Contending Legitimacy in World Politics

The State, Civil Society and the International Sphere in the Twenty-first Century

Bronwyn Winter, Lucia Sorbera

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781351703772
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Legitimacy, along with security and democracy, is arguably one of the most widely used global buzzwords of the new millennium. Yet, the idea of political legitimacy is not new and has been constructed in different ways at different moments in history. This book problematizes this notion, from various contextual standpoints, disciplinary and theoretical perspectives. Taking a comparative, transnational and bottom-up approach to the study of political legitimacy, this book sheds light on multiple perceptions by different actors (institutions, civil society, majoritarian and minority subjects), analysing the notion of political legitimacy from a critical perspective. Questioning received wisdom or one-size-fits-all analyses, it leads to a reassessment of the link between legitimacy and sovereignty, and emphasises the demand by transnational civil society to go beyond identity politics, which produce logics of violence. This book was originally published as a special issue of Global Discourse.

Debating legitimacy transnationally

Anna Meine

ABSTRACT

As modes and institutions of governance proliferate beyond the state, legitimacy has become a key concept for assessing, supporting or contesting not only the domestic but also the international political order. Often, however, it tends to be used as an umbrella term encompassing different standards of evaluation. How we are to understand legitimacy beyond the state systemically and to relate the different discussions on legitimacy to each other or to the legitimacy of our political order in its entirety are questions yet to be answered.

Against this background, I aim to systematise the underlying issues and questions discussed in contemporary politics and in academic debates by means of a relational conception of political legitimacy. This conception stresses the importance of a constructive relation between institutions and those subject to them, i.e. between objects and subjects of legitimacy. They form the frame of the norms and processes, implied in conceptions of legitimacy. By foregrounding this relation, it becomes visible that debates on norms and processes, which transcend the state, implicate uncertainties, if not struggles about the subjects and objects of legitimacy. Thus, making explicit and discussing openly who the subjects of legitimacy are and how they are or should be related to the objects of legitimacy constitutes a jurisdictional challenge. This is a challenge we have to face if we accept and apply legitimacy as a valid standard for transnational politics. In addition, determining the subject of legitimacy constitutes a conceptual and political challenge, which becomes especially relevant when debating legitimacy transnationally. While both challenges call for broadening and deepening our understanding of legitimate political orders as well as legitimate second-order decisions, the latter, in particular, constitutes a meta-jurisdictional task when thinking about and debating the legitimacy of political orders.

1. Introduction: legitimacy as transnationally contested standard

What are the standards by which UN and EU refugee politics should be evaluated? How should decisions be made within the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organisation (WTO)? Should civil society actors be included in processes of decision-making beyond the state? These are some of the many questions, which arise as institutions of governance proliferate not only nationally but also inter-, trans- or even supranationally and as their existence and working become politicised and contested. The upsurge of political as well as academic debates illustrates that legitimacy has become a key concept for assessing and judging, supporting or contesting actors, institutions and processes of transnational politics. Not solely territorial nation-states but international institutions and governance mechanisms as well are increasingly considered as mechanisms of rule in need of legitimation.¹

Two types of discussions characterise the discourse on transnational legitimacy in political science. On one hand, it is disputed whether democratic legitimacy can be maintained beyond the state and whether distinct norms should constitute the standard of legitimacy transnationally (e.g. Buchanan and Keohane 2006, 417–436).² On the other hand, many academic contributions assess the legitimacy of specific institutions, policies or actors without discussing the political order in general.³ Legitimacy tends to be used as an umbrella term, encompassing a myriad of different issues as well as different standards of evaluation. Yet, while the different issues are worth discussing, their interrelation and broader significance remain unclear. How we are to understand legitimacy beyond the state more systemically and how we are to relate the different aspects and discussions to each other or to the legitimacy of our political order in its entirety are questions yet to be answered.

Against this background, I aim to uncover and systematise the underlying issues and questions discussed in contemporary politics as well as in academic debates on legitimacy by means of the conception of political legitimacy itself. The relational conception of political legitimacy, which I consider to lie at the heart of twentieth century conceptual thinking about legitimacy in political science and theory, denotes a constructive relationship between a subject and an object of legitimacy. Emphasising this relation provides the means to better understand, relate and systematise the theoretical and normative challenges at hand. Not only are norms and modes of governance subject to contestation but also, fundamentally, the underlying relations between subjects and objects of legitimacy are in dispute. Thus, making explicit and discussing openly who the subjects of legitimacy are and how they are or should be related to the objects of legitimacy presents a major jurisdictional challenge we have to face if we accept and apply legitimacy as a valid standard for transnational politics. At the same time, legitimately determining the subject of legitimacy constitutes an additional conceptual as well as a political challenge. The notion of ‘horizontal legitimacy’ (e.g. Schmelzle 2007), which considers questions of interpersonal relations between members of a democratic collective as a new dimension of legitimacy, does not reach the heart of this challenge. In order to discuss and decide on the frame of a political order, it is necessary to develop an understanding of legitimate meta-jurisdictional will-formation and decision-making based on the relational conception of legitimacy itself. Making this argument, I try to provide a frame within which we can constructively relate the various, highly variable and often highly specific debates we witness and, thereby, understand what is at stake when we argue about the legitimacy of specific bits and pieces of the developing system of governance and rule in and beyond the state.

