Peace and Ethnic Identity in Northern Ireland

Consociational Power Sharing and Conflict Management

Henry Jarrett

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138040090
• eBook ISBN: 9781351706629
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Consociational power sharing is often perceived to be the method of conflict management that is most likely to succeed in deeply divided societies. The case of Northern Ireland in particular is heralded by many as a consociational success story. Since the signing of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement in 1998, significant conflict transformation has taken place in the form of a considerable reduction in levels of violence and the establishment of power sharing between unionists and nationalists.

This book looks at what consociational power sharing achieves after its implementation – specifically, whether it can work to overcome existing identities in divided societies, or whether it simply freezes divisions. It argues that if consociational power sharing is facilitating a move towards a genuinely shared society, this would be demonstrated in the focus of the election campaigns of Northern Ireland's political parties, which would be almost exclusively based around socio-economic issues affecting the whole population, rather than narrow single identity concerns. However, the book claims that, on the whole, this has not been realised. Although election campaigns are today less strident than they were in the pre-1998 era, it remains the case that they usually foreground single identity symbolism, as it is this that resonates with voters. Whilst consociational power sharing has been very successful in reducing levels of violent conflict and facilitating elite level cooperation between unionists and nationalists, it has been much less successful in reducing divisions within wider society to facilitate a genuinely shared Northern Irish identity.

By establishing an important middle ground between consociational proponents and critics, this research will be of significant interest to students and scholars of ethnic politics, political sociology, conflict management, and divided societies more generally.

1 Ethno-symbolism

It is impossible to understate the role of ethnicity and nationalism as causes of division in many plural societies (see, for example, Guelke, 2012, p. 20). A clear example of this is the case of Northern Ireland, as whilst there is a religious dimension to its divisions, the major source of conflict is ethno-nationality between British unionists, who favour maintaining the present constitutional link with the UK, and Irish nationalists, who desire a united Ireland, although it should be noted that these ideals are not entirely universal within either community (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009a, p. 31). This chapter is structured by first exploring the key characteristics of nationalism and why it is such a significant phenomenon in plural, or divided, societies, by analysing the characteristics of ethno-symbolism. It then turns its attention to the origins of divisions between unionists and nationalists on the island of Ireland, from the plantation of Ulster in the seventeenth century, through to partition and the establishment of Northern Ireland in 1921, to the present day. Finally, an overview of unionism and nationalism is drawn, with particular focus placed on the political ramifications of these identities, including the ethno-symbolist characteristics of both. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical and historical framework that forms the foundation of this study.

Defining ethno-symbolism

Githens-Mazer (2006, p. 4) identifies three broad fields of theories of nations and nationalisms – modernism, primordialism and perennialism. First, the position of modernism is that the relationship between the state and the nation is fundamentally important, and that this is brokered by elites and/or state institutions, the purpose of which is to establish a unifying political identity within the state (Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 5). Smith (1998, pp. 22–23) draws attention to a number of defining characteristics of the modernist approach. He asserts that for modernists, the nation is a political community within a designated territory; it is a wholly modern product, ‘both recent and novel’; it is created and deliberately constructed by elites, who influence the masses to achieve their objectives whilst ‘possessing certain resources’; it is divided socially into a number of different groups; and, finally, the principles of the nation are to be found in citizenship and social communication. From these characteristics, Smith (1998) highlights various fields of the modernist approach which seek to explain the establishment of nations and nationalisms – the role of industrialism (Gellner, 1964); capitalism (Nairn, 1977); the state and nation (Breuilly, 1993; Giddens, 1985); political messianism (Kedourie, 1960); and invention and imagination (Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1990).

