The Guns Fall Silent

The End Of The Cold War And The Future Of Conventional Disarmament

Ian Cuthbertson, Peter M E Volten

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000302103
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book discusses part of the military-stability problem, notably the part relating to East-West relationships, which is becoming synonymous with military stability between the Soviet Union and NATO.

3
Doctrines and Force Structures

KLAUS NAUMANN

■ Introduction

The idea of including talks on doctrines and force structures has arisen from time to time as part of the arms control process, although this need has been advocated with varying degrees of emphasis and not always with direct reference to existing interrelationships.

The Warsaw Pact's statement on military doctrines of May 1987 made it clear that, from the point of view of the Eastern side, the "doctrines" issue had to be dealt with in order to eliminate distrust and suspicion—which, along with many other factors, stood in the way of a conventional arms control agreement. The Warsaw Pact's argument suggested that for this kind of East-West dialogue, a forum should be found in the extended CSCE scope of the 35 rather than the more limited forum of the 23. The reasons behind this choice may lie not only in the natural dismay of the neutral and nonaligned nations of Europe at their exclusion from such discussions, but also in the recognition that the somewhat more detached view of those nations in Europe which are not part of the two alliances might help in the determination of when a doctrine is considered defensive and when it is not. The East's reasoning, however, also demonstrates that doctrines cannot be discussed in isolation, separate from the consideration of force structure. In isolation, discussion would only confirm a declaratory policy without considering the other important factors which engender perceptions of threat. These factors—the structures of forces, their deployment and their training—follow from and are reflected in doctrines. It is for this reason that NATO insisted on a discussion which considers doctrine in combination with the capabilities of the armed forces. Only such an approach offers a realistic possibility of answering the question of whether or not forces are defensively oriented. To facilitate such an answer is the ultimate purpose and aim of a discussion on doctrines.

Doctrines express political objectives, and as such they ultimately determine the extent to which forces may be reduced and the level of confidence-building measures which is desirable or acceptable. In this respect it is certainly useful to start considerations on doctrines at an early stage of an arms control process and a preliminary discussion between NATO and the WTO was held on this topic in February 1990 as an adjunct to the Vienna negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the interrelations and interdependences existing between doctrines, force structures and stability, as well as those between doctrines, disarmament proposals and confidence-building measures. To that end, I shall seek to identify the criteria characterizing a defensive military doctrine and the way in which a defensive orientation manifests itself in structures.

Once obtained, the findings will be conducive to developing yardsticks that may be helpful in assessing the defensive nature and orientation of forces, both politically and militarily. This approach underlies the structure of this essay.

■ The Interrelations and Interdependencies between Doctrines, Force Structures and Stability

Academic inclinations and traditional military thinking both call for definitions to clarify terms and provide the necessary prerequisite for any constructive debate or discussion.

The first generic and overarching term is stability, because it describes the objective to be achieved by the concept of mutual security. The definition of stability common in physics comes closest to the state desired in security policy: if on both sides constancy of a system held together by internal forces, even against external disturbances, has been reached, one may say that confrontation has been overcome and the threat of war has been eliminated.

Transferred from physics to security policy, such a state would describe a relationship between nations or alliances in which:

• national and/or alliance interests are pursued exclusively by peaceful means;
• a general political condition exists in which the probability of a military conflict breaking out is assessed as low; and
• cooperation, despite a possibly continuing antagonism between value systems, is practiced and even further promoted in all areas of international relations.

The objective of stability arid the associated general renunciation of the use of military force as a means to achieve political objectives are obvious and can be reflected in the policy of nations and alliances. Such a policy alone, however, does not yet signify a relaxation of tensions or an end to antagonism. Rather, it initiates a process which for its duration needs to be backed up by military power as insurance against a return to confrontational politics.

The goal of general stability must therefore be accompanied by military stability. Military stability describes a condition between nations and alliances in which each side is assured of the ability to deny to the other side the successful use of military force. In a condition of stability, military force at the strategic level is oriented exclusively toward defense. Where military stability prevails, war, while still technologically and operationally possible to wage, will no longer be winnable.

The current situation in Europe continues to be characterized by a regional imbalance in favor of the Warsaw Pact countries, in particular the Soviet Union. This situation may still, in the future, offer possibilities for exerting political pressure. These possibilities are emphasized all the more when a lack of political stability is reflected in military doctrine¹ which, in accordance with the confrontational nature of political relations, does not restrict the use of military force to defense of one's own territory. The military expression of such a doctrine are force structures with a capability for large-scale offensive operations and the conquest of foreign territory.

The existence of such a situation is contrary to the objective of stability. In a state of stability, political and military stability are in concord and harmony exists between military doctrine and force structures. This harmony is a prerequisite for an accurate perception of the situation by the previously adversarial partner in a new relationship of mutual security. It makes him trusting and gives him confidence that military power is no longer regarded as a viable means of enforcing political objectives. Thus it follows that harmony among the defensive political objectives, doctrines and force structures of nations and alliances is a prerequisite for stability.

In the current political situation we must continue to proceed cautiously, seeking dialogue and process without ignoring the long existing antagonism between value systems. However, against a background of 40 years of conflict and distrust, at a time when attempts are being made to make cooperation feasible, harmony among defensive political objectives, doctrines and force structures assumes special weight. It cannot, however, be achieved at short notice. But once it has been attained, and if a defensive orientation and objectives can be perceived, then an essential prerequisite has been established for further concessions in trust and greater cooperation. With this in mind, what then is it that makes doctrines and structures defensive?

