Pakistan 1992

Charles H Kennedy

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367282127
• eBook ISBN: 9781000310047
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

"Pakistan: 1992 is the inaugural volume of a prospective series of biennial
assessments of contemporary events and issues in Pakistan affairs. In general,
the series will cover issues relevant to Pakistan's domestic politics, foreign
policy, and economy. This volume contains special chapters on the 1990
elections, Islamization, health policy, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Each of
the contributors to this volume is a specialist on Pakistan, and each has
had recent research experience in the state relevant to their respective rontnbutions.
Pakistan: 1992 is published in affiliation with the American Institute of Pakistan
Studies, a non-profit, non-partisan educational organization in its nineteenth
year of operation, which is dedicated to encouraging and supporting research
on issues relevant to Pakistan and the promotion of scholarly exchange between
the United States and Pakistan."

1
Dilemma and Challenge in Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan

Lawrence Ziring

The year 1991 was transitional for the world, and no less so for Pakistan. In many respects it was a defining year for Pakistani political system and for the central government led by Nawaz Sharif. Never before did international events have a deeper impact on the domestic scene, and by the same token, never before was the country’s foreign policy so clearly an extension of its national condition. The time had passed when internal and external matters could be compartmentalized. The intertwining of the one with the other gave new emphasis to holistic doctrine, and indeed Pakistan was called upon to reexamine its basic ethos and to determine the course it would pursue in light of the cataclysmic changes generated by the collapse and disintegration of its giant neighbor, the Soviet Union.

The task of leading the nation during this uncertain period fell upon two personalities, one with his roots in the emergence of the Muslim state, the other, a man half his age, more conditioned by the urban growth and entrepreneurial development of the third world nation.

The relationship between President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif offered more synergism than that between the president and Nawaz Sharifs predecessor, Benazir Bhutto. Whereas division, rivalry, and conflict framed the relationship between Benazir and Ghulam Ishaq, there was relative compatibility in the way in which Ghulam Ishaq interacted with Nawaz Sharif. Such sharp contrast was also discerned in the character of the support that Benazir and Nawaz Sharif received in buttressing their administrations. Benazir led a curious coalition, the most striking feature of which was her inability to carry the Punjab or to find a place within her government for the forces led by Nawaz Sharif. She failed to sustain a coalition with the Karachi-based MQM (Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz), and her tactics prevented alliance with frontier leaders in Balochistan and the NWFP (Northwest Frontier Province). Nawaz Sharif, on the other hand, proved more adept at forming coalitions. As the dominant political figure in the Punjab, he was successful in bringing the Sindhi Muhajir organization into the fold, while heretofore rival provincial and ideological camps joined with him in the creation of a harmony of interests not experienced since the earliest years of the country’s independence. And, although Benazir assumed the role of leader of the political opposition, many of her former PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) stalwarts opted for a place within the ruling IJI (Islamic Democratic Alliance).

The Intertwining of Domestic and Foreign Policy

But as much as domestic developments caused Pakistanis to reassess their political performance, it was the world beyond Pakistan that provoked the nation to respond to combinations of challenges that demanded reappraisals of its status and role in a rapidly changing global environment. The year began with an American-led international force, of which Pakistan was a token member, assaulting Iraq. The success of Operation Desert Storm forced Baghdad to retreat from Kuwait, which it had invaded, occupied, and annexed only months before. The Pakistani troops that were despatched to Saudi Arabia, however, were stationed distant from the war zone, and their services were neither contemplated nor used by the alliance that planned and prosecuted the action. Moreover, although volunteering forces for the international coalition, Islamabad itself officially proclaimed that they only were to be used to protect the most sacred of the Islamic holy places in Saudi Arabia.

With Pakistani troops distant from the war zone, the government had little difficulty in coping with public sentiment Nevertheless, a vocal segment of the population left little doubt it favored Baghdad’s claim to speak for revolutionary Islam. There was considerable street support for the ouster of the Kuwaiti monarch, and the demonstrators voiced particular approval for Saddam Hussain’s defiance of Washington and the U.S.-led coalition. Furthermore, once the American field commander ordered an all-out attack on Iraq and quickly humbled the war-making capability of the Arab world’s most formidable military presence, Pakistanis in and outside the armed forces registered their concern that the “real” purpose of the action was to prevent the emergence of a substantial Muslim power. Hence, no less a figure than General Mirza Aslam Beg, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff, condemned the United States for what he described as the use of vengeful force. He also had harsh words for the Saudi royal family, as well as the other monarchs in the region. Thus, despite the placing of Pakistani forces in Saudi Arabia, none other than the leader of the Pakistan Army appeared to side with those of his vocal countrymen who unambiguously supported the Iraqi ruler. The episode proved a considerable embarrassment for the government of Nawaz Sharif as well as President Ghulam Ishaq, but their management of state affairs was never in jeopardy. Although publicized as a normal sequence of events, Beg’s retirement from the army and the transfer of the command to General Asif Nawaz Janjua was also judged as the government’s way of balancing its domestic and foreign needs.