According to Hutchinson (1994, p. 6), modernists reject the position of primordialists that nations are shaped by distinctive cultural attributes and argue instead that modernisation has encouraged the rise of nationalisms, with nationalist elites inventing nations. Modernists such as Gellner (1983, p. 138, quoted in Hutchinson, 1994, p. 6) are, however, willing to concede the existence of some nations prior to the modern era – England, for example – but argue that this was ‘merely accidental’. Although there are many different explanations for the rise of nations and nationalisms within modernism, such as those identified by Smith (1998), all modernists agree that nations are invented by nationalist elites (Hutchinson, 1994, p. 7). The form of nationalism most associated with modernism is civic democratic political, which uses a threshold principle to determine whether nations are large enough to support a capitalist market economy and, if so, are entitled to claim the status of a self-determining, sovereign, independent state (Hobsbawm, 1990, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 121). Breton (1988, pp. 99–102, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 212) extends this definition by claiming that membership of a civic nation is determined not by ethnic attributes but, rather, in terms of citizenship. Civic nationalism is based on the type of nation created as a result of the French Revolution, and which flourished in Europe between 1830 and 1870, with Germany, Hungary and Italy notable examples from this time (Hobsbawm, 1990, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 121).

The second broad field of theories of nations and nationalisms identified by Githens-Mazer (2006, pp. 4, 5–6. See also Geertz, 1963; Grosby, 1995; Shils, 1995; van den Berghe, 1995) is primordialism. This approach suggests that the nation is either a result of enduring patterns of human culture, social and political organisation or is based on ‘otherness’ and/or a number of conceptions of genetic fitness, which are socio-biological in character. The pre-modern/modern divide within theories of nations and nationalisms is therefore irrelevant to primordialists, as it does not account for either of the aforementioned explanations of the establishment of nations. In defining primordialism, van den Berghe (1978, pp. 403–404, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 146) argues that not only is shared ethnicity and race important to bring about nationalisms and to establish nations, but so also is kinship, as ethnic groups were ‘inbreeding super-families for most of human history’. The form of nationalism most associated with primordialism is ‘ethno-linguistic’ (ethnic), with smaller groups entitled to establish their own states based on a shared ethnicity (including race) and/or language, which is in contrast to the civic vein of nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1990, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 121). Modernist and primordialist theories of nations and nationalisms are important, as they are considered to be polar opposites, with perennialist theories such as ethno-symbolism bridging the gap between them (Githens-Mazer, 2006, pp. 7–15, 86–87).

The third broad field of theories of nationalisms is thus perennialism, which Githens-Mazer (2006, p. 7) defines as the belief that ‘the phenomenon of the nation has occurred and/or recurred throughout history’ and is part of recorded history rather than part of the human condition or nature. He argues that in order to ‘(re)construct, (re)invigorate, or transform’ a community into a modern nation, some nations reach back to pre-modern era myths and memories of the collective, and these nations therefore bridge the gap between pre-modern and modern. Other communities utilise processes of ‘(re)discovery, (re)appropriation, (re)affirmation and (re)imagination’ in order to demonstrate their cultural or political legitimacy, which is necessary for their transformation into a nation. Smith (1998, pp. 22–23) identifies a number of defining characteristics of perennialism. The nation is ‘a politicised ethno-cultural community’ with common ancestry; it is enduring and immemorial, with a long history, and has its roots in a historic homeland; it is ‘a community of “the people”’ and therefore reflects their needs, with members possessing particular qualities; it is a seamless whole; and, finally, its fundamental principles are an authentic culture and ancestral ties. On this basis, ethno-symbolism fits within a perennialist approach to nations and nationalisms (Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 7).

Whilst recognising the importance of politics, Hutchinson’s (1994, p. 41, quoted in Smith, 1998, pp. 177–180) analysis of cultural nationalism argues that it is impossible to overlook the recurrent and continuous significance of culture. Hutchinson (1987, pp. 12–14, quoted in Smith, 1998, pp. 177–178) explains the cultural nationalist argument as being that ‘the essence of a nation is its distinctive civilisation, which is the product of its unique history, culture and geographical profile’, and the aim of cultural nationalism is to reunite the nation by reaching back to its creative life principle. As the nation is an organic entity, the state and its institutions are ‘accidental’ and a result of the processes of modernity (Hutchinson, 1987, p. 13, quoted in Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 86). Cultural nationalists are, however, keen to demonstrate that despite looking back to ‘a presumed glorious past’, their recurrent approach seeks to revive an ethnic historicist vision of the nation to construct a community which is both integrated and autonomous (Hutchinson, 1987, p. 34, quoted in Smith, 1998, pp. 178–179).

