Sadat And Begin

The Domestic Politics Of Peacemaking

Melvin A Friedlander

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9780367286545
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000310658
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The architects of the Camp David process expected their efforts to become a broad and inclusive framework for peace in the Middle East. Dr. Friedlander's book demonstrates how domestic factors affecting policy decisions made in both Cairo and Jerusalem prevented Sadat and Begin from embracing a structure that would yield a more comprehensive arrangement. Sadat, for example, confronted an antipeace movement in Egypt, strengthened by then-Vice President Mubarak's ties to the military-security establishment and his alliance with members of the Arab nation's diplomatic corps. Begin was opposed by Israeli conservatives who saw the Camp David formulas as leading to a peace that would jeopardize Israel's security. Both leaders, Dr. Friedlander concludes, were able ultimately to guide their nations toward approval of the peace initiative primarily because of their mastery of techniques of domestic intra-elite bargaining.

1
The Struggle for a Geneva Conference

The Motives

Egypt and Israel shared a common desire for peace at the start of 1977, Yet the separate paths each chose to achieve that goal resulted from dissimilar motives.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had by mid-December 1976 abandoned Kissinger's step-by-step approach to peace negotiations and successfully sponsored a United Nations resolution calling for talks to resume in Geneva no later than 1 March 1977.¹ He also called for a Palestinian presence at the conference. Sadat later emphasized that the "core" and "crux of the problem" continued to be the Palestinian situation. He said the "Palestinians must have their state" and indicated that Egypt would press for creation of a Palestinian entity on the West Bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip, with a corridor linking the two territories. The Palestinian entity would, however, be linked in some manner to Jordan.²

Sadat's empathy for the Palestinians was actually a hollow gesture. His endorsement of Palestinian statehood resulted not from a heartfelt belief in their cause but from fears that a continued impasse would jeopardize attempts to secure a return of the Sinai. Egypt had restored its honor with the 1973 Suez Canal crossing, but even that partial success had worn thin by January 1977. Reestablishment of sovereignty over the Sinai would boost Egyptian military morale, reduce the cost of maintaining a large standing army, and reduce the competition among advisers who, depending on their ideology, viewed rapprochement with Israel as either desirable or disastrous. In short, reacquisition of the Sinai would achieve large political gains at a time of declining economic fortunes.

Lower military expenditures would allow Sadat to channel additional resources to the urban poor, partially mitigating the ill-effects of excessively rapid development. The Egyptian president would then be in an excellent position to balance the needs of an army tied in large part to the rural middle class with the conflicting but equally important needs of an urban peasantry willing to seek alliance with radical religious sects who could topple the regime.

Sadat's effort to accommodate Palestinian demands for statehood at a Geneva-style, comprehensive peace conference was an effort to recover the lost territories quickly and under multilateral auspices. Kissinger's step-by-step strategy after nearly four years of bargaining had gained Sadat only a separation of combatants and small slices of land. The Palestinians — once uncontrollable, leaderless, and hopelessly radicalized — had moderated their tone and appeared to have found a natural leader in Yasir Arafat Sadat would not demand a totally independent Palestine but one constrained through some form of relationship with Jordan. Palestinian representation at Geneva could be as part of an all-Arab delegation. Even a partial success at a new Geneva Conference would lead to an end to hostilities between Arab and Jew and pave the way for the return of the Sinai to Egypt — or so Sadat reasoned.³

The Israelis, however, were conditioned by experience to view the dynamics of Geneva from a different perspective. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin favored a new international conference to deal with the issues still outstanding. His concept of the new Geneva negotiations was patterned after the recently successful European Security Conference in Helsinki, but with an important difference. The Helsinki meeting had ratified existing boundaries; a Geneva meeting, in Rabin's view, could consider negotiation of new frontiers. Israel was determined — at whatever type of conference that might be called — to require recognition of its legal and moral right to exist. Failure to obtain that singularly important concession had caused Israel to boycott several previous conferences. Israel had always insisted, as it would under the Rabin plan, that all essentials of cooperation with a neighboring state — trade, technological assistance, and human coexistence — must be on the conference agenda. Rabin blocked any representation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) by restricting attendance at the meeting to "heads of sovereign governments."⁴

The earlier step-by-step negotiating strategy had served Israeli interests well. Partial withdrawals from captured territory could be exchanged for substantive Arab retreat from a formal state of war. Furthermore, Israel could obtain complete recognition and full relations — including an exchange of ambassadors, lifting of trade restrictions, and extension of oil lease arrangements — incrementally through staged evacuation of the occupied lands.⁵

There were other problems, however. Most proposals for a general settlement threatened Israeli sensibilities and perceived security needs by explicitly calling for Palestinian self-determination. Israeli leaders had refused to attend a Geneva-style conference for fear of being forced into an unacceptable solution of the Palestinian impasse. Measures to provide for territorial adjustment in the West Bank, such as the Allon Plan, were advanced only within the context of Jordanian sovereignty.⁶