Beg’s reaction to the Gulf War was mirrored in the expression of his demonstrative countrymen, but his concern was more broadly geopolitical and strategic. The elimination of Iraq as a major actor in the Middle East seemed to signal a more aggressive American posture in the area. On its face, a formidable Arab state, dedicated to the destruction of Israel, had been seriously damaged by Zionism’s principal supporters. Pakistanis spoke of a “Pax Americana” being imposed upon a world no longer balanced by a Soviet presence. Moreover, strains in Washington-Islamabad relations had been aggravated earlier when President Bush failed to certify to the U.S. Congress that Pakistan was not engaged in a nuclear weapons program. In October 1990, the Bush administration suspended military transfers to Pakistan. Under the terms of the Pressler amendment even non-military American aid had been put on hold. From a Pakistani viewpoint, the damage inflicted on Iraq by the Washington-led coalition was serious, but not nearly as vital as the dramatic change in U.S. policy or the threat the Americans seemed to pose to Pakistan’s nuclear program.

In the absence of the Soviet Union, let alone a communist threat to the region, Islamabad perceived a different United States, particularly one less inclined to assist the Muslim nation, and even more intimate with India. Indeed, if there were to be ongoing relations of a positive character between the two states, another not immediately apparent raison d’etre would have to be found. In addition to their perception of American “overkill” in Iraq, Pakistanis were clearly ill at ease with a powerful globally involved country no longer restrained by heretofore countervailing influences.

Thus, the passing of the Cold War and the changing American attitude toward Pakistan compelled Islamabad to reevaluate its position vis-a-vis Washington. The Nawaz Sharif government also found it necessary to steer a difficult course between those who demanded a total break with Washington and others who continued to emphasize the utility of a sustained association.

Sino-Pakistani relations never appeared more important, and the visit to Islamabad by China’s president was answered by visits from the highest-ranking Pakistani officials. Perhaps the most notable was General Asif Nawaz’s journey to Beijing to discuss mutual security interests in the changed conditions. Although agitated over Li Peng’s visit to India, Islamabad claimed China remained an important friend and expressed pleasure that the Chinese leader had called upon India to accept Pakistan’s overture for a nuclear-free weapons zone in South Asia. And, while new arms agreements were entered into with China, there was ample recognition in Islamabad that the changed world conditions offered new prospects for a Chinese-Indian detente. The full impact of such activity demanded increased vigilance in the Pakistan Foreign Office.

Nor was government unmindful of the need to develop new policies with the Arab Middle East, where the divisions between the monarchies and non-monarchies had become more pronounced; or with Iran, which had emerged stronger from the 1991 Gulf War and with a new pragmatic diplomatic style. Islamabad was also intrigued by developments in Central Asia, and in order to better adjust to the new conditions there, a way needed to be found to harmonize Islamabad’s interest in the region with those of Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

Islamabad also observed developments within the European Community and was provoked by the global significance of a unified Germany. The organization of the new European Charter and the expansion of the Conference in Security and Cooperation in Europe was recognition that the Cold War was truly over and that a new framework of worldwide relationships was already well advanced.

Islamabad acknowledged the need to bring a final resolution to the struggle in Afghanistan, and the prospects for a satisfactory, compromise solution were much improved in the new global environment. Moreover, the ouster of Najibullah, the collapse of his government, and the seizure of Kabul by factions of the resistance in April 1992 forced Pakistan into a difficult mediator’s role. The success or failure of Islamabad’s diplomacy would determine whether the Afghan refugees returned to their homeland or remained indefinitely in their Pakistani surroundings. A final and durable settlement of the Afghan conflict, and the establishment of a stable government in Kabul, were essential keys to Pakistan’s policy in Central Asia.

But if the Afghanistan problem at least seemed tractable, the same could not be said for Pakistan’s continuing difficulties with India. The Kashmir problem generated considerable heat, but efforts at turning down the burners were largely unsuccessful. Conflict between Pakistan and India remained a constant, barely influenced by the disappearance of the Soviet Union or the opening of a new era in East-West relations.

Management and Reform

Although the government was called upon to do some delicate balancing, the principal burden rested on the backs of the higher administration, the professional core within Pakistan’s steel frame that combined the talents of the public administrators with that of the civil-military bureaucracy led by Ghulam Ishaq. It was its combined sense of reality that enabled the Nawaz Sharif government to weather what could have been a far more turbulent period.