Hutchinson (1987, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 180; Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 86) also recognises the importance of memories and symbols in defining the nature and history of nations, and in attaching people to a particular nation, whilst reinforcing the role of historical memory. He makes three conclusions from his analysis of cultural nationalism (Hutchinson, 1987, pp. 29–30, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 178). The first is ‘the importance of historical memory in the formation of nations’ and the second ‘that there are usually competing definitions of the nation’, which are resolved by trial and error whilst interacting with other communities. The third is that, due to the significance ‘of their power to convey an attachment to a specific historical identity’, cultural symbols are central to group creation. Hutchinson (1987, quoted in Smith, 1998, pp. 179–180) thus repudiates any primordialist theories of nations and nationalism, and also distances himself from modernist positions, as he rejects the idea that nations are invented and instead emphasises the importance of reaching back to the ethnic past and the revival of cultural traditions, whilst stressing the significance of historical memory and religion.

Although supportive of the emphasis cultural nationalists place upon the significance of, for example, a unique culture and history, historical memory and the centrality of cultural symbols in explaining the creation of nations and nationalisms, Smith (1998, p. 180) criticises Hutchinson for focusing only on the movement back from the present to the (ethnic) past and argues for the need for this to be supplemented by an analysis of the movement forward from the past to the (national) present. To facilitate this, Smith (see, for example, 1986; 1998, ch. 8; 2009) formulated and founded the ethno-symbolist approach. Githens-Mazer (2006, p. 7) explains ethno-symbolism as recognising the modernity of nations, yet argues that some of the political and/or cultural characteristics of a nation pre-date this era. Furthermore, ethno-symbolists claim that some nations may in fact be ‘based on pre-modern cultural, political and ethnic groups, which are (re)constituted in a modern period as nations’. This shared ethnic past is rooted in the ethnic group or ethnie, defined by Smith (1986, p. 32, quoted in 1998, p. 191) as ‘named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and culture, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity’. At the heart of ethnicity is the ‘myth-symbol complex’ and the mythomoteur; this diffuses the myths, memories and symbols associated with the ethnic group across generations and through this group, which preserves and maintains the form of the group’s identity over time, and the ethnie is distinctive because of those myths, memories, symbols and values (Smith, 1986, quoted in Githens-Mazer, 2006, pp. 7–8).

Smith (1986, p. 198, quoted in Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 8) argues that national myths, memories and symbols must be meaningful and potent enough to unite and excite the nation politically or culturally. He also asserts that ‘the myth of a common origin in time and place’ is vital to ethnic communities, as it marks ‘the foundation point of the group’s history, and hence its individuality’, and identifies the importance of a collective name, association with a homeland, emblems, festivals, customs, and so on (Smith, 1981, p. 66, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 191; 2009, p. 25). Smith (2009, p. 25) outlines three general factors to explain the significance of these characteristics. First, they play a crucial role in shaping social structures and cultures, and in defining and legitimising a community. Second, they provide communities with distinctive symbols, such as religion, language and customs, which enable their differentiation from other communities, and divide ‘us’ and ‘them’. Finally, these characteristics have helped maintain continuity with past generations of the community, which has been enhanced by the acceptance of collective symbols such as anthems, flags and national holidays – the form of which remains largely fixed, despite the possibility of their meanings changing over time.

These symbols create and maintain communal bonds and contribute to a sense of national identity. Therefore, whilst ethno-symbolists agree with modernists that nations are active communities rooted in a particular historical epoch, they disagree with modernist approaches over their failure to link ethnicity to the formation of nations (Smith, 2009, pp. 20–21). Ethno-symbolists also repudiate primordialist notions of nation and nationalism formation, and focus instead on cultural affinities, shared historical memories and ethnic symbolism, rather than physical kinship ties (Smith, 1998, p. 192). There is, nevertheless, the possibility of the meanings of collective identities changing over time, with this influenced by ‘structural circumstances, strategic imperatives, and the social psychological needs of group members’ (Smithey, 2011, ch. 2). For example, in post-Good Friday Agreement Northern Ireland, some unionists report a change in their identity that has been brought about by former republican paramilitaries participating in a power-sharing government within the jurisdiction of the UK (Hancock, 2013, pp. 63–64). Examples such as this do not, however, suggest moves away from a particular ethnic identity but, rather, that changes can take place within it, whilst the salience of identities means that they are unlikely to ever be fully overcome. White et al. (2013, pp. 240–241) argue that divided societies such as Northern Ireland struggle to overcome identity conflict because different groups feel threatened by each other and cooperation between them demands inter-ethnic trust, which is often not present due to the narratives of ethnic identities reinforcing negative stereotypes about the ‘other’.

