The International Dimension Of Palestinian Terrorism

Ariel Merari, Shlomi Elad

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9781000302530
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Terrorism, by its very nature, is a dynamic and rapidly changing phenomenon. This is particularly true of Palestinian terrorism: it is pluralistic in composition, flourishes in a highly volatile region, and is affected by numerous external actors and elements. Hence any attempt to produce research on Palestinian terrorism of a completely up-to-date nature is doomed to failure. Most of the work on this study was completed by the fall of 1985, and the statistics presented generally cover the period 1968-1984.

1. The Palestinian Impact on International Terrorism

Since 1967, Palestinian terrorism has had a fundamental impact on the world's political consciousness. This has stemmed not so much from the proportion of acts carried out by Palestinians within the total framework of all international terrorist activities —between 1968 and 1984 this was only 4.6 percent—but from the innovative nature of the acts themselves. Table 1 compares the annual number of Palestinian terrorist incidents with overall international terrorist incidents in the period 1968-1984.

Aircraft hijacking is probably the most notable example. While Palestinians were not the first terrorists to hijack an airplane for political purposes (this distinction belongs to a group of Colombians, who on March 5, 1968 hijacked an airplane to Cuba as a means of securing political asylum), the Palestinian hijacking of an El Al plane to Algiers on July 22, 1968 was the first time hijacking was used for the express purpose of political blackmail. In exchange for the release of the passengers, the hijackers demanded the freeing of jailed Palestinian terrorists within Israel. Again, in September 1970, Palestinians carried out the simultaneous hijacking of TWA, Pan Am and Swissair aircraft. What is important in these episodes is the assumption that by striking boldly in the international arena, and by linking their actions directly to specific political demands, the Palestinians could call world attention to the Palestinian political problem.

Hijacking also came to be used by the Palestinians as a means to win the release of terrorists arrested in previous activities. The first episode of this kind occurred on July 22, 1970 when an Olympic plane was hijacked; in return for its release, the perpetrators demanded the freeing of Palestinian terrorists then held in jails in Greece. The speedy submission of the Greek authorities in this instance encouraged a number of similar occurrences of this kind, and the use of the tactic quickly spread to non-Palestinian terrorists as well.

It is interesting to note that in the years 1968-82 only 29 (about 24 percent) of all terrorist-related hijackings were carried out by Palestinians. Nevertheless, so innovative was their style, that in the popular consciousness the phenomenon came to be viewed as almost exclusively Palestinian.

In addition to hijacking, the Palestinians introduced two other types of action against civil aircraft: one involved attacks against aircraft and their passengers on the ground; and the other, the blowing up of aircraft in the air. On December 26, 1968, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) attacked an El Al plane on the tarmac in Athens, causing heavy material damage and killing one of its passengers. In the years that followed, numerous attacks were mounted along this pattern against planes on the ground; even anti-tank missiles were employed. Passengers were also attacked inside airport terminals. The stratagem of the mid-air bombing of aircraft first appeared when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) blew up a Swissair plane en route from Zurich to Tel Aviv on February 21, 1970, and made a similar but abortive attack on an Austrian Airlines aircraft that same day (it was forced to make an emergency landing after an explosion in its luggage compartment}. Stringent security measures had a certain salutary impact on subsequent sabotage attempts though the terrorists did register some additional successes, most notably when a TWA flight from Athens to New York crashed after a mid-air explosion on September 8, 1974.

Another method the Palestinians pioneered in worldwide terrorism was that of taking hostages in non-aircraft related situations. The first such episode occurred on July 9, 1970, when the PFLP seized hostages in the Philadelphia and Intercontinental hotels in Amman, and successfully demanded that the Jordanian government cease military operations against Palestinian forces and replace the Jordanian armed forces' commander in the Jordanian capital. As with aircraft hijacking, many terrorist groups followed the Palestinian lead in the application of this new tactic; but here too it was always the Palestinians who were the most spectacular in its execution.

The Palestinians were also among the first to employ hostage-taking against specifically diplomatic targets. (Pioneers in this regard were Croat terrorists who, on February 10, 1971, occupied the Yugoslav Consulate in Goteborg, Sweden.) On December 28, 1972, members of Black September occupied the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok and on March 10, 1973, they undertook similar action against the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum. While Palestinian seizures of diplomatic premises hardly constituted the majority in this category of terrorist activity — out of the 48 incidents of forcible occupation of diplomatic premises in the years 1971-80 the Palestinians accounted for only 13 (27 percent)² — theirs were the instances that grabbed the lion's share of international attention.