Within months of his embarrassing statements, General Beg had been ushered into retirement. Contacts with the Arab oil producers, notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were reinforced. The government also sought to mend fences with the United States, but there was no mistaking the changed circumstances of that relationship or that the Americans were perceived differently, particularly by the Pakistani literati who sought to articulate a new view of the Pakistan condition.

That condition was not something to celebrate in 1991. Pakistan’s economy had ceased to expand and the burden placed upon the country by its returning citizens, long domiciled in the Gulf states, was further exacerbated by the loss of a major source of foreign exchange. Pakistanis working in the Arabian peninsula states had remitted huge sums of money to Pakistan. That flow was drastically curtailed by the war and its aftermath, and no less important from a political as well as economic vantage point, the returned laborers could not find employment in Pakistan.

The government nonetheless aggressively tackled some of the country’s more long-standing problems. The Water Apportionment Accord which had remained unresolved since independence was concluded despite the continuing criticism of the opposition. The Kalabagh Dam project was suspended pending the development of a compromise formula acceptable to all the provinces. The Water and Power Development Authority, however, was permitted to proceed with the non-controversial Bhasha and Skardu dams. The National Finance Commission (NFC) accepted a formula for a proportional distribution of funding among the different provinces and other funds were reserved for the so-called backward areas. The NFC action, like the Water Accord, was made possible by the dominance of the IJI in each of Pakistan’s four provinces.

Nawaz Sharif also used his business experience in an effort aimed at transforming the way Pakistan conducts its commercial affairs. The prime minister cited the changed conditions in the world marketplace that placed new emphasis on the private sector. Restrictions on Pakistani business practices were reduced significantly in order to prepare the country for the competition that it had heretofore neglected. The promotion of exports and new attempts to attract foreign investors were given higher priority. The introduction of foreign currency accounts also was aimed at Pakistani entrepreneurs, some of whom seized the opportunity to expand their activities and increase holdings. Nevertheless, the economy was seriously affected by the worldwide slowdown in economic forces, as well as the new, more cautious attitude of former external benefactors in the Arab world as well as in the West. Pakistan’s significant law and order situation also played havoc with the economy, causing both domestic and foreign investors to question the viability of possible ventures.

In spite of strenuous measures, government programs aimed at controlling the violence in Sindh province proved unsuccessful. Lawlessness was so generalized that the citizenry lost what little confidence it had in government’s capacity to correct the situation. Incidents of robbery, home invasion, kidnappings, and rape were more numerous than at any other time in the nation’s history. Even foreign engineers and technicians could not escape the grasp of the dacoits, and development projects in the interior regions of Sindh were seriously affected by the government’s inability to guarantee the safety of on-site workers. Moreover, police officials, including officers, were implicated in criminal acts or simply corrupted by the prevailing conditions. Nor was the mayhem isolated to Sindh alone. A massacre of residents in Islampura and Sheikhupura in the Punjab forced Nawaz Sharif to cancel an important trip to Japan, and the attention given to the event raised anew the question of investing in Pakistan’s economic future. In the Punjab, citizens were quick to point out that many of the violent assaults on persons and property were perpetrated by unemployed youth from relatively well-to-do families. The easy availability of firearms and an intensifying drug problem were described as causes for an escalating countrywide crime wave.

The government responded to the dilemma by forcing the national parliament to adopt the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution. The vote was taken before a debate could be mounted by the opposition, and the most contentious aspect of the law was the establishment of Speedy Trial Courts, which were charged with dispensing summary justice almost immediately following the apprehension of suspects. Legal scholars argued that the amendment effectively diminished the powers of the conventional judiciary, created a parallel judiciary with extreme powers, and buttressed the latter by linking it with investigative and prosecuting agencies. Few among the legal community believed the Speedy Trial Courts were the answer to the country’s crime problem, and the vast majority concluded that the powers conferred would only strengthen the arbitrary will of the government. Fearing abuses of power, several judgments decided in the new courts were overturned at the appellate level.

The Shariat Bill also was passed in 1991, arousing the concerns of those who feared the government was yielding to Islamic fundamentalists. The legislation, its critics said, destabilized the long-established socio-legal order, and would stand as a barrier to foreign investment in the country. Nawaz Sharif hesitated in fully implementing the legislation with the politician’s hope that its mere passage would achieve the desired results. In the end, however, the Shariat Bill failed on all counts. It neither placated the Islamic fundamentalists, nor did it calm the fears of the more secular-minded members of Pakistani society. The increasing alienation of the Jamaat-i-Islami was traced to the failure to enact and enforce a rigid Shariat bill, but the government apparently believed its fortunes remained with those members of society who staunchly opposed providing the ulema with powers that could drastically alter their lifestyle. As in the days of Zia ul-Haq, the Pakistan government promoted the notion of an Islamic state, but the actual portrayal of a state governed by theological teaching was judged out of time and substance.

