Social Deviance In Eastern Europe

Ivan Volgyes

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367287528
• eBook ISBN: 9781000311747
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

During the last thirty years, under Communist rule, the East European states have attempted to eradicate activities that are deemed deviant from the point of view of the government. But despite all efforts, such activities as prostitution, murder, robbery, private profiteering and even political dissidence continue to flourish. In this book, five s

1. Social Deviance in Eastern Europe: On Understanding the Problem

Paul H. Shapiro

Marxist ideology postulates that there will be no social deviance in Communist society, that deviant behavior will disappear with the termination of the exploitation and alienation of man that characterize capitalism, and with the termination of the lag in social consciousness of the individual that characterizes socialism. Communist consciousness will make the citizen a thoroughly integrated member of society.(1) Were these hypotheses verifiable, it might be possible to devise a method, based on relative or absolute levels of social deviance present, to measure the progress made—and yet to be made—toward the introduction of communism in the eight countries erf Eastern Europe. But since it is difficult in the absence of societies claiming to have reached full communism to test and operationalize such ideas, one must instead be content with the tasks of investigating and trying to understand the nature and scope of social deviance as it exists in Eastern Europe today, and of examining its possible ramifications for the regimes of that region. The present essay will be an effort in this direction.

In order to look as objectively as possible at social deviance in Eastern Europe, it is necessary first to try to establish a general theoretical framework within which the phenomenon of social deviance can be examined. In part this implies the establishment of a working definition (or more than one), and to this end we will look briefly at the theory of social deviance as it has been developed by Western sociologists. Next we will see whether and how application to the East European setting requires adaptation of the theoretical framework described to the specific conditions of the region. Only then will it be possible to define the issues most relevant to an analysis of social deviance in Eastern Europe and to draw conclusions concerning the significance of the situation as it now exists or as it is likely to evolve there.

Western Theories of Social Deviance

Broad definitions of social deviance are certainly possible and have often been proposed. From a purely statistical perspective, for example, deviance can be viewed as anything that varies too widely from the average. But this definition is faulty: it implies that the average is the norm, while this has simply not been so in much of man's societal experience. The medical analogy which some have used to discuss deviance, on the other hand, identifies deviance as something pathological, revealing "disease" (biological or otherwise) in the perpetrator,(2) and thus implies the existence of a notion of "healthy" behavior which is normative rather than statistical. Unfortunately, this method of identifying deviance, just as much as the statistical method, concentrates excessively on the individual perpetrator, in the belief that there is something inherent in deviants which distinguishes them from non-deviants. It locates the source of deviance within the individual, but prevents the observer from seeing that the societal judgment of what—rather than who—is deviant is a crucial factor in understanding the phenomenon of social deviance. We are looking, after all, at deviance within society, not of the isolated individual.

The behavioral questions of how and why some people engage in deviant acts in fact deal with only one part of the twofold problem of explaining social deviance. The questions relevant for the second, social aspect of the problem are how and why certain types of behavior are deemed deviant. Efforts to develop a sociology of deviance have been aimed toward finding answers to both of these sets of questions. Only a theoretical framework which explains both deviant behavior and social definitions will allow the operationalization of definitions of social deviance such as that provided by one of the early investigators of the phenomenon, Robert K Merton:

...deviant behavior refers to conduct that departs significantly from the norms set for people in their social statuses.(3)

In his pathfinding 1938 article "Social Structure and Anomie," Merton himself offered a theory of social deviance which remained largely unchallenged until the 1960s. In discussing various elements of social and cultural structures, he laid special stress on: (a)"culturally defined goals, purposes and interests, held out as legitimate objectives for all or for diversely located members of the society," and (b) institutionalized norms intended to define, regulate, and control "the acceptable modes of reaching out for these goals." The goals were "more or less integrated—the degree...a question of empirical fact—and roughly ordered in some hierarchy of value," while the regulatory norms fell into the various categories of "prescription," "preference," "permission," and "proscription." Merton argued that a rough balance between the emphasis placed on cultural goals and institutionalized norms would provide the basis for integrated and relatively stable societies. Dissociation of "culturally prescribed aspirations" and "socially structured avenues for realizing these aspirations," on the other hand, would result in social deviance which might, if sufficiently widespread, undermine societal stability. The dissociation can be of two sorts. Activities originally viewed as instrumental means to societally approved ends might became ends in and of themselves. "Close adherence to institutionally prescribed conduct becomes a matter of ritual," without consideration of original or ultimate purpose. Conversely, at the other extreme, the emphasis placed upon the value of certain goals may become so great that means come to be limited by technical rather than institutional norms, so that any and all means to the desired end will be permitted. Technical expediency rather than cultural legitimacy comes to govern decisions as to means, social deviance increases, and society begins to destabilize as it heads toward normlessness (anomie).(4)

