Ontological Security and Status-Seeking

Thailand's Proactive Behaviours during the Second World War

Peera Charoenvattananukul

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9780367858179
• eBook ISBN: 9781000028010
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

How and why was it possible for a small state such as Thailand to challenge great powers France and Japan during the Second World War?

Putting ontological security theory into dialogue with status seeking approaches, Charoenvattananukul uses a case study of Thailand in the early 1940s to interrogate the dynamics and logic of a small state foreign policy. During this period, Thailand's foreign policy can appear to be surprising, if viewed through a lens of survival imperatives which would assume that passivity towards more powerful states is the optimal policy. As the majority of states are small- and medium-sized it is very important to understand the imperatives that drive such states, especially in their interactions with great powers.

In applying these frameworks to a small state, this book makes a unique and valuable contribution to the field of international relations theory. It will also be of great interest to scholars of twentieth century Thai history and of the Pacific Theatre of the Second World War.

Part I
Introduction and theory

1 Introduction

Introduction

The famous Melian Dialogue, which is a tale about how a great power such as Athens annihilated a small islandic state such as Melos, is widely cited as a textbook example of how power and survival assumptions trump any other considerations in international politics. A few scholars would ask how and why the Melians prioritised their sense of pride, honour, and prestige at the expense of survival. This book project follows a similar line of inquiry. It asks how and why it was possible for Thailand to challenge both France and Japan during the Second World War. As a small country, Thailand’s choices should be constrained by the survival option. The book suggests that the frameworks of ontological security and status concerns could further an empirical investigation of the selected case. This book argues that Thailand’s proactive behaviours towards the two great powers were driven by the concerns for status among the Thai elites and the will to be recognised as an equal nation.

Thailand has been considered a ‘small state’ since the modern international system has been exported worldwide in the late nineteenth century. Its diplomacy in relation to ‘great powers’ is believed to naturally adhere to a principle of flexible foreign policy (Likhit 1964; Corrine 1999; Pavin 2010). A ‘naturalised belief’ does not always conform to reality, however. The intent of this book thus is to explore such vagaries and redirect the study of Thai foreign policy in a new direction by examining the case of Thai foreign policy from 1938 to 1944 through the lens of contemporary International Relations (IR) approaches.

During wartime, Thailand pursued a surprisingly adventurous and risk-taking foreign policy vis-à-vis the great powers during this period as exemplified by how it waged war against France (1940–41) and how it disobeyed the Japanese directions (1942–44). From 1938 to 1944, Thailand sought to assert her position to become one of the great powers on the international stage. In other words, its wartime foreign policy was determined by its desire to become primus inter pares. This book seeks to understand Thailand’s proactive foreign policy strategy in this period, given its conventional wisdom of conducting passive and flexible foreign policy. Rather than interpreting the case study of Thailand’s wartime proactive policies by employing a conventional analysis of Thai foreign policy that prioritises material interest, this book introduces the concepts of ontological security, status concern, and recognition in order to better explain Thai foreign policy. It studies how past trauma shaped foreign policy preferences and choices of Thai policy-makers during the Second World War.

The remainder of this introductory chapter presents justifications for the case study by providing a historical background of the selected case study and an overview of the gaps in the literature. The chapter concludes with a discussion of methodology and research design.

Background

Situated in the central part of Southeast Asia, the geography of Thailand¹ has had strategic implications for great powers since the country’s initial exposure to the international system in the nineteenth century. A former U.S. ambassador to Thailand, Edwin F. Stanton (1954), once commented: ‘because of her geographical and strategic location, Thailand is the heart and citadel of the region (72). The choices of Thai foreign policy have been limited due to its geography.

