Media, Security and Sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic

From the Manhattan to the Crystal Serenity

Mathieu Landriault

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9781032240213
• eBook ISBN: 9781000731163
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book documents how the Arctic region has been represented in the media: exploring how the media has framed the Arctic and whether this has an impact on governmental decision-making and public preferences.

The Arctic region faces profound transformations, due to global warming, spurring intense debates about economic growth, environmental protection, and socio-cultural development. At the same time, most of humanity will never come face-to-face with the realities of the region: the media represents our only opportunity to learn about what this evolving region stands for. Recognizing that media coverage will tend to focus on specific events and relay specific messages, this book scrutinizes the nature of these messages to figure out how the Arctic region is presented by different media outlets. Studying different types of media, Landriault conducts an analysis of 628 newspaper articles, 110 televised reports, 9 magazine articles, and 404 tweets to provide the first systematic and rigorous study of Arctic media representations.

This book will interest scholars, practitioners, and students in Arctic studies, critical geography, political science, and communication studies.

1 The Canadian media and Arctic sovereignty crises

As specified in the introduction, scholars focusing on Arctic sovereignty blamed the media for past sovereignty crises. Indeed, it is widely accepted that the media had an agenda-setting effect, by devoting attention to the region and compelling national decision-makers to react more forcefully than originally planned. However, how this agenda-setting outcome came to materialize was not sufficiently documented by these same experts. This chapter has the ambition of providing the first systematic study of how the Canadian media successfully attracted public interest to these events.

Agenda setting has been investigated in numerous studies, for the most part tackling the phenomenon in two different ways. First-level agenda setting has focused on object salience, typically measuring the amount of coverage given by the media to a topic or event where more coverage equals more importance. However, second-level agenda setting set out to define agenda setting by also analyzing issue frames present in the media. The idea is that the manner in which these items are described will also have an impact on issue salience (Wanta et al., 2004: pp. 366–9). This chapter will investigate both first and second-level agenda settings to analyze media treatment of the 1969 Manhattan and 1985 Polar Sea crises.

The Canadian media and the 1969 Manhattan crisis

The 1969 Manhattan crisis did not constitute the only episode of controversies regarding Canada’s Northern sovereignty: discussions on the establishment of the Distant Early Warning System with the United States in the late 1950s also created tensions and debates in Canadian society and government. However, this crisis represented the most acute episode on Canada’s Arctic sovereignty at that time – one that did not lead to easy or immediate solutions. The timeline studied begins with the first instances of media attention in mid-May 1969, and end soon after the return trip of the second Manhattan expedition in late June 1970. The Globe and Mail coverage was analyzed, using the keyword “Manhattan.”¹ In total, 170 news articles and editorials were published, with 62% of them having the Manhattan as their primary focus of interest.²

As may be observed in Figure 1.1, media attention peaked twice during the time period under scrutiny: once in September 1969 and a second time in March 1970. Articles for which the Manhattan was the primary focus also peaked at the same time.

Figure 1.1 Number of newspaper articles published in the Globe and Mail with the term “Manhattan” by level of interest.

Note: All graphs in this book have been generated using SPSS.

Rather than garnering attention, media coverage followed a cycle of wave, receding from October 1969 to January 1970, before picking up steam from February to April only to decline in May and June 1970. Focusing on a more specific timeline, the initial response by government did not seem to have been spurred by overwhelming media attention. At first, Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau and key ministers offered reassuring answers, downplaying the seriousness of the situation. Trudeau told Canadians that “the legal status of the waters of Canada’s Arctic archipelago is not at issue with the proposed voyage,” adding, however, that “it is also known that not all countries would accept the view that the waters between the islands and the archipelago are internal waters over which Canada has full sovereignty” (Globe and Mail, June 28 1969: p. 11). The Manhattan was mostly framed as an economic opportunity before the transit by the Prime Minister while he visited Churchill:

Canada had to make a choice – leave some things underdeveloped or undeveloped, or to have them done with the aid of foreign capital […] Mr. Trudeau said he could see nothing wrong with the ship of a friendly nation testing the feasibility of transporting oil from the region.

