Soviet Radioelectronic Combat

David Chizum

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367288372
• eBook ISBN: 9781000312683
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Radioelectronic combat (REC) embraces the entire range of possibilities for manipulating the electromagnetic spectrum to military advantage. Options include electronic warfare, physical destruction of electronic targets, signals intelligence, and radio-electronic concealment and deception. Developed in the early 1970s by the Soviets, it is still poorly understood in the West. This study analyzes REC as a method of warfare with which Western military thinkers must reckon seriously at all levels of combat planning. It also provides a solid base of information on REC's origins, functional structure, and basic military goals. Equally important, it defines REC's greatest threat as conceptual rather than technological. Manipulating the electromagnetic spectrum depends more on thoughtful planning and centralized control than on sophisticated equipment¡ further, the Soviets appear to be ahead of the West in integrating the concept as an institutional part of military activity. Based primarily on Soviet sources, this book not only traces the evolution of REC but also serves as a model for understanding the development of other Soviet combat concepts.

1
Historical Background

Use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum and How it Grew

Until just before the turn of this century, what is now called the electramagnetic spectrum, like outer space, stood virtually void of human intrusions. Until then, the only man-made presence in this intangible realm took the form of feeble light sources and a few unintentional radio frequency emissions, such as those from a tiny number of electric power generators and transmission lines. There was little hint of an impending onslaught of artificial energy in what had always been the exclusive home of rays generated by the stars and a handful of naturally radioactive substances.

Then one man, a British subject named Guglielmo Marconi, found a way to invade and exploit a part of that spectrum, using radio waves to carry communications without wires over long distances. Unfortunately, it was not long until mankind, characteristically, began to fight over what had so recently been virgin territory.

Although World War I saw the beginnings of largescale use of the electramagnetic spectrum for military purposes, the range of potential frequencies--from electroacoustic waves to visible light--for conveying signals is so great that at first it seemed limitless. Things did not really start to get crowded until World War II. Then, in the post-war years, filling the upper ends of the spectrum (with very high frequency [VHF], ultra high frequency [UHF], and micro-wave signals) increased at an exponential rate. Only in the last 20 years or so have its users fully begun to appreciate that the carrying capacity of the electramagnetic spectrum is finite, after all. Now many experts warn that burgeoning radio wave emitters--from CB radios to cordless telephones--may cause a glut of destructive interference.¹

Such gloomy forecasts have focused on unintentional interference, which is a potentially serious problem for military operations as well in any future major conflict. With the advent of ever more sophisticated weapons systems, military dependence on electronics has increased manyfold since World War II. The growth of complex weapons has brought a parallel demand for ever-expanding command and control communications and data links, all taking up space in the electromagnetic spectrum. Neither the Warsaw Pact nor the NATO nations have ever cane close to turning on the full capacity of their military communications resources, but the effect of mutual interference alone in such a case would likely be disastrous, at least in the more populated areas of Central Europe.

Early Russo-Soviet Developments in Radio Jamming

There is, of course, another aspect of military exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum. Enemies can tamper with, manipulate, or surreptitiously steal information from each other's signals. This element, intentional interference, adds a whole new dimension to an already formidable problem.

By all accounts, the Russian Navy had the first success--albeit an indecisive one--in intentionally interfering with the communications of a military opponent. It came in 1905, at the dawn of the radio era, during the Russo-Japanese War. As the Russian and Japanese fleets approached each other in the Tsushima Strait, an enterprising Russian captain, ignoring specific orders, used his shipboard radio sets--presumably in a noise-transmitting mode--to jam Japanese naval communications.² The impact of that innovation, however, was blunted by the Japanese victory over Russia.

By no means did the Russians and their Soviet successors stay in the vanguard of the military radio revolution during its early years, but they nevertheless maintained a keen interest in the defensive and offensive aspects of intentional communications jamming. In 1920, an article in the Russo-Soviet Naval Digest summarized knowledge of naval communications gained since the turn of the century. In it was a section entitled "The Struggle for Possession of the Atmosphere and Space," which dealt with radio j amming and the protection of friendly communications, two frequently recurring themes in current Soviet publications.³

Soviet Conduct of Electronic Hostilities in World War II

Electronic warfare, or what Winston Churchill called the "Battle of the Beams," was conducted by all major powers in World War II. The Soviets, put on the defensive in every way by the Nazi attack against them in 1940, were at first quite unprepared for the intensive German electronic blitz. Some Soviet commanders were gripped by "radio fear," a phobia which sought to prevent any type of enemy radio intercepts. Radio fear prompted overreactions which forbade the use of any radio equipment, thus complicating command and control procedures.⁴

It took considerable time for the Soviets to mount a credible response to German electronic warfare. In essence, they did it by copying the three main elements of German electronic tactics: radio intelligence (or communications intelligence [CCMINT]), radio disinformation, and a combination of jamming and destroying enemy artillery and aviation command posts and communications centers.⁵