As Merton developed and refined his anomie theory of social deviance after 1938, he examined many questions of potential importance for the application of deviance theory to Eastern Europe. Looking now at three relevant points made by Merton will not only preview our discussion of some of the issues raised by the East European context, but will also facilitate an examination of the alternative theories of deviance current among Western sociologists.

(a) The first point made by Merton has to do with the way in which norms are established in society. When social values are a matter of overwhelming consensus in society, consensus establishes the norm. But in the absence of consensus, when differentiated groups promote varying and often contradictory sets of values, interests, and standards of conduct, mere numbers, be they majority or plurality, do not suffice to set norms. Mertan accurately asserts:

Those occupying strategic positions of authority and power of course carry more weight than others in deciding social policy and therefore, among other things, in identifying for the rest what are to be taken as significant departures from social standards.(5)

Thus there exists in every society which is not perfectly integrated a group or combination of groups which makes rules and provides social definitions for the society as a whole. It is by no means guaranteed that the rules promulgated by the definers will correspond to those thought appropriate by most members of the society, but this is of little importance. In fact, to the extent that the definers maintain their positions by virtue of something other than representativeness of the general citizenry, their views ought to be expected to differ from those of the society at large. What is important here is neither whether the definers promulgate popular norms, nor whether they maintain their authority to enforce rules on others in society by plebiscite or by virtue of inherent political and economic power. What matters is whether they are accepted—for whatever reason—as legitimate definers by those upon whom they are imposing their rules. If they are, social deviance will be at a minimum and the existing social order will be relatively stable. If they are not, then individual members of society will feel justified in rejecting societal rules and challenging those enforcing the rules as either incompetent or not legitimately entitled to do so. Sufficient numbers of such challenges might eventually endanger the authoritative status of the definers and of the rules they impose.

Viewed in this light, the question of social deviance appears ultimately related to that of societal legitimacy, and this fact has been reflected in the efforts of students of social deviance who have tried to improve on Merton's basic definition cited above. Robert Dentler and Kai T. Erikson, for example, define social deviance as:

behavior which violates institutionalized expectations which are shared and recognized as legitimate [italics mine—PAS] within the social system.(6)

The possibility that the definers might themselves qualify as "deviants" if they perform their rule-making function without societal recognition of their legitimacy in the role is a corollary of Merton's theory of social deviance which needs to be kept in mind.

(b) Another important point made by Merton in the course of his examination of the phenomenon of social deviance is that deviance is not uniform in nature. He distinguishes two major types of deviance, "nonconforming behavior" and "aberrant behavior." His enumeration of the contrasting characteristics of the two types is most useful to anyone trying to look at actual deviant behavior in a specific social setting.

The nonconformer "announces his dissent publicly," while the aberrant tries "to hide his departures from social norms." This relates directly to the fact that the nonconformer challenges the legitimacy of the social norms he rejects (or at least the way in which they are being enforced), while the aberrant "acknowledges the legitimacy of the norms he violates," simply finding it "expedient or expressive of his state of mind to violate them." The nonconformer "aims to change the norms he is denying in practice," hoping to replace them with a morally superior set; while the aberrant mainly hopes "to escape the sanctioning force of existing norms, without proposing substitutes for them." An important further distinction is that the nonconformer "is acknowledged, however reluctantly, by conventional members of the social system [though not necessarily by the definers—PAS] to depart from prevailing norms for disinterested purposes," while the aberrant "is generally assumed to be deviating from norms in order to serve his own interests." The definers and enforcers of societal rules may not differentiate between the two types of deviant (nor will the law if a society is so inflexible as to equate deviant with illegal behavior), but many among the general citizenry will. Finally, according to Merton, the nonconformer "can lay claim to legitimacy by drawing upon the ultimate values, rather than upon the particular norms of the society," by claiming to be trying to make "social reality" out of what current definers have left 'Institutionalized fiction" He can "appeal to the tacit recognition by others of discrepancies between...prized values and social reality." The aberrant can make no claim to legitimacy in the eyes of other members of society.(7)

