Some Aspects of Japan and Her Defence Forces (1928)

M.D. Kennedy

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9781138603431
• eBook ISBN:
  9780429870422
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

First published in 1928, this collection of previously published articles entered the fray of rising tensions between Japan and Anglophone countries such as Britain, Australia and America. Japanese expansion into China had led to fortification of Britain's Sembawang Naval Base in Singapore and Pearl Harbour in America as deterrents against the increasingly ambitious Japanese Empire. 'The bogey of Japanese militarism' had become ever more feared, in what the author felt was a deplorable lack of understanding about Japan and its affairs. Highlighting parallels between Japan sixty years prior and China in the present, the author began with an exploration of the effect of Far Eastern and Pacific affairs on the Anglo-Japanese alliance which, for twenty years, had formed the basis of Japan's national defence policy. He then proceeded with an exploration of Japan's attitudes towards contemporary issues such as armament reduction, America's immigration laws, Britain's Singapore base, the Chinese situation and Soviet activities in Manchuria with the hope of maintaining peace in the Far East and the Pacific.

Some Aspects of Japan and Her Defence Forces

Chapter I.
Historical Shetch of Anglo-Japanese Naval Relations.

(1) First Contacts.

IN the days of Good Queen Bess, the line between naval seamen, privateers and buccaneers was often hard to distinguish. This was as true of Japanese sailors and adventurers as it was of the Drakes, the Frobishers, and the Hawkinses of England. Times have changed and the seafaring freebooters of old are now no more; but the virility, courage, and love of adventure, which were so characteristic of British and Japanese sea-rovers alike, have been diverted into healthier channels and have had much to do with bringing the two countries to the fore-front among the naval Powers of the present day.

Although the Japanese seafarers of old required no instruction in the gentle art of piracy, it is an interesting coincidence that, when the time came for her to build up an efficient navy on modern lines, it was to England that Japan turned for assistance, England who, as will be shewn later, had been known in Japan in days gone by as a nation of pirates, a reputation which the Japanese had similarly earned tor themselves amongst their contemporaries at one time. That their rise as a naval power is largely the outcome of British instruction is readily admitted by the Japanese, though it is only fair to point out that, had it not been for their own aptitude as pupils, British teaching would have availed them no more than it did the Chinese Navy.

Generous testimony on the score of Japan's debt to England in the matter of her naval strength and efficiency was offered by the late Count Okuma in his "Fifty Years of New Japan,"* in the course of which he wrote:—" . . . we are indebted to Western experts for the inception and subsequent development of our navy, especially to the British Government for the courteous loan of a number of their capable naval officers to serve as instructors at the Cadets' College Tokyo. The men of deeds and ability that the Imperial Navy now possess are the direct consequence of the tuition then granted us by British Officers."

The friendly feeling between the two nations that enabled Japan to become the willing pupil of Great Britain in naval matters, however, is of barely sixty years' duration. Before this came about, hostility was the rule and friendship the exception. In both periods—the hostile and the friendly—the history of naval relations between the two countries is of such a nature that a brief study of the main facts should be of interest even to the lay-reader.

Being an island Power, it is but natural that her watery surroundings have had a very direct effect on Japan from the earliest times. In the distant past the sea acted both as a natural obstacle to invasion by her enemies and as a deterrent to Japanese expansion and intercourse with the outer world. Thus in the thirteenth century it saved Japan from falling a victim to the Mongol hordes of Kublai Khan—a fact which was all to Japan's good—and four hundred years later it led to the Shogunate enforcing the very short-sighted policy of seclusion, which was continued, as Admiral Ballard in his "Influence of the Sea on Japan" puts it, throughout "... the vitally important seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while the colonial empires of Western Powers were taking definite shape in many quarters of the globe, and all Europe was making great strides in the sciences of war and peace."

