The Begin Era

Issues In Contemporary Israel

Steven Heydemann, Jean Newsom

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Topic: History
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000314847
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

The years of Menachem Begin's leadership were among the most turbulent in Israeli history. Domestically, the preeminence of the Labor Alignment was successfully challenged, the Likud government failed to reduce Israel's high inflation rate, military and security expenditures reached new highs, and the politicization of economic policy increased. Internationally, although Israel's policy toward the occupied territories and its regional strategy were the focus of domestic and international debate, Begin's policies--departures from earlier norms--did successfully define Israel's foreign policy agenda, and his outlook is likely to continue to influence policy considerations. The contributors to this volume explore how Israel changed under Begin, the source of those changes, and how Israel is likely to evolve in a post-Begin era.

1
Israel and the United States: The Special Relationship Reexamined

Bernard Reich

The affinity of the United States and Israel antedates Israel's independence in 1948. Support for the idea of a Jewish state developed after World War I and concrete efforts to achieve the goal began to appear in United States policy discussions soon after World War II. Israel was a creation of the United Nations, but the United States has been its main benefactor, particularly since 1967, and today is essential to ensure Israel's future.

Between 1947 and 1977 the United States and Israel developed a complex relationship, which fluctuated between relative indifference and closeness, and developed from an essentially humanitarian focus to a multifaceted relationship. At the outset the United States based its policy on the humanitarian considerations associated with the plight of European Jewry, but by the 1970s political and strategic considerations were dominant. United States policy on arms supply evolved from "embargo" to "principal supplier," and arms became an important tool of United States policy to reassure Israel and to achieve policy modifications. The two states developed a diplomatic-political relationship that focused on the need to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. But while they agreed on the general concept, they often differed on the precise means of achieving the desired result.

The relationship became especially close after the June War of 1967. A congruence of policy prevailed on many of the salient concerns of the two states, and a certain exclusivity seemed to develop in United States Middle East policy. However, despite general concord there were also significant disputes. The two states often held differing perspectives on regional developments, on their dangers and opportunities, and on the appropriate form of response. No major ruptures took place, although significant tensions were generated at various junctures, such as during the Suez crisis of 1956-57.

The accession to office of Jimmy Carter in Washington and of Menachem Begin in Jerusalem in 1977 inaugurated a new period in the relationship, characterized by increased public tension and, sometimes, recrimination. Carter and Begin focused on the Arab-Israeli peace process and the desire to terminate the conflict. Nevertheless they often disagreed on the modalities and the interim objectives of the peace process and there were significant personality clashes between senior American and Israeli figures. There was also a reduced exclusivity in the relationship, especially after the Sadat visit to Jerusalem in November 1977.

The record of the first three years of the Reagan administration was a mixed one. There were periods of discord and others reflecting policy congruence. The two states clashed over divergent interpretations of the regional situation, of the peace process, and of Israel's security requirements. The war in Lebanon and associated developments raised significant questions about various aspects of their links. However, a number of events contributed to the improvement of United States-Israel relations in 1982-1983: King Hussein failed to join the peace process in the wake of the keagan initiative of September 1982, Soviet involvement in Syria increased significantly, and Israel and Lebanon reached an accord (although later aborted), under United States auspices. By early 1984 the two nations seemed linked by a congruence of policy that included recognition of Israel's strategic anti-Soviet value and its desire for peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This comported with President Reagan's initial perceptions of Israel and presaged a period of positive relations between the United States and Israel. The absence of a peace process and the expected elections in Israel and the United States suggested that the positive links between the two nations would prevail for the remainder of the Reagan administration's initial term in office.

The U.S. National Interest and the Israel Component

The United States national interest lies in its continued independent existence, survival and security with its institutions and values safeguarded, and with the welfare of its people enhanced. There is an "American ideology" that seeks democratic institutions, with morality and principles as guidelines of policy, and with liberty and human rights for its own people and for others. "Making the world safe for democracy" is an operational imperative. The United States cannot maintain its existence in isolation; it requires a world conducive to its unique political experiment.