In addition, Palestinian terrorists also left an imprint on the conduct of international terrorism through the dispatch of letter bombs — hundreds of which were sent to addresses in Israel, to Israeli embassies, and to other Jewish and non-Jewish destinations in the early 1970s — as well as through the poisoning of Israeli oranges in Europe in 1978. Though this latter episode was a one-time operation, it could still emerge as a precedent for other international terror groups.

Aside from example, Palestinian influence on international terrorism has been brought about through the provision of training, arms and, in some cases, operational assistance, to international terrorist counterparts. In this sense Palestinian terrorist groups have had a significant impact on the capabilities of other terrorist organizations and the scope of their activities.

On the other hand, when carrying out their own terrorist activities the Palestinians have benefited from the direct provision of training, arms supply, transport of equipment, operational intelligence and refuge and accommodation by a number of sovereign states in the Arab world. Moreover, Arab governments have provided the Palestinians with almost unlimited political support, and in many instances have exerted pressure on other governments to refrain from retaliating against Palestinian perpetrators of terror. This kind of assistance is unique in the annals of international terrorism and has probably contributed substantially to the influence of Palestinian terrorism on international terrorism overall.

2. Terrorist Activity Outside the Target Country: The Palestinian Approach

A terrorist organization decides to operate outside the borders of the country that it has targeted for primary action, when it concludes that such activity will serve its interests. In some instances, an assessment that internal terrorism alone is insufficient to achieve the organization's goals serves as a catalyst for this decision; in others, additional factors are involved.

Assuming that terrorist organizations reach decisions rationally, let us consider the possible arguments for and against international terrorist activity, from the standpoint of a terrorist group.

Arguments in Favor of Acting Outside the Target Country

Propaganda benefit. Terrorist activities outside the target country have a greater impact than internal activities, as they reach a wider audience. An internal terrorist incident will receive international attention only if it is particularly gruesome and causes a great number of casualties, while an external action constitutes, by definition, an international problem, and thereby increases the potential publicity benefit.

Security benefit. Terrorist activities outside the target country are less prone to be foiled by security authorities. As the awareness of the threat of terrorism increases in the particular target country, that country's security procedures become more sophisticated, and targets outside the target country appear more attractive to the terrorist contemplating action. When operating abroad, target country security forces lack both absolute area knowledge and absolute freedom of movement. In addition, the target country is normally unable to dispatch sufficient forces to protect all potential targets in the host country. Finally, host country security forces do not usually share the target country security forces' level of dedication in defending target country installations and nationals within their own borders.

Element of surprise. International terrorism invests the terrorist organization with an element of surprise, as it expands the geographical area exposed to a terrorist strike and widens the organization's range of targets. This is particularly true regarding activities against persons and facilities of the target country located abroad.

Ease of escape. Not only does the terrorist outside the target country have a lighter security burden, he also has an easier time escaping from his pursuers. Particularly in Western Europe, with its open borders, rapid transport and communication systems and general ease in securing accommodation, getaways are a relatively easy matter. In addition, the presence of target country emigrants, as well as host country terror groups and sympathetic nationals, provides supplementary getaway assistance.

Lightness of punishment. In normal circumstances, neutral countries have little incentive to burden terrorists with heavy prison sentences, and are often willing to commute whatever sentences they might give. According to Robert Fearey, former Special Assistant to the American Secretary of State and Head of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, less than half of the terrorists captured between 1971-75 completed their prison sentences — sentences which in any event averaged only 18 months in duration.¹

Ideological attraction. Extremist Marxist terrorist organizations see the entire world in ideological terms as a legitimate arena for terrorist activities against the "imperialist" countries. In consequence, the normal restraints imposed by national frontiers cease to exist, and terrorists see themselves as both entitled and duty bound to operate wherever they think their actions will be effective.

Arguments Against Acting Outside the Target Country

Political damage. Terrorist organizations interested in legitimizing their cause in the court of world public opinion must consider the possibility that international terrorism will work against their interests. Public opinion, particularly in the West, exerts considerable influence on the shaping of policies with regard to terrorist organizations. Given that terrorist acts committed in neutral countries are generally regarded as inconsistent with legitimate international conduct, the danger exists that such acts will provide the opponents of the terrorist organizations with substantial ammunition to undermine the terrorists' quest for political legitimacy.