2. Legitimacy: relational structure as conceptual core

Conceptions of legitimacy highlight different aspects and pursue different aims. However, they all contain information on the object, on norms and/or processes and on the subject of legitimacy. While the subject often remains implicit and norms and processes constitute the main points of contention (see below), the object to be legitimated, though differently denominated in the literature, is always present. Beetham (1991) discusses relations of power, Weber (1978, 212) speaks of authority or rule and Easton (1965, 285) and Luhmann (1983) theorise the political system. But what is at stake here? Buchanan argues that the object of legitimacy is ‘the attempt to exercise a monopoly, within a jurisdiction, in the making, application and enforcement of laws (2002, 689–690). Schmelzle (2012, 420, 432–433) convincingly specifies that, fundamentally, the right to govern, which follows from legitimacy, refers neither to a claim to obedience nor to a permission to exercise coercion, but to the competence to set and change binding norms, and thereby the rights and duties of its subjects. Thus, legitimacy refers to the justification of second-order rights. I agree with Schmelzle that authoritative political institutions constitute the object of legitimacy. Yet, in addition, I argue that, at its core, legitimacy refers to the justification of the underlying asymmetric relations between authoritative institutions or their representatives on the one hand and those affected by or subjected to the generated norms on the other. The asymmetric character of this relationship follows directly from the former’s competence to set binding norms, but it is only problematic and in need of justification as it restricts the latter’s individual autonomy and equality. It is Beetham’s (1991, 15–20) multidimensional conception of legitimation, which precisely highlights this fundamentally relational structure and helps to trace it throughout the literature, and elaborates the repercussions of this insight on the different dimensions of legitimacy, i.e. legal validity, publicly voiced consent and justification in terms of the moral convictions of rulers and ruled.

Legal validity and consent are dominant elements of descriptive, sociological or functional conceptions of legitimacy, which focus on compliance and, fundamentally, on legitimacy’s function as a means for furthering stable political rule (Peter 2014). In his study, Weber (1978, 213–215; 2004) observes that a general belief in the legitimacy of a system of rule cannot be based on economic, affective or habitual reasons to comply with domination alone, but depends on rational, traditional or charismatic foundations. Easton (1965, 278–309) argues that the belief in legitimacy as ‘the conviction on the part of the member [of the political system, A.M.] that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime’ (278), which may be based on ideological, structural or personal reasons, forms a part of the input, a political system needed in order to persist. Luhmann (1983), in turn, emphasises procedures, e.g. legislative or judicial processes, as mechanisms of self-legitimation by the political system itself, which generate compliance and thus contribute to maintaining the system. These different examples illustrate that legal validity and the belief in the legitimacy of a political system are crucial for the continued existence of authoritative political institutions. Yet, although all three authors implicitly presuppose a normative background consensus, which guarantees the smooth functioning of political institutions, they do not explicitly discuss the normative content of legitimacy. Thus, Beetham’s (1991, 11) criticism of Weber, whom he accuses of ignoring the central element of legitimacy, i.e. the justification of relationships of power in terms of people’s beliefs, applies to Luhmann’s and, in alleviated form, to Easton’s contributions as well. The relation between object and subject of legitimacy is misconstrued and the normative or critical potential of the concept abandoned if legitimacy is reduced to a function of the political system, which, as in Luhmann’s case, the system itself might even provide for.

Normative conceptions of legitimation and legitimacy, in turn, focus on analysing and discussing the justification of asymmetric relations of rule beyond legal validity and understand legitimacy as an end in itself. In contrast to procedural conceptions (see below), substantive accounts ask for the qualitative norms constituting standards of legitimacy. Buchanan’s proposition to understand ‘at least the most basic human rights of all those over whom it [i.e. a wielder of political power, A.M.] wields power’ (2002, 703), i.e. the respect of individual liberty and equality, as the core criterion of legitimacy, is a case in point. In addition and in accordance with the relational reading of legitimacy, which foregrounds the asymmetric relation between rulers and ruled, Beetham (1991, 77–89) points out that any normative justification of relations of rule has to include a normative account of a common interest, which recognises and encompasses the interests of rulers and ruled, and a principle of differentiation, which accounts for the difference between them. Buchanan’s insistence on human rights norms serves as a notion of a common good. In contrast, charisma, tradition and bureaucratic hierarchy (see Weber), personal authority (see Easton) or meritocratic principles as expressed, e.g. by the institution of democratic elections (see Beetham 1991, 81–82) are examples of principles of difference. However, to be of value for a specific political order, abstract principles of difference and, even more so, notions of a general interest need to be specified.

