Sovietthird World Relations

Carol R Saivetz, Sylvia Babus Woodby

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9781000312782
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

Soviet-Third World Relations presents an overview of Soviet policy toward the less-developed countries and considers the determinants of that policy and its reflection in action. The authors first examine the theoretical underpinnings of Soviet-Third World policy, including Leninism and Soviet developmental models, and explore the tensions between prescribed "progressive" development strategies and the realities of Third World political processes. Next, the authors present a detailed look at the record of Soviet activities in the Third World. This is a chronological and regional account, which describes Soviet policy in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. This part also provides a discussion of the openings (such as local conflicts, "liberationist" movements, and socialist causes) and the obstacles (nationalism, anti-imperialism, the volatility of Third World politics) to Soviet policy in the Third World. It closes with an analysis of Soviet foreign policy tools, and asks whether chosen policy instruments achieve their desired objectives. In the final section of the book, the authors look at the decision-making context for Soviet-Third World relations, including an analysis of Soviet objectives, decision-making variables, and the participants in the decision-making process. They conclude by assessing trends in Soviet-Third World relations, the successes and failures of Soviet activities in the nonindustrial world, and analyzing the current situation. Here they address as well the lessons learned from the past and the prospects for the post-Brezhnev, post-Andropov era.

Chapter One
Changing Soviet Perspectives on the Third World

Ever since the earliest days of the Soviet state, the USSR has conducted multifaceted relations first with the states contiguous to its borders and then more extensively with the whole of the Third World. Today these ties include close political and economic links with so-called progressive^* states as well as diplomatic and commercial ties with conservative and even anticommunist countries. Making sense of these sometimes chaotic sets of relations requires, first of all, analyzing how the Soviets see the Third World. Although the Soviet leadership has traditionally justified its relations with the nonindustrial world in terms of both the "world revolutionary process" and Soviet state interests, even a cursory look at Moscow's activities between 1917 and the present reveals that its attitudes and interests toward the Third World have changed and have been modified by its experiences there.

The Soviets' unique slant on Third World politics and on their relations with the less-developed countries (LDCs) emerges from Soviet official statements, academic discussions, and a vast monographic literature. Soviet perspectives on the Third World are an important indicator of Soviet priorities, of the roles the Soviets have designed for themselves, and, therefore, of Soviet objectives.

The evolution in Soviet-Third World relations and consequently in the Soviets' world view reflects and is part of some major shifts in international politics—primarily the changed status of the USSR within the international system. In the more than sixty-seven years of the USSR's existence, Soviet military and economic capabilities have increased substantially. Starting as "the new kid on the block" with a revolutionary political philosophy and an economic and military system in shambles, the Soviet Union emerged from World War II as a superpower, in fact one of two superpowers. However one assesses the contemporary military and economic prowess of the Soviet Union, its growth and power are unquestioned. In terms of Soviet-Third World relations, the Soviets' statements about their interest in and attitudes toward the nonindustrial world help us to gauge how Soviet leaders intend to use their clout. These pronouncements plus academic studies of Third World politics all facilitate a glimpse of policy discussions and represent attempts to create a fit between ideology and policy.

This chapter will provide an overview of Soviet perspectives on the Third World with particular attention to Soviet ideas about the importance of the Third World, expectations for political change there, and about Soviet roles in and relations with the nonindustrial states.