Rabin's acceptance of a comprehensive framework seems all the more curious unless viewed as a by-product of the volatile Israeli political scene during the winter of 1976. The National Religious Party (NRP), the Israeli Labor Party's (ILP) traditional coalition partner, had stiffened its position toward the West Bank and stubbornly refused to consider even minor concessions to Jordan. A mixture of younger NRP members and other more radical — but orthodox religious — elements even urged outright annexation of the territory to accommodate a planned expansion of Jewish settlements. Rabin's overall political weakness enhanced the ability of the NRP, minority party, to exert heavy influence on Israel's foreign policy. In addition, Rabin had been outflanked by rival party leader Yigal Allon who, as foreign minister, articulated a plan of self-rule for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, linked to Israeli military administration and Jordanian political federation. Shimon Peres, the more serious contender for party leadership, favored more Israeli settlements in the West Bank and a total ban on any talks with the PLO. As defense minister in the Rabin cabinet, Peres had tried unsuccessfully to sponsor municipal elections in administered Arab territories — hoping thereby to drive a wedge between local Palestinian officials and the PLO.⁷

It was to ensure his own political survival that Rabin sought a middle-of-the-road negotiation posture. A pragmatic yet principled stance — equidistant between the positions of Peres and Allon — could earn Rabin renomination as prime minister. Increased U.S. financial and material support obtained as a result of firm but flexible bargaining could reassure a divided electorate of Rabin's effectiveness. The Israeli prime minister had committed a serious gaffe by seeming to endorse incumbent President Gerald Ford prior to the 1976 U.S. election. The newly elected U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, was known to favor a solution to the impasse along the lines suggested in a December 1975 Brookings Report,⁸ and a demonstration of reasonableness by Rabin would probably erase any lingering ill-effects of his impolitic endorsement of Ford. In any event, the struggle to achieve a reputation for moderation was joined with Egypt, as the focus for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict shifted from the Middle East to Washington.

Washington Meetings: First Rounds

The Brookings Report offered the Carter administration a welcome opportunity to design its own policy.⁹ Zbigniew Brezinski and William Quandt were members of the Brookings study group and each was to play a key role in developing Carter's Middle East strategy — the former as National Security Council (NSC) adviser, the latter as senior Middle East Director for the NSc.¹⁰

Middle East policy making in the U.S. government had been the special province of Henry Kissinger during the Nixon and Ford administrations. Despite Kissinger's penchant for close and detailed supervision of foreign policy making, he had organized a particularly able group of assistants at both the NSC and Department of State to pursue a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Carter chose to retain most of the Kissinger team. Quandt had served for two years as a junior White House staff member in the early 1970s. Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia Alfred Atherton also remained and would, before the end of 1977, emerge as a special presidential assistant, shuttling between Cairo and Jerusalem as Kissinger had in 1975. Quandt's former superior at the NSC, Harold Saunders, became Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the state department and later succeeded Atherton as Assistant Secretary for the Near East and South Asia. Leslie Janka, a former NSC press aide of Kissinger, remained the ranking head for Middle East matters in the Defense Department's Office of International Security Affairs.

The drafting of papers on the Arab-Israeli conflict — unlike other maiden attempts at foreign policy making — became a smooth operation during the Carter administration. This efficiency was not surprising because Quandt, Saunders, Atherton, and Janka had worked together during the Kissinger era, spoke the same bureaucratic language, and to a certain extent viewed the Middle East through similar lenses.¹¹

Such effective management assured the administration of at least modest success in its effort to achieve some progress toward peace before the end of 1977. Carter sought to hasten the process by sending Secretary of State Vance to the Middle East in mid-February to solicit advice from local officials.¹² Meanwhile, the administration worked to construct a balanced peace proposal to present to a succession of Middle East statesmen visiting Washington during March and April. Significant progress toward the convening of a new Geneva Conference would be unlikely until after the May 17 Israeli elections, but valuable insights concerning the minimum demands of the parties involved could be gained in the interim. The idea of granting PLO representation as part of an all-Arab delegation appeared to be gaining nearly universal acceptance.¹³ The Brookings Report had spoken of "comprehensive" peace, but that term was defined narrowly in one capital and broadly in another. Moreover, the staged withdrawal envisioned for Israel in the Brookings study could occur only after several prerequisites had been met. To detail the ultimate objective, the administration seemed to assume, would be the easiest step toward an accommodation between Arabs and Israelis.¹⁴

The Rabin Visit — March 1977

Rabin underscored the vast differences that separated Arab and Israeli notions of a final peace during a visit to the White House in early March. In the view of Rabin and Vance the Arab position amounted to an offer to end hostilities in exchange for the return of the occupied territories. Such a tradeoff did not suffice for the Israelis. Rabin sought a comprehensive peace treaty that ensured open borders, cultural exchanges, and diplomatic relations. He still considered a Geneva-style conference a desirable objective. Staged Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory was also possible if accompanied by Arab actions to grant Jerusalem permanent status.

Rabin's political insecurity prevented him from being too specific on final borders. A territorial compromise with Jordan, which...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1. The Struggle for a Geneva Conference
• 2. The Soviet-American Communique
• 3. Sadat's Visit to Jerusalem
• 4. The Triangular Relationship
• 5. The Triangular Relationship Deepens
• 6. Meeting at Camp David
• 7. "Peace is at Hand" — Almost
• 8. The Peacemakers
• Selected Bibliography
• Index