The two varieties of deviance thus differ in publicity, attitudes toward existing norms, purposes, and claims to legitimacy and support. These distinctions open up the possibility that deviance, in its nonconforming variety, is not necessarily bad for society. Situations may arise in which a nonconformer minority represents the values and ultimate interests of a society better and more faithfully than the definer societal elite. In this case, legitimate deviance may help usher in social change in the direction of greater conformity with societally approved values, or it may hasten the definers' departure from their positions of authority.

(c) Finally, Merton identifies variations in the characteristics of social norms against which deviance is measured. Norms might prescribe or proscribe, or indicate what is preferred, or simply what is permitted. They might have the support of a bread consensus of opinion within society, or, at the other pole, of none but a very restricted clique of rule-enforcers. They may vary in the intensity of commitment which they evoke, and in the nature of the control mechanisms associated with them. They may require only overt conformity, or inner adherence, or both. And they may vary in elasticity, requiring close adherence to rigidly set behavior or belief patterns, or perhaps, on the other hand, allowing considerable leeway and behavioral autonomy to members of the society.

Merton calls these distinctions variations of "spectrum of normative control," "extent of agreement," "affective or moral commitment," "social structure of control," "kind of adherence required," and "elasticity," (8) and each turns out to be significant in the East European setting. In part this is because they focus on societal rules and rule-making processes, rather than on deviant conduct itself. This change in focus is basic to the theory of social deviance formulated by the so-called "labeling school."

The "labeling theory" of deviance was developed in the 1960s by Howard S. Better, Kai T. Erikson, John I. Kitsuse, Edwin Lemert, and others, as a means of responding to certain deficiencies which they perceived in Merton's anomie theory, most notably its overconcentrations, in their opinion, on the classification and analysis of deviant forms of behavior, and its contention that varying rates of particular types of deviance are caused by socially patterned discrepancies between culturally approved aspirations and access to societally approved means to attain them. The labelers contend that deviance is not a "property inherent in certain forms of behavior," but "a property conferred upon these forms" by the social audience, "since it is the audience which determines whether or not any episode of behavior or any class of episodes is labeled deviant. "(9) Their theoretical shift in focus from the individual actor to the "social audience," or, more narrowly, to the "definers" of deviance, is underscored by the following key statements of Kitsuse and Becker. Kitsuse writes:

Forms of behavior per se do not differentiate deviants from non-deviants; it is the responses of the conventional and conforming members of society who identify and interpret behavior as deviant which sociologically transforms persons into deviants.(10)

And Becker continues:

...social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying these rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders...Deviance is not a quality of the act a person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an "offender." The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label.(11)

According to the labelers, then, deviance exists only when society identifies and reacts to the potentially deviant act. Thus, rates of deviance depend on the "actions taken by persons in the social system which define, classify, and record certain behaviors as deviant,"(12) rather than on the imbalance between approved goals and societally sanctioned means which Merton emphasizes.

Some have criticized the labeling theory as "relativistic in the extreme," since it does not answer questions concerning, for example, variations in the incidence of certain acts (presumably intrinsically deviant) from society to society, the commission of deviant acts by some individuals within a society but not by others, or the consideration of an act as deviant in some societies but not in others.(13) In part, the criticism is valid. In its extreme form, labeling denies any normative definition of deviance, denies that people may commit deviant acts because of their own individual situations, regardless of labels which others may or may not apply to them, and denies that societal reaction occurs because the act committed deviates from norms, rather than vice versa. According to this extreme interpretation, labeling night be ta...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• About the Authors
• 1. Social Deviance in Eastern Europe: On Understanding the Problem
• 2. Social Deviance in Czechoslovakia
• 3. Social Deviance in Hungary: The Case of Prostitution
• 4. Social Deviance in Hungary: The Case of the Private Economy
• 5. Social Deviance in Poland: The Case of the Private Sector
• 6. Social Deviance in Romania
• 7. Social Deviance in Yugoslavia
• 8. Social Deviance in Eastern Europe: The Case of Alcoholism