Marxist-Leninist and Recent Soviet Views

The USSR professes to conduct its diplomacy according to the dictates of Marxism-Leninism. In fact, the Soviet leadership claims that its very existence and the existence of the socialist bloc exert a profound influence on international affairs. Ironically, although Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the "grandfathers" of Soviet ideology, did comment on diplomatic and military events of their day, there is little international relations theory to be found in their work. Marx's elaborate theory of history and economic development focused on class issues; he presumed that workers' and capitalists' interests would cross national boundaries and render them obsolete. Vladimir Ilich Lenin adapted Marxism to conditions within the tsarist empire and to the tactical exigencies of seizing power. He reconstructed Marxism to emphasize political education and propaganda of the masses by a dedicated and well-trained elite. Lenin argued that political power in appropriate hands could be used to alter economic structures and thus move history along. (As we shall see this has echoes in many prescriptions for Third World political development.) But Lenin, unlike his ideological predecessors, also wrote about international relations. His analysis of world politics blamed imperialism, that is, the exploitation of colonial markets, for the continuing survival of capitalism, and he, therefore, perceived a link between what was happening in Russia, Europe, and the "Orient." As early as 1913, Lenin noted that "hundreds of millions of toilers in Asia have a reliable ally in the proletariat of all the civilized countries."¹

In fact, the manifesto of the founding conference of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1919 stressed:

The emancipation of the colonies is possible only in conjunction with the emancipation of the metropolitan working class. The workers and peasants not only of Annam, Algiers, and Bengal, but also of Persia and Armenia will gain their opportunity of independent existence only in that hour when the workers of England and France, having overthrown Lloyd George and Clemenceau, will have taken state power into their own hands. . . . Colonial slaves of Africa and Asia! The hour of proletarian dictatorship in Europe will strike for you as the hour of your own emancipation.²

The anticipated revolution in Europe never occurred, leaving Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks to conduct their own peculiar brand of diplomacy. In the years immediately following the October Revolution, Soviet foreign policy seemed to center on Europe. Not only did the new Soviet government negotiate its withdrawal from World War I, but it also had to establish relations, however tenuous at first, with the other European powers. This was made more difficult by the Allied expeditionary intervention on the side of anticommunist forces during the civil war. By 1921, Moscow signed a trade agreement with England, and in 1922, Germany and Russia concluded a formal treaty that included commercial and military provisions. Almost simultaneously, the British presence in Iran and Afghanistan prompted the Soviets to support local anti-British forces in these contiguous countries.

By 1921, Bolshevik Russia had negotiated treaties with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. In the Turkish situation, nationalist leader Kemal Pasha (Ataturk) approached Moscow for assistance in his war for independence. The Soviet state responded with financial assistance and ultimately secured a treaty that accepted Soviet dominance in the Caucasus and promised a Soviet role in any international conference dealing with the Dardanelles. However, this did not prevent Ataturk either from turning on the local Turkish communists, or working out friendly relations with the Western European powers, once his regime was safe. In Afghanistan, the new Soviet leadership extended diplomatic recognition to the embattled Afghan emir, who won his throne over British opposition. The Iranian case is more complex: Moscow not only protested the British occupation of Iran, but also helped a rebel leader to establish a Soviet republic along the northern borders. In the end, the Soviets abandoned the local communists in favor of a neutrality treaty with the central Iranian government. This treaty included a mutual pledge not to join any military alliance against the other, or to permit hostile forces to operate from its territory. Should one of the parties be unable to prevent such use of its territory, the other was entitled to invade in order to eliminate the aggressive threat.

Lenin's anounced sympathy with liberation struggles everywhere necessitated a redefined role for the small native communist parties in many areas. In general, as the Iranian case illustrated, local communists were to be far less important than "bourgeois nationalist" leaders. Despite objections from some members of the Comintern,³ Lenin chose to support national liberation movements, which were by definition anticolonial regardless of their noncommunist composition. Lenin went so far as to argue that with the help and guidance of the Russian communists, certain of these liberation leaders could skip the capitalist stage of development and take steps toward socialism.

