Temperament

A Survey of Psychological Theories

Constance Bloor

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367418472
• eBook ISBN: 9781000767407
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Emotions in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Originally published in 1928, this title attempts to give a short historical outline of the treatment which 'temperament' had received at the hands of psychological theory. From the time of Hippocrates 'temperament' had figured in philosophical and psychological writings as one of the constituents which determine behaviour. The language in which it had been treated had been vague and obscure, and this, combined with the equally indeterminate associations which were carried over from the speech of everyday life at the time, had contrived to surround the subject with an atmosphere of unreality which was in sharp contrast to the significance of the role assigned to it.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE assertion is often made that the Psychology of to-day tends to emphasize the individual and his differences rather than the universal and alike. In adopting an attitude of experimental detachment Psychologists would appear to be approaching more nearly to the methods of Biology and even to those of the physical sciences. It is possibly true that along these lines only can the claims of Psychology to recognition as an exact science be established. If, in the laboratory, the psychologist can measure and correlate, and devise a law which will fit the measurements, and on the basis of which further predictions can be made, then he will receive at the hands of scientists the recognition of equality. Until that time he is apt to be looked upon with suspicion by the chemists and physicists as one who seeks on the one hand to ally himself with pure speculative philosophy, and on the other to claim for his subject a position among the exact sciences.

It may be useful to inquire initially into the nature of the criticisms levelled at Psychology by scientific critics. These criticisms appear in general to be directed against the looseness of the terms employed and against the introduction of too many speculative hypotheses. The critics also inquire with reference to the measurements of Psychology— ‘What are the the units of measurement which you employ and to what extent are they invariable?’ An example may be quoted in reference to the concept of energy, in terms of which many psychologists find it convenient to state the problems of mental behaviour. In the science of Mathematical Physics the term ‘energy’ has a very definite and circumscribed meaning and unit of measurement. The psychologist may reply that it is open to him, also, taking the dictionary definition of energy, to employ this term for his purposes, but he lays himself open to the retort that by the mere adoption of a term he does not in any way further the scientific progress of his subject. Methods of science demand that the terms used should be in accordance with the nature of the material investigated. Having analysed the material at his disposal the scientist must then find a term to fit the facts, and should the term so chosen be already in the dictionary he is yet free to circumscribe its meaning in reference to his particular line of investigation. The argument would appear to be that in the carrying over of terms from common usage or from other fields of inquiry into a science, which may from the nature of its material require a different nomenclature, there is a danger of transferring with it irrelevant associations.

The question as to how far the conceptions and phraseology of the physical sciences will prove inadequate for the needs of Psychology is a difficult one. In the introductory chapter to his study of Experimental Psychology, Myers states the problem thus: ‘We are now in a position to realize that it is only the possibility of giving a physical expression to mental states, which confers on Psychology the rank of a science.’¹ But this statement must be regarded as qualified by a previous one. ‘We must regard experimental psychology as but one mode of studying psychological problems, not all of which however, can be approached from the side of experiment. Far from being independent, experimental psychology has arisen as a refinement of general psychology.’²

¹C. S.Myers. Experimental Psychology. Ch. I. page 4.

²Myers. Experimental Psychology. Ch. I. page 1.

It is the existence of this supposed ‘general psychology’ which appears to constitute a real difficulty to many inquirers. It is interesting to contrast for example the criticisms outlined above which issue from the biologist and to a still greater extent from the physicist with those levelled from within the ranks of the psychologists by those who devote themselves principally to the particular province of Psychotherapy. One hears frequently from this source the admission that the psychoanalyst can find little of interest or usefulness in what he in general refers to as the ‘academic psychology.’ At this stage of psychological progress it would probably be unjust to suppose that the stigma of ‘academic’ denotes in the mind of the critic a belief that such psychology emanates purely from speculative thought. It is perhaps more likely to mean that it appears to him to have little connexion with the more urgent problem of maladjustment to the conditions of life, with which he himself is so usefully employed. The apparent divorce in sympathy between the different schools, resulting as it must in a disastrous lack of cohesion in the subject itself would seem to indicate a difference in emphasis in the line of approach. Those who, with the Psycho-Analytic school concentrate upon the life and conflict of the individual, consider him as a reacting whole, an essentially autonomous creature. To deal with him as such would imply a danger of submergence in the vast complexity of the problem which can only be avoided by a deliberate simplification. Such a simplification would find a parallel in other fields of scientific work, and is, in itself, a legitimate procedure. Psycho-Analysis might not unduly claim that, while it has reduced the problem to a few broad generalizations, there is, in the technique elaborated for dealing with them, a delicate complexity which is able to meet the demands of widely differing individuals. If the hypothesis adopted by this school of thought may appear to be in the nature of speculation, its exponents can at least point to its consistency with experimental testing.

