Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Cold War

Shahin P. Malik, Alan P. Dobson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138614215
• eBook ISBN: 9780429873751
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Published in 1999. These essays are not deconstructive in the postmodern sense. None of the authors have that depth of scepticism about knowledge claims, but they are all concerned that the terms of reference of Cold War enquiry have been inappropriately bounded. The chapters by Murray and Reynolds specifically address the broad theoretical issues involved with paradigms and explanation. The chapters by Dobson, Marsh, Malik, Evans and Dix stretch out Cold War paradigms with successive case studies of Anglo-American relations; the USA, Britain, Iran and the oil majors; the Gulf States and the Cold War; South Africa and the Cold War; and Indian neutralism. All five authors challenge the efficacy of neo-realist analysis and explanation and critique the way that assumptions derived from that position have been used in historical explanation. The chapters by Ryall, Rogers and Bideleux deal with Roman Catholicism in East Central Europe, with nuclear matters and with the Soviet perspective. Each work goes beyond the limits of Cold War paradigms. Finally, Ponting places the Cold War in the broad context of world history. These essays provide thought-provoking scholarship which helps us both to nuance our understanding of the Cold War and to realise that it should not be taken as an all-embracing paradigm for the explanation of postwar international relations.

Section 1: Theory

1 Reconstructing the Cold War: The Evolution of a Consuming Paradigm

ALASTAIR MURRAY

Traditionally, the “discipline” of international relations has tended to approach the post war period through the lens of what we might term a “Cold War paradigm”, explaining the majority of what occurred by reference to the ebbs and flows of superpower tension, and forcing to the margins of debate that which cannot be so explained. At the theoretical level, for instance, we find that the dominant neorealist orthodoxy has tended to assume that the bipolar structure of the post war system explains the character of international relations within it.¹ At the strategic level, we find that security specialists have habitually assumed that the strategy, and, in particular, the nuclear strategy, of the two superpowers explains the level of stability prevailing in different periods of the post war era.² And, at the empirical level, we find that diplomatic historians have frequently assumed that the superpower conflict represents the essential fact of post war international politics, and thus the appropriate point from which to begin any explanation of their course.³

The impact of this tendency almost to equate “post war” with “Cold War” is two-fold. First, it has seriously distorted our understanding of the events of the post war years. As the chapters in this volume by Dix and Evans demonstrate, by approaching post war international politics in these terms, we have been prevented from understanding the way that events developed independently of the conflict between the superpowers in the large areas of the world which remained outside the alliance structures, such as Southern Africa and the Indian Subcontinent. Indeed, as the chapters by Dobson and Marsh show, this type of approach to post war international politics cannot even offer an adequate explanation of the relations within the alliance structures, because it prevents us from understanding the role that non leading alliance members often played independently of, and even in defiance of, the bloc leader and the Cold War priorities it promulgated.

Second, and perhaps, in the long run, more importantly, the exclusionary focus of the Cold War “paradigm” forced potentially significant qualitative developments in the structure of the international system to the margins of debate.⁴ The focus on the potential for military conflict in the system obscured a profound growth in economic interdependence.⁵ The focus on hostility between the superpowers obscured a profound growth in co-operation between other states.⁶ The focus on east-west relations obscured the growing significance of north-south tensions for the international system.⁷ The focus on the potential threat from a nuclear exchange obscured the growing danger of a crisis in the global ecosystem.⁸ Only in recent years have such issues received anything like serious consideration in the mainstream of international relations.

The “discipline” of international relations has effectively employed as a heuristic framework with which to approach post war international politics a “paradigm” which, far from clarifying matters, has involved both the premature closure of its terms of reference and the distortion of its analysis within these parameters. It is this paradox which this chapter seeks to address. The conventional wisdom amongst those critical of this rather curious situation is that it can be explained solely in terms of the influence of realist thought on the study of international politics. Imposing upon the “discipline” as a whole its own very narrow power political approach, the theory is held to have delineated “legitimate” research areas, marginalising other perspectives and the diverse facets of international relations with which they were concerned.⁹ Against this, I argue that the “paradigm” was not a static, once and for all, creation of realism, but rather evolved dynamically over time. Whilst realism contained its seeds, it was only in the behavioural revolution that these seeds germinated, and only in neorealism that they flowered. Consequently, I suggest that the misconceptualisation of the post war period should be explained less in terms of realist assumptions than in terms of the methodological shift to positivism which was later imposed upon them.