(Globe and Mail, July 15 1969: p. 4)

In fact, only a few articles were written before a change of policy and tone could be noticed from government. Indeed, External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp announced on 2 September 1969 that “a definitive statement on Canada’s claims to sovereignty in Arctic waters will be made some time within the next few months” (Globe and Mail, September 3 1969: p. B1), a statement that, while being relatively vague, acted as a reaction to perceived popular pushback. In all, only 21 articles were published before 2 September 1969, even if unexpected developments could have caused greater media exposure. For one, two barges, the John A. Norburg and the Learmonth, operated by Panarctic (a joint venture between Canadian companies and the federal government) were punctured by ice on 21 August and ultimately sank near Melville Island. The Norburg represented a potential environmental hazard, containing thousands of gallons of diesel fuel (Watkins, August 28 1969: p. B2). The accident highlighted the perils of Arctic navigation, particularly when dealing with oil transportation.

It would not be until 5 September that the first Globe and Mail editorial was to be published, more than a week after the departure of the Manhattan on 25 August. The editorial was short on solutions, rather criticizing the “negligent” governmental handling of the transit and calling it a nasty precedent for Canadian Arctic sovereignty. However, Sharp’s announcement was welcomed with cautious hope: “all we can hope for at present is Mr. Sharp’s statement, after Mr. Sharp has been told, in a meeting this fall, what the United States will accept” (Globe and Mail, September 5 1969: p. 6).

Sharp’s announcement did not mean that the Manhattan was no longer on the media’s radar. In fact, most media reports peaked in September, after the 2 September announcement. Two types of stories dominated media coverage between 2 September and 24 October, at which time the Prime Minister delivered a speech indicating that government would impose pollution control regulations in its Arctic waters.

First, the very nature of the Manhattan transit generated the most media coverage. The most popular framing of the issue served to assess whether the transit was a success or a failure, emphasizing on the fact that the voyage was a precedent. In the Globe and Mail, such framing resulted in detailing the obstacles that the Manhattan had encountered all the while, informing readers on how the Canadian icebreaker (the John, A. Macdonald) assisted the American vessel. In total, 14 news articles described the Manhattan transit and the functions performed by the John A. Macdonald. The presence of American journalists (and the Canadian Press) aboard the Manhattan and Canadian journalists aboard the John A. Macdonald helped insure significant, almost day-to-day coverage of the expedition.

A second type of story often covered in the Globe and Mail focused on governmental responsiveness to the transit. Past the initial passive stance, Cabinet became proactive at defusing the tension produced by its initial response. Nine (9) news articles had for main purpose to report or react to a minister’s public address on the upcoming Arctic statement. For the most part, External Affairs minister Mitchell Sharp was the main protagonist, reinsuring Canadians that a new legislation tackling maritime pollution in the Arctic would be introduced soon, with the Globe and Mail offering Sharp a full page to explain the government’s point of view. Prime Minister Trudeau, National Defence Minister Léo Cadieux and Northern Development Minister Jean Chrétien carried the same message when delivering talks at other venues.

This strategy paid off as the announcement of a future Arctic statement calmed the clamour. In a subsequent editorial on 13 September, the Globe and Mail deemed the idea of the statement reasonable. The editorial then turned to necessary investments in order to ensure control over the region, describing Arctic waters as vital to Canadian well-being (Globe and Mail, September 13 1969: p. 6). A later editorial also made clear that the initial governmental strategy to deny that the Manhattan raised sovereignty issues was ill-advised, even for a rather centrist and moderate newspaper like the Globe and Mail.³ According to the newspaper, “Canadians could be forgiven for suspecting that the Government is sitting on the issue’s head in the hopes that it will not arise,” further pointing to the Canadian government’s passive approach towards Arctic sovereignty since the early 1960s (Globe and Mail, September 19 1969). It would, therefore, seem obvious that the statement on pollution control in Arctic waters acted as an acceptable solution to address the crisis.

