Why Nations Put to Sea

Technology and the Changing Character of Sea Power in the Twenty-First Century

Kevin L. Falk

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9780429835391
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Originally published in 2000, this book describes the relation between technology and the exercise of sea power. It emphasizes the importance of mastering and maintaining technology for the means of exercising maritime power whether the USA is at peace or in a time of conflict. The changing character of maritime power is evaluated through an examination of current trends, historical precedent and deductive logic. Many factors influence sea power, but it is the exponential growth in the use of science and technology which the author believes is the key to understanding the future of sea power.

CHAPTER 1

The Historic Importance of Sea Power

There is nothing—absolutely nothing—half so much worth doing as simply messing about in boats.

—KENNETH GRAHAME,
THE WIND IN THE WILLOWS

THE HISTORY OF SEA POWER

Men have gone to sea for all of recorded history. Initially the sea provided mankind with an abundant source of natural resources—especially food. There is ample archaeological evidence, such as fish bones found at the sites of ancient camps, to suggest that hunter-gatherers consumed fish. It is likely that early man caught what fish he could with his bare hands either from a riverbank or standing in shallow water near shore. This method of fishing apparently lasted for ages (and in a limited manner endures today). Archaeologists have found large numbers of harpoon tips and pointed fishing hooks in the camps of reindeer hunters of the Magdalene period, dating from sometime around 16,000 BC.¹⁸ These finds appear to represent an improvement in fishing technology. The Magdalene hunters and gatherers evidently used all of the important fishing implements still being used today (fishing spear, hook, and net).¹⁹ At first such implements would have been used from shore; it must have been only a matter of time before it was realized that greater catches of fish could be made in deeper water—thus the initial, and very practical, need that man go to sea. With the Magdalene hunter-gatherers we observe a dramatic leap forward in technology which leads to the re-organization of their society. The hunter-gatherer has become a fishermen—a historic transition rivaled only by the development of planned farming. Today mankind harvests 20 percent of its daily protein consumption from the oceans.²⁰ The radical technological advances of the plow and the hook have shaped modern social conditions. Future social conditions, evolving globally, may be shaped by the technological advances of our era.

Covering approximately 70 percent of the earth’s surface, the oceans have a tremendous impact on global climate and weather. Extensive mineral and petroleum deposits, along with declining reserves of these resources on land, combine to make the oceans a significant and ever more important source of natural resources.²¹ Man discovered long ago (the exact time frame has been lost in antiquity) the important idea that water supports weight as he gained experience on bodies of water while harvesting food.²² The currents in rivers and streams provided locomotion at first, then paddles, poles, and oars were developed, later sails and steam were used. Mankind found then and still knows today that materials could be delivered quickly and more easily than by land across great distances by use of water. The eventual transport of valuable goods across the waters naturally led to piracy and warlike raids on rivers, lakes, and oceans; just as highway-men had long ambushed merchant caravans on remote roadways, so too would pirates ambush vessels in areas along popular shipping lanes.²³ As societies²⁴ began to appreciate the strategic value of what is now called “force projection” by water, the movement of troops across large bodies of water was realized. In some cases, seaborne piracy and looting actually became a common practice, as some communities made their living by piracy and sea-borne raids on settlements.²⁵ Piracy, troop shipments, and the clear military advantages of military force projected across water encouraged some governments to create sea-borne military forces.²⁶ As the historian F.E. Adcock explains, “naval warfare, in the strict sense, begins when ships not only carry men on warlike expeditions, but also are themselves instruments of war.”²⁷ These naval forces were to protect friendly commerce by attacking those who would interfere with it.²⁸ The Phoenicians may have developed the first true naval vessels in about 700 BC. The Greeks, especially the Athenians, would later improve the design of the Phoenician galley; the basic Athenian galley design and their battle tactics dominated western naval warfare for about two thousand years.²⁹ Cultural legend springing from Homer’s Iliad holds that Greek amphibious landings near Troy made possible the destruction of Troy during the Trojan War. Whether the Greeks truly “launched a thousand ships” in their war against Troy may never be known, but clearly without Greek naval supremacy to facilitate their troop landings there would have been no heroic siege.³⁰ The Greek historian Thucydides teaches that the Peloponnesian War was precipitated by Athenian domination of the Delian League.³¹ The Delian League originally was intended to be a voluntary naval alliance, centered upon Athenian naval power, which would enable Greek city-states to resist the Persians. As the Persian threat receded the Athenians used the League as a vehicle to gain hegemony in Greece. Sparta was the only city-state still strong enough to attempt to check Athenian power. The Spartan victory over Athens in the Peloponnesian War owed in part to Sparta, a traditional land power, seizing supremacy of the sea from Athens. Lysander’s destruction of the Athenian navy at Aegospotami in 405 BC effectively ended the war. Such success through the exercise of sea power is not unusual. The Roman victory over Carthage in the Second Punic War owed less to Scipio Africanus’ victory over Hannibal at Zama in 202 BC than to the Roman command of the sea which contributed to the defeat of the great Carthaginian general on land.³²

The exercise of sea power offers great utility in times of peace and war. In times of peace mercantile power is an important economic (and thus political) tool for nations. War ships can be used to demonstrate political will with friendly port calls or not-so-friendly displays of power. In times of war a merchant fleet marshals the resources of the world—both men and material. In times of war naval power guards friendly merchant-men while sinking or capturing enemy traders. If sufficiently powerful, naval power can be used to land troops in unexpected regions. During periods of conflict, sea power has provided its wielder with unparalleled strategic leverage.³³ For island and coastal nations, naval power is the first line of national defense. Beyond protecting home coastlines, sea power can equip and protect far-flung regions of interest from one’s adversaries.

