The Dynamics Of Soviet Policy In The Middle East

Between Old Thinking And New

Mark A Heller

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367291419
• eBook ISBN: 9781000316063
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This study examines the extent to which new political thinking has been applied to Soviet policy in the Middle East and aims to speculate about the possible impact of any changes on patterns of international relations in the region.

Chapter 1. The Third World in Soviet Policy

Since the accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, the familiar contours of post-war history have changed, in many cases beyond all recognition. The image of the Soviet Union as a stolid, totalitarian communist regime has been challenged by cultural effervescence, efforts to restructure the economic system, the liberalization of Party and government politics, and the growing drive for autonomy or independence by the various nationalities of the Soviet Union. The image of the Soviet Union as a militaristic global power determined to maintain its sphere of influence at any cost and to expand it through subversion or violence has been challenged by reforms in Soviet force structure and military doctrine, acquiescence in the overthrow of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and a declared posture of international cooperation to resolve regional conflicts by political means.

Since the character and behavior of the Soviet Union have an impact on practically every facet of international politics and security, these changes have provoked the most fundamental and far-reaching debate since the onset of the Cold War. Indeed, Soviet terminology for these phenomena — glasnost (the opening up of information and expression), perestroika (restructuring of the political and economic systems), and novoye mishleniye ("new thinking" in the principles guiding the behavior of the Soviet government at home and abroad) — have been incorporated into the lexicon of international discourse. At the highest level of generality, the changes associated with Gorbachev have created a sense of revolutionary transformation. However, the outcome of this process is by no means predetermined, because the Soviet leadership itself may lose control or lose confidence in its chosen course (as the resignation of Foreign Minister Edward Shevard-nadze in December 1990 clearly suggested). Much uncertainty remains about the direction, pace and durability of change, and about its ultimate meaning for other actors in the international system. This is particularly true with respect to Soviet behavior in the Third World and its impact on regional instabilities and bilateral Soviet-American relations.

The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which new political thinking has been applied to Soviet policy in the Middle East and to speculate about the possible impact of any changes on patterns of international relations in the region. The Middle East should be a particularly revealing test case of Soviet new thinking. Of all Third World regions, it is the closest geographically, it has attracted the greatest Soviet investment in recent decades, it is potentially the most closely linked to Soviet domestic politics, and its economic and strategic importance have historically given crises and conflicts there the greatest resonance in global politics and bilateral Soviet-American relations. Indeed, Middle Eastern exceptions to overall Soviet policy may be logically required by the exceptional character of the region. However, thoroughgoing changes in Soviet policy in the Middle East would, precisely because of that region's importance, constitute prima facie evidence that the entire basis of the Soviet approach to the Third World had been profoundly shaken.

Expansionism has been the hallmark of Soviet foreign policy and of the Russian Empire before it. Unlike other European great powers, however, the Russian tradition is one of expansion at the margins. Russian Czars sought cultural and economic influence wherever they could, but the extension of Romanov political-military control generally meant the sustained overland expansion of the state borders, rather than the acquisition of farflung overseas possessions. Whenever a countervailing force was encountered at the frontier of Russian power, state policy was to undermine the influence and presence of the competing power center: Austria in the southwest, Sweden and Poland in the northwest, China in the east, Turkey and Persia in the south, and Britain in India and the Middle East.

There is nothing exceptional about such behavior. On the contrary, it conforms with the tendency of every actor in an anarchical international system, whether for offensive or defensive reasons, to push out the range of its influence to the maximum extent permitted by its resources, and there is therefore no need to look for explanations peculiar to the Russian people or the character of their government. Nevertheless, national identities and political ideologies do influence the policies of governments in the sense that they shape geographical priorities and modes of action, provide rationales, and help determine the choice and effectiveness of various foreign policy instruments.

The Bolshevik Revolution provided an ideological reason, or at least rationale, for Soviet involvement throughout the world. Communism was held to be a socio-economic doctrine of universal applicability, and Soviet efforts to help extend it were both required by the logic of history and necessary for the security of the Soviet state — the embodiment of the Revolution — against the forces of imperialism determined to overthrow it. Contrary to Marx's prediction, capitalism had persisted in the advanced, industrial countries long after it reached its monopoly stage and the explanation, according to Lenin, lay in imperialism.

...instead of having developed its internal contradictions and tensions to a point where a revolutionary break must occur, capitalism has found a way out of these contradictions.... The way out is expansion into the whole world in search of cheap raw materials, ready markets for commodities and for excess capital, and most important, cheap labor.... This expansion of capitalism is called imperialism. By embarking on it, capitalism has, for the time being, staved off the revolution and its own downfall.¹

With the superprofits gained from exploiting the underdeveloped countries, capitalists were able to bribe labor leaders and "the upper stratum of the labor aristocracy" in their own countries, and thereby ensure their own survival.²

In this analysis, overseas colonies are the weak link in the chain that sustains capitalism. If the link can be broken by disconnecting the colonies from their metropolises, then the imperialist powers themselves will be weakened to the point where they will not only be unable to throttle the socialist revolution in its Soviet cradle, but will themselves also become ripe for revolution at home. However, it was not at all clear that the political dissolution of empires would be sufficient to produce these results. National liberation movements might achieve political independence but still leave their countries closely integrated into the global network of capitalism, thus perpetuating the economic dynamics of imperialism under a new guise: neo colonialism. Much depended on the class structure and domestic policies pursued by the leaders of formerly dependent countries. The collapse of the European and Japanese colonial empires after World War II imparted a worldwide dimension and political immediacy to this problem, but it was one with which Soviet theoreticians and policymakers had had to grapple since the first years of post-revolution foreign policy: "What is the correct Soviet approach to nationalist, non-communist liberation movements and governments?"

