Contemporary Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique

Josef Bleicher

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351622370
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Hermeneutics can loosely be defined as the theory or philosophy of the interpretation of menaing. It is a central topic in the philosophy of the social sciences, the philosophy of art and language and in literary criticism. This book, first published in 1980, gives a detailed overview and analysis of the main strands of contemporary hermeneutical thought. It includes a number of readings in order to give the reader a first-hand acquaintance with the subjects and the debates within it.

Part I

Hermeneutical theory

Introduction

The necessary as well as autotelic function of understanding one's contemporaries or, in fact, any human expression, for individual and social existence Dilthey successfully established in his outline of The Rise of Hermeneutics’. The awareness of one's own history and of that of mankind as a whole is an indispensable condition for a rich and fulfilled life. Through it, the limits of one's time are transcended and new sources of strength are opened up. Knowledge of past civilizations enriches our lives and their study itself affords us great pleasure; understanding the emotional states of other human beings not only accounts for a large amount of happy moments in our lives but also constitutes a precondition for action on our part. We recognize ourselves as individuals only through intercourse with others and so become aware of characteristics which are specific to ourselves.

Access to other human beings is possible, however, only by indirect means: what we experience initially are gestures, sounds, and actions and only in the process of understanding do we take the step from external signs to the underlying inner life, the psychological existence of the Other. Since the inner life is not given in the experiencing of sign we have to reconstruct it; our lives provide the materials for the completion of the picture of the inner life of Others. The act of understanding provides the bridge for reaching the spiritual self of the Other and the degree of enthusiasm with which we embark on this adventure depends on the importance the Other has for us.

Understanding, then, is motivated by our interest in partaking in the inner life of somebody else and is both necessary and rewarding. It establishes a communion of the human spirit dwelling in all of us and addressing us in multifarious forms from all directions.

As the title of the essay suggests, it is mainly concerned with outlining the emergence of a discipline that regulates, and thereby improves, the ‘art of understanding permanently fixed expressions of life’ (Dilthey, V, p. 319). The methodology of this activity which Dilthey refers to as ‘exegesis or interpretation’ has come to be known as ‘hermeneutics’. The exposition of the rules that guide successful interpretation not only leads to more efficient interpretation but also safeguards the general validity of its results from the intrusion of arbitrariness and subjective elements. It represents a Kunstlehre, i.e. the systematization of formal procedures to assist the art of understanding in its endeavour to arrive at certainty of knowledge.

Chapter 1

The rise of classical hermeneutics

1. The origin of hermeneutics

Hermes transmitted the messages of the gods to the mortals, that is to say, he not only announced them verbatim but acted as an ‘interpreter’ who renders their words intelligible – and meaningful – which may require some point of clarification or other, additional, commentary. Hermeneutics is consequently engaged in two tasks: one, the ascertaining of the exact meaning-content of a word, sentence, text, etc.; two, the discovery of the instructions contained in symbolic forms.

In the course of its history hermeneutics sporadically emerged and advanced in its development as the theory of interpretation whenever it became necessary to translate authoritative literature under conditions that did not allow direct access to it, owing either to distance in space and time or to differences in language. In both cases, the original meaning of a text was either disputed or remained hidden, necessitating interpretative explication in order to render it transparent. As a technology for correct understanding, hermeneutics has therefore been employed at an early stage in three capacities: one, to assist discussions about the language of the text (i.e. the vocabulary and grammar), giving rise, eventually, to philology; two, to facilitate the exegesis of biblical literature; three, to guide jurisdiction. I shall turn to Dilthey¹ for an exposition of the first two, and to Betti (1954) for the third use of hermeneutics.

Literary interpretation has its origin in the Greek educational system where it assisted in the interpretation and criticism of Homer and other poets. Its subdivision into rhetoric and poetics eventually merged into the art of textual verification. A second stage was reached in the formulation of a methodology for the interpretation of profane texts in the Renaissance and Humanism, where classical literary monuments were once again scrutinized. These philological investigations sprang from a practical interest – since Greek culture not only represented a model for artistic and scientific education, but for life in general.

