The Iranian Revolution And The Muslim World

David Menashri

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9781000302646
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book delineates the Islamic revolution's impact mainly on the Muslim Middle East and examines the first decade of the revolution. It deals with the repercussions of the revolution in several Shi'i communities and examines Sunni polemical writings on the Shi'a and the Iranian revolution.

Part 1

Islamic Universalism and Iranian Impetus

1

The Export of Ithna Ashari Shi’ism: Historical and Ideological Background

Roger M. Savory

Ten years ago, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, burst upon a largely unsuspecting world. It soon became clear that it was one of the major revolutions of this century. Indeed, assessed on the basis of its long-term implications not only for the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and the whole Dar al-Islam, but also for the rest of the world as well, it could claim to be the most significant since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

Until the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Shi’i tradition had been largely ignored by Western scholarship, with some notable exceptions. Most scholars appeared willing to look at Shi’ism through Sunni eyes, that is, to view it, at best, as a relatively unimportant minority sect of Islam, and, at worst, as a sect so deviant as actually to be outside the pale of Islam. The Khomeini Revolution has not only resulted in an unprecedented degree of interest in Shi’ism, but has also led scholars to take a new look at some basic questions about the nature of the Ithna Ashari tradition. For example, is militancy an essential part of the Ithna Ashari tradition or is it an aberration? S. A. Arjomand and others maintain that the normative Ithna Ashari tradition is quietist, and that militancy, and extremism of the ghuluww type, represent the exception to the rule. Those who hold this view consequently regard the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a deviation from the norm and Khomeini’s doctrine of velayat-e faqih (“the rule of the jurisconsult”), a doctrine which is the cornerstone of this ideology, as a bid’a, that is, as an innovation tantamount to heresy.

Closely linked to this question is whether Ithna Ashari Shi’ism implies the rejection or the subjugation of earthly power. This is not simply an academic question, but a fundamental political question relevant to the permanence of the Khomeini regime. If one argues that Ithna Ashari Shi’ism implies the subjugation of earthly power, then the Islamic Revolution, by overthrowing the shah, who represented the pre-Islamic tradition of secular monarchy, has achieved its objective, and the religious leaders may, therefore, presumably look forward to a lengthy period of power. If, on the other hand, one argues that Ithna Ashari Shi’ism implies the rejection of all earthly power, and that its ideology is purely millenarian and messianic, then Khomeini, by claiming to have instituted a regime which anticipates the just rule of the Twelfth Imam, may run the risk of being judged to have fallen short of the standards of perfect equity expected from the Mahdi. The fact that Khomeini seemed to encourage the attribution to himself of the title ‘Imam’, with some messianic overtones, increases the likelihood that, at some point, disillusionment with the Islamic regime may occur.

Finally, there is the whole vexed question of Iranian nationalism and of the part played in it by the traditions of Darius and Muhammad respectively. Through the legend that Husayn, the younger son of Ali, married Shahrbanu, the daughter of the last of the Sasanid kings, Yazdgird III, Ithna Ashari Shi’ism was lifted out of its purely Islamic context and merged with the Iranian historical tradition. As Eugène Aubin put it:

Le Chiisme offrit une expression à cette nationalité qui s’obstinait à survivre; il fit une nation compacte de peuple le plus divers de l’Asie moderne, et, à défaut d’autre ressource, l’idée persane se réincarna sous une forme religieuse.¹

Under Khomeini, has this alliance, which was at best a mariage de convenance, ended in divorce? Is Khomeini in the process of forging something which one might call Ithna Ashari nationalism, consisting of some elements of Iranian nationalism but resolute in its rejection of secularism? All these inter-related questions bear indirectly on this paper, which attempts to discover to what extent there is any historical justification, in the Ithna Ashari tradition, for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s policy of seeking to export its brand of revolutionary Islam to other parts of the Islamic world.

Is Ithna Asharism Innately Revolutionary?

Until the Islamic Revolution, it was frequently assumed that Ithna Asharism was too closely identified with the Iranian national identity to be exportable to other parts of the Muslim world. This assumption may, of course, still prove to be well-founded. If it proves to be incorrect, it may be discovered that it is other elements of Khomeini’s syncretist ideology, rather than undiluted Ithna Asharism, that have made the mixture palatable to non-Iranian Muslims. What is now generally conceded, I think, even by the most optimistic Arab states in the Persian Gulf area, is that the attempt by the Khomeini regime to export its Islamic revolutionary ideology does constitute a danger to other states in the region. The wish to export one’s ideology, to foist it upon unwilling recipients, postulates that the ideology in question is revolutionary in nature. Before attempting to address the question of the export of Ithna Ashari ideology, therefore, perhaps one should first ask whether or not Ithna Asharism is innately revolutionary.

As Bernard Lewis has correctly said, there are present in the Islamic tradition, as a whole, strands of both quietism and activism,² and the same is true of Ithna Ashari tradition. There is, however, a crucial difference in the balance struck between quietism and activism in the Sunni and the Shi’i traditions, respectively. Over twenty years ago, Vladimir Minorsky captured the essence of Ithna Ashari ideology when he referred to “Shi’ism, with its overtones and its aroma of opposition, of martyrdom, and revolt.” These attributes, Minorsky said, had always been “quite well” matched with the Persian character.³ Given these basic characteristics of Ithna Ashari Shi’ism, a prima facie case could be made for its being a revolutionary creed. The circumstances attending its birth ensured that it would be a party, initially only a political party, opposed to the government of the day. This undeniable fact has left an enduring mark on Ithna Ashari ideology. There has always been a strong strand of negativism in Shi’i thought. It has always been much easier to say what Ithna Asharism is against, than to say what it is for. In the long-term, the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran may need to change this historically negative outlook into a more positive one. In the initial stage, however, they have been quite satisfied with a negative one.