Soviet policy in the Third World has been periodized in a variety of ways, but however many "stages" observers may count, the major variable appears to be movement along the scale of responses to this basic question, with the two poles being almost exclusive identification with and support for orthodox communists, at one end, and virtually indiscriminate identification with and support for any forces hostile to the major imperialist powers, at the other.³ As part of a general "relaxation" which accompanied the transition from War Communism to the New Economic Plan, Lenin himself legitimized the second approach by endorsing temporary alliances with the bourgeois leadership of nationalist movements and of governments in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. "Socialists," he wrote, "must not only demand the unconditional and immediate liberation of the colonies without compensation...but they must render determined support to the more revolutionary elements in the bourgeois-democratic movements...and assist their uprising — and, if need be, their revolutionary war — against the imperialist powers that oppress them."⁴ This position was criticized by more dogmatic Marxists such as the Indian Communist M.N. Roy, who insisted that revolutionary national movements would not really succeed under bourgeois leadership and that "leadership would have to be taken over by the communist parties when the bourgeoisie deserted and betrayed the national revolution, as they were bound to do."⁵ Since bourgeois leaders were expected either to compromise in the struggle for independence or to settle for the trappings of political independence while leaving imperial economic ties essentially intact, communist support for them was expected to be at best futile, if not self-defeating.

However, it was Lenin's view that prevailed. It is true that efforts were made to enhance the ideological and institutional authority of the Soviet leadership over the national movements. For example, the Fourth Comintern Congress proclaimed, in the Theses on the Eastern Question, "It is one of the most important functions of the anti-imperialist united front tactic to make clear to the broad working masses the necessity of an alliance with the international proletariat and the Soviet republics."⁶ Nevertheless, this was not a major determinant of Soviet state behavior. Lenin established the diplomatic practice of offering sympathy and support to unequivocally bourgeois or even feudal nativist movements and regimes in such countries as Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, because in their political struggles against the domination of the main imperial power on the Soviet periphery — Great Britain — they were playing an objectively anti-imperialist role. In short, Lenin bequeathed to his successors both a conceptual framework for the struggle against imperialist powers to be played out over the entire world, and a clear appreciation of the advantages to be gained in that struggle by properly manipulating the forces of nationalism among non-European peoples.

However, the credibility of this tendency was seriously undermined in 1927-28 by the "treason" of the Soviet-support Kuomin-tang Party in China and the nearly mortal blow it inflicted on the Chinese Communist Party. Until then, Stalin had essentially pursued Lenin's approach to the question of national-liberation, thereby allying himself on foreign as well as domestic issues with Bukharin and other "rightist" forces. Indeed, the issue was an additional point of contention in Stalin's struggle for power with Trotsky. Stalin favored alliance with and support of the national bourgeoisie, provided that it objectively served the cause of anti-imperialism (as Kuomintang opposition to British interests in China apparently did). Proletarian support, he urged, "must be given to those national movements which tend to weaken imperialism and bring about the overthrow of imperialism, and not to strengthen and preserve it."⁷ Following the setback in China, Stalin eliminated Trotsky but then turned on his erstwhile allies, led by Bukharin, and adopted the harder theoretical line advocated by Trotsky and before that by Roy.

The new logic, incidentally, was also applied to communist parties in Europe, which avoided making common cause with other anti-fascist forces until the growing power of Nazi Germany presented an immediate and unambiguous threat to Soviet security. In the mid-1930s, European communist parties were directed to join various "Popular Fronts" in order to forestall the further progress of fascism, and communist parties in the Third World suppressed their revolutionary instincts in order not to distract the imperial powers from the main task, which was to resist Germany and Japan. But insofar as direct Soviet interest in the Third World was concerned, the communist liberation movement remained a dead letter for more than 20 years.⁸

Contrary to common perception, postwar policy under Stalin was not uniformly rigid. It is true that Soviet policy in the Third World between 1945 and 1953 was generally marked by a low profile, due to weakness and the need to concentrate on reconstruction, higher priorities elsewhere (especially in Europe itself), and what one observer has termed "ideological myopia."⁹ Soviet leaders viewed the world in dichotomous terms — capitalist and socialist — and in accordance with the so-called "two camps doctrine" associated with the name of Andrei Zhdanov, rejected any cooperation with or support for the national bourgeoisie in the national-liberation movements. Even during this first Cold War phase, however, the Soviet Union assisted certain non-communist forces which appeared to threaten imperialist interests; support for the creation of Israel was a noteworthy example of such behavior. Even in this case, however, Soviet reading of the class character of the forces involved played an important role; the Soviets assumed that the feudal or bourgeois Arab regimes opposing Israel were, by definition, serving British interests in the Middle East. By and large, ideological prisms produced indifference to, or active suspicion of national-liberation movements by both Soviet spokesmen and local communists; denunciations of Gandhi and the Congress in India are a case in point.

