The European Neutrals In International Affairs

Hanspeter Neuhold, Hans Thalberg

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9780367307332
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000301120
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

First published in 1984. A conference, organized by the Austrian Institute for International Affairs and dealing with the topic "In Search of Peace and Security: The Role of the European Neutrals", was held at SchloB Laxenburg on 27 and 28 October 1983. The main purpose then had been a comparison of various historic, political, legal, economic an

Sweden: Neutrality, Defense and Disarmament

Nils Andrèn
Swedish institute of International Affairs, Stockholm

1. Introduction

"We need disarmament in order to make the world safe for all countries, including ourselves"¹

The main themes of this paper are the development and character of the Swedish policy of neutrality and its significance for Sweden's role in international disarmament and arms control efforts². The underlying assumption for raising this issue is obviously that "neutral" States historically have had a distinct and useful function in these efforts and possibly can maintain and increase their importance in this respect if they can find effective methods of coordinating their intellectual and political endeavors.

The paper consists of two major parts. The first deals with neutrality, its background and conditions, the second with disarmament and arms control. After a) an introduction to some essential questions related to neutrality, the paper b) opens with a brief historical outline of Sweden's role as a neutral and not-aligned country. Special reference is made to c) problems raised by economic integration, d) defense and e) "active neutrality" and international "moralism".

In the second part Sweden's role in disarmament and arms control, and its conditions, are overviewed in sections on a) disarmament and arms control and b) Sweden and disarmament after World War II. The paper closes with c) an attempt to evaluate the factors influencing Sweden's disarmament behavior and with d) some questions raised and some tentative answers offered concerning Sweden's future role in the disarmament field.

2. Neutrality

a) The Essence of Neutrality

Surveying the countries of the world which claim the status of neutrals, it is obvious that they represent a wide variety of external conditions and policy responses. "Neutral" has, in wide circles, acquired as positive conceptual value; as all terms thus charged, it has been adopted for various political purposes, related both to external security and to domestic issues.

Hence an overview of Swedish "neutrality" should start with some basic definitions and clarifications. In international law, neutrality is related to a situation of war and refers to a State not participating in a war between other States. In international law, the neutral State has both obligations and rights. It is clear, however, that in the general discussion neutrality is also used as a term for describing an uncommitted stance between rival parties which are not necessarily involved in open hostilities, but have very conflicting interests and tense relations³. The post-war habit of describing a state of uneasy but stable peace as "Cold War" adds to the confusion. It even leads to the legally absurd claim to be neutral in peace—but not necessarily in war.

Sweden's basic definition of its international position in this respect is very simple and unambiguous. Sweden has adopted a not-aligned (to avoid the—possibly—politically misleading word non-aligned) position in peace-time with the firm intention of remaining neutral should there be a war in its environment. In view of its purpose, this policy of not-alignment may hence also be called a policy of neutrality, and indeed normally is. This policy is established by unilateral declaration; it is neither internationally guaranteed nor constitutionally prescribed.

A policy of neutrality leads already in peace-time to a number of restrictions and demands, in order to make the policy credible to the outside world in general and, in particular, to the powers which in case of a war may have a special strategic interest in the territory of the "neutral" country. Hence, the use of the term "neutral" in peace-time may be accepted as indicating the attitude of a State which intends to observe internationally prescribed or nationally perceived and declared conditions of neutrality for its pattern of behavior in war-time, and to adjust its peace-time behavior accordingly.

b) Sweden Neutral and Not-Aligned

Sweden's past as much as its present illustrates the importance of geopolitical or strategic conditions for the foreign policy options of a country. When the traditional Baltic powers, some four hundred years ago, were in a partly transient, partly permanent state of political disorder and dissolution, they left a power vacuum in which the rising Swedish kingdom (until 1809 also including Finland) could, in the 17th century, step in and establish itself as a major regional power. After less than a hundred years the conditions changed. Sweden's military power and political influence were greatly reduced, in relative as much as in absolute terms. The political and psychological adjustment to the change from greatness to weakness was a gradual and not wholly painless process. Eventually, after more than a century, a practically permanent policy of neutrality emerged. It was conditioned by Sweden's strategic location between mutually suspicious or openly rivaling Great Powers—whether the German Empire versus Czarist Russia (until 1918), Nazi Germany versus the Soviet Union or NATO versus the Warsaw Pact (or: the United States with Western Europe versus the Soviet Union and its East European "clients").

Somewhat paradoxically, the firmness of the Swedish attachment to a policy of neutrality is illustrated by the fact that it has never been tested in the official opinion polls dealing with questions of defense and security. It is always taken for granted, and nobody seems to object to this attitude.

It is hardly possible to single out the year or even the decade when Sweden definitely subscribed to its now traditional international principles. In 1890, King Oscar II spoke of Sweden's intention to be "neutral as far as possible, and even a bit further"⁴. During World War I the policy of neutrality was an axiom for Sweden — however, not quite for its warfaring neighbors⁵. Sweden has, ever since that time, proclaimed a policy of neutrality in all open conflicts between Great Powers. Given the fact that this policy has helped Sweden to stay out of all European wars (Sweden has indeed not participated as a belligerent in a war since the era of Napoleon I) the policy could be called an unqualified success. Some caution is, however, justified: The policy of neutrality was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. In difficult situations, especially during World War II, Sweden was probably also protected by other conditions, mainly outside its direct influence⁶.