Nevertheless, in January 1992, a Working Group on Nifaz-i-Shariat (Islamic legal order) was constituted on a directive of the prime minister. It was called upon to monitor and recommend measures for the enforcement of Islamic laws in the country. Convened under the chairmanship of Maulana Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi, Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, the meeting brought together prominent ulema from all schools of Islamic thought, as well as the Federal Minister for Parliamentary Affairs and a number of MNAs. The charge given to the group included an examination of the process of Islamization, and its impact on the individual and the society as a whole. The Working Group adopted a nineteen-point scheme, which it claimed would lead to a pious life for Pakistan’s citizens in addition to enhancing their material wellbeing. Among the nineteen points were calls for piety among Pakistan’s political leaders; the implementation of all Islamic legislation, especially that body of laws creating the Shariat Courts; increased attention to the work of the Council of Islamic Ideology; the enforcement by central authority of all Shariat rules; the full transformation of the educational system to represent Islamic teaching; controls on the electronic and print media to assure a morally sound Islamic way of life; uniform and enforced prayer schedules for all citizens, including members of the armed forces and civil servants; the total abolition of interest; an Islamic banking system with prohibitions on the acquisition of income in the absence of appropriate labor; and the creation of a women’s university. Perhaps more significant in the long term was the recommendation that the political system be brought into greater conformity with Islamic requirements.

The conference also used the occasion to cite its concern for the plight of Muslim fundamentalists in Algeria and called upon the Algiers government to accept the results of the electoral process. Before adjourning, the Working Group addressed the changed conditions in Central Asia and urged the despatch of a delegation of ulema to the new Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union. The objective of the delegation would be to interact with the citizens of the new states and to ascertain their needs and concerns. The delegation also was urged to identify Central Asian students who could be brought to Pakistan for religious training. It was most doubtful, however, that the administration was prepared to address all of these issues in the foreseeable future.

Overall, the IJI did not suffer from its go-slow approach to Islamization. Most important, it sought to avoid taking extreme ideological or religious positions. Acceptance of this approach was demonstrated by the Senate elections, wherein the IJI won 28 of the 39 contested seats. The IJI also retained its hold on the lower house and effectively sustained its preeminence in the provincial assemblies. The Local Bodies elections also went in favor of the administration, and the prevailing governmental order was essentially undisturbed by the problems which otherwise afflicted the nation.

Azad Kashmir, the only remaining stronghold of the PPP, also yielded to the IJI in the 1991 elections. The dissolution of the Azad Kashmir Assembly had necessitated the call for new elections, and although the opposition cried fraud, Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, in league with Nawaz Sharif, took control of the state’s administration.

Nawaz Shariſs success was perhaps less a matter of satisfying the material needs of his constituents and more a question of denying Benazir’s re-emergence. Pakistan’s disparate and regional political leaders preferred Nawaz Sharif over Benazir Bhutto because they believed he would better serve their interests. A good portion of the Pakistani electorate had obviously drawn the same conclusion. Benazir attempted to provide the opposition with the necessary leadership in the parliament, but she was under increasing pressure from the number of legal cases that had been brought against her. Similarly, her husband and associates were cited with abuses of power as well as criminal acts, and they had considerable difficulty in organizing an effective defense, let alone providing the leadership to challenge the government.

The opposition was highly critical of the government’s selection of Jam Sadiq Ali to be Sindh’s chief minister. Ordered to deal ruthlessly with Sindhi hooligans and terrorists, Sindh province had been transformed into something resembling a police state. Jam Sadiq was accused of adopting fascist methods, and not only the political opposition, but the country’s intelligentsia also voiced the view that the remedy for the region’s unrest was worse than the malady. The general fear was raised that the totalitarian actions observed in Sindh would ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Map of South Asia
• Map of Pakistan
• 1 Dilemma and Challenge in Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan
• 2 The 1990 General Elections in Pakistan
• 3 Economic Policy After Zia ul-Haq
• 4 Judicial Activism and Islamization After Zia: Toward the Prohibition of Riba
• 5 The Politicization of the Shias and the Development of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria in Pakistan
• 6 Healing Power and Medical Practice in Pakistani Society
• 7 Pakistan and the Resolution of the Afghan Conflict
• 8 Kashmir Conflict: The New Phase
• Chronology of Events: September 1988 - April 1992
• Glossary
• About the Contributors
• Index
• About the Book