In the Middle East, United States interests and concerns can be cataloged with substantial agreement although debate surrounds their priority. Preventing Soviet dominance (and the expansion of its power and influence in the area); assuring the flow of oil at reasonable prices, particularly to American friends and allies; assuring access to regional markets as a means of recycling the petrodollars earned by the regional states through the sale of oil; and the security and well-being of Israel are at the core.¹ The United States has increasingly seen it as "in its interest" to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

There is general agreement that Israel is an important interest and has achieved a special position accorded to no other state in the Middle East, despite some disagreement as to whether or not this should be the case. Recognition of the interest is widespread and essentially beyond the realm of debate, even by observers such as George Ball who are regarded by Israel as hostile to it:

First of all, one of our interests in the Middle East is the carrying out of a rather deep emotional commitment to the Israeli people to permit them to achieve their objective of a national home. Now this goes back a long way. . . . From a strictly strategic position, apart from the intellectual and emotional basis for our commitment, the fact that we had made it not formally and in treaty form, but in a dozen different ways, means that we should sustain it. It is not in the American interest to engage in a reversal of alliances, or to indicate that we abandon our friends. Israel is established as a friend of the United States.²

There is an ideological concern and a political-strategic value in the relationship. Israel is seen as a like-image state whose survival is crucial to the ideological prospering of the United States. This perspective goes beyond the more general concern for all similar states to one associated particularly with Israel:

It is unthinkable that the international community could stand idly by . . . if Israel were in danger of destruction. The moral and political convulsion which such an event would engender is beyond calculation. It could spell the end not only of the Atlantic alliance, but of liberal civilization as we know it.³

The ideological/emotional interest is buttressed by a perspective which regards Israel as a political-strategic asset. As Minority Leader of the House Gerald Ford said in 1969: "I firmly believe that the fate of Israel is linked to the national security interests of the United States."⁴ Israel has been supportive of United States policy in the United Nations and in other world forums. Tangible national security advantages have included the view that Israel is a reliable bulwark against Soviet penetration and domination of the Middle East and against radical Arab expansion. The Reagan administration codified this perspective in the Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation (1981), which focused on the Soviet threat, and has articulated this view in the statements of Secretary of Defense Weinberger and other administration officials.⁵

Israel's strategic value became a component of American interests primarily after 1967 when specific contributions could be identified. Israel's positions in Sinai and along the Suez Canal prevented Soviet use of the Canal to shorten its supply lines to the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. Israel provided the United States with valuable military information and intelligence as captured Soviet equipment facilitated United States countermeasures against similar weaponry in Vietnam and Israeli experience with American equipment helped in the modification of designs and tactics. Israeli military installations could prove valuable to the United States in various military situations. During the 1970 civil war in Jordan, Israel took actions which the United States could not because of political and military constraints. It acted on behalf of the United States in support of King Hussein to prevent Syrian intervention on behalf of the PLO. Israel's highly visible military activities became an element in United States policy.

President Reagan has articulated his perspective of Israel's value:

. . .our own position would be weaker without the political and military assets Israel provides. . . . The fall of Iran has increased Israel's value as perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the United States can truly rely. . . . Israel has the democratic will, national cohesion, technological capacity and military fiber to stand forth as America's trusted ally.⁶

Commentators have argued that American interests; peace, stability and security in the Middle East, can be preserved by a strong Israel supported by United States military and economic assistance, as well as diplomatic and political support. In this view Israel represents a solid Western foothold in the region and serves as a countervailing factor to the Soviet presence in some Arab states.

American credibility is at stake. Israel is perceived by the Arab world and much of the international community as benefitting from a United States security commitment. American actions that might be interpreted as backing away from that obligation would undermine the credibility of the United States as an ally. If the United States were to "abandon" Israel, the American role in other, and lesser, relationships would be open to question.

The United States Component of Israel's National Interest

Upon independence Israel sought positive relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Although there were strong factors propelling Israel in a westerly direction, superpower support for the establishment of the Jewish state and an apparent competition between them for closer links with it, suggested that avoidance of a choice might be possible. This initial policy of nonalignment (nonidentification) faded as the Soviet and American perceptions of and positions in, the Middle East were altered. Almost inexorably Israel moved into a position of alignment with the West and estrangement from the East and into a clear linkage with the United States. This shift to the West led, by the late 1960s, to the United States becoming the single most significant element in Israeli foreign policy. By the late 1970s the United States had assumed an unrivaled position in the national interest calculations of Israel and had become virtually indispensable as a source of economic and military assistance as well as political and diplomatic support.