If one accepts that opposition is a basic characteristic of Ithna Asharism, then the chances of this opposition being expressed in the form of a revolt are high. In the mediaeval Islamic world, as in mediaeval Christendom, dissidence was bound to be expressed by revolt, since there were no mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of political power. One may say, then, that Ithna Asharism had, from its inception, at least the potential for revolutionary activity. Arjomand, however, in a series of recent publications, considers that the dominant influence in Ithna Ashari thought is “legalistically and theologically rationalized Shi’ism,” which is quietist. What he terms “millenarian extremism” he regards as aberrant and unrepresentative of ‘true’ Shi’ism, however that may be defined.⁴ I believe that an even stronger case can be made for the proposition that Shi’is were quietist only during those periods when they had no hope of attaining political power. After 940/1, when Ithna Asharis abandoned the hope of the imminent return of the Twelfth Imam, such quietism could be rationalized in the light of their millenarian expectations. Sub specie aeternitatis, it might seem foolish to invite repression on the part of the dominant Sunni rulers of the Islamic world on a scale which might result in the annihilation of Ithna Asharism. It is interesting to note that the other major branch of the Shi’a, the Isma’ilis, achieved political power early, and, by the tenth century, ruled an important part of the heartlands of Islam. It was only after the Fatimids had lost political power that they attached greater importance to their millenarian expectations. Ithna Asharis were assisted in this attitude of quietism, when quietism seemed inevitable, by their doctrine of taqiyya, or ‘prudential dissimulation’, which not infrequently saved them from persecution. I would contend, then, that what Arjomand sees as “pious withdrawal from the political sphere”⁵ was, in reality, an attitude dictated by political necessity. Having failed to seize political power from the Sunni caliphs by force of arms, the Ithna Asharis bided their time and continued to operate ‘underground’.

In the course of their armed opposition to the Sunni caliphs, the Ithna Asharis acquired martyrs. Indeed, Ithana Asharis firmly believed that most of their Imams were done to death on the orders of the caliphs.⁶ In this way, Ithna Asharis came to lay increasing emphasis on the third characteristic of their creed noted by Minorsky: martyrdom.

Targets of Ithna Ashari Activism in the Middle Ages

If it is agreed that Ithna Ashari ideology contained within itself at least the potential for revolutionary activity, at whom was this activity to be directed? In the early days of Islam, Ithna Ashari political activism was directed primarily at the Sunni caliphs, who were deemed to be usurpers. Ithna Asharis came close to success during the Abbasid Revolution, but had victory snatched from their grasp when Ali al-Riza, the eighth Imam, whom the Abbasid Caliph Ma’mun had designated as his successor in 817,⁷ died the following year. Ithna Ashari historians allege that he was poisoned either by or on the orders of Ma’mun, but Tabari does not allude to the possibility of murder.⁸ In 940/1, the last of the four vakils or vicegerents of the Mahdi died without designating a successor, and Ithna Asharism entered the period of the ‘greater’ occultation (ghaybat-e kubra), which is still in progress. Ithna Ashari messianic aspirations were postponed till the millennium. It took the Ithna Ashari community some time to decide who was to lead it, in the absence of an Imam or of a vicegerent of the Mahdi. Ultimately, the community agreed that the Ithna Ashari mujtahids, those scholars most learned in jurisprudence and theology, should act as the representatives on earth of the Mahdi, and should exercise a ‘general agency’ (niyabat-e ammo) on his behalf, until his second coming. This decision coincided roughly with the establishment of the Buyid (Buwaihid) dynasty at Baghdad in 945, and the extension of the dominion of the Buyid rulers over Iraq-e Arab and most of Iraq-e Ajam.

The century of Buyid control of the caliphate (945–1055), which was felicitously termed by Minorsky the ‘Iranian intermezzo’, still poses some questions which await satisfactory answers. Prima facie, one would have expected the Buyid rulers, who were by all accounts some kind of ‘moderate’ Shi’is, to have seized the opportunity to establish an Ithna Ashari caliphate. Why did this not happen? Various arguments have been advanced to explain this. First, it is suggested that the Fatimids pre-empted the Ithna Ashari position by establishing a Shi’i caliphate in Cairo. It would have been difficult, this argument runs, to establish a rival Shi’i caliphate. I find this argument unconvincing. The two major branches of the Shi’a, the Isma’ilis or ‘Seveners’ and the Ithna Asharis or ‘Twelvers’, had diverged after the death of the sixth Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq, in 757, and had gone their separate ways. Their ideology had developed along very different lines, and there was no collaboration or community of interest between the two groups. On the theoretical level, it seems to me that the establishment of an Ithna Ashari caliphate by the Buyids should not have been beyond the bounds of possibility. There would have been no question of weakening a theoretical ‘common Shi’i front’ against the Sunnis.

A second argument commonly advanced is that, since the majority of the population in Iraq-e Arab was Sunni (and probably also at that date the majority of the population in Iraq-e Ajam) the Buyids decided that it would be politically unwise to provoke political opposition by installing a Shi’i caliph in Baghdad. Thi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• List of Abbreviations Used in Notes
• Introduction
• PART 1 ISLAMIC UNIVERSALISM AND IRANIAN IMPETUS
• PART 2 ARAB SHI’I COMMUNITIES: EMULATION AND SUBVERSION
• PART 3 THE SUNNI-ARAB HEARTLAND: INSPIRATION, SUSPICION, AND CONFRONTATION
• PART 4 ACROSS THE NORTHERN TIER: CONTAINMENT FROM WITHIN
• List of Contributors
• Index