The Syrian Involvement In Lebanon Since 1975

Reuven Avi-ran

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367296438
• eBook ISBN: 9781000306187
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book is a comprehensive examination of the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese crisis. It focuses on the Syrian interests in Lebanon, the motivation of the Assad regime for intervening in the Lebanese