It was not until the forced abandonment of that policy seventy years ago that Japan came to realise that the words in the preamble to the British Naval Discipline Act—which sets forth that "... it is on the Navy, under the providence of God, that the wealth of the Empire chiefly depends" might be applied with equal truth to herself.

It has become rather the custom now to look askance at naval and military armaments, and although Japan has cut down the proportion which the expenditure on her fighting forces bears to her total annual budget from nearly 50% in 1920 to about 27.5% in the estimates for the 1928-1929 financial year, the percentage is still regarded by many —both Japanese and foreigners—as too high.* Nevertheless, there can be" but few unbiassed persons who would not admit that Japan acted wisely when, on being forced out of her self-imposed seclusion in the middle of last century, she decided to ensure the continuance of her independence by building up adequate land and sea forces to guard herself against the fate which had befallen so many other eastern peoples.

As far back as the second half of the sixteenth century European methods of ship building had been introduced into Japan by the Portuguese, these first foreign instructors being followed soon after by Will Adams, the first Englishman to land in the country. Wrecked off the coast of Kyushu in a Dutch vessel on April 9th, 1600, he was, after a term of imprisonment, taken under the patronage of the great Iyeyasu, who set him the task of instructing the native craftsmen in the art of shipbuilding,† Great success attended this venture, but, with the policy of seclusion which was enforced a few years later, it came to an untimely end. Two and a half centuries had to elapse before it was revised once more.

It is interesting to find then that Date Masamune's famous mission to Rome set off in 1613 in a vessel constructed at Sendai under the supervision of Will Adams himself. This is all the more noteworthy by reason of the fact that, although two hundred and fifty years were to elapse before the despatch of the next Japanese mission to Europe, the ship in which it sailed was also of British construction, being in fact a British warship, the frigate "Odin" under command of Lord John Hay. That was in 1862.

It is unnecessary to recall the reasons actuating the Tokugawa Shogunate in their decision to cut off their country from communication with the outside world in 1639 as the facts are too well-known to require it. That the British Navy established a number of direct and indirect links with Japan during, and immediately preceding, that seclusion period of two hundred odd years, is not such common knowledge. A brief outline of the main facts may not therefore be considered out of place.

In December 1604, some four and a half years after Will Adams' arrival in Japan, Sir Edward Michelborne was commissioned by the English Government to "discover the countries of Cathaia, China, Japan, Corea and Cambaia, and to trade with the people there, notwithstanding any grant or charter to the contrary."* With Michelborne went John Davys, one of the great seamen of Queen Elizabeth's time, as "pilot major." Strictly speaking this was not a naval expedition; but as already observed, the dividing line between naval men and buccaneers was but slight, and Michelborne's two vessels, "Tiger" and "Tiger's Whelp," shewed by their piratical exploits on the way out that they were fully entitled to be included under the latter classification. It was while indulging in their favourite pastime—piracy—that they sighted a Japanese junk at Bintang, near Singapore. Thinking it to be an easy prey, they attacked, as was their wont on such occasions. The Japanese, however, proved to be of tougher mettle than anticipated, and gave their assailants a very severe handling. With their heavy two-handed swords they did terrible execution amongst the Englishmen and amongst those who fell in the melee was John Davys. Of the Japanese only one is thought to have escaped.

From what Michelborne stated in his report on his return to England, it would seem that this was by no means the first encounter between English and Japanese, for he speaks of "the Japons not being suffered to land in any port of India with weapons, being a people so desperate and daring that they are feared in all places where they come."

