Restructuring Universities

Politics and Power in the Management of Change

Geoffrey Walford

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9781138328112
• eBook ISBN:
  9780429829062
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

Originally published in 1987 Restructuring Universities uses Aston University as a case study of the internal restructuring taking place in universities. Aston lost one third of its funding in 1981 and was told to reduce its student numbers by one fifth within three years. The university has a balanced financial budget, well oversubscribed courses, and the average A level scores of entrants are over the national average in all subjects taught. The books looks at the ways in which the university dealt with rapid change, looking particularly at the decision making processes within the university and the ways in which internal power and politics influenced decisions made. Previous models of decision making are discussed and a new political model outlined. The book provides a useful and informed analysis of the context, politics and management of change in the university system.

THE CASE STUDY OF CHANGE

Chapter 4

THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE AT ASTON

4.1 Change in a single institution

In the last chapter an outline was given of how government imposed reductions in university finance were distributed between the various university institutions. It was shown that the effects of policy changes were not fully thought through by government and that the results by 1985 were in line with neither government nor UGC objectives. In this present chapter the same story is traced, but at the more detailed level of change within a single institution. The account, although substantial, is highly selective, for it is simply not possible to detail all of the many changes and power struggles that occurred in such a complex institution as a single university over this time span. The account is largely arranged chronologically and divided for convenience into several time periods. Inevitably there are numerous simplifications, and other writers might have chosen to emphasise different individual events; however, it is unlikely that a dramatically different set of events would have been produced.

4.2 Before the letter: July 1980–June 1981

The major elements of the history of the University of Aston were given in chapter two, and from those it can be seen that a logical place to start any account of recent changes at Aston is with the taking up of office in July 1980 of Professor Crawford as the third Vice-Chancellor. At that point it was evident that Aston, along with the rest of the universities, would have to make significant reductions in spending to accommodate to predicted cuts in overall UGC funding. Of necessity, some reductions had already been made by July 1980, but on the whole they were pragmatic, piecemeal and marginal. The university showed an understandable reluctance to make major decisions in the last months before the departure of the second Vice-Chancellor in September 1979 and during the near year-long interregnum period. The seriousness of potential problems was quickly recognised by the new Vice-Chancellor. Many British academics were still shocked when the actual cuts came a year later, even though clear announcements had by then been given. The feeling that the universities were somehow sacrosanct, and that no government would really do them any harm, took several years to die. With a background in the rather harder environment of a private American university the new Vice-Chancellor at Aston had a harsher realism.

There were two important initiatives during the first few months. The first was the establishment of an Advisory Group on Budget Adjustment in January 1981 which acted to advise the Vice-Chancellor on possible courses of action. It consisted of the Vice-Chancellor as Chairman, the Senior Pro-Vice-Chancellor, the Deans of Faculty and three administrative officers, including the Finance Officer. It is worth noting that although finance is ultimately the responsibility of Council rather than Senate, there were no non-academic Council members of the group. The inclusion of administrative officers as equal members of the group is also noteworthy. This group, along with the Academic Planning Committee which had a greatly overlapping membership, was to play a very important role.

The second initiative was a multiply phased ‘information gathering’ exercise which centred on the Vice-Chancellor. In November 1981, as phase I, a lengthy questionnaire was circulated to all members of academic staff who were to complete them and return them in confidence directly to the Vice-Chancellor. The accompanying letter explained the need for a revision to the Academic Plan and recognised that to be successful this must embody the views and aspirations of the greatest number possible of academic staff. It is worth quoting from this letter:

‘However well or badly universities are faring collectively, Aston can do better differentially by a willingness to recognise the influences affecting it, and to plan astutely its responses to them. Expansion is certainly more agreeable, but the steady state does not imply stagnation, nor does retrenchment imply decay: bold initiatives can always be taken provided we are prepared to curtail less effective academic ventures; significant advances can always be made if we are adventurous enough to leave the comparative shelter of the status quo, and to assume the attendant risks judiciously.’

Few of the academics receiving the letter in November 1980 realised that the Vice-Chancellor was certainly adventurous enough to take bold initiatives at times of retrenchment. Chapter Six outlines some of the major ones taken at a time of harsh financial stringency. It is only on re-reading the letter several years after that its significance becomes clearer. At the time it was the content of the questionnaire which was of concern. There were two types of questions. First there were factual questions about personal activities in teaching, research and administration, and what changes each academic would like to see in his or her activities. All academic staff were ‘expected’ to answer these. The second set of questions were opinion-sounding ones to which staff were urged to respond wherever they had ‘thoughtful views about the future of the university and how to shape it’. This second group invited comments on strengths and weaknesses of the respondent’s own department, how it ranked with similar departments in other universities, how things could be improved, which departmental activities ought to be phased out and which strengthened. It also asked for comments on which departments of the university were thought to be the strongest and which the weakest, and which activities the university as a whole should phase out and which retain. In short it offered the chance for each academic to point the finger of blame or praise wherever he or she wished.