With Lenin's death and Joseph Stalin's accession to power, the Soviet policy of alliances with nationalist movements was refined and reinforced. Stalin wrote:

Of course this does not mean that the proletariat should support every national movement, always, and everywhere, in all separate concrete cases. Rather, this means that the proletariat should support those national movements which are directed at the weakening or destruction of imperialism. . . . The struggle of the Afghan Emir for the independence of Afghanistan is objectively a revolutionary struggle despite the monarchical outlook of the Emir and his colleagues, for it weakens, disintegrates and undermines imperialism. . . . The struggle of the Egyptian merchants and bourgeois intellectuals for the independence of Egypt is for the same reasons a struggle objectively revolutionary.⁴

Stalin sought to mediate between local communists and nationalists so that anticolonial alliances need not damage the fortunes of the local parties. The difficulty inherent in this approach was nowhere more evident than in China; there, the Soviets tried to support nationalists and communists simultaneously. Even prior to Lenin's death, local Chinese communists were urged to join the Kuomintang and in 1923, the Soviets expressed support for Sun Yat-sen, while noting that "conditions for the successful establishment of either communism or Sovietism" did not exist in China.⁵ In the mid-twenties, Stalin argued that Chinese communists, waiting for a later chance to take over the government, could best advance their own fortunes by collaborating with the nationalists. Chiang Kai-shek, however, successfully out-maneuvered the communists; in 1927, he nearly annihilated them all. Stung with defeat, Stalin, through the Comintern, urged local parties to fight the local national bourgeoisies.⁶

These early tentative relations with the areas immediately contiguous to the USSR illustrate several features about the importance of Soviet-Third World relations at this time. First, Lenin and his followers were preoccupied with consolidating their hold on power and with establishing a functioning economic system in Russia. Second, the confused Soviet activity of this period reflected multiple approaches to the outside world. Lenin, as noted above, supported nationalists in their anticolonial struggle, while maintaining relations with ruling governments where appropriate. Simultaneously, the Soviets, through local communist parties and the Comintern, sought to influence the course of the ongoing political struggle. Third, the Soviet Union of the twenties was not the post-World War II USSR: Soviet leaders in this period, lacking the economic and military capabilities now associated with Moscow, could hardly expect to play a more major role in the Third World. Adam Ulam, for example, called Ataturk the Nasir of his day, but both the situation in the LDCs and the limits on Soviet capabilities clearly prevented the kind of assiduous cultivation that occurred thirty years later.⁷

By the late twenties, the Soviet Union seemed to turn inward. Stalin's rapid industrialization drive required a major overhaul of Soviet society. By the same token, the purges of the mid-thirties riveted the Soviets' attention. Yet, in some ways, this period had an outward thrust as well—even if indirectly. The industrialization drive, of course, resulted in a major build-up of Soviet capabilities (which would be needed to fight the coming war). By the end of the war, the Soviets would have demonstrated their military prowess, culminating in the achievement of superpower status. Moreover, the purges themselves had an international relations aspect. By using charges of international espionage against prominent Soviets, the leadership implied a hostility from and toward foreigners. With regard to specific foreign policy issues, Europe was indeed the top priority. The record of Soviet diplomacy of the thirties shows that the Kremlin leadership was preoccupied with Europe and the growing Nazi power on the continent: Policy was directed first at containing and then at working with Hitler's Germany. The USSR signed a nonaggression pact with Poland in 1932; joined the League of Nations in 1934; negotiated treaties with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935; and signed the infamous Nazi-Soviet Pact with Germany in 1939. In Asia, the Soviets were concerned primarily with Japan and China and the conflict between them. The rest of the Third World paled in comparison.

From June 22, 1941, when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, until the end of World War II, the Soviet goal was survival. In the colonial areas this meant, for example, that the communists in Bolivia supported the pro-U.S. government against striking workers and that Indian communists backed the British against a nationalist noncooperation movement. In China, communists agreed to cooperate with the Kuomintang against the occupying Japanese.

