The U.s. Government Response To Terrorism

In Search Of An Effective Strategy

William R Farrell

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9780367296803
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000306606
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the organizational problems faced by the U.S. government in developing an effective strategy to counter terrorism and presents a detailed history of U.S. counter-terrorist policy since 1972. Dr. Farrell offers a working definition of terrorism, reviews its international, transnational, nonterritorial, and domestic forms, then focuses on the activities of those U.S. government agencies directly concerned with the prevention or neutralization of terrorism Critical of existing programs and of the fact that counter-terrorist activities seem to have a low priority among the duties of the relevant agencies' key executives, he concludes that the development of a clear, reasonable, and effective strategy against terrorism has been unnecessarily delayed. He is doubtful whether, even now, a satisfactory arrangement has been achieved. Beyond looking strictly at governmental agency responses to terrorism, Dr. Farrell considers the sociological, legal, and operational factors that would be brought into play should military forces be employed to quell a terrorist attack and also addresses the nature and extent of the terrorist threat to U.S. businesses.

1
The Setting

This book will, from an organizational perspective, concern itself with the countering of transnational terrorism. Terrorists pose a potential threat to the nation and effective organizational countermeasures are essential for the maintenance of public order and political stability.¹

Terrorism is directed against institutions or personages holding social and/or political power. It is evident that the nature of these targets determines the effectiveness and the means of the attack. The strength of a society, or more particularly a government within a society, depends in part upon the ability of key agencies to transmit or allocate societal and consensual values without distortion.² This requires that these institutions be secure in the sense of maintaining, with public approbation, the intellectual and material resources necessary to counter serious threats from both within and without.

Security maintenance becomes increasingly difficult as powerful forces — urbanization, industrialization, technological changes, popular and legal alienation, disruption or displacement due to war — place strains upon the system. If the strain becomes severe, discordant groups such as terrorists find fertile fields for exploitation. As dissatisfied groups feel their ties to the community breaking down, they seek to unite in other ways. As links with church, family or government weaken, individuals may search out new social and symbolic arrangements as substitutes for those accepted in the past.³ Governmental organizations once capable of fulfilling these needs become much less effective in dealing with the situation. The vacuum thus created is filled by groups that provide surrogate means of social participation.⁴

This book will concern itself only peripherally with specific groups, i.e., terrorists who seek to fill the void caused by perceived severe governmental inadequacies. In the main, it will address the tremendous problem faced by the U.S. government, as a structure of organizations, in coping with their potential activity.

In a democracy the methods of action available to leaders are limited. The use of a secret police, censorship, or denial of the right of free speech or assembly will not be tolerated. Since the goal of the government is the defense of certain values, the weapons used against the terrorist must be fashioned to preserve these values in the course of their defense. An understanding of the structure of organizations, as channels of policy actions, will aid greatly in comprehending the difficulty in countering the serious threat posed by transnational terrorism.

To date, the threat posed by terrorists in the United States is not primarily the result of indigenous forces but rather, outside forces seeking to further their particular cause on American soil.⁵ The national experience has been limited to groups such as the Weathermen and the Symbionese Liberation Army, both small in number and limited" in popular appeal. Such groups are more analagous to tiny gangs of bandits than to serious political movements, despite claims that they are the "vanguard of a people's revolution."⁶ However, the activities of certain Puerto Rican national groups bear watching in the future. Social conditions have remained stable enough in the United States that the disruptive appeal has been quite restricted. What made their activities noteworthy and what makes the U.S. a prime target for terrorist activity is the heavy attention given such events by the media. In relying on immediate and extensive coverage by television, radio, and the press for the maximum amount of propagandizing, terrorists can rapidly and effectively reach audiences at home and abroad. This can lead to an enhancement of the effectiveness of their violence by the creation of an emotional state of fear which results in the granting of demands.⁷ If the government responds harshly, it may result in sympathy toward the terrorist. Tom Hayden, one of the founders of the Students for a Democratic Society, addressed this very topic when he referred to stern countermeasures by the U.S. government: "The coming of repression will speed up time, making a revolutionary situation more likely — we are creating an America where it is necessary for the government to rule behind barbed wire where it will be necessary for the people to fight back."⁸ The careful and judicious handling of terrorist situations is a most demanding task. The suddenness of the terror coupled with the danger of lost lives requires effective countermeasures to be timely and complete. There will be little time for bureaucratic and organizational disputes over jurisdiction as the agencies concerned haggle over the right approach.

At first blush, it may appear that the United states would not be vulnerable to a transnational attack within its borders. However, despite the growth of modern weaponry and the increased sophistication of defense planning, highly industrialized nations remain quite fragile. In fact, the highly technological, exposed, and interdependent automated systems so essential to our modern society provide many prime targets for terrorist groups. Commercial aircraft, natural gas pipelines, electric power grids, offshore oil rigs, and computers storing government and corporate records are examples of sabotage-prone targets whose destruction would have more serious effects than their primary losses would suggest. Social fragility is reflected in the blackout which occurred in New York City on July 13, 1977. The disproportionately high damage caused by uncontrolled looting and arson, resource shortages, and loss of public confidence, attests to urban vulnerability. On that day lightning completely disrupted the Consolidated Edison System, immobilizing ten million people. Subways and elevators came to a halt. Airports and television networks were forced to close down. Thousands of looters surged through the streets, resulting in 3300 arrests and causing injury to nearly 100 policemen. It was estimated that the cost of the damage approached $150 million.⁹ If the blackout had lasted four or five days, it is easy to picture New York almost paralyzed with numerous incidents of looting, arson, and panic.