The Domestic American Factor in United States-Israel Relations

The United States-Israel relationship is a product of the American decision-making process which, in turn, is influenced by domestic political factors--public opinion, political participation, and voting behavior all have an effect.

The Israel lobby, which seeks to maintain and enhance the United States relationship, enjoys a number of advantages in its efforts to secure its objectives, including an environment that is generally sympathetic. Hyman H. Bookbinder, the Washington Representative of the American Jewish Committee and an important member of the Israel lobby, has described it succinctly in these terms:

The greatest single thing going for American support for Israel is the fact that our American leaders--the President, Cabinet officials, Senators, Congressmen, national security advisers--have for 30 years consistently said it is in America's interest. I do not contend that the great majority of Americans have themselves studied this issue carefully, know where the West Bank is, [or have] come to their own conclusion. They have accepted a national verdict. That verdict has been that Israel's security is in America's interest.⁷

A widespread fund of goodwill toward Israel, not restricted to the Jewish community, favored the establishment and consolidation of a Jewish state in Palestine and favors the continued existence, integrity, and security of Israel. At the same time pro-Arab forces have to operate in an environment that provides very little mass support.

Underlying much of the support is an American perception which sees Israel as the type of state with a similarity of outlook and generally progressive nature, which the United States would like to see exist worldwide. President Gerald Ford, in a White House toast for Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in September 1974, noted:

The American people have a great deal of understanding and sympathy and dedication to the same kind of ideals that are representative of Israel. And, therefore, I think we in America have a certain rapport and understanding with the people of Israel. . . . We have mutual aims and objectives. We have the kind of relationship that I think, if expanded worldwide, would be beneficial to all mankind.⁸

In a similar vein, former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban has identified a "Harmony in democratic values, harmony of historic roots, harmony in spiritual memories, harmony of ideals, and, I am convinced, a profound, underlying harmony of interests in this hard and dangerous world."⁹

There is an element of cultural identity that sees Israel as a "Western" state in a sea of feudal, oriental entities and as a perpetuator of the Judeo-Christian heritage. It is perceived as sharing the concept of individual freedom and the right of all individuals to live in peace. It is characterized as a valiant, young state, which provides a model of courage and tenacity. Its people have been praised for their sacrifice, dedication and spirit. Israel is seen as having achieved substantial progress, despite its precarious existence, and is worthy of emulation. There is a historical affinity and similarity of national experience, which includes the immigrant and pioneering nature of the two states and their respective commitments to democracy. The American experience in striving to escape persecution and establish an independent national homeland has a parallel in a Jewish state in Palestine which appears to reaffirm these ideals through absorption and integration of immigrants in distress. There has been a corresponding dedication to the values of pioneering--the United States placed a premium on the pioneers who heeded the call to "go west," and Israel places a similar value on the settlers who moved to the frontiers to develop those areas.

There is a general understanding of Jewish history and the advantages of the Biblical connection. Israel fits into the historical-religious collective memory of Americans.

The relationship is also influenced by the religious perception that Israel is fulfilling the biblical prophecy that the Jews would return to the promised land. This perception, nurtured in America's Biblebelt fundamentalist Christian areas, is further reinforced by "Sunday-school stories" linking the Jews to the Holy Land. In response to the historical persecution of the Jews, particularly the Holocaust and the destruction of large segments of world Jewry in Euro...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• About the Book and Editor
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Israel and the United States: The Special Relationship Reexamined
• 2 America and the Middle East in the Post-Begin Era
• 3 The Government-Armed Forces Relationship
• 4 Israel After Begin: The View From the Religious Parties
• 5 Political Polarization: Contradictory Interpretations of Israeli Reality
• 6 The West Bank and Gaza in Israeli Politics
• 7 Some Observations on the Economy in Israel
• 8 Israeli Economic Policy Under the Likud, 1977-83: A Guide for the Perplexed
• 9 Economic Development in Israel: A Comparative Assessment
• About the Contributors