While the questionnaire was promoted by the Vice-Chancellor as an exercise in democracy, it raised a number of doubts and questions in the minds of the recipients. The Local Branch of the Association for University Teachers (AUT), the university academic staff union, advised its members not to complete the form as they were concerned about how the information might be used in the future. They also saw little need for a new structure of representation responding directly to the Vice-Chancellor, when academics were already represented through trade unions and various official university committees. This was an understandable reaction at a time when there was already talk of possible redundancies, and many would argue that it was proved a justified reaction in view of later events. As can be seen, even at this early stage, the actions of the Vice-Chancellor and AUT were already edging them towards adopting polarized positions. Nevertheless, the responses received no doubt acted as an interesting data source. The promised analysis of the questionnaire responses and comments from the Vice-Chancellor never appeared yet the data was known to have influenced later planning documents.

The Vice-Chancellor also attempted to gain further information and views from academic staff through a series of meetings over lunch. All tenured staff from a mixture of departments were met reasonably informally in groups of about five or six. Reactions to the process were mixed. While some respected this desire to get to know staff, others found the occasion strained and were worried about possible underlying motives.

In January 1981, phase 2 of the Academic Plan Revision process was launched. Thirty five ‘task forces’ were set up, one in each of the departments and a few in some special areas, to raise questions and debate the future of those groups. Again the emphasis was on enabling junior academic staff to get their views heard. The task forces were to be chaired by an elected junior member of staff and generally included few senior members. These ‘task forces’ were to discuss new directions in teaching and research, student and staff recruitment, resource generation and much more, not only in times of expansion and steady state, but also in the much more likely future of contraction. As might be expected, the response to this from professors and senior academics was not always enthusiastic. The local AUT this time gave a more confused response - they liked the idea of consultation, but were again worried about possible misuse of information. The quality of the reports produced varied and it is unlikely that many were particularly revolutionary. However, it is likely that they influenced the final Academic Plan for each department which was eventually produced and it also meant that everyone involved became increasingly aware of the possible severe problems of the future.

Even at this stage there was a tension between the initiation of consultation with a wide range of staff and the development of ad hoc centralized advisory groups and committees which paralleled the official committee structure. For example, phase 1 and 2 procedures were proposed as being in contrast to possible autocratic or centralized processes:

‘… the revised Academic Plan is everybody’s business. Though the democratic process may seem slower to the impatient, it is likely to prove more effective than the autocratic or centralized process whose initiatives are unacceptable to those whose support is necessary to bring them to fruition’ (Crawford, 1981a).

Yet, at the same time small centralized groups selected by the Vice-Chancellor were formulating the boundaries to possible changes and setting out the parameters to be used in discussion. After the government announced the overall reductions in grants to universities the Advisory Group on Budget Adjustment announced that there would be a need to cut expenditure (or increase income) by about 18–22 per cent by 1984 assuming equal treatment for all universities. This was translated directly into a cut of 1000 students, 120–150 fewer academic staff and 240–300 fewer non-academic staff.

At the same time as the overt information gathering process was proceeding involving academic staff, a somewhat more covert information gathering and ordering process was being conducted by administrative staff on behalf of the Vice-Chancellor. At this stage it was not completely clear what indices would be used by the UGC in making its discriminatory allocations of funding to universities, or what the relative importance of the various variables would be. It was possible, however, to make some shrewd guesses about what sort of numerical data might be used. One way of indicating the relative attractiveness of similar departments in various universities, for example, is to look at the A level grades of the students accepted on courses and the apparent size of student teaching groups. Some indication of teaching within departments might be indicated by student drop-out rates and final degree classifications. At the research level the number and type of publications is a commonly used indicator along with the amount of external funding attracted for research by the department. Particular attention might be given to the funding through the Research Councils where judgements are made by academic peers. The number of Research Council supported research students, their rate of success and time to completion might also be used. All of these indicators have major problems of interpretation, but it was known that they were the sort of data being used by the UGC in its deliberations. It was thus sensible for any Vice-Chancellor to gather together such information for his own use on the various individuals and departments in his university. This was certainly done at Aston, where by mid 1981 the administration had prepared a considerable data bank of information for the Vice-Chancellor on individual and departmental performances which drew comparisons with similar departments in other universities. On many of the indices Aston departments were found to be doing rather poorly.

It is important to recognise that it seemed that few other universities were planning so much in advance at this stage. Certainly Aston’s position, because of the high number of overseas students, seemed somewhat bleak, but not necessarily as bleak as some other institutions. The government was arguing for more applied research and teaching, and Aston’s graduates were popular in the employment market; thus it might have been thought that Aston would not be very badly cut when the distribution was finally announced. In early 1981 all staff vacancies were frozen, but, much more surprisingly, in April 1981 the University Council introduced an Early Retirement Scheme for those aged 55 or above, which was financed from the University’s own funds.