We know, of course, from ancient records that Japanese pirates frequently ravaged the coasts of Korea and China, and that they were not unknown in the Philippines and the Malay Archipelago; but it would seem from this that they even carried on their depredations so far afield as India. As Englishmen, not undeservedly, had the reputation, in Japan, of being pirates in the days of Will Adams, it is of interest, therefore, to find that the Japanese had, apparently, (and quite as well merited) much the same reputation among their contemporaries in England.*

It was a few years after this that the first English ship arrived in Japan. This was the "Clove," in 1613, but as it was a merchant vessel and not a warship it need not concern us here, though it may be noted in passing that the following year, 1614, appears to have marked the arrival of the first Japanese visitors to England. These visitors were, like Will Adams, seafarers. The first contacts between the two countries were, therefore, established by sailors, and, as their actual status in those days was apt to change as rapidly from merchant seamen to buccaneers or naval rating as is that of the Chinese soldier of the present time, (who is a soldier one day, a bandit the next, and peaceful civilian a few weeks later) it is perhaps permissible to include these among the early naval contacts. That this observation is justified may be seen by the records of hostile encounters on the high seas that took place between English and Dutch trading vessels on their way to Japan during the years 1617—20, and between English and Dutch on the one hand and Portuguese and Spanish on the other during the next three years.

It was in no small part due to the losses suffered in these encounters that English trade relations with Japan were discontinued in 1623 after lasting ten years only. Subsequent attempts were made to reopen them,* but in the meantime the Shogunate had instituted its seclusion policy and the few British ships that visited Japanese waters during the next two centuries met either with a cool or with a definitely hostile reception. An outstanding instance of this was seen in the year 1808 when H.M.S. Phaeton," "... a crack ship, one of four frigates known as the Saucy Channel Four," created a quite-uncalled-for panic in Nagasaki by its unexpected and undesired arrival there in September of that year. A full description of this incident is to be found in an ancient Japanese pamphlet entitled " History of the Outrage by Anglians at Nagasaki,"† a summarised translation of which appears in Vol. III., Part IV. of the Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan under the date May 13th, 1879. Briefly the facts were as follows:—

The Dutch, who were, at that time, the only western traders allowed in Japan, used to send one or two vessels filled with merchandise to Nagasaki each year. Early in 1808 H.M.S. " Phaeton," under command of Captain Fleetwood Pellew, was sent from England to Bengal where, on arrival, her commander learned that two Dutch merchantmen had sailed for Japan on the annual visit. As England and Holland were then at war, the "Phaeton" at once set off in pursuit, hoping to overhaul and capture them before they reached their destination. The attempt was unsuccessful and the "Phaeton" reached Nagasaki without sighting her prey.

On her approach being observed from shore, the local authorities mistook her at first for one of the Dutch vessels whose arrival they were awaiting. On learning their mistake they determined to forbid her entry, as no foreign vessels, other than Dutch or Chinese, were permitted to come to Japan. A boat containing some of the local officials and two Dutchmen as interpreters was sent out to demand her withdrawal; but, before they had time to realise what was happening, the two Dutchmen were seized by the men of the "Phaeton," and the Japanese had to return to shore without their interpreters and without having carried out their intentions. On learning what had occurred, great consternation arose in Nagasaki and orders were issued for troops to assemble in order to ward off a possible invasion. At the same time "fire-junks" were prepared with the intention of trying to set the "Phaeton" on fire.

As a matter of fact the English warship had no hostile intentions, and its only desire was to obtain water and provisions for the return voyage. One of the Dutch captives was sent ashore to explain matters and, as the request was, at first, rejected, the commander threatened to destroy ail the Japanese and Chinese vessels in the harbour unless the authorities carried out his wishes in this respect. The demands were fulfilled eventually as, with the exception of the Governor of Nagasaki and a few of his closest attendants, the local authorities on this occasion shewed up very badly, as they were too scared of what might happen if they tried to oppose the foreign intruder.

The Governor himself, who had done his best to urge his subordinates to assist in driving off the presumed invaders, felt the shame so deeply that he took his life. The discovery of what he had done is described by one of his attendants as follows:—

"In front of the image of the guardian god, and close under the hedge, I found that he had spread a carpet, seated on which he had made a long narrow wound below his navel, and had then thrust the dagger through his throat up to the hilt."