GREAT SEA POWERS IN HISTORY

Many of the great empires of history were powerful, in part, because they based their power on applications of maritime power. The Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, British, Japanese, and Americans could all be considered sea powers. Importantly, these states were very often successful in their rivalries with land powers. It is beyond the scope of this paper to comment in detail on the histories of all the great sea powers. Thus, the following summary is intended only as a modest reminder of the historic influence of sea power.

The Phoenicians were one of the earliest empires from which archeologists have discovered written records. It is apparent that the great wealth the Phoenicians accumulated was based upon their sea-borne trade. This trade was defended by the invention of naval forces. The original “sea power,” the Phoenicians set the example for later maritime empires. Almost contemporaries with the Phoenicians, the Greek city-states are often thought of as a collection of small land powers—with the possible exception of Athens. Yet it was Greek naval power that thwarted the Persian Empires drive into Europe. The brave stand of Leonidas’ Spartan garrison at Thermopylae was epic, but strategically indecisive. Less well known is the fact that this land battle was intended to bring about a naval battle on terms favorable to the Greeks.³⁴ Later in the conflict it was the naval battle at Salamis, on the flank of the Persian land advance, which led to the eventual defeat of the Persian expeditionary force in Greece. Denied supplies and reinforcements, the Persian army found its position untenable and it withdrew from Greece. Such success through sea power was not unique. The Romans have the classic attributes and outlook of a land power. And yet, the Romans used naval power to defeat their most serious challenger, the Carthaginians. Carthage was a sea power; to defeat Carthage in the Punic Wars, Rome became a sea power and eventually dominated the Mediterranean.

The advantages of sea power remain seen in contemporary times. In the past few centuries, the British held naval advantages first over the French, and later over the Germans. In their respective competitions with the English, the French and Germans both attempted to carry out both sea and land strategies. Conceding supremacy at sea to the British, both the French and Germans waged guerre de course on the British merchant fleet while pressing advantages on land. Ultimately, neither power achieved lasting success. In recent history, with the twilight of the British Empire, the United States largely has taken over the British maritime tradition. Maritime powers have been known to fail: The Japanese Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere, based upon Japanese sea power, did not survive World War II. Interestingly it was a second maritime power, the Americans, who (along with naval forces of the British Common Wealth) defeated the Japanese.

DEFINING SEA POWER

Sea power is a broad component of national power. Conceptually, sea power is often ambiguous; in this regard it is not unlike other components of national power that are so often described without precision. One would suppose that most individuals engaged in the formation of national security policy have a working understanding of the phrase “the exercise of sea power.” Sadly, it is not always clear that those who write about of national security issues have a clear conception of maritime power.

For example, Alfred Mahan, while taking credit for coining the phrase “sea power,”³⁵ nonetheless failed to define it in any concise manner in either of his principal works, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History or The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire. It is difficult to find a single definition of sea power in either classical or modern literature. The lack of an accepted definition of “sea power” is important in that it suggests a variety of useful approaches to the understanding of sea power. For the purposes of this paper, sea power will be considered to be that collection of military and other means that help define political, military, and economic relations among nations at sea.³⁶ This definition is necessarily broad since the modern components of sea power range from naval vessels to cargo ships, from aircraft production to deep-sea mining technology.

This wide range of categories reflects the components of sea power as contributing to: the capability to wage war on, over, under, and above the seas; the ability to conduct sea-borne commerce; the industrial base that can support both of these activities; and the technological facilities to extract useful materials from the sea itself. Brodie claims that sea power “has always meant the sum total of those weapons, installations, and geographic circumstances which enable a nation to control transportation over the seas during wartime” (italics in original).³⁷ This definition is no longer sufficient—though it remains an excellent description of sea power during times of war (when states are most susceptible to a loss of control over their sea-borne transportation). Beyond his neglect of the industrial-technological foundation of sea power, Brodie neglects any conception of the positive strategic effects that the exercise of sea power may have for a state during times of peace. We find then that rather than state what sea power is, many writers have chosen instead to emphasize what sea power does. It is as though the necessary broadness of a true definition of sea power renders “sea power” too large a subject for most writers. Colin Gray’s excellent The Leverage of Sea Power is a case in point of this tradition—the literature informs as to the uses of sea power, but makes Little attempt to define it.

Sea power, then, can then be understood as comprising aspects of both 1) naval power and 2) mercantile power.³⁸ Since some nations are either naval powers or mercantile powers, but not necessarily both, it is sometimes useful to be specific when identifying which type of sea power a given nation is. South Korea is an example of a significant mercantile power that few would consider to be more than a severely handicapped naval power. While a major player in commercial activities, South Korea has little means to protect its sea-borne commerce. Thus, South Korea must depend on a friendly naval power (in this case the United States) to defend South Korean interests.³⁹

SOURCES OF SEA POWER

In The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan identifies six elements of sea power that are still useful in modern discussions of sea power. Mahan’s elements of sea power are:

I.. Geographical Position

II. Physical Conformation

III. Extent of Territory

IV. Number of Population

V. National Character

VI. Character of the Government40

Mahan rolled these elements into a prescription for the successful exercise of sea power. Many now suggest that Mahan’s elements are no longer useful because they were more a contemporary reflection of national assertivenes s through naval power than a series of timeless principles.⁴¹ In short, Mahan is accused of mistaking nineteenth century aspirations for a deeper truth. It has been suggested that Mahan’s six elements of sea power were in fact dated even as they were written, since Mahan’s emphasis on a batt...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Foreword
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Chapter 1: The Historic Importance of Sea Power
• Chapter 2: The Impact of Technological Innovation
• Chapter 3: National Merchant Marines and Economic Reliance on Sea Power
• Chapter 4: Sea Power in the 21st Century
• Appendix A
• Appendix B
• Appendix C
• Works Cited
• Index