The point here is that an "act of nature" with the aid of human inefficiency produced a two-day siege. Probably a quite small but trained paramilitary force could take the city of New York or any other large metropolitan area off line for considerably longer periods of time.¹⁰ However, despite the magnitude of the threat, only limited countermeasures by the governmental organizations concerned have been undertaken. The objective in undertaking this book is to determine to what degree the lack of development of antiterrorist strategies is due to the structure and functions of organizations themselves. The research will center upon those governmental organizations directly concerned with the prevention and/or neutralization of transnational terrorism targeted within the United States.

Certain key assumptions lie at the foundation of this work:

1. Agencies within the United States have developed plans to detect, prevent, and neutralize terrorist acts, but the plans cross over the jurisdictions of several organizations. Here we have the classic case of the decentralization required by government running headlong into the requirement of coordination.
2. Such plans have been developed within agencies, among agencies and by ad hoc groups at the highest level of decision making — the National Security Council.
3. Key personnel in concerned organizations are extremely worried about the outcome of any terrorist attack, while appearing to tempt fate through inaction. But their programs and repertoires make change difficult except at the margins. Further, other demands upon organizational leaders draw their attention in different directions, making concentration on one issue difficult.
4. Bureaucratic and organizational imperatives common to all agencies — i.e., factoring of problems, parochial priorities, goals and the sequential attention to them, standard operating procedures, concern for uncertainty, resistance to change, and much more — hinder needed cooperation.

To better appreciate the complexities that confront organizations, this book will begin with the formulation of an operational definition of terrorism, highlighting its many complexities.

Notes

1. Terrorist activities worldwide increased at a dramatic rate during 1979 when 2585 significant actions (i.e., assassinations, kidnappings, hijacking, and bombings) were reported. This compared to a total of 1511 incidents in 1978. Data is based on Executive Risk Assessment, Vol. 1, no. 12, 1979, prepared by Risks International, Alexandria, VA. Information available for 1980 showed no let up.

2. David Easton, Framework of Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965). The author distinguishes a political system from all other systems as one predominately oriented toward the "authoritarian allocation of values." The values are allotted in three ways: providing access to some but denying it to others; depriving a person of a valued thing already possessed; obstructing the attainment of values. The process of allocation is binding upon the populace and is in the form of decrees, rules, laws, and policies which must meet the demands of the society. Failing this, the political system, if it is to sustain, must be able to coerce existing support.

3. This was very common for college students during the 1960s and early 1970s. It was not just a phenomenon in the United States but also in Europe and Asia. The educated youth began to question not only their role within a society but also the authority and purpose of the university and the government. Students banded together, often disruptively, in efforts to bring about change. Studies concerning the so-called "student movement" fully document this occurrence. See Edwin Wright Bakke, Revolutionary Democracy (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1968). in Japan it has been shown that student activism and the subsequent feelings of alienation were directly related to the rise of a terrorist group, the Japanese Red Army.

4. The failure of governmental organizations to respond to the needs of the people is very much part of world history. It can occur over an extended period such as in China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries where total decay was replaced with stability only after millions had died and various forms of order were attempted. It may also be more limited and time-specific, such as the kinds that grip societies during a period of modernization. Samuel Huntington, in his work "Civil Violence and the Process of Development," Adelphi Paper no. 83 (London: 1971), suggests that rapid modernization always involves intensified relative deprivation because it widens the gap between the changing aspirations and capabilities of the groups involved. Social mobilization, education, increased opportunities, and governmental and administration resources cannot keep pace with fresh expectations and needs.

5. Hugh David Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Violence in America (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979), p. 333.

6. Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorist Movements," Terrorism: Theory and Practice, Yonah Alexander, David Carlton and Paul Wilkinson, eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 107.

7. Yonah Alexander, "Terrorism and the Media," Ibid., p. 160.

8. Robert Moss, "Urban Guerilla Warfare," American Defense Policy, Richard G. Head and Ervin J. Rokke, eos. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 257.

9. New York Times, July 15, 1977, p. 1: July 22, 1977, p.12.

10. Robert H. Kupperman, Facing Tomorrow's Terrorist Incident Today (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.: October 1977), p. 1.

2
Terrorism Is ...?

When we speak of terrorism it is not always clear just what one has in mind. The term has no precise and completely accepted definition. Some countries label those who engage in violent acts against them as terrorists. Freedom fighters rarely label themselves in such a way but they often claim they are subjected to governmental terror. "In short, the definition of terrorism seems to depend on one's point of view — it is what the 'bad guys' do."¹

Terrorism is frequently described as mindless, senseless, and irrational violence. However, none of these terms is appropriate. It is not mindless and there is a theory of terrorism that frequently works. Terrorism should be viewed as a means to an end and not an end unto itself. While terrorist activity may appear random, closer examination reveals that terrorism has objectives. Attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract media attention. The holding of hostages serves to increase the drama, especially if their being killed is a possibility. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching and, in this sense, "terrorism is theater."²

While the term "terrorism" is often indiscriminately used and is difficult to u...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Preface
• 1. The Setting
• 2. Terrorism Is...?
• 3. The Organizational Perspective
• 4. Governmental Structure to Counter Terrorism
• 5. Aspects of Military Involvement
• 6. The Need for Organizational Response
• 7. How the Organizations Responded
• 8. Conclusions
• Bibliography
• Index