

The French and Indian wars in North America provide another example of the effect of intelligence on the strategy and tactics of opposing sides. In 1759, the French commander in Canada, Montcalm, planned his defenses against the English along the line of Lake Champlain and Fort Niagara, the waterways of western New York having long served as avenues for military expeditions. Montcalm learned from an intercepted letter of the British commander, Wolfe, that the campaign against Quebec was to be by sea and the St. Lawrence River, instead of following the western route. With this warning the French were able to assemble their defensive forces at Quebec, which were then considered virtually impregnable. Wolfe, having lost the element of strategic surprise, resorted to tactical intelligence. In his army was a man who had been a prisoner of the French at Quebec, where he had learned of a steep trail up the high embankment from the river to the plain behind the fort. The French, considering the trail too steep and narrow for use by significant military forces, left it undefended. Wolfe moved his forces up the trail,⁵ took the French by surprise, and won the battle that ensued on the level fields behind the fortified city.

There are more familiar instances of the role of intelligence in recent times. Most readers are aware of the lack of warning of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Subsequent investigations disclosed that in the various military and civilian departments of our government there was information that, if brought together, analyzed, and reported promptly, should have provided warning adequate for essential defense measures. It was a failure of organization, not a lack of information, that allowed surprise. That tragic experience was an important factor behind the reorganization of the nation's intelligence structure under the National Security Act of 1947.⁶

Another event in this selective scan of history that provides additional insight into the use of intelligence is the Vietnamese communist Tet offensive in early 1968. A pending offensive by the communist forces had been reported. Accordingly, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were redeployed in defensive positions. However, it was judged that a truly all-out offensive would result in such extensive losses to the communists— who, it was felt, would realize this fact—that the likelihood of such an assault was discounted, although widespread lesser activities were expected. Many South Vietnamese troops were given leave for the religious observances of the Tet season, under a cease-fire declared by both sides. Despite the deployment of Saigon's reserve forces, there was a reduced level of readiness.

The communists launched a major offensive on the night of January 30-31. While this offensive met with dramatic initial successes, communist losses were some 32,000 in the first two weeks, with another 10,00015,000 in the following two weeks. The offensive collapsed. The losses were so great that the communists required several months' reinforcement and regroupment to regain offensive capabilities in the South.⁷

The intelligence reporting on the impending offensive was correct, so far as it went. The military projection of the losses that the communists would incur also proved to be correct. What the U.S. estimators failed to appreciate were the ideological considerations that led the communists to undertake an offensive with such risks. The communists had convinced themselves that the South Vietnamese would welcome the invaders from the North, and that there would be a "general uprising" that would reduce the number of casualties and help gain major communist objectives. The general uprising failed to materialize. Since the Americans could not believe the communists would be so foolhardy, early communist successes appeared more dramatic than they actually were. Both sides would have handled the situation differently had they managed their intelligence more effectively. Neither side could have foreseen the political repercussions in the United States occasioned by media coverage that reported a great communist victory and heightened antiwar sentiment in this country.⁸

A final example of disastrous strategic hypotheses based on incomplete and mishandled information is the Argentine seizure of the Falkland/ Malvinas Islands in 1982. The Argentine government obviously misjudged the strength and resolve of an England in decline as a major world power since the dissolution of its empire. It became dramatically clear that the government of Argentina, in occupying a territory that England considered its own, had reached erroneous conclusions. The humiliating defeat of the Argentine forces, leading two years later to the country's return to civil government, highlights the need for both knowledge and understanding in making major military decisions. Argentina's miscalculation is not unlike what must have been the Soviet view when the Kremlin launched the North Koreans against South Korea in 1950.

These examples of the uses of intelligence (and sometimes of its misuse) emphasize the role of intelligence as a tool of policy-making.

Among the problems in employing intelligence is the ever-present awareness that what is known may be flawed in important respects.

Today it is generally accepted that comprehensive, accurate information on the nations of the world is essential to the policymakers and military leaders of any major power, including the United States. Our information needs range from the numbers and capabilities of Soviet military forces through international political and economic matters, down to the internal stability of a small Central American country with which our nation has friendly relations. Given such broad interests, the requirement for the best knowledge possible is high. It is an unavoidable fact that a modern government must have a large, complex national intelligence structure. The future of our nation rests on sound political and economic policy and on strong defense, none of which can be shaped confidently without comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the world in which we live.

Since World War II the United States has developed complex machinery for managing national security policy and programs, and intelligence has been given a key place in that structure. A summary overview provides an introduction to the subject.

U.S. National Security Structure

The lessons of Pearl Harbor arid World War II led to the conclusion that a formal structure for managing major national security affairs was needed. Pre-World War II arrangements were inadequate for guarding against a breach of the peace, and the various organizational arrangements during the war left much to be desired, although they demonstrated the usefulness of government-wide arrangements. While the war was under way, several studies of postwar organization for national security were conducted. Some of these studies are mentioned in the Church Committee Report.⁹ Out of the process emerged the proposal that, with congressional review and action, became the National Security Act of 1947.¹⁰

Although the 1947 Act established a framework for policy-making and a new central mechanism for intelligence, some will recall that the most publicized feature at the time of its passage was "unification of the armed services," The U.S. Air Force was plucked from the rib cage of the Army—much as the scripture tells us Eve was created from Adam—and made into a third military service equal to the Army and Navy. The 1947 Act also created a National Military Establishment (redesignated the Department of Defense by a 1949 amendment to the Act), which was headed by a Secretary of Defense who held cabinet rank and presided over the three military services. This new overlord of the national military defense system was to coordinate military policy, and harness and direct the intense competition for roles, missions, and resources anticipated among the three services.

As substantial as these legislative innovations may have been, they were but part of a broader concept of providing for coordination of national security policy. Beyond military organization, the 1947 Act created a National Security Council (NSC) composed of senior government officials. The NSC was presided over by the President, with the Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense as permanent members.¹¹ It became customary for the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General to attend NSC meetings, but the latter is no longer listed among those attending regularly. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget now attends.

In essence, the Natio...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• About the Book and Author
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• PART 1 BACKGROUND, HISTORY, AND ORGANIZATION
• PART 2 SECRECY, ACTIVITIES, AND TECHNIQUES
• PART 3 CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING INTELLIGENCE
• Appendix A: The National Security Act of 1947
• Appendix B: Executive Order 12333, December 4, 1981
• Bibliography
• Acronyms
• Index