■ Defensive Doctrines

East and West often use the same terms with widely differing meanings. Thus this paper assumes for the sake of comparability, that the term "military doctrine" refers to that part of the military-technological component of the East's conception of military doctrine which deals with matters above the level of "operational art"—i.e., above the front level. Analogously, on the NATO side, we will be considering "military strategy"—that is, concepts such as "flexible response."

The intention is, however, not to compare the doctrines but to identify the criteria that determine defensiveness. A sensible approach would proceed from those elements which characterize military operations: forces, area and time. The caution that emerges in any country from an awareness of its relative vulnerability suggests beginning with "area" first.

A doctrine can only be defensive if the objective of all military actions in wartime is to protect and preserve one's own territory. Any permanent seizure of terrain which did not belong to the national or alliance territory before the start of combat operations must be as clearly excluded as an objective of military operations. Thus regarding "area," the objective can only be the restoration of the status quo ante. Therefore the critical criterion is the permanent seizure of foreign territory. This cannot form part of any defensive doctrine. This does not exclude, however, either damage to enemy territory or temporary transit through enemy territory during military operations.

If these two situations were excluded, the defender would be additionally burdened by having to suffer all of the destructive effects of military operations on his territory. That would condemn him to merely responding to the activities of his attacker without having a chance to terminate the war by actions of his own. This kind of doctrine is not designed to prevent war; rather, it invites preemption. Thus its tendency is toward instability. The objective of restricting military operations to one's own territory (and airspace and waters) is thus the first criterion of a defensive doctrine.

It follows almost automatically that defensiveness in terms of "time" means not being the first to initiate any combat action. Self-constraint until an attack is launched by the adversary, including preparedness to accept a first strike by the enemy on one's own territory, is the second criterion for a defensive military doctrine. However, this only applies to the start of combat operations. Once aggression has taken place, the defender is free to choose how to respond. If this were not the case, he would again be deprived of any possibility to terminate the conflict by his own actions.

These interrelated factors are of special importance with regard to the first use of weapons. An indication of the defensive orientation of a military doctrine is the clear and unequivocal stipulation that a nation or an alliance renounces the first use of all weapons and that weapons must not be used except in response to an attack. NATO's Bonn declaration of 1982 is an example of a comprehensive statement of a defensive posture. A declaration renouncing first use of specific weapons such as, for example, nuclear weapons constitutes much less in comparison. It is by no means an indication of a defensive posture, since a restriction limited to a specific category of weapons ultimately permits the first use of all other weapons.

Regarding first use of nuclear weapons, it should be pointed out that the general renunciation of the first use of any weapons precludes the possibility of a nuclear first strike. If the defender were denied the first use of nuclear weapons after having been attacked in violation of international law, he would be deprived of the only instrument that might induce the aggressor to terminate the war—perhaps merely by the threat of its use—because of its unbearable destructive power. Furthermore, to bar this threat of escalation would remove the only currently available way of making war unendurable and unwageable and hence of preventing it before even a single round has been fired. If the threat of escalation to the nuclear level were to disappear, then the only alternative, if the strategy of war prevention were to fail, would be to fight the conventional conflict to its conclusion. Thus war would become wageable again. That is what must be prevented.

On the other hand, experience with human nature and the fact that political confrontation can only be overcome through a relatively lengthy process argue against war being finally and definitely abolished in the near future. For that reason we need an instrument that backs up and safeguards the transition process from confrontation to cooperation which is already under way. As things stand, nuclear weapons are best suited to this purpose because, by virtue of their immense destructive power, they make war unwageable. However, nuclear weapons only are able to preserve peace with the "ultimate" (in the true sense of the word) threat. That is, the aggressor anticipates that reaching for any weapon may entail a nuclear response by the defender. From this perspective, renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons as a response to a conventional attack is by no means a criterion for a defensive military doctrine. In fact, this implies that escalation may be a component of a defensive doctrine, if it is undertaken in reaction to an attack and with the aim of terminating the conflict.

A decisive criterion for the defensiveness of both political and military doctrines therefore is the general renunciation of the first use of any military means and preparedness to accept a first strike on one's own territory. This is the highest form of risk and it entails that the alliances have to find ways to make this burden bearable for those countries which are located close to areas of tensions. This criterion at the same time signifies a definite "no" to preventive action, preemption and strategic surprise. It means foregoing military options that are designed to prevent war by intimidation. Above all, it calls for the transparency of both sides' entire military potential.

Unlike the "area" factor, the "time" factor varies. Thus the "time" factor requires special supervision and control, like the "forces" factor. Time is the factor that can affect the quantitative implications of reduction agreements in their operational effect because different levels of reductions will have varying impacts on the force balance depending on when they are implemented. Confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) must therefore concentrate on this field.

If, in regard to the time factor, mutual transparency is restricted or even refused, this would be a cause for concern and suspicion, and would cast doubt on the defensiveness of the doctrine. Conversely, openness in all matters concerning the time required for transition from peace to war and preparedness to waive any possibilities of surprise and grant transparency are indications of a defensive orientation.

Besides time and area, we should examine whether in terms of forces military doctrines themselves offer indications of their defensiveness. Military doctrines must at least estimate the availability of forces. Availability depends on two factors: the degree of readiness of the forces available in peacetime, and their ability to expand to full wartime strength. In the case of equal or even inferior enemy forces, if a doctrine calls for a high level of immediately ready and available forces, then this is an initial indicator of the retention of offensive options. If,...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• Introduction
• I. Political Dimensions
• II. Structures
• III. Controlling Technology
• Conclusion
• About the Authors