In order to demonstrate this, I attempt in this chapter to reconstruct the evolution of the Cold War “paradigm,” identifying the assumptions which originally informed it, and tracing the way that these assumptions were developed over time. I begin, in section I, by examining the realist theory in which critics have traditionally found the rise of the Cold War “paradigm,” arguing that, if the seeds of the “paradigm” clearly lie within it, they are as yet undeveloped. In section II, I then go on to look at the behaviouralist and neorealist modifications of the realist framework by examining, respectively, the theories of Kaplan and Waltz, in order to demonstrate the way in which, by progressively narrowing its content, they fostered the constrictive agenda we associate with the Cold War “paradigm.” Given that the dynamic view of the “paradigm” which emerges from this analysis refutes traditional understandings of its causes, I proceed, in section III, to examine the factors which underlay its development, arguing that it is the attempt to render the realist framework scientific which led the seeds of the “paradigm” contained within it to germinate, rather than any inherent quality. Finally, in section IV, I go on to consider some of the factors which motivated this attempt, in order both to determine the ultimate causes of the “paradigm” and to set its development in context.

The Origins of the Cold War Paradigm

The tendency to read post war international politics as little more than an expression of the Cold War obviously finds its initial stirrings in the approach to the subject developed by realist thinkers. Whereas the idealist thought of the interwar period focused largely on international law and organisation as the key to understanding the international system,¹⁰ realist thought treated such institutions simply as a reflection of the interests and the values of the major powers, and adopted the position that concentrating on the struggle for power between such states offered the best way to approach international politics.¹¹ Indeed, its conviction that the struggle between status quo and ‘imperial’ or ‘revisionist’ powers for control of such institutions represented the principal threat to such stability as could be said to exist in the international system led it inevitably to regard such a focus as not only empirically valid but, moreover, morally essential (Murray, 1997, Chs. 2-3). Hence, in the face of the frustration of interwar ideals, Carr sought to explain the problems of the League of Nations in terms of a revisionist challenge from Germany, advocating a policy of appeasement to reconcile it to the international order (Carr, 1939).¹² And, in the face of the frustration of wartime ideals, Kennan sought to explain the collapse of allied unity in terms of a brewing revisionist challenge from the Soviet Union, advocating a policy of containment to reconcile it to the international order (Kennan, 1946, pp.701-3; 1947, pp.575-6, pp.580-1).

It is thus very tempting to locate the source of the problems that the “discipline” has had in approaching the post war period in realist doctrine. It is obviously but a short step from the position that international politics is best understood through an analysis of the struggle between the major powers to the position that this struggle is a sufficient explanation of international politics in general and the post war period in particular. It is then a relatively straightforward matter to establish a link between these assumptions and the problems involved in the Cold War “paradigm,” given the crucial role that realist doctrine played in shaping the development of the “discipline” of international relations.¹³ If it was displaced as the theoretical orthodoxy by the 1960s, ‘the behavioural revolt did not change the “paradigm” of the field but provided a conception of scientific methodology’ (Vasquez, 1983, p.13). Indeed, by the 1980s, any doubts about the influence of such assumptions were removed with the establishment of neorealism as the new theoretical orthodoxy, and the reassertion of traditional realist tenets in explicit terms.¹⁴ Thus Vasquez was able to suggest in the early 1980s that ‘international relations theory in the last thirty years or so can be viewed as an attempt to articulate the realist “paradigm” in light of research, whilst at the same time learning and debating what constitutes scientific research’ (Vasquez, 1983, p.22). Hence the complaints that realism is responsible for the premature closure of “disciplinary” enquiry might seem to have a certain plausibility. It seems to have advocated the appropriate type of ideas for accomplishing this, and to have possessed the right type of influence.

Yet, if it is but a short step from the type of assumptions put forward by realism to the assumptions which underlay the Cold War “paradigm”, it is a step which realism does not seem to have actually taken. The emphasis on the struggle for power between the major states that we find in the theory is actually a very flexible approach, which can in no way be compared to the narrow, distorting focus involved in the Cold War “paradigm.” It is clear, to begin with, that realism did not limit its understanding of the structure of the international system simply to matters of the number and arrangement of the major powers, but rather remained open to consideration of precisely the type of qualitative shifts that critics of the Cold War “paradigm” have sought to highlight. In Politics Among Nations, for instance, Morgenthau went to considerable trouble to discuss the challenge posed by nuclear weapons to the traditional, spatial division of political authority, and the consequent need to move towards more universal modes of governance in the international system (Morgenthau, 1960, Chs. 29-30). In much the same way, Kennan was to spend a considerable proportion of his career highlighting the global environmental threat, and the consequent need to undertake radical measures to prevent a catastrophe arising.¹⁵ Similarly, Kissinger was able to recognise the significance of both increasing economic interdependence and growing north-south tensions, and the consequent need to build a more inclusive framework of international order (Kissinger, 1977, pp.152, 219-20, 240-72; 1981, pp.25-39, 49-67; 1985, pp.68-72, 127-138, 221-236). Ultimately, if realism attempted to bound its field of enquiry, this closure was not premature, but rather perfectly compatible with the type of research agenda emphasised by its critics today.