On the other hand, apparently remote from this line of approach is the work of those psychologists, who with infinite precautions are engaged in the laboratory exploration of such discrete cognitive processes as ‘imagery’ and ‘attention’ and those who, nearer perhaps to the situations of life are investigating differences in intelligence and in specific abilities. Their method might be briefly described as the elimination of those factors which are irrelevant to the investigation of the moment, and the criticism which is often brought against them, is, that they eliminate life itself. They may claim with justice, that only so can quantitative accuracy be secured, and that the results so obtained can in virtue of their reliability, find a surer application in the situations of life.

The question which arises is—‘Assuming that such experiments are carried to the furthest degree of accuracy and extent, will it be possible so to weave together the results that they may form a complete science of human behaviour, or will it remain true that ‘the whole is greater than the sum of the parts?’

If the linking up of such results would constitute a complete explanation then behaviour would be determinate. There is, for example, the effort which is being made to establish a correlation more or less perfect between quantitative factors in behaviour and physiological reactions. Assuming this attempt to be successful then when the time comes that the fields of biology and physiology have been completely explored, the corresponding aspect of psychology would be reduced to the status of a mere corrollary of a precise physiological representation. But, supposing that when the field of experimental investigation has been completely explored there should still remain a factor, which should prove not amenable to scientific measurement, but which should yet prove vital to the understanding of behaviour, then psychology might claim that in respect of this factor it must be allowed to evolve a new method of attack. There was a time when the suggestion that ‘emotion, character and will’ should ever be expressed in terms of a mathematical equation would have been greeted with derision. But this time has passed. The ‘faculties’ have disappeared from psychological writings, the concept of an abstract ‘will’ has been replaced by that of ‘willed action’ (in which apparent mere interchange of terms, there is a profound significance), and ‘emotion’ is discussed mainly in connexion with glandular reaction. The psychologist is showing an increasing disposition to incorporate in his work to the fullest extent the results of physiological research as it affects the reaction of behaviour, and to present an unalarmed front to the possibility of ultimate solution along these lines alone. He may feel that in the meantime, pending the complete exploration of the physiological field which alone can resolve the problem, that his particular function is to work out in the field of behaviour those items which can be isolated for immediate investigation, and to ensure that the overlapping of different manifestations receives due recognition. We may perhaps be entitled to say that the object of psychological investigation is to express behaviour in terms of the least number of independent variables. It must also elucidate the relationships between the factors which it is found necessary to assume at the different stages of the investigation. If, in the last resort these minimum factors should prove to be purely physiological then the mechanistic school may claim to have justified itself, but if there comes a point at which the physiological explanation breaks down it should then become apparent why the scientific method must also fail in its attempt to crystallize the whole.

We are familiar in the history of the physical sciences with the method which is known as the making of relevant abstractions. We realize that in every science the first development ensued as the result of an accumulation of data. Kepler, for example, collected data about the motions of planets and as the result of his analysis formulated certain empirical laws. It was left to Newton to make the abstraction which regarded the earth as a point and the sun as a centre of attraction, and so to draw his conclusions. When the question of the mechanism of the tides was under investigation, the earth was considered simply as a rotating sphere covered by liquid, with the sun and moon as centres of attraction. On the analysis of this problem, the heaping up of the water under attraction was deduced. But for other purposes the earth is regarded not as a sphere, but as a spheroid. The point which would appear to emerge is that the nature of the abstraction is dictated by the needs of the problem in hand, and that the nature of the problem is derived from the consideration of the data which are available. Psychology is considered to be at the best a young science. It may be said to be still at the stage of accumulating data, and the ‘relevant abstractions’ have yet to be made. It would be possible to hazard conjectures as to the lines along which they will have to emerge. Some writers in the psychological field may claim that they have already made their selection and are working up to the formulation of their laws. In the final issue it will remain to be shown that the results which accrue from one abstraction do not invalidate those of the others.

Surveying the problem from the scientific angle we may feel intimidated by the extent of the field, and the enormity of the task. There is perhaps one small aspect of it which suggests itself as requiring urgent consideration. We refer to the criticism as to looseness of terminology to which allusion has already been made. It must be recognized that the criticism is just. Not only, it is argued, does the connotation of terms used, vary in different psychological text books, but the issue is further complicated by the fact that many of the terms are taken from common speech and have already a vague significance. It is, for example, disconcerting to the layman to learn that while he may know broadly what he may mean when he speaks of the ‘disposition’ of a companion, the psychologist wishes to restrict the meaning in the exposition of his subject. That the psychologist is justified in such a restriction, there can be no doubt. It may perhaps be found advisable, in the interests of accuracy to devise a new terminology to meet the needs of psychological expression. Such a procedure might, in appearance at least, tend to make psychology more detached from those problems of life and behaviour, which are supposed to be its peculiar province. But we must be prepared to make the subject technically invulnerable, and if it is found that a terminology divorced from that of common speech is required in order to give precision to the ideas involved, the necessity must be faced. Other sciences have had to overcome the same difficulty.

