Polarity And War

The Changing Structure Of International Conflict

Alan Ned Sabrosky

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9780367283155
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000306026
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

A fundamental transformation is underway in the structure of the international political system, with changes in both the definition and the distribution of power in world politics. But the precise extent of those changes and their implications for the conduct of foreign affairs remain unclear. The contributors to this book draw upon a common data base to provide the most current assessment available of the relationships among power, alliance, polarity, and international conflict in today's emerging world system.

1
Introduction: Polarity and War

Alan Ned Sabrosky

It has become increasingly clear that a fundamental transformation has been taking place in the structure and processes of the international political system. International relations no longer are dominated by the ideological hostility and geopolitical intransigency that had obtained during the most intense phase of the Cold War, occasional relapses notwithstanding. Changes have occurred in both the definition and the distribution of power in world politics. Only the precise extent of those changes, and their implications for the conduct of foreign affairs in the global arena, remain unclear.¹

One of the clearest interpretations of the possible political ramifications of this situation appeared several years ago with the proclamation of the so-called "Nixon (or Nixon-Kissinger) Doctrine."² The bipolarity which had characterized the Soviet-American rivalry, while never quite as inflexible as some had believed, was cast into the proverbial dustbin of history. In its place the architects of the Nixon Doctrine acknowledged the existence of a multipolar system in which China, Japan, and Western Europe (and, perhaps later, others as well) would join the United States and the Soviet Union as principal players in the game of world politics. Nor would this multipolar world order be disfigured by the same degree of conflict as its bipolar predecessor. The Cold War itself was declared to be at an end. Instead, there would be detente between the superpowers, with Moscow and Washington cooperating to reduce tensions and to avoid confrontations with one another throughout the world. The strategic nuclear arms race was to be brought under control, thus moderating (if not abolishing) the "balance of terror" on which the avoidance of nuclear war had rested for years. It was assumed that the leaders of the Chinese, Japanese, and Western European power centers would share the superpowers' interest in maintaining stability.

In the years since the Nixon Doctrine was enunciated, it has become all too obvious that many of its claims were overstated, reflecting American preferences rather than political reality. Like a modern-day Canning, the United States had turned to a "New World" of five major powers to "redress the balance of the Old" bipolar world which the United States alone was no longer able to maintain. But it became apparent early in the game that the multipolar balance of power envisioned by the Nixon Doctrine was little more than a chimera.³ The waning of bipolarity had not seen the rise of new centers of influence joining the United States and the Soviet Union at the apex of the structure of world power. The basic conflict of interests which helped produce the Cold War had not been resolved, and the notion of detente--once extolled as the best hope for "peace in our time"--has been subjected to an increasingly critical scrutiny. Certainly, the discord attending the negotiations for arms control agreements, Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan, US involvement in Central America, and the absence of a basic accord among the various principal actors on a wide range of issues underscore both the transitional character of the international system and the fragility of whatever stability currently obtains therein.

The fact that we now hear little of multipolarity and virtually nothing of the Nixon Doctrine and its various derivatives does not necessarily mean that their central tenets were wholly mistaken. Quite the contrary. The world has moved beyond the bipolarity characteristic of the most intense days of the Soviet-American "Cold War." To be sure, the two superpowers remain at the head of the international order, especially in military terms. But power has diffused; new centers have appeared, or are taking shape, while other once-powerful states seem to be declining in stature; and international relations have become more complex in an increasingly interdependent world, with obvious consequences for the conduct of US foreign policy.

Precisely how far the movement "beyond bipolarity" has gone, however, is as uncertain as its implications for the future conduct of world politics. Indeed, the ambiguities of power and polarity in the emerging world order are striking, as are their consequences for international stability. These factors have lent added significance to the need to resolve a number of fundamental questions: What constitutes a "pole"? What is meant by "polarity" in the present-day context? What is effective power in world politics? What role do alliances play in the process? How does the advent of nuclear weapons affect the definition of a "pole" and the relationship between polarity and war? And finally, what will the changes taking place in the above mean for the future stability of the international order--that is, will more "poles" (however they might be defined) mean more or less danger of war than existed in the bipolar era?