Confrontation with friendly countries, Many terrorist organizations enjoy the support and help of countries which, in addition to publicly championing their struggles, are willing to supply them, either clandestinely or openly, with material aid. Terrorist activities abroad may at times harm the interests of these countries and in some cases lead to open confrontation between the supporting country and the "offending" terrorist organization. In extreme cases such a confrontation may be engineered intentionally by an interested third party, and result in a total cessation of support to the terrorist organization in question.

Heavy organizational and manpower investment. Terror abroad requires heavy investments in both organizational infrastructure and manpower. Terrorist organizations must determine whether these lie within their capabilities. In terms of organizational infrastructure, requirements include a logistical framework for weapons procurement, documentation and safe houses, and an infrastructure for intelligence gathering, operational planning and escape arrangements. In terms of manpower investment, terrorism abroad requires training of special cadres. These need a foreign language capability — to allow them to carry out the technical steps necessary for the mission, if not to mingle with the local population completely. They must be flexible and possess both a certain sangfroid and a well developed operational imagination. In addition, they must be proficient in the use of different types of arms and explosives.

Ideology. While some terrorist organizations are internationalist in ideological orientation, others possess a distinctly nationalist bent, and focus almost exclusively on the struggle within the target country. In the case of the latter, resorting to terrorism outside the borders of the host country is likely to be seen as a deviation from their central objective — a deviation which either wittingly or unwittingly may involve injury to both people and property in neutral countries.

Clearly, the decision to launch terrorist activities outside the target country is an important step in the strategy of any terrorist organization. While the advantages of this tactic would, on the surface, seem to outweigh the disadvantages — particularly in view of target vulnerability, getaway possibilities and the relative lack of punitive disincentives — in practice the decision to enter the international terrorist arena appears to be related mainly to an assessment of the costs and benefits of two specific factors: actual security disincentives in the target country, versus potential political and propaganda advantages accruing to acts outside the target country.

With regard to the first consideration, an organization which operates successfully in the target country is seldom called upon to act on other fronts; only when the opportunity for widespread activity within a target country is denied is it likely to contemplate the initiation of a terrorist campaign outside the target country.

With regard to the second, two factors appear to be particularly influential: one is the degree of legitimization the organization would acquire internally — that is, among its members and the population it claims to represent; the other is the degree of legitimacy the organization would acquire internationally, both in friendly and unfriendly countries.

Internal legitimacy depends on the ability of the terrorist organization to provide a framework for meeting the aspirations of its members to engage in the armed struggle and so advance their political cause. If such legitimacy can be obtained without recourse to engaging in international terrorism, then the latter option may not be contemplated. On the other hand, the decision to undertake terrorism outside the target country is sometimes taken to comply with extremist demands from elements within the organization who are not content with the current level of armed struggle.

Legitimization from friendly countries is related to the organization's ability to satisfy these countries in return for their political assistance and material help. Because some of them view international terrorism as a useful instrument in the pursuit of their own policy goals, while others oppose it and are likely to be harmed by identification with it — any terrorist organization contemplating international terrorist activity must weigh this factor carefully.

Finally, international legitimacy outside of friendly countries depends on an awareness both among the public-at-large and among decisionmakers of the cause for which the organization is operating. At the same time, it ultimately requires that the international community support the organization's methods and conduct. In deciding whether to embark on a program of international terrorism, terrorist organizations must take this factor into account as well.

The Palestinian Ideological Debate

The various Palestinian terrorist organizations differ in their conception of the armed struggle; it is therefore not surprising that they also differ in their approach to the strategy of carrying out terrorism outside the borders of Israel. Their debate on this question has taken account of both ideological and practical considerations a...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 The Palestinian Impact on International Terrorism
• Chapter 2 Terrorist Activity Outside the Target Country: The Palestinian Approach
• Chapter 3 Palestinian Terrorism Outside of Israel, 1968-84: Data and Trends
• Chapter 4 International Reaction
• Chapter 5 Conclusion: A Cost-Benefit Account
• Epilogue
• Tables
• Appendices
• Notes
• Series Page