This ethical-pedagogic interest was, however, even more pronounced in biblical exegesis. It is here that we find the main impetus for the development of hermeneutics: practically all religions relying on a sacred text have developed systems of rules of interpretation. The Rabbis had established rules for the interpretation of the Talmud and the Midraschim. Dilthey himself refers to Philo, an Alexandrian, to indicate the origin of canons and laws for the interpretation of allegories (Kanones and nomoi tes allegorias) and the distinction between pneumatic and literal meaning.

Biblical hermeneutics reached its first major formulation in the course and the after-effects of the Reformation with Matthias Flacius. As a Lutheran, he regarded the Bible as containing the word of God (revelatio sacrio Uteris comprehensa). In opposition to the dogmatic position of the Tridentine Church that reaffirmed the Catholic emphasis on tradition in the interpretation of allegedly obscure parts of the Scriptures, Flacius insisted on the possibility of universally valid interpretation through hermeneutics. Allegorical interpretation was restricted to the case of simile and is not required for the understanding of the Old Testament at all. Any passages, the sense of which was not immediately clear, could be understood if one employed the following procedures: grammatical interpretation, reference to the context provided by the actual lived experience of Christianity and, above all, the consideration of a passage in the light of the intent and form of the whole.

The insight that individual parts have to be dealt with in relation to the whole and to the other parts marks a significant step in the development of hermeneutics which, in its early, pre-Schleiermacher, form progressed yet further. The anti-dogmatic self-understanding of early Protestant hermeneutics did not escape a hidden dogmatic of its own: the presupposition of the unity of the Bible apparent in the hermeneutic principle of considering parts within their ‘whole’. Dilthey regards this as a ‘formal deficiency’ that was overcome by the work of Semler, Michaelis and Ernesti, who were able to completely liberate exegesis from dogma by introducing grammatico-historical procedures to complement the existing aesthetico-rhetorical ones. After the rejection of any dogma that might be brought to bear on exegesis, it was only a small step to the attempt to incorporate the ‘specific hermeneutics’ of Biblical exegesis into a ‘general hermeneutics’ which was to provide the rules for any interpretation of signs,² be they of profane origin or not.

We associate the names of Ast and Wolf – both were philologists – with this development which leads immediately to Schleiermacher, whose genius resided in giving their ‘hints’ a systematic foundation. Before considering his general theory of hermeneutics, I would like to at least give a mention to the contribution made by juridical interpretation to the development of hermeneutics.

The task of mediating a particular case with the generality of the law proceeds under presuppositions which are, by necessity, dogmatic. Its normative character is, for example, quite apparent in cases where an existing law requires some form of supplementation. Betti has developed one canon of interpretation from this practice of civil law in which the public good, i.e. a social interest, is introduced into the juridical process. The canon of the ‘actuality of understanding’ stresses the need for the interpreter to reconstruct the genesis of a thought, law, etc., and to adapt its formulation to changed circumstances. Juridical hermeneutics displays, consequently, a dual character in that the problems arising from its interpretative task are intimately connected with the application of its results. Apart from drawing our attention to the practical dimension of interpretation, juridical hermeneutics has provided us, through Betti's important work, with three more canons which help to form the core of a general hermeneutical theory and among which ‘the canon of totality and meaningful coherence’, frequently referred to as the ‘hermeneutical circle’, figures again prominently.

Reference to the practice of hermeneutics alone cannot suffice for the formulation of a theoretical framework in terms of which the limits and validity of hermeneutical procedures can be evidenced – itself a precondition for the development of a general hermeneutics. The first approach in the history of hermeneutics that attempted to inject epistemological considerations into methodological discussion is that of Schleiermacher.

2. Romanticist hermeneutics

Some of the main themes that still characterize hermeneutics can already be found in Schleiermacher's precursors. I have referred to the importance that was attached to the canon of totality and the associated employment of the hermeneutical circle. Ast (in 1808) had regarded the process of understanding as a repetition of the process of creation – a principle that was echoed by another philologist, Wolf, when he demanded that the thoughts of an Other had to be understood as he had understood them himself.