However, this hard, exclusivist line effectively prevented any broadening of the mass base of communist parties and led to serious setbacks for those parties, especially in Asia. Just as importantly, it prevented Soviet adaptation to a rapidly-changing world of independent states in the former colonial areas. In 1949, communists were therefore instructed to bid for the support of that part of the national bourgeoisie "that suffered from foreign competition" and to pay special attention to the peasantry.¹⁰ This reorientation, no doubt inspired by the success of the Chinese Communist Party, was still a partial one. There was as yet no recognition that a national revolution under bourgeois leadership might mean real independence for a former colony. Before these countries could be helped to play their assigned role of weakening imperialism, Soviet policy had first to admit the possibility that non-communist leaders could be anything other than western stooges, and this required further modification of the "two camps" doctrine. By 1951, there were already indications of a reevaluation of the possibility of using expanded trade and economic aid as a weapon to drive a wedge between the West and the newly-independent underdeveloped countries, and at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1952, a new policy was formally announced.¹¹

Thus, the foundations for a reintroduction of Leninist principles into Soviet relations with the Third World were actually laid under Stalin. A truly active Third World policy, however, was only instituted after 1953, when Nikita Khrushchev entrenched this "new-old" approach and the usefulness of national self-determination as an instrument to weaken the West was reinforced by the example of swift Soviet reconstruction and modernization. Of course, the opportunities for more tangible gains also increased. The disintegration of the British, French and Belgian overseas empires during Khrushchev's tenure and the post-independence resentments and weaknesses of many former colonies left little doubt that an anti-western animus existed which could potentially be exploited to Soviet advantage, provided sufficient ideological and diplomatic flexibility were forthcoming. In particular, the widespread desire for neutralism or nonalignment in the Gold War, symbolized by the convening of the Bandung Conference in 1955, indicated that the bourgeois leadership of these countries did intend to distance itself from the West and play a far more "progressive" role in international relations than Soviet leaders had previously thought possible.

At the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev therefore focused his attention on the vast "zone of peace" made up of nonaligned, underdeveloped nations. The central themes in Soviet relations with these states were henceforth to be peaceful coexistence and benevolent noninterference, demonstrated by generous trade and aid agreements. In a sense, the Soviet leadership resolved to compete with the West for the support of these states by offering an alternative source of developmental assistance, thereby enabling them to do what they were in any event predisposed to do, that is, to loosen their ties with the West. In the following years, the guiding principle was "that these new states, although state capitalist and part of the world capitalist system, occupied a special place within that system, reflected in their neutral foreign policy and their desire for economic independence. Thus, they had a special status, marking a progressive stage on the road to socialism."¹²

Nothing in this policy was meant to imply that the Soviet Union or communist parties loyal to it had abandoned all interest in the class character of regimes in developing countries or all desire to see the ultimate triumph of socialism. Indeed, much effort was invested in endowing Soviet-supported and -aligned countries with ideological legitimacy. Lacking guidance from the corpus of classical Marxism, Soviet ideologues created new categories of analysis. The most notable of these was the progressive, post-liberation "national-democratic state," endorsed at the Moscow Conference of 81 Communist Parties in December 1960 and codified at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961. The national democracy was defined as:

a state which consistently upholds its political and economic independence, fights against imperialism and its military blocs, and against military bases on its territory; a state which fights against the new forms of colonialism and the penetration of imperialistic capital; a state which rejects dictatorial and despotic forms of government; a state in which the people are assured broad democratic rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstrations, establishment of political parties and public organizations), the opportunity to work for the enactment of an agrarian reform and the realization of other democratic and social changes and for participation in shaping government policy.¹³

Such formulations professed to derive from a scientific understanding of socio-economic forces, such as the putative contradiction between the interests of the national bourgeoisie and those of imperialism, but the terms used left much latitude for subjective interpretation and were sufficiently elastic to provide ideological justification for relations with virtually any state in the Third World prepared to act or speak against western interests. Ideology was not ignored, but rather than a determinant of policy (which it had never really been) or even a tool for understanding the world in which Soviet decisionmakers had to operate, it was increasingly becoming a method of ex post facto rationalization for policies pursued for other reasons, primarily, the desire to undermine the position of ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Summary
• Chapter 1. The Third World in Soviet Policy
• Chapter 2. The Soviet Record in the Middle East
• Chapter 3. New Political Thinking and the Third World
• Chapter 4. New Political Thinking and the Middle East
• Chapter 5. Conclusions
• Appendix, "Fundamental Principles of International Security"
• Notes
• About the Author
• Series Page