Portugal Since The Revolution

Economic And Political Perspectives

Jorge Braga De Macedo, Simon Serfaty

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9781000307771
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This volume examines the economic and political circumstances in Portugal since the 1974 revolution. A succinct analysis of the central themes of Portuguese politics (drawing on public opinion surveys conducted in Portugal) is followed by a framework for analyzing the economic consequences of the coup. The authors then assess the influence of the I

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Patterns of Politics in Portugal Since the April Revolution

Thomas C. Bruneau

The purpose of this essay is to analyze the formation of a liberal democratic regime in Portugal since the 1974 military coup. To this end we will describe some aspects of the structures of politics, the dynamics of the conflicts concerning them, and the solutions proposed to resolve the Portuguese ‘crisis’. There is probably little need to dwell on the continuing instability of a political system which has seen six provisional and six constitutional governments between 1974 and 1980. What is more, this condition may well continue.

The potential gravity of such instability is readily understood if we recall that there are similarities between the unstable First Republic (1910–1926)--which gave way to almost half a century of non-democratic rule--and the present system. And, as shall be seen, in the discussion of our survey data^*, a substantial part of the population look back to the non-democratic Estado Novo with a certain amount of nostalgia as they compare their memories of it to the present situation of socio-economic change and hardship. Guarded optimism about the future of Portuguese democracy remains warranted. Yet, its continuation cannot be taken for granted; few anticipated the demise of the previous regime yet it collapsed suddenly and completely.

The present situation cannot be properly assessed without some prior understanding of the authoritarian regime and the revolutionary process initiated by its collapse. Since this background has been previously discussed elsewhere, it is only necessary here to review a number of the main points.¹ Political activity during the period 1928–1974 was structured within a conservative authoritarian regime created and directed by Premier Antonio de Oliveira Salazar until his illness in 1968, at which point his understudy, Marcelo Caetano, assumed control. The regime was conservative in that it sought a return to the stable, ordered, and class-structured society of the 19th century, and based its legitimacy on Catholic and corporatist doctrines. It was authoritarian as it did not allow any serious degree of popular participation in government. All levels of government were controlled by those above them, and the regime was largely autonomous from society. Through an elaborate system of class associations, guilds, professional associations, and institutions, including the Catholic Church, demands were reduced through anticipation and cooptation. Thus independent from society the regime was not obliged to innovate or evolve, and conflicts were not structured into the decisionmaking apparatus. However, as the government remained static, it grew increasingly less able to adapt to. a domestic situation that was changing on account of the African wars (from 1961) and growing economic integration with the outside world (mainly from 1965 on). Ultimately the government was unable to respond to the key colonial issue and fell quickly and helplessly when those obliged to fight the wars, i.e., the middle-ranking officers, realized they would have to overthrow the regime to change this, or any other important, policy.²

The legacy of this non-democratic, non-innovative regime was a complete lack of structures upon which to build a more democratic system. In overthrowing the regime the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) and the parties and groups that promoted and became involved in the revolution eliminated the previously existing structures and sought to replace them by some other complete system.³ The question of a new regime was so broad, so open, and the actors in the struggle for power so diverse as to set in motion a dynamic process that must be termed revolutionary both for its very momentum and the resulting changes in socio-economic structures. A key actor in this process was the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) which had precise goals as well as specific strategies to attain these goals. Its prominence, jointly with that of the MFA, encouraged the emergence of other groups and parties, many with international support, which contested the PCP’s strategy.⁴ This interaction of political forces gave rise in early 1976 to a system which is still in process of formation but which minimizes the alternative of the far Left and the far Right. The importance of these alternatives is limited further by the influence of foreign states and organizations. Yet, even within the parameters of the far Left and far Right there remains considerable room for change. Indeed, there is still so much to define that the question of regime continues at issue. While the likelihood of coups from the Left or Right appears remote we must recall that the First Republic collapsed more from apathy than from the strength of the military which initially assumed power.

In the light of this background, and in order to comprehend the dynamics of the political system that has emerged since the Constitution came into effect in May 1976, we must define certain of its characteristics, or axes, which condition these dynamics and the eventual solution to the Portuguese ‘crisis’. While this, the first consideration, may appear too abstract and even philosophical, it would appear that the mere scope of what is involved in being Portuguese and appreciating what can be expected from any political system is central to the crisis. As the oldest continuing imperial power the image of Portugal with colonies (or overseas territories - o ultramar) was integral to a national character or psyche, and was promoted as such by the previous regime in defining Portuguese uniqueness. It is no exaggeration to state that both the nature of the regime and the identity of the nation itself are now in question. The country is a mere 5 percent of its former territory and one political system has yet to be clearly defined. Thus, Portugal is diminished in more ways than one: the colonies are gone, the economy remains extremely weak, and the country can no longer boast of dramatically distinct features. It is simply small and poor. What is more, so much was expected from the demise of the old regime and was promised by various governments that it would be difficult for any population to comprehend the present crisis, much less one indoctrinated for so long and never allowed to participate in politics.