Many in both the academic and the policy communities have speculated on each of these questions. There is certainly a growing body of theory and research on the definition and measurement of power, pacts, polarity, and war, as well as the relationships among them. Unfortunately, the extensity of the literature on this subject is matched only by its indeterminacy. Some have argued, for example, that war is more likely in multipolar than in bipolar systems; others have reached the opposite conclusion; and still others, with an equal weight of logic or evidence on their side, have attempted to strike a balance between the contending schools.⁴

No single work is likely to untangle this particular Gordian knot to the satisfaction of all concerned, or to provide definitive answers to all of the preceding questions and their many derivatives. Yet it is possible to clarify the debate and to improve our understanding of this demanding and important subject, provided two conditions are met. First, the study must address both theoretical and empirical questions from a common perspective in order to enhance the comparability and the cumulative effect of the findings. And second, what is learned from the study as a whole must add to the existing knowledge base and provide some guidance--however tentative--capable of being used by the foreign policy community on issues affected by the diffusion of power and influence in the world. There must, in short, be a systematic effort to weave together history, theory, and policy in a way that is useful (albeit perhaps in different ways) to scholars and practitioners alike.

This volume addresses the broad subject of polarity and war within this framework. It consists of eight substantive papers, in addition to brief introductory and concluding chapters by the editor. The introduction provides the rationale for the volume. The first two substantive papers by David Garnham (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee) and Jeffrey Hart (Indiana University) appraise the "state of the art" on the theme of the volume. They therefore serve as informational benchmarks, summarizing where we are now, what we know, and what should be done to learn more about the relevant issues. The next six papers go beyond their predecessors, examining a number of relevant empirical questions and presenting, where applicable, policy-relevant recommendations. Jack S. Levy (University of Texas-Austin) extends the temporal domain for a study of the relationship between polarity and war back into the 15th century, to take a "longer view" of this phenomenon. Michael Champion (University of Michigan) and Richard Stoll (Rice University) focus on the major power subsystem, incorporating the concept of "satisfaction with the status quo" into a study of the impact of capability and alliance distributions on international war. Michael Wallace (University of British Columbia) presents a new concept of "polarization." Frank Wayman (University of Michigan-Dearborn) expands the concept of polarity to take into account distinctions between the distribution of power and the clustering of states with one another. Alan Ned Sabrosky (Army War College) looks at the problem of "wide wars"--conflicts which expand beyond their initial belligerents to involve or to engulf other states. Michael Altfeld (Michigan State University) focuses on the impact nuclear weapons have had in the post-1945 era on national war involvement. The concluding chapter draws on the findings of the preceding papers. It assesses where and why they converge, and discusses what has been added to our knowledge base and what insights may be of value to the policy community.

The volume as a whole has certain attributes. All of the contributions are original papers by scholars at the forefront of what has been called the "fourth wave" in the scientific study of world politics, schooled in the scientific method, yet sensitive to the care that must be taken when applying it to political questions. All of the empirical studies begin with a common set of definitional propositions and a common data base (that of the Correlates of War Project directed by J. David Singer at the University of Michigan),⁵ although several do use somewhat different empirical domains in the latter part of their analyses. Some redundancy has been retained in the various descriptions of the theoretical literature, in order to permit each contribution to stand alone. Policy recommendations are made on a number of issues of potential importance to decision-makers, with those pertaining to the changing likelihood of war and the impact of nuclear weapons being of particular interest. Finally, these papers--taken together--provide the most current assessment available in a single volume of the relationship among power, alliances, polarity, and international war from both a theoretical and a substantive perspective. As such, they serve as milestones on the road to an improved understanding of these phenomena which merit consideration by those in both the basic and the applied research communities.

Notes

1. See William P. Bundy, "Elements of Power," Foreign Affairs, 56 (October 1977), pp. 1-2; Stanley Hoffman, "Notes on the Elusiveness of Modern Power," International Journal, 30 (Spring 1975); Ralf Dahrendorf, "International Power: A European Perspective," Foreign Affairs, 56 (October 1977); and John Lewis Gaddis, "The Rise, Fall, and Future of Detente," Foreign Affairs, 62 (Winter 1983/1984). For a good discussion of the concept of polarity, plus a summary of the relevant literature, see Joseph L. Nogee, "Polarity: An Ambiguous Concept," Orbis, 18 (Winter 1975).