The limitation of the pre-Schleiermacher effort consisted, conversely, in the lack of reflection that transcended merely methodological considerations – which themselves did not reach any systematic formulation and remained on the level of ad hoc insights that were forthcoming from interpretative practice.

Schleiermacher

The two traditions Schleiermacher brings to bear on his developmental hermeneutics are those of transcendental philosophy and romanticism. From these he derived a form of questioning – the conditions of the possibility of valid interpretation – and a new conception of the process of Understanding. Understanding is now seen as a creative reformulation and reconstruction. Fichte's emphasis on the productivity of the active I (Ego) led Schleiermacher to the discovery of the hermeneutical law that every thought of the author has to be related to the unity of an active and organically developing subject: the relationship between individuality and totality become the focal point of romanticist hermeneutics.

Individuals are able to understand without having to problematize their activity – until they find themselves unable to come to grips with the meaning expressed in speech or writing. The experience of mis-understanding, and the consequential attempt to avoid it happening again, lies at the heart of the search for certainty which culminates in Schleiermacher's formulation of a systematic hermeneutics.

His systematic contains two parts: grammatical and psychological interpretation. For the former he develops forty-four ‘canons’ (Kanones). The two first are most important and certainly shed some light on Schleiermacher's overall approach: one, ‘Everything that needs a fuller determination in a given text may only be determined in reference to the field of language shared by the author and his original public'; and, two, ‘The meaning of every word in a given passage has to be determined in reference to its coexistence with the words surrounding it’.³ The stress on the linguisticality of understanding, apart from evidencing Schleiermacher's debt to Herder's concern with language, certainly distinguished Schleiermacher's hermeneutics from that of his predecessors and points into the future as a recurrent theme in hermeneutical discussions.

The canons developed for psychological interpretation centre around the investigation of the emergence of thought from within the totality of an author's life. The use of these hermeneutical rules allows for the understanding of the meaning of a given text. But this is not all: given adequate historical and linguistic knowledge, the interpreter is in a position to understand the author better than he had understood himself. Dilthey, to whom we owe a great debt for his important work on Schleiermacher, traces this possibility to Fichte's conception of the soul as containing conscious and unconscious intuition and finds that ‘the interpreter who follows conscientiously the train of thought of the author will have to bring many elements to consciousness which could remain unconscious⁴ in the latter – he will thereby understand him better than he had understood himself’ (Dilthey, XIV/I, p. 707).

Schleiermacher's formulation of a system of interpretative rules brings to fruition a development within hermeneutical practice that sprang from the gradual move away from a dogmatic starting-point. The unity of procedure enabled the interpreter to disregard the specific content of the work under consideration. General hermeneutics does not allow the use of a specific methodology for a – supposedly – privileged text such as the Bible. The only allowance made for specific content consists in the variegated use made of the methods approved by the science of hermeneutics.

Apart from continuing the tradition of hermeneutics by systematizing and generalizing the methods of interpretation that had already been in use, Schleiermacher ranks as a central figure for two more reasons: one, he complemented grammatical exegesis with psychological interpretation, which he referred to as ‘divinatory’. Hermeneutics is as much art as it is science; it endeavours to reconstruct the original creative act – ‘how it really was’. Two, it is with Schleiermacher that we encounter the first attempt to analyse the process of understanding and inquire into the possibilities and limits of it. Adumbrating Dilthey's conception, Schleiermacher refers to the substratum of general human nature that underlies potentially successful communication. Individual differences are acknowledged, which leads to the requirement of congeniality: the interpreter ought to approximate the intellectual – ‘spiritual’ – stature of the author as closely as possible. The existence of qualitative gradations among people who may be separated in space and time, on the other hand, provides the incentive and rationale for the hermeneutical task: understanding the Othe...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• Part I Hermeneutical theory
• Part II Hermeneutic philosophy
• Part III Critical hermeneutics
• Part IV Summary and new perspectives
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Glossary
• Bibliography
• Name index
• Subject index