It is easy to select examples of topics, proper to psychological inquiry, in which the progress of elucidation has been severely handicapped by this looseness of usage in respect of the terms employed. To the writer of this monograph it appears that the subject of ‘temperament’ affords a most cogent instance. From the time of Hippocrates ‘temperament’ has figured in philosophical and psychological writings as one of the constituents which determine behaviour. The language in which it has been treated has been vague and obscure, and this, combined with the equally indeterminate associations which are carried over from the speech of every day life, have contrived to surround the subject with an atmosphere of unreality which is in sharp contrast to the significance of the rôle assigned to it. It is withal a subject which has its own appeal. All that is attempted in the following pages is to give a short historical outline of the treatment which ‘temperament’ has received at the hands of psychological theory. The resulting conflict in expression and significance will be only too apparent. It is hoped that this attempt may lead to an ultimate precise definition of the factor involved. If this should prove possible it would then be necessary to investigate experimentally the claim of such a clarified concept to inclusion in the irreducible constituents which determine behaviour. If on the other hand we find on analysis that ‘temperament’ has no meaning, other than that covered already by better defined terms we must be content, as far as psychological inquiry is concerned, to eliminate it altogether.

CHAPTER II

CONFLICTING DEFINITIONS OF TEMPERAMENT

IT has been suggested in the previous chapter, that the study of the theories of temperament, which have been put forward from time to time, offers a most cogent example of confusion resulting from the use of ill-defined terms attached to nebulous conceptions. An attempt is here made to investigate some of the available theories with a view to elucidating if possible any common factors which may emerge.

In common speech temperament is held to possess a determining influence upon behaviour. To ascribe a man’s conduct to his temperament is to make a certain gesture of dismissal which refers to the adjudged finality of the temperamental factor. The phrase ‘the victim of his temperament’ expresses a general belief that whatever the temperament may actually be, it is liable at any time to upset the more orderly components of a man’s personality.

Again we hear frequently the expression ‘incompatibility of temperament.’ This suggests that the influence of temperament makes itself felt in the relations of people, one to another, and that where this mysterious incompatibility occurs, it constitutes a real and vital obstacle to profitable relationship. Again, there is the idea of finality and the conception of temperament as a rigid, implacable force, working destructively. It is significant that in common speech temperament is most frequently invoked in excuse for failure in adaptation to external demands. One even hears the adjective ‘temperamental’ applied loosely without context. To say that so and so is ‘temperamental’ is to make a statement partly derogatory, and partly pitying in character—which implies that so and so is unreliable—moody—and erratic in behaviour. It is less easy to find in popular speech a phrase which would seem to give a more positive and hopeful turn to the temperamental factor. Certainly the phrase ‘he has the artist’s temperament ‘may be spoken in approbation, but more generally it is in apologetic defence in excuse of some slight deviation from conventional conduct. While one hears frequently the remark, ‘he is temperamentally incapable,’ of following a particular line of action, it is seldom thought necessary to bring forward the more positive aspects of the subject’s temperamental outfit.

There is, however, also to be met with—though less frequently—an attempt at a somewhat less vague classification of temperament. Thus it is not uncommon to hear an individual referred to as being of a sanguine, a nervous, or of a morbid temperament. One hears also the words phlegmatic, melancholic, choleric on the lips of people who would lay no claim to the study of the psychological history which produced these terms. It may be supposed that the terms here indicated supply a means of expression for the observed differences in individual behaviour. It may be not unprofitable to consider the nature of the differences symbolized vaguely by the above mentioned ‘types of temperament’ It is difficult at this stage to clear one’s mind entirely from any more circumscribed connotation which one may perhaps wish at a later stage to impose on a particular term. If we select for example the ‘morbid temperament’ for examination we have here a term which has no exact classical counterpart. It would appear to denote something rather more than the allied term melancholic. The individual marked down as morbid would probably be further described as reading into his experiences a subjective reference not easily understood by more so called ‘normal people.’ The word ‘unhealthy’ would probably be employed in this connexion and the subject would be described as preoccupied with the darker side of life. At the opposite end of the scale would be put the man of sanguine’ temperament who would be described as taking life easily and maintaining an equable reaction to its emergencies. The same description would perhaps apply also to...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Contents
• Chapter I. Introduction
• Chapter II. Conflicting Definitions of Temperament
• Chapter III. The Classical Doctrine of the Temperaments
• Chapter IV. Temperament and the Endocrine Glands
• Chapter V. Temperament and Emotionality
• Chapter VI. Temperament and Temper in Modern Psychology
• Chapter VII. The Factors of Will and Perseveration
• Chapter VIII. Temperament and Analytical Psychology
• Chapter IX. Contemporary Research into the Analysis of Personality
• Chapter X. Indications from the Behaviourist Doctrine
• Chapter XI. Summary and Conclusion
• Chapter XII. Some Tentative Suggestions
• Appendix: “The Rôle of Temperament in Educational Theory and Practice”
• Bibliography
• Index