While the term ‘crisis’ tends to be associated with Marxist analysis it has become prevalent in discussing the general situation in Portugal. In our survey we attempted to ascertain whether the population felt a crisis was at hand, the results are unambiguous as shown below.

Many people speak of a crisis in Portuguese society. Do you think there is such a crisis?

Yes	63%
No	5
Don't know	28
No response	4

Granted the crisis, most of our sample perceived its most serious aspect in economic terms: lack of jobs - 30%; the economy in general - 29%; increased cost of living - 26%; and general social problems - 8%

Portuguese themselves perceive this crisis because the instability of these past five years is compared to the stability of the old regime. Prior to April 25, 1974 the country may not have been progressive, just, or even promising for the majority of the population. Emigration is one indicator, and great masses of Portuguese voted with their feet in seeking opportunities else where.⁵ A constant drain on the state budget, the wars in Africa wore down the population, eventually constituting a moral issue as it became clear that a large number of people were undergoing severe hardship and death for what was increasingly seen as a lost cause. Yet, in the face of these overwhelmingly negative aspects, the situation was at least predictable: it may have been bad, but it was a known bad, and one that many could live with. One wonders how many Portuguese living abroad intended to return and live in their “casas Portuguesas”. With the coup of April 25th and the subsequent revolutionary process, much was expected and even more promised as people believed they would enjoy all the positive aspects of the past with the added benefits from the three D’s of the MFA: Decolonization, Democracy, and Development. Instead, the first of these three D’s resulted in some 600,000 refugees arriving in Portugal and making demands on the state and competing for scarce jobs, even while Portugal lost the economic benefits of colonies absorbing goods and providing cheap raw materials. The second D (Democracy) granted numerous opportunities to participate, but it also produced extravagant promises and rhetoric which became increasingly hollow and at odds with the real situation. And the last D, understood as economic development, has yet to materialize, as it is unanimously recognized that the economic situation is parlous.⁶ In general, then, the revolution and the political system emerging from it have left something to be desired.

There was no feasible way Portugal could have retained the colonies, and the parties and movements attempting to gain support on this issue have not succeeded. However, although Portugal may not have had the power to influence events in any case, there is disagreement about the manner in which decolonization was effected:

Portugal should have continued to fight	2%
Independence should have beep handled as it was	9
Independence should have been granted but with guarantees for the Portuguese living there	59
A federation should have been created	6%
Don’t know and no response	24

In addition to the problems of decolonization which can be blamed on the post-coup governments, there were also setbacks created by the rapid increases in petroleum prices after 1973 and the world recession which severely limited trade options and emigration from Portugal. However, such factors have proved to be difficult to comprehend for a population used to order and stability, and already disconcerted by the need to come to terms with Portugal as a very small European country rather than an empire spanning three continents. To be sure, any revolution promises far more than it can deliver, but what is unique (and particularly at issue here) is that Portugal provides a democratic system allowing for the representation of the people’s interests and feelings. Accordingly, the political elites have good reason to be concerned if the population is discontented with the ability of the government to govern. Such discontent emerged very explicitly in our survey in all the items concerning popular support. Thus, to the question ‘Which government or regime best governed the Country?’ we gathered the following answers:

Salazar —	7%
Caetano — Estado Novo	28
P. Carlos	1
V. Gonçalves Provisional governments	8
P. Azevedo —	3
M. Soares - 1st Constitutional Government	9
Don’t know and no response	44

The total of 35% for the old regime contrasts to a total of 21% for all the governments since the revolution. The low (9%) figure for Mario Soares came after almost two years at the head of the First and the Second Constitutional Governments. Those preferring the government of Marcelo Caetano comprised 50% of all respondents whereas those preferring M. Soares amounted to 16% only. Such preference clearly reflects economic concerns: Of those preferring Salazar and Caetano, 49% and 63% respectively explained their preference in terms of the better economic situation said to prevail then. Only 12% of those who favored Soares reached a similar judgment. The Soares government was praised for its democratic aspects, but the total here paled in comparison with the negative evaluation regarding the economy.

In more general terms the population was aware of changes since 1974 (72% yes; 11% no; and 17% no response). There was, however, little consensus on the direction of change: for the better 18%; for the worse 39%; no change 15%; and don’t know 33%. Pursuing this we asked about changes in one’s personal life and found the following: for the better 18%; for the worse 26%; no change 50%; and no response 6%. In essence then, there is little positive appreciation of changes since the revolution of 1974 and this is confirmed by virtually all the questions raised in our survey. Similarly, there is little appreciation of the governments that have come and gone during these five years.

The p...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• List of Figures
• Preface
• 1. Patterns of Politics in Portugal Since the April Revolution
• 2. The Economic Consequences of the April 25th Revolution
• 3. Portugal and the IMF: The Political Economy of Stabilization
• 4. Portugal and Europe: The Channels of Structural Interdependence
• Notes on the Contributors