The quasi absence of organized civil society opposition somewhat limited media coverage. The most vocal opposition came from within the governing party’s rank. Members of the House of Commons Northern Development and Indian Affairs committee flew to the Arctic in order to conduct what they called an “inspection tour” of the tanker (Globe and Mail, August 29 1969: p. 25). The group members, led by Liberal MPs, were quite critical of the governmental position, voicing environmental protection and citing the loss of the two Panarctic barges as signs of risks for upcoming oil transportation. Furthermore, they were vocal on sovereignty issues, rebutting arguments that the status of Arctic waterways was up for debate. However, this opposition was only able to capture minimal media attention.

The Arctic pollution protection legislation was only introduced in late October. The vagueness of the upcoming bill contributed to the second media coverage peak, this time over a longer timeline (February–April). Media attention was more significant ahead of the second transit. Between the public announcement of the second transit (2 February 1970) and its actual departure (3 April 1970), 50 news articles mentioned the Manhattan. It is fair to say that political parties played an important role in making the issue salient. As the event happened before deliberations in the House of Commons were broadcasted, the Globe and Mail offered a transcript of Question Period to its readership. The issue was raised no less than nine times by Opposition MPs over a two-month period.

Opposition parties were quite skilful at zeroing in on the proposed bills’ shortcomings. A minority of their interventions were centred on the necessity for the government to issue a “unilateral claim to Canadian jurisdiction over all the waters of the Arctic archipelago” (Newman, February 14 1970: p. 4). The confusing political messaging of the acting government did not help to dissipate the controversy. On 19 February 1970, External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp displayed a contrastingly assertive attitude towards the dispute:

These are our waters. There has never been any question of that. We have always regarded them as our waters. The question may be whether other people regard them as our waters – but that is another matter […] It would be difficult to argue that the Arctic waters between Canadian territory have been regarded as part of the high seas.

(Sharp cited in Newman, February 20 1969: p. 1)

The timing for these comments is intriguing: they were made one day after the publication of the most critical Globe editorial. Published on 18 February, the opinion piece called the government’s approach towards Arctic sovereignty pusillanimous, meek and riddled with pious platitudes. It further enunciated a list of conditions to meet before any new transit:

We should not let them come until the rules that will govern their presence have been settled; until the research into their potential for trouble has been completed; until the safeguards that should be taken have been determined and agreed upon; and until the challenge to our ultimate authority and responsibility in the archipelago has been faced and resolved.

(Globe and Mail, February 18 1970: p. 6)

The text embodied a nationalist turn taken by the nation’s most influential newspaper. As a result, Sharp’s comments were worthy of front page attention, displaying assertiveness and authority. Nonetheless, this meant a sharp departure from a previous position and, as a result, put the Prime Minister on the defensive, with the PM electing to either dodge questions on his ministers’ comments or making strange comments raising further questions⁴ (Globe and Mail, February 25 1970: p. B2). Past Sharp’s outburst, government was content with delaying any statement or answering questions in a meaningful way until the pollution control bill be put up for debate in the House of Commons in early April.

However, the announcement of a possible second Manhattan transit in early February forced the government to detail its approach. It seemed that the devil was in the details for Opposition MPs, resulting in significant media coverage. First, questions in late February were raised on the possibility that the Canadian government might deny the Manhattan transit if it was found that the tanker may not withstand ice pressure.

Subsequently, the need for an inspection of the said tanker was put front and centre: an inspection of th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction: Media, security, and sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic
• 1 The Canadian media and Arctic sovereignty crises
• 2 Time to ring the alarm bell?
• 3 Touring a (melting) ice pack
• 4 2010–2015: Arctic governance in a new era
• 5 Social media, Arctic tourism and the Crystal Serenity
• Conclusion: The Arctic and the Canadian media
• Index