Events at Stalingrad in 1942 turned the tide of battle in favor of the Soviets. This proved true not only on the ground but also on the electronic battlefield. It was there that the Soviets claim to have accomplished an historical first integrated use of the three elements detailed above.⁶ According to Soviet boasts, an unbroken series of radioelectronic successes followed, ending with the Nazi capitulation. Authors Paliy, Grankin, and Zmievskiy all affirm that the Soviet experience of World War II--or, as the Soviets refer to it, the Great Patriotic War--is still applicable in many ways to modern concepts of conducting electronic combat.⁷

Radioelectronic Combat Emerges

In the early 1970's, the Soviet military adopted a new concept in warfare, evolved in both terminology and doctrine from earlier Soviet ideas on the subject. It was also related to--but most certainly distinct from--its Western counterpart, electronic warfare (EW). The Soviets called it radioelectronic struggle (radioelektronnaya bor'ba). Common usage in the Western press has dictated a translation with a more military sound to it: radioelectronic combat (often abbreviated REC), the rendition used for this book. However, the Soviets' choice of the word bar'ba for their new concept merits special attention, which will come later. Briefly, however, struggle tends to signify the melding of ideology and military thought.

Integration stands out as the most significant point of the new concept. The word integrated, as used in the title of this book and as translated from numerous Soviet articles, has five specific meanings when applied to EEC:⁸

1. It means that REC has been adopted far use by all the services of the Soviet armed forces, subject to central direction, probably by the General Staff.

2. It portrays the combination of political ideology and military strategy into one unified concept.

3. It signifies that REC is an integral part of over all Soviet military doctrine.

4. It means that REC integrates all methods of manipulating radioelectronic emissions throughout the electromagnetic spectrum--including electro-optical and acoustic signals--into one inclusive system of military practice.⁹

5. Finally, it indicates that several of the component elements of EEC are employed simultaneously for maximum effectiveness.¹⁰

Although the Soviets are continuing to make minor refinements in the concept of radioelectronic combat, no major changes should be forthcoming in the near future. In the past decade (and especially in the latter half) it has become a firmly established and well-defined cornerstone of Soviet military thought.

Notes and References

1. Norman Black. Associated Press dispatch. "U.S. Communications Could Suffocate in Thickening Cloud of Radio Interference," The Sun [Baltimore, Maryland], 30 October 1983, sec. G, p. 1, cols. 1-3.

2. V. Grankin and V. Zmievskly, "From the History of Radioelectronic Combat (Ot istorii radioelektronnay bor' - by)," Military Historical Journal (Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal), No. 3, 1975, p. 84.

3. Ivan Ivanovich Rengarten, "On Radio Communications in the Navy (O radiosvyazi v voennom flote)," Naval Digest (Morskoy sbornik), No. 1-3, 1920, pp. 53-62.

4. A. Paliy, "Radioelectronic Combat in the Course of the [Great Patriotic] War (Radioelektronnaya bor'ba v khode voyny)," Military Historical Journal, No. 5, 1977, p. 11.

5. Paliy, "Radioelectronic Combat in the Course of the War," p. 11.

6. Grankin and Zmievskiy, p. 84.

7. Grankin and Zmievskiy, p. 88; Paliy, "Radioelectronic Combat in the Course of the War," p. 19.

8. Several Russian words can be translated "integrated." Some conclusions about the five meanings of integration resulted from analysis of Soviet writings on NATO electronic warfare. See the following chapter, "Methods for Analysis of Soviet Military Literature Used in This Study," for further details on the technique of "reverse analysis" used in making such determinations.

9. V. Pirumov and A. Partala, "Views on the Development of 'Electronic Warfare' Systems (O vzglyadakh na razvitiye sredstv 'elektronnoy voyny')," Naval Digest, No. 6, 1982, p. 86.

10. Pirumov and Partala, p. 86.

2
Methods for Analysis of Soviet Military Literature Used in This Study

Soviet Secrecy: The Problem

Probably since the first hieroglyphics were inked onto papyrus, military authors have been beset by a fundamentally unresolvable conflict. On the one hand, propaganda and indoctrination ask that military information be spread widely to persuade and instruct. On the other, security demands strict controls on the spread of that same information to protect what are deemed vital state secrets.

The Soviets, well aware of the problem, prefer to stress security. That presents a dilemma to Soviet officers, especially those with sensitive areas of expertise, who wish to advance their careers by publishing books or articles. Their only outlet for getting into...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• About the Book and Author
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Figures
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Translator's Note
• 1 HISTORECAL BACKGROUND
• 2 METHODS FOR ANALYSIS OF SOVIET MILITARY LITERATURE USED IN THIS STUDY
• 3 THE IDEOLOGICAL ROGTS OF RADIOELECTRONIC COMBAT
• 4 MILESTONES IN THE EVOLUTION OF RADIOELECTRONIC COMBAT
• 5 THE STRUCTURE OF RADIOELECTRONIC COMBAT: HOW IT IS ORGANIZED AND PROMULGATED
• 6 STRATEGIES FOR REC EMPLOYMENT
• APPENDIX ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOVIET LITERATURE RELATED TO RADIOELECTRONIC COMBAT
• GLOSSARY DEFINITIONS OF SELECTED TERMS RELATED TO RADIOELECTRONIC COMBAT
• BIBLIOGRAPHY