Despite Thailand’s geopolitical significance, Thai foreign policy choices have not attracted much academic attention. This may be because most works on Thai foreign policy are inclined to characterise the nature of Thai foreign policy behaviours as ‘reactive’ as opposed to ‘proactive’. By the broad definitions of Palmer and Morgan (2011; Pongpisoot 2009), a proactive foreign policy corresponds to a policy with an objective to transform the status quo, whereas a reactive foreign policy is a policy which aims at preserving the status quo. Generally speaking, Thai foreign policy is understood to be formulated in response to immediate international events and to maintain the status quo. The tradition of Thai foreign policy is usually characterised as flexible and pragmatic, but reactive. Thai foreign policy decision-makers tend to have an internalised belief that the nation should conduct its diplomacy amidst the external pressures by accommodating demands of great powers in order to maintain Thailand’s sovereignty and independence. In the sphere of foreign relations, most observers see Thailand as having thus been generally ‘responsive’ and ‘reactive’ in appeasing prevailing powers to stabilise the existing status in the international system. The general understanding of the flexible position of Thailand almost becomes a cliché in Thai studies. For example, according to Pavin Chachavalpongpun (2010, 18–31), one of the most prominent scholars of Thai foreign policy, Thailand has generated foreign policies with the underlying rationale of reacting to international occurrences which might have an impact on the nation. To Pavin, Thai foreign policy decision-makers only break with the passive tradition from 2001 to 2006, which is the contemporary period of Thai foreign policy. Pavin’s opinion about Thailand’s traditional passivity is the received wisdom among Thais.

Is such a generalised explanation of Thai foreign policy behaviour valid across time and space in Thailand’s history? The answer is no. Relying on the characterisation of flexibility in Thai foreign policy and thus predicting that Thailand will be merely reactive and responsive in dealing with great powers encounters an impasse when a researcher travels back in time to the Second World War period. The case study of Thai foreign relations vis-à-vis the great powers during the premiership of Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram² from 1938 to 1944, which is the main emphasis of this book, renders reductionist approaches to Thai foreign policy problematic.

At first glance, applying the concept of flexible foreign policy to explain Thai behaviours on the eve until the end of the war is reasonably convincing. Nonetheless, on closer inspection, it is revealed that Thailand pursued proactive foreign policies towards both France and Japan. Its behaviours, which are to be discussed in the following sections, could be considered as an objective to transform the status quo. Their policies in relation to France and Japan were not subject to preserve any status quo. In this regard, their behaviours correspond to Palmer and Morgan’s (2011) broad definition of proactive foreign policy.

Thailand’s war with France

Prior to the Second World War, up until 1938, Thailand pursued a political agenda of reclaiming its lost territories from colonial powers such as Britain and France. In this period, it was rumoured among the British and French diplomats that Thailand had been influenced by Italian and Japanese fascism and hence was likely to pursue a course of expansionist policies in mainland Southeast Asia (TNA-FO371/22207-F4339/113/40³). The irredentist tendency in Thailand gradually became substantial two years before the Thais waged war against the French Vichy government from 1940 to 1941 in order to regain territories from France. And, prior to the Thai-French armed clash which took place in December 1940, France’s distrust of Thailand was more than real, and Thailand’s behaviours towards France were distraught and provocative even before the outbreak of the Second World War (Thompson 1940, 248). One historian notes that Thailand’s sense of irredentism was a ‘dormant sentiment hidden in the heart of every Thai leader’ (Kobkua 1995, 254). Similarly, Sir Josiah Crosby, the British ambassador to Thailand of the time, realised that the lost territories represented Thailand’s national quest for the last 50 years (Aldrich 1988, 214). Henceforth, Thailand’s aggression towards France was historically contingent.

The French and the British were worried about the tendency of Thailand’s expansionist aspirations well before the war broke out. The two European powers therefore sought a guarantee towards the Thai irredentist posture by proposing a mutual non-aggression pact in August 1939, and the agreement was signed in 1940 (Sang 1944) in order to ensure Thailand’s political neutrality in times of war. The French and British observed that discourses and sentiments among the Thais to reclaim their lost territories were gaining strength and thus concluded that it was in their best interest to take precaution against Thailand’s opportunism. Despite the conclusion of the pact between Thailand and France, however, the Thai-French skirmish between Thailand and French Indo-China borders escalated into a war between the small Asian country and the proud major European power in 1940.

How could Thailand decide to wage war against France’s Vichy government in late-November 1940? There are various explanations. A former governor of Indo-China, Alexandre Varenne (1938, 168–69), believed that Japan abetted Thailand’s drive towards expansionism. Whether the Japanese succour was premeditated is no central concern of this book. However, this explanation offers inadequate grounds to understand the Franco-Thai war. If this explanation was valid, the Thais should declare war on France when the Japanese forcibly demanded military bases from French Indo-China in September 1940. On the contrary, as will be shown in the empirical chapters, the Thai government opted for diplomatic routes until the crisis was escalated in November 1940.