2. For an excellent appraisal of the "Nixon Doctrine," see James E. Dornan, Jr., "The Nixon Doctrine and the Primacy of Detente," Intercollegiate Review, 9 (Spring 1974).

3. For early critiques of "multipolarity," as espoused in the Nixon Doctrine, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Balance of Power Delusion," Foreign Policy, 7 (Summer 1972); and Stanley Hoffmann, "Weighing the Balance of Power," Foreign Affairs, 50 (July 1972).

4. Nogee, "Polarity: An Ambiguous Concept;" Harvey Starr, "'Detente' or 'Two Against One'? The China Factor," in C. W. Kegley, Jr. and Pat McGowan (eds.), Foreign Policy USA/USSR (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1982); and Barbara Hinckley, Coalitions and Politics (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), Ch. 9.

5. Examples of the project's work, and compilations of its data, are Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1982); J. David Singer (ed.), Correlates of War-II (New York: Free Press, 1979); and J. David Singer (ed.), Explaining War: Selected Papers From the Correlates of War Project (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1979).

2
The Causes of War: Systemic Findings

David Garnham

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the major substantive findings from research conducted during the last decade on the causes of international war. The literature on the etiology of war is voluminous and disparate. This chapter, however, focuses on findings from system-level studies. It begins with an overview and a critique of those findings, and concludes by assessing the cumulative results of such enterprises and suggesting possible agendas for future research.

My analysis is restricted to empirical research which examines the occurrence of international war. Therefore, despite some references to systemic theories of international warfare, the chapter emphasizes findings of data-based analyses of explicit hypotheses. Furthermore, I focus on research which treats war as an "event" rather than a "variable property."¹ Typically in these studies, the dependent variable is the occurrence or nonoccurrence of war or the number of wars. There are several studies, however, that treat war as a variable property and measure the quantity of war. None of the studies discussed in this paper focuses on issues such as war termination or the effects of war. Finally, these research efforts endeavor to explain international war. Most commonly, this means war between nation-states (i.e., interstate war), but in some studies it includes wars involving nonnation-state actors--what Singer and Small label "extra-systemic wars."²

Many systemic analyses of the occurrence of international war have focused on four structural attributes of the international system: (1) the size of the system--which typically means the size of the major power subsystem; (2) the magnitude of alliance commitment; (3) the tightness and discreteness of poles; and (4) the distribution of power within the system. These four topics do not subsume all empirical research on the systemic correlates of war, but they are among the most common concerns, and much of the most significant cumulation has occurred in these areas. There is substantial overlap among these topics, and that will be obvious as each is discussed. Nevertheless, I believe that the clarity of my discussion will be enhanced by making these distinctions.

Every study discussed in this paper is based, at least partially, on analyses of data collected and published by the Correlates of War Project which J. David Singer heads at the University of Michigan. There are a number of concepts, including the interstate system, the major power subsystem, interstate war, extra-systemic war, and the magnitude and severity of war, which have been operationalized by th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• About the Book and Editor
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables
• List of Figures
• Acknowledgments
• CHAPTER 1 Introduction: Polarity and War
• CHAPTER 2 The Causes of War: Systemic Findings
• CHAPTER 3 Power and Polarity in the International System
• CHAPTER 4 The Polarity of the System and International Stability: An Empirical Analysis
• CHAPTER 5 Capability Concentration, Alliance Bonding, and Conflict Among the Major Powers
• CHAPTER 6 Polarization: Towards a Scientific Conception
• CHAPTER 7 Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Threat of War
• CHAPTER 8 Alliance Aggregation, Capability Distribution, and the Expansion of Interstate War
• CHAPTER 9 Nuclear Weapons and War-Choice Decisions
• CHAPTER 10 Beyond Bipolarity: The Potential for War
• About the Contributors
• Subject Index