The pace of change seemed to be rapidly increasing, for what had started a few months earlier as an ‘information gathering’ exercise, had become, by April 1981, contingency plans for possible levels of funding for the future. The most pessimistic cut being planned for at this time was 30 per cent. It will be shown later that this was very close to the 31 per cent cut actually received. The uncertainty was so great that by May 1981, when the universities still did not know what their funding for the coming academic year would be, Aston along with many other universities froze all undergraduate admissions, on the advice of the UGC.

‘… we are shocked, frustrated and angry that Government policy to reduce support for the universities has induced such uncertainty about Aston’s funding that our only prudent option is to suspend the admissions process when it is only three-quarters of the way towards its target.

It is tragic that, to avoid a staggering projected deficit in 1981/82, we must actively recruit high fee-paying overseas students while turning away qualified British candidates’ (Crawford, 1981b).

While such announcements received good publicity, the actual effect of a freeze on admissions at that late stage was minimal. However, the desire to make such a statement is an indication of the pressure the university felt itself under by that time.

4.3 The week of the letter - 1 July 1981 – 8 July 1981

The University Grants Committee had promised universities that it would announce its allocations to universities for the academic year 1981/82 and projected allocations for the following two years in Spring of 1981. In the end it was 1 July 1981 before universities heard of their allocation for the following October. Wednesday is the traditional day for university meetings, so that when the UGC announced that the letters would be available on Wednesday, 1 July 1981, it was found to coincide with a Senate meeting on that afternoon. A further meeting was then scheduled for a week afterwards.

‘The seven-hour 1 July Senate meeting was held in three parts. The first was given mainly to presentation of a strategic document by myself on academic planning and Aston’s response to the impending cuts Looking Forward. The Senate then adjourned while the contents of the UGC letter to Aston were telephoned from London and transcribed. At 5.10 pm, one year to the minute from first setting foot in Aston to take up my appointment, it fell to me to deliver the stunning news that the UGC proposed to cut 31% of our recurrent grant over the period 1981/84, and 22% out of our home student population. The dire prediction of the Advisory Group on Budget Adjustment in April, based on average cuts, had been far too optimistic’ (Crawford, 1982).

Stunning the news certainly was, and stunned were most of the members of Senate, yet Professor Crawford was by this time well prepared for action. The size of the cuts made it appear imperative that action was initiated very quickly. Estimated cumulative financial deficits were rapidly calculated which emphasised the enormity of the problem. The UGC letter, however, not only announced financial cuts, but outlined clear reductions in student numbers. Aston’s 4670 full-time home and EEC students in 1979/80 were to be reduced to 3640 in 1984/85. Moreover, it was also made clear that these target numbers were to be adhered to by individual universities and later a few universities were actually ‘fined’ by the UGC for taking too many students. 1984/85 was just three academic years away and at Aston more than half of the undergraduates were on four year courses. In July 1981, it seemed obvious that action would have to be taken for the 1981/82 intake of students if there was to be any hope of reaching the required lower numbers by 1984. On 1 July Senate readily agreed that the Vice-Chancellor should rapidly prepare a ‘package’ of course cuts in undergraduate courses, in consultation with Deans, Heads of Department and so on, which would be discussed at the special 8 July Senate meeting.

Within that one week, which must have been one of the most exhausting weeks in his life, the Vice-Chancellor had prepared a ‘starting point, rather than a fully-revised academic plan’ and it had been presented and agreed by Senate. The events of that week were crucial to the way in which the events of the next three or four years unfolded, not only in terms of the content of the decisions made during that hectic week, but also in terms of the development and acceptance of a changed managerial style.

It is quite clear that the university was faced with very severe problems imposed upon it by government and the UGC - the ways in which the cuts were implemented seemed, indeed, to be designed to cause the maximum amount of chaos and disruption to the system. The announcement was made in July, yet most places had been offered by that time to potential students, conditional on their achieving required A level grades. The Vice-Chancellor recognised, and he was able to convince Senate, that there was little sense in simply reducing the number of students on each course - real financial savings could only be possible if new intakes to some courses were immediately axed. As it was, some courses would continue into 1983/84, but if courses were allowed to recruit as planned in 1981 they would extend into 1984/85. If the courses could be axed for the following session, then the university could keep in line with the UGC and government’s timing; if not, then it would have one or two years where there were far more students on small courses than could be justified. The bad effects on staff morale of teaching courses that were being phased out would also be overcome quicker if decisions were made rapidly.

The individual letter to each specific university sent by the UGC to each Vice-Chancellor, gave specific target student numbers for 1983/84 for so-called Arts, Science and Medicine students. Aston only had Arts and Science students. A paragraph of ‘advice’ was available on each category, indicating which areas the Committee valued and which areas the UGC recommended that ‘the University should consider discontinuing’....

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Foreword
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• The Context of Change
• The Case Study of Change
• The Politics of Change
• Bibliography
• Index