A seemingly even more compelling argument is that the changing structure of the international system and French weakness were the reasons for Thai leadership to conduct an opportunistic foreign policy against France. In July 1940, France capitulated to Germany and relocated the government to Vichy. The French prestige and power dropped to a new low in an international arena. This situation offered a window of opportunity for Thailand to mobilise against France and her Indo-China colonies. The undeclared war between Thailand and France actually broke out in December 1940, however. Why did Thailand not resort to the use of force immediately after the fall of France? Why would Thailand wait for five months to initiate an armed conflict? Moreover, if Thailand was naturally passive and reactive towards arising situations, why, according to archival records, was Thailand acting aggressively towards French Indo-China even before the French reached her nadir? The puzzle here is thus: ‘How was it possible for Thailand, despite its inferior status in the international system, to resort to proactive foreign policy in relation to a much more powerful country such as France?’

Thailand and greater East Asian conquest

Another case in point, sequential to the border dispute with France, happened during the period of the Greater East Asia War (1941–1945). In accordance with the conventional approach to the study of Thai foreign policy, the Japanese presence in Thailand is viewed as Thailand’s flexible accommodation of greater powers (Buszynski 1982, 1037). Such an understanding enormously neglects the proactive role of the Thai policy-makers in joining and turning against Japan.

On the night of 7 December 1941, Direk Jayanam, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, was informed of the possible Japanese invasion. He was confident that the Thais would resist the Japanese occupation by all means as he told Crosby: ‘Siam would definitely put up a fight’ (Direk & Keyes 1978, 62). As the Thais expected, the Japanese ambassador to Thailand, Teiji Tsubokami, sent an ultimatum to the Thai government and expected a response within an hour. Japan offered three possible choices to the Thais. The first was simply that the Japanese require the rights of passage for the Japanese troops to Burma and Malaya. The second choice involved signing a defensive military agreement of alliance between Thailand and Japan, and Japan would aid Thailand if attacked by any third party. The last proposal was a robust Thai-Japanese military alliance. Additionally, Japan pledged to return territories that Thailand had lost to France and Great Britain in the nineteenth century (Direk & Keyes 1978, 64; Nuechterlein 1965, 73).

The Thais resisted the Japanese, and some lives were lost. Prior to any decisive agenda, the cabinet members also held a belief that by capitulating to the Japanese demands after the Thai patriots lost their lives trying to stall the invaders, Thailand’s situation might be sympathetic in the Western perspective (Pensrinokun 1988, 148). Eventually, the Thai government ordered a ceasefire as the cabinet decided to grant rights of passage for the Japanese troops provided that Thailand could maintain its sovereignty and independence. On this matter, Pridi Banomyong, Thai Finance Minister, stressed to Phibun that the Thai-Japanese negotiation should reaffirm Japan’s respect for Thai sovereignty and any co-operation should be limited (Pridi’s emphasis cited in Reynolds 1988, 312).

Despite the bloodshed from both sides, Phibun and his cabinet finally drove towards the Japanese arms. On 11 December 1941, a few days after the Japanese invasion, Thailand abruptly concluded another secret military agreement to become a formal ally of Japan. And, on 25 January 1942, Thailand formally declared war on the US and Britain. In conclusion, from 1942 towards the end of the war, Thailand was formally a part of the Greater East Asian War. In 1942, the Thai army crossed the border into Burma. From the outset, Thailand’s decision to join the war stemmed from Japanese pressure. Nevertheless, brilliant research by Eiji Murashima (2006), a prominent historian, contradicts the general belief that Thailand was forced by Japan to conduct a military campaign in Burma. In fact, according to Murashima, Japan was reluctant to assign Thailand’s military operations, and the Burma campaign was an effort by Thai policy-makers who inexorably pushed forward an agenda to participate in the war. Although Thailand pushed forward the declaration of war against the Allied powers and co-operated as a Japanese ally, the Thai government later turned against Japan in less than a year of the alliance.