The call for broader international solidarity, leading to the formation in 1919 of the League of Nations and in 1945 to the establishment of the United Nations, raised some new problems for neutral countries. Switzerland solved them by being granted exemption from obligations in respect of military sanctions in the League and, so far, by abstaining from membership in the United Nations—but willingly hosting, wholly or in part, both organizations. In Sweden, the lack of universality, especially of the League, and the rules on sanctions of both organizations caused serious worries. As for the League, the fact that military sanctions except the transit of League troops through the territories of member States-were not compulsory reduced the obligations to harmless proportions for a neutral State. As the dissolution of the League progressed, Sweden, along with other small States, terminated its sanction obligations by unilateral declaration. The United Nations posed, in principle, a more difficult problem; here compulsory sanctions included also military measures. By becoming a member Sweden might, at least in theory, be drawn into a conflict. However, in practice, the veto power of the rivaling Great Powers in the Security Council removed completely the possibility of decisions on sanctions that might compel member States to participate in an armed conflict between Great Powers⁷.

Sweden demonstrated its awareness of the practical compatibility between UN membership and virtual neutrality by observing that if "against expectation" the United Nations tended to split into two camps, Sweden would not allow itself to be drawn into a group or bloc formation⁸. This marginal observation was soon to be transformed into a firm policy declaration.

A new warning came in connection with the proclamation of the Marshall Plan (1947). Sweden declared, in its own economic interest, that it perceived it as a reconstruction plan, not as the formation of a bloc directed against outside powers. This was clearly not the interpretation of the Soviet Union, and hardly in full conformity with the political intentions behind the Plan. However, the situation made Sweden refine the definition of its declaration of bloc-independence: Sweden would not choose sides by "affiliating with a great power bloc, neither by an express alliance treaty, nor by tacit understanding on common military measures in case of a conflict"⁹.

The final moment of decision came when the conditional fears expressed by the Swedish government became obvious facts. In 1948, the Brussels Pact was concluded by West European States as an instrument of protection, not against a resurging German threat, but against the Soviet war ally. The alarm bell was the Soviet take-over in Czechoslovakia. A year later, the Atlantic Pact was forged as an American effort to protect an ailing Europe against what many Western political leaders with broad popular support perceived as an imminent Soviet threat.

Sweden's reaction to the emergence of the „Cold War" revealed a variety of ambitions and fears. The World War II experience of Great Power presence, intervention and war was still fresh. To maintain Sweden's own policy of neutrality and to protect Sweden's immediate environment from involvement in the power bloc confrontation became two obvious Swedish goals. There was, at least in theory, one way of attaining both of them. The solution chosen by the Swedish government—with broad opposition support—could, however, also be interpreted as an infringement of the policy of neutrality, as it would mean a commitment undertaken in advance to fight for other countries. It was formulated in a Swedish offer to Norway and Denmark to establish a Scandinavian defense alliance. The condition was that the member States should all commit themselves to conducting a policy of neutrality, basically according to the Swedish model. Finland had recently concluded its Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union (1948) and could not be included in a Scandinavian arrangement. A defense alliance should, however, also have been in the Finnish interest. By preventing direct NATO involvement in any of the Scandinavian countries, the alliance could well have alleviated Soviet fears¹⁰.

The Swedish plan failed; for the Norwegians the World War II experience finally proved stronger than the still forceful undercurrent of traditional "neutralism". Hence they would not accept the requirement of total neutrality. Denmark, with some expressions of reluctance, followed Norway in early 1949 into the new Western alliance. Sweden was never tempted to follow the example of the two West Scandinavian States¹¹. The logic of both the historical experience and the strategic situation was overwhelming.

The aim of the Swedish initiative to form a Scandinavian defense alliance was to obviate a threatening deterioration—caused by increasing Great Power involvement—in Sweden's security environment as a not-aligned country. Keeping this goal in mind, the failure of the Scandinavian alliance also proved for a very long time at least a partial success. It facilitated the acceptance of conditions—the refusal to allow foreign NATO forces to be permanently stationed and nuclear weapons to be deployed on their territories in peace-time—for Denmark's and Norway's membership in the Atlantic Alliance¹². It also contributed to the conditions for Finland's successful development of its post-war relations with the Soviet Union: avoiding membership of the Warsaw Pact (in 1955), retaining a democratic system and also joining the "Nordic Commonwealth", which—with the Nordic Council as its pivotal institution—developed as a political, economic, social and cultural factor. It expanded, both in spite of, and as a defensive reaction to the different Nordic roads to national security¹³.

In this way the Swedish policy of neutrality adjusted itself to the new situation from the end of World War II to the formation of the divisive pact systems. The policy of neutrality was reaffirmed with the new formula of "not-alignment between power blocs", from which the special reference to power blocs was gradually omitted as the memory of Sweden's own efforts to form a "bloc"—albeit a minor and neutral one—waned.

But there were other problems ahead, connected with Sweden's role as a committe...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Editors' Preface
• Neutrality and Political Good Offices: The Case of Switzerland
• Austria's Policy of Neutrality: Constants and Variables
• An Interpretation of Finland's Contributions to European Peace and Security
• Sweden: Neutrality, Defense and Disarmament
• Between Lost Illusions and Apocalyptic Fears: Benelux Views on the European Neutrals
• The Value of the Swedish and the Finnish Policies of Neutrality to the Security of Norway
• The United States and the European Neutrals
• The European Neutrals and Soviet-American Relations
• Neutrality: A Hungarian View
• In Search of Peace and Security: The Role of the European Neutrals. A Yugoslav Point of View
• The European Neutrals and Regional Stability
• Participants of the Conference