Ross (2009) explains why the culture and symbolism that ethno-symbolists consider to be so important in forming and defining nations and nationalisms often result in conflict in divided societies. He argues that it is not cultures or cultural differences that cause conflict, but that they are, rather, ‘the lenses through which the causes of conflict are refracted’ (Ross, 2009, p. 5. See also Avruch and Black, 1993, pp. 133–134; Eller, 1999; Posner, 2004). Ross (2007, quoted in 2009, p. 5) states that these differences result in cultural contestation, which intensifies when fundamental group identity issues are involved, often polarising participants. There are several ways in which this contestation is manifested in divided societies (Ross, 2009), which will be explored with a focus on their role in the Northern Ireland conflict. First, symbolic landscapes are significant to a group’s identity and include, but are not limited to, emotionally important public spaces and sacred sites, and representations in mass media, theatre and literature (Ross, 2009, p. 6). In Northern Ireland, the display of flags and emblems and the painting of murals are important ways in which both communities claim ownership of a particular area, establishing it as their own symbolic landscape (Bryan and Stevenson, 2009; Smithey, 2009).

Second, psychocultural narratives are emotionally powerful accounts of events that make judgements of the role of one’s own group and that of opponents, often alternating in portraying one’s own group as strong or vulnerable depending on the situation (Ross, 2009, p. 8. See also Kaufman, 2001). An example of this in Northern Ireland is unionists portraying themselves as triumphant over nationalists during the Twelfth of July commemorations of the Battle of the Boyne of 1690, when Catholic King James was defeated by Protestant King William (Smithey, 2009, p. 96), but vulnerable to what they considered to be an affront to their culture by nationalists during the 2012–2013 protests and riots against the decision to limit the flying of the union flag at Belfast City Hall (Devenport, 2012). Third, collective memories that blend key events, metaphors, heroes and moral lessons connect group members through time and space, and are recited as narratives which serve as group memory repositories (Ross, 2009. See also Devine-Wright, 2003, p. 11; Halbwachs, 1980; Kaufman, 2001). Examples include important historical events such as the Battle of the Boyne for unionists and the Easter Rising for nationalists.

Finally, psychocultural dramas are conflicts emanating from differing opinions of the history and contemporary identity of a group, and can focus on material resource allocation or cultural differences such as religion, language and popular culture (Ross, 2009, p. 12. See also Ross, 2007). The competing constitutional claims of unionists and nationalists over Northern Ireland constitute a psychocultural drama, with the former arguing that Ulster’s unique geography and history mark it out as distinct from the rest of the island of Ireland, whilst the latter dispute this (Morag, 2008). These areas of cultural contestation are important, as they demonstrate the ways in which ethno-symbolic characteristics of nations and nationalisms can result in conflict in ethno-nationally divided societies, and are significant to this study, as Northern Ireland is affected by many of these phenomena.

The island of Ireland – a divided society

Pre-partition

Despite Northern Ireland having existed as a political entity only since 1921, divisions have been present on the island of Ireland since well before the twentieth century (see, for example, Connolly, 1996; Kennedy and Johnson, 1996; O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, ch. 2). O’Leary and McGarry (1996, p. 54) note that nationalist history in Ireland began in 1169 with the first Norman invasion, which, as Clayton (1998, pp. 44–45) asserts, was authorised by the first and only English Pope wi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Ethno-symbolism
• 2 Politics in plural societies
• 3 Electoral politics in divided societies
• 4 PR-STV in Northern Ireland
• 5 Election campaigns in Northern Ireland
• 6 Consociationalism and conflict transformation
• Conclusion
• Post-Script
• Appendix
• Index