Thailand’s wartime diplomacy and its subsequent survival from the severe punishments of the Second World War were viewed as a genius diplomatic masterpiece. The case study is often invoked to argue that bending with the tide in order to survive is a wise strategy. The flexible foreign policy approach fails to explain how policy choices and preferences were selected from aligning with and breaking from Japan. If the Japanese pressure and changing international structure factored in this case, why did the Thais formally aligned with the Japanese and why did the Thai leaders declare war on the British and Americans? And, as Murashima (2006) reveals, why did the Thais deliberately undertake the military campaign against Japan’s wishes? How could a flexible foreign policy approach make sense of such choices? The optimal choice for Thailand after the course of the Japanese invasion was to pursue a limited co-operative approach. After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the result of the Pacific War was uncertain. As such, it would have been wise for Thailand to restrain its relationship with Japan. However, the Thais at first became an eager Japanese ally, declared war on the Allied powers, sought to be part of the Axis, and participated in the military operations in Burma. But, within less than a year, Thailand’s diplomatic relations with Japan became frayed and the Thai elites surreptitiously turned against Japan.

The case study of Thai foreign policy from 1938 to 1944 thus represents a challenge to the ‘flexible foreign policy’ characterisation of Thailand in particular. In this period, Thailand attempted to reclaim its territories by challenging Europe’s great powers such as Britain and France which were more technologically well-equipped than Thailand. From late 1941 to 1944, the time which Thailand was under the clout of Japan, the Thai decision-makers were also rather expedient in dealing with the Japanese. Phibun first pursued a proactive foreign policy towards Japan. He then decided to break with Japan abruptly. Phibun’s foreign policy from 1938 to 1944, henceforth, poses a challenge to the studies of Thai foreign policy.

Conventional explanations of Thai foreign policy

As previously mentioned, the studies of Thai foreign policy have generally revolved around the received wisdom that Thailand has survived crises by adopting a flexible foreign policy strategy. This section reviews the literature on the approaches to explain Thai foreign policy and finds three competing explanations.

Flexible foreign policy approach

The dominant understanding in studies of Thai foreign policy is the ‘flexible foreign policy approach’.⁴ Most major contributions in this area concentrate on using this approach to explain instances in each period of time (Corrine 1999; Kislenko 2000; See examples of the works which follow the flexible approach from Kislenko 2002; Pensri 1984; Smairob 1980; Snidvongs 1960; Viraphol 1976). This explanation, as observed by Nattapoll Chaiching, has been picked up by Western scholars such as D.G. Hall (1968), Donald E. Nuechterlein (1965), and David Wyatt (2003) without questioning its tenability. Scholars who employ the flexible foreign policy explanation tend to perceive Thai foreign policy as reducible to its conduct with external powers. In this approach, the nature of Thai foreign policy stems from its tradition which has been characterised as ‘bending with the wind’, meaning Thailand conducts foreign policy on the basis of pragmatic calculations and always seeks to bandwagon with any prevailing powers in times of a security crisis, regardless of moral and reputational consequences. Likhit Dhiravegin (1974, 48) has metaphorically termed this as ‘bamboo diplomacy’. The reason behind this usage is because a bamboo naturally bends towards the direction of the wind.

Consequently, Thai IR scholarship has been mostly emphasising the importance of diplomatic history and historiography of how Thailand has preserved its sovereignty from time to time (Supamit 2007, 68). The implication is that the study of Thai foreign affairs does not need to employ a variety of IR approaches to interpret international political phenomena within the boundaries of the political science tradition. In this light, Nattapoll Chaiching (2009, 4) similarly observes that most of the scholarly works on the historical events of Thai foreign affairs reproduce a conventional narrative, descriptively and repetitively explaining how the Thai elites have naturally accommodated the great power demands for the sake of national survival. One expert on Thai foreign policy commented that almost ‘all textbooks on Thai diplomacy agree on the uncompromising objectives of Thailand’s foreign policy [which adheres to the principle of flexibility – my emphasis]’ (Pavin 2010, 64). The overwhelming dominance of this approach in Thai foreign policy discussion can also be further testified in the words of Chanintira et al. (2019):

Academics have commonly highlighted Thailand’s flexibility and pragmatism in its foreign policy otherwise labelled as “bending with the wind policy” and “bamboo diplomacy”.

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Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• Note on names and transcription
• Part I Introduction and theory
• Part II The origins of Thailand’s sense of ontological insecurity
• Part III Thailand’s two gambits
• Bibliography
• Index