More specifically, however, it is also clear that, within this framework, realism did not so privilege structural explanation as to imply that an analysis of the struggle for power between the major actors could constitute a sufficient explanation of the character of international politics in any given period. In theoretical terms, if Morgenthau emphasised the importance of the tension between status quo and ‘imperialist’ powers to any explanation of international politics, this was treated as little more than a provisional starting point capable of providing a framework in which other factors might be considered (Morgenthau, 1960, p.37). In more practical terms, if Kennan sought to explain the difficulties which the United States faced in the post war environment largely in terms of a revisionist challenge from the Soviet Union, he consistently opposed attempts to reduce international politics to this struggle, emphasising that a large proportion of the earth’s surface exceeded the terms of the conflict and had to be addressed on its own terms (Kennan, 1954, Ch.2; 1978, Chs.3-12). Ultimately, realism’s concern with the power political structure of the system was not as disproportionate as critics have implied, but rather roughly commensurate with what even they would accept. There are few, for instance, who would contest that the centrality of the major powers in terms of their ability to construct, singularly or severally, the norms, regimes, and organisations which constitute the international order holding in any particular historical epoch makes comprehending their relations an essential guide to understanding what occurs in the system.¹⁶ And there are few who would dispute that the centrality of the major powers in terms of the extent of their interests and the extent of their capability to defend these interests makes understanding the incidence of major power war in the system an essential indicator of the level of security that all states may enjoy.¹⁷ Ultimately, if we find some of the seeds of the Cold War “paradigm” in realism’s conviction that the explanation of international politics must begin by examining the struggle between the major powers, it is difficult to claim that this conviction involved either the level of distortion or the premature closure of enquiry that we tend to associate with the “paradigm” in its full form. If we are to understand the consuming obsession of the “discipline” with the Cold War, we need to look at the way that this initial framework was developed.

The Development of the Paradigm

It is only with the behaviouralist revolution of the late 1950s and early 1960s that we see the first signs of difficulty. If it is in political realism that we first find the conviction that international politics is best approached by studying the struggle between the major powers, it is in behaviouralism that we first find this rough heuristic device transformed into a constrictive framework. Under its auspices, the structure of the system was increasingly narrowly drawn in terms of the number and arrangement of such powers, and this structure was increasingly privileged in the explanation of international politics. If we examine, for instance, Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politics¹⁸ we find that, because of the turnover between, and change within, units, international politics is studied in terms of ‘systems of action,’ composed of ‘the essential rules of the system,’ ‘the transformation rules,’ ‘the actor classificatory variables,’ ‘the capability variables,’ and ‘the information variables’ (Kaplan, 1957, pp.4, 9-11). The structural component of these systems is ‘the essential rules of the system’ and ‘the transformation rules’ (Waltz, 1979, p.53). Given that the essential rules relate solely to the ‘general relationships between the actors of the system,’ that the range of actors is narrowly delimited, emphasising major or ‘essential’ states, and that the transformatory rules relate exclusively to the changes produced by these states’ deviations from the essential rules, it should be apparent that the conception of system structure which Kaplan’s theory presents is narrowly circumscribed, treating the number and arrangement of the major powers as the predominant variable, to the exclusion of qualitative variations such as the density of interactions, the depth of interdependence, and the richness of institutions (Kaplan, 1957, pp.9-11, 22-23).¹⁹

Furthermore, this much narrower conception of structure is then privileged in explanation, such that the struggle for power between the major actors becomes the predominant source of explanations of the character of international politics. There is, it should be stressed, no suggestion here that the structure of the system is determinist: the major actors can deviate from the essential rules under certain circumstances, sparking a transformation in the system (Kaplan, 1957, pp. 10-11). But it is the structure of the system which is used to explain the character of international politics in any given period. Hence we find that enquiry into the international system of the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is guided by the premise that the character of the system depends on the numbers, objectives and relative power of the ‘essential national actors’ (Kaplan, 1957, pp.22-35). And we find that enquiry into the post war system is guided by the premise that ‘[t]he functioning of the loose bipolar system depends upon the organisational characteristics of the supranational blocs’ (Kaplan, 1957, pp.37-8). In Kaplan’s behaviouralism, the seeds of the Cold War “paradigm” which were sown with realism begin to germinate. Imposing, for the first time, a narrow definition of the structure of the system and privileging explanation within this structure, it effectively advocated a position which held that the character of international politics should be explained not only primarily, but also predominantly, by the analysis of the struggle between the major powers, crucially nourishing the temptation to read the international politics of the post war period in terms of the Cold War between the superpowers.

It is in neorealism, however, that this tendency culminates. Whereas, in Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politics, the analysis of the struggle for power between the major states became a predominant element in any explanation of international politics, in Waltz’s Theory of International Politics it became a sufficient explanation in and of itself.²⁰ To begin with, the definition of the structure of the system that neorealism advances is extremely narrow, to the extent that the number of the ma...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• Introduction
• Section 1: Theory
• Section 2: Stretching Out the Paradigms
• Section 3: Beyond the Paradigms
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index