This insight lies at the heart of procedural conceptions of legitimation. Prominently, Habermas conceptualises legitimacy as a political order’s validity claim of being justifiable and worthy of recognition. It can be established if an order contributes to realising the fundamental moral and ethical beliefs of its society’s members (Habermas 1976, 42–43). In order to be compatible with the idea of individual autonomy, this claim has to be specified and supported by good reasons in public discourses and to be recognised as valid by the members of a political order. ‘At present, only those rules and conditions of communication which enable us to distinguish an agreement or accordance under free and equal agents from a contingent and forced consensus assume legitimating force.’ (46, my translation) As a consequence, legitimacy is to be understood as only ever a temporarily valid result of these processes of legitimation, within which citizens examine, criticise or validate claims to legitimacy. In this sense, voiced consent (not a general belief in legitimacy) is indispensable because legitimacy as a quality of rule is in constant need of renewal or actualisation. At the same time, legitimate rule must provide for processes of legitimation, i.e. for opportunities to question and criticise it in order not to cut itself off from legitimation, but to allow for its renewal (Beetham 1991, 94–108).

These arguments would remain incomplete, however, without answers to the following questions: Who is bound by set norms and rules? Over whom is power wielded? Who is to have a share in the general interest? From whom are rulers different? And who actually is to participate in processes of legitimation? Answers are implied, but not specified above. While a political order may contribute to its own legitimacy insofar as it meets its ends and guarantees the existence and functioning of processes of legitimation conforming to the rule of law (e.g. Luhmann 1983), its legitimacy depends on the judgement of the subjects or subject of legitimacy. Thus, the subject of legitimacy forms not only the counterpart to political rule but also constitutes the foundation on which the construction of legitimate political rule relies.⁴ Norms and processes of legitimation relate political rule to its subjects, or rather bind that rule to them. These subjects are meant to decide upon the legitimacy of the relationship themselves.⁵ Thus, at present, it is mostly the people who constitute the internal but nonetheless authoritative source of political legitimacy. This position leaves room for different accounts of who ‘the people’ is meant to be. A nation, a homogeneous community or a heterogeneous, perhaps multicultural society (see e.g. Canovan 2008)? While already contested within the state, these questions pose major challenges beyond the state as they refer to the conditions of the possibility of legitimate relations of rule.

In sum, legitimacy designates a political order’s validity claim of being justifiable and worthy of recognition in terms of socially shared norms (quality), which due to the underlying asymmetric relation between the object and the subject of legitimacy, between a system of rule competent to set binding norms on the one hand and the people or collective of individuals subject to it on the other, needs time and again to be scrutinised and temporarily to be re-approved or dismissed (process). It refers to norms and processes that ex...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction
• 1. Debating legitimacy transnationally
• 2. Reply: Legitimacy and the shadows of universalism: a response to Meine’s ‘Debating legitimacy transnationally’
• 3. The discursive (de)legitimisation of global governance: political contestation and the emergence of new actors in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body
• 4. Reply: Political contestation and the emergence of new actors, but who governs? A response to Michael Strange
• 5. Resisting legitimacy: Weber, Derrida, and the fallibility of sovereign power
• 6. Reply: The sovereignty of sovereignty and the restricted object of critical IR
• 7. The evolving and interacting bases of EU environmental policy legitimacy
• 8. Reply: The evolving and interacting bases of EU environmental policy legitimacy: a reply to Brown
• 9. Do Catalans have ‘the right to decide’? Secession, legitimacy and democracy in twenty-first century Europe
• 10. Reply: Scotland, Catalonia and the ‘right’ to self-determination: a comment suggested by Kathryn Crameri’s ‘Do Catalans Have the “right to decide”?’
• 11. Building authoritarian ‘legitimacy’: domestic compliance and international standing of Bashar al-Asad’s Syria
• 12. Reply: Reply to ‘Building authoritarian “legitimacy”: domestic compliance and international standing of Bashar al-Asad’s Syria’ by Aurora Sottimano
• 13. Looking for a new legitimacy: internal challenges within the Israeli Left
• 14. Reply: The Israeli left: part of the problem or the solution? A response to Giulia Daniele
• 15. Body politics and legitimacy: towards a feminist epistemology of the Egyptian revolution
• 16. Reply: De-orientalizing sexual violence and gender discrimination in Egypt
• 17. Women’s human rights and Tunisian upheavals: is ‘democracy’ enough?
• 18. Reply: A reply to ‘Women’s human rights and Tunisian upheavals: is “democracy” enough?’ by Bronwyn Winter
• Index