To this description he, like a true connoisseur, appends the quite matter-of-fact comment—" It was a magnificent harakiri."

Subsequently, when the cowardice of the other officials became known to the Central Government, they were all ordered to iollow the example of the Governor and disembowel themselves, an order which, it seems, was carried out without demur.

Many British warships have visited Japan since that occasion, and some of the earlier visits resulted in a fair amount of blood-letting; but this little-known visit and its sequel are probably unequalled in dramatic effect. Nevertheless, it is perhaps not out of place to mention that, just as this arrival of a British warship in Japan resulted in the self-inflicted death of a number of Japanese, so also did the decision of the Crown Prince (the present Emperor), to visit England, more than a century later, in fact as recently as 1921, result in the threat of an even larger number of Japanese to take their own lives by way of protest.

It is an interesting commentary on the "Phaeton" incident that the "Rebecca," one of the two Dutch vessels for which the British warships had been searching, was captured subsequently and that, in the course of the appeal made on her behalf, the King's Council ruled that, as Nagasaki was open only to the enemy, it could not be considered as neutral; consequently it was held that the blockade extended to that port.* Thus we find that Japan, despite its hermit-like existence in those days and its distance from the main theatre of operations, was actually included in the calculations of the British authorities during the Napoleonic wars.

Following the giving of this decision in the "Rebecca" prize-court case, no new Anglo-Japanese naval contacts of special importance were made until the arrival of Admiral Stirling in 1854. Captain Broughton in the course of his famous survey expedition had entered several Japanese harbours in 1795, and in 1845 and 1849 two other British survey ships, "Samarang" and "Mariner," likewise paid visits; but it was not until 1854, when Admiral Stirling arrived at Nagasaki in his flag-ship and obtained an agreement from the Japanese authorities, promising kindness and assistance to British subjects wrecked on the coast and opening certain specified ports to British trade,f that the first real step towards the institution of friendly naval relations was made. This was followed four years later, 1858—just fifty years after the "Phaeton" incident—by the arrival or H.M.S. "Furious," under command of Captain Sherard Osborn, and H.M.S. "Retribution," bringing Lord Elgin's Mission for the purpose of concluding a treaty of commerce and amity between Britain and Japan, similar to the one that had just been made by Townsend Harris between the Tycoon and the President of the United States of America.

These, the first attempts on the part of Great Britain to induce Japan to give up her policy of isolation, marked the commencement of an unbroken series of Anglo-Japanese naval connections which, as much as anything else, served to bring the two countries together in such a way as to culminate in the unprecedented spectacle of a close alliance between a great Western and a great Eastern Power.

The first few years of this naval connection were marked by incidents that were far from friendly and even led to bloodshed; yet, paradoxical as it may sound, the hostilities that then took place helped to found the subsequent friendship between the two nations on the firmest possible basis, as each gained a healthy respect for the courage and fighting qualities of the other.

Despite all that has been said to the contrary, however, both Britain and America, in forcing Japan to join the comity of nations, behaved in a manner which can only be described as high-handed and reprehensible. Without attempting to condone Japan's action, nearly sixty years later, in forcing China to agree to the Twenty-One Demands "at the point of the bayonet," there is, from the moral standpoint, but little to choose between t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Original Title
• Preface
• Acknowledgement
• Contents
• List of Contents
• CHAPTER I. Historical Sketch of Anglo-Japanese Naval Relations
• CHAPTER II. British Army Connections with Japan
• CHAPTER III. The Japanese Fighting Forces and Disarmament
• CHAPTER IV. Bearing On Trade and Foreign Relations
• CHAPTER V. Random Notes On Japan and Her Army
• CHAPTER VI. Korea's Part in the Scheme of National Defence
• CHAPTER VII. Japan and the Singapore Base
• CHAPTER VIII. Some Matters of Importance to National Defence
• APPENDIX
• Index of Ships Mentioned in the Text
• Index of Persons Mentioned in the Text
• General Index