By means of the victory at Stalingrad, the eventual defeat of the Axis Powers, and the occupation of substantial sections of Eastern Europe, the Soviets proved to themselves and the rest of the world that they were a major power that could challenge the United States. At the end of the war, the Soviets demobilized but never to the same extent as the West. They proved capable, as a result, of pressing their new role and image in Eastern Europe (including Berlin), in border regions such as Iran and Turkey and, of course, in Korea. Simultaneously, the USSR developed its nuclear arsenal, thus further enhancing its superpower status. This growth in prestige and capabilities was matched by increasing opportunity created by the era of decolonization. As subsequent chapters will show, the USSR groped its way—sometimes acting cautiously and sometimes adventurously. The remainder of this chapter will present an overview of the Soviets' own attempts to understand Third World dynamics and to interpret their involvement.

The dramatic changes in postwar international politics, Stalin's death in 1953, and the ensuing succession struggle contributed to a rethinking of the international environment in which the Third World would acquire increasing significance. Soviet analyses of the time emphasized the changing international balance of power in favor of socialism; indeed, the espousal of several varieties of home-grown socialism and of vehement anti-Westernism by a growing number of Third World leaders seemed to confirm this trend. At the Twentieth Communist Party Congress in 1956, Nikita S. Khrushchev, the Party secretary, announced that because of the strength of the socialist camp, war was not inevitable and that a vast "peace zone" existed in the awakening Third World. The Congress also provided an arena for criticisms of leaders who argued against dealings with developing states and of the institutes of the Academy of Sciences that had not provided adequate information or devoted enough energies to contemporary issues.

The evolving Soviet world view implicitly permitted the Soviet Union to be active in the Third World: Formal diplomatic relations were conducted with many nonindustrial states and, as they had in the twenties, the Soviets proffered economic and military aid to several others. As part of the change, nationalist leaders who had been reviled under Stalin became honored guests at Kremlin receptions. Nevertheless, Moscow's growing interest in the Third World did not overshadow other foreign policy concerns. Priority has still been accorded to Soviet relations with the United States, China, and Western Europe. These policy spheres are, however, interrelated and decisions and/or events in one area may impinge on policy in another region.

The proliferation of Soviet ties with an ever increasing number of Third World states brought with it ideological problems, intracommunist disputes, and practical concerns. The Kremlin's dealings with the Third World radicals of the late fifties and early sixties infuriated local communists as well as some of the more doctrinaire members of the Politburo. Critics from both groups challenged policy assumptions and the wisdom of neglecting ideological imperatives. Several Third World leaders who were attractive to the USSR because of their anti-Westernism proved equally anticommunist. While jailing, if not executing, members of the local parties, they also initiated domestic programs that seemed to merit Soviet approval. The series of nationalizations, the establishment of agrarian cooperatives, the curtailment of foreign investment—all without Soviet prompting—forced Moscow to assess how socialistically acceptable these home-grown socialisms truly were. On a pragmatic level, the Soviet leadership was concerned about how the burgeoning investments of the USSR were being used. This worry prompted some of the earliest attempts to sort out and evaluate local development strategies. Thus Soviet involvement in the nonindustrial world carried with it the need to guard the USSR's international prestige as leader of the socialist bloc. Moreover, the Soviets hoped as well that their activities matched their superpower status.

As a result of these problems and pressures, the Soviet leadership and the members of the relevant institutes of the Academy of Sciences attempted, over the years, to define "acceptable" Third World allies and to suggest programs to alleviate some of the apparent troubles. The analyses by politicians and academics combined Marxist-Leninist social science with some empirical observation. Additionally, their prescriptive nature is evident in the suggested strategies for movement from a traditional to a Soviet-type society.

The first significant formulation was the National Democratic State (NDS), which appeared as part of a statement issued in 1960 by the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties. The statement characterized an NDS as a state that maintains close economic and cu...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables, Figures, and Maps
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Changing Soviet Perspectives on the Third World
• 2 The Record
• 3 Third World Openings and Soviet Opportunities
• 4 Third World Obstacles and Soviet Vulnerabilities
• 5 Tools of Soviet Involvement
• 6 Accounting for Soviet Behavior
• 7 Soviet-Third World Relations: Trends and Prospects
• Maps
• Bibliography
• Recommended Reading
• List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
• About the Book and Authors
• Index