In attempting to return to notions of subjectivity, we are of course reminded that this term also has had both a long and contentious history in philosophy, particularly continental philosophy, and can be traced to the work of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. For our purposes, we understand subjectivity as revolving around questions about the constitution of the individual and objectivity. To quote Hegel (1998), subjectivity can be understood as follows:
The living substance, further, is that being which is truly subject, or, what is the same thing, is truly realized and actual (wirklich) solely in the process of positing itself, or in mediating with its own self its transitions from one state or position to the opposite. As subject it is pure and simple negativity, and just on that account a process of splitting up what is simple and undifferentiated, a process of duplicating and setting factors in opposition, which [process] in turn is the negation of this indifferent diversity and of the opposition of factors it entails. True reality is merely this process of reinstating self-identity, of reflecting into its own self in and from its other, and is not an original and primal unity as such, not an immediate unity as such. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle which presupposes its end as its purpose, and has its end for its beginning; it becomes concrete and actual only by being carried out, and by the end it involves.
(para. 18)
For Hegel, a subject arises out of the structure of its own negation, its own alienation. In his own way, Freud took up this idea of subject-as-structure and would popularize the idea of the unconscious and a subject to whom parts of itself were alien and inaccessible (Freud, 2005). One notes the structuring point was speaking, as opposed to Gestalt (e.g., as elaborated by Merleau-Ponty (1967, 2002), leaving the unsayable, the unsaid, as its residuesâhence the unconscious. However, the subject would interact with the world though the use of a specialized sub-function of the subject Freud dubbed Ich, often translated as Ego. This term would be picked up by popular psychology as a way to describe oneâs sense of subjectivity and even by cognitive psychology as the seat of cognition (Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2010).
The purpose of this book is to think through the ways in which subjectivity can be said to be constituted, affected, and penetrated by social discourses, with concerns for being socially just. It is the authorsâ intention to consider subjectivity as a locus of these discourses through which to consider the implicit intersection of the individual and the social, where each constitutes the other. In order to do this, each chapter is helmed by an individual author, lending his or her expertise to questions pertaining to subjectivity and social justice.
In Chapter 2, Sakenya McDonald demonstrates the ways in which critical psychology can come to inform psychology about the role of subjectivity in social justice issues. She focuses specifically on the role psychology and education have had on the creation of apathetic subjectivities through hyper-competitiveness and emphasis on personal worth determined by capital. This chapter grounds our concerns as localized within neoliberal capitalism, asking how it implicitly produces problematic subjectivities. This allows Sebastienne Grant to further discuss in Chapter 3 the ways in which psychology has contributed to the construction of subjectivities that are resistant to or hinder social justice. She takes up the argument that the field of psychology unintentionally contributes to constructions of modern Western subjectivities that are largely incompatible with the ideals, values, and goals of social justice. She argues that psychology could promote social justice by mindfully contributing to the construction of more socially just subjectivities. This follows the work of psychologists such as Philip Cushman and David Loy, who have claimed that modern subjectivities are marked by a deep sense of emptiness, resulting in personally and socially harmful traits and behaviors (such as individualism, materialism, narcissism, territorialism, and greed) aimed at covering over or filling up their lacking interiors. She contends that with intention and effort, however, psychologists can address the issue of the empty self and promote socially just subjectivities.
In Chapter 4, Bethany Morris considers the responses to social justice concerns at the industrial and organizational level, looking specifically at diversity and inclusion initiatives. She argues that such initiatives are ultimately conceived of through a combination of cognitive psychology discourses and neoliberal capitalist demands and are thus problematic for those interested in social justice concerns. She uses a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective to explore the construction and relationship to the Other that is reified in both cognitive psychology and diversity initiatives. A Lacanian perspective also allows us to consider how we might confront, consider, and be compassionate in the face of alterity in ways that does not demand assimilation into an exploitative capitalist system.
In Chapter 5, Chase OâGwin explores some of the problematic manifestations of social justice in popular culture as a way to explore social justice ideology and the symptoms that have arisen from it. This chapter will focus on two of the most prominent symptoms. The first goes by many names: the Tumblr Social Justice Warrior, the Facebook Activist, the call-out troll, and so forth, wherein social justice causes are seen as an opportunity for social performance rather than a chance for participating in actual activism. The second is the nature and status of being âwoke.â He investigates how these present symptoms have arisen, particularly in an age where Baudrillardâs predictions of a reality as simulacrum have already come to pass or have come perilously close to doing so. Furthermore, he advances the implications this has on the current social justice movement, exploring the problematic nature of symptoms as part of a social/cultural ideological injunction of âjustice for allâ that is impossible to meet. Finally, through the theories of Emmanuel Levinas, he considers some possible solutions to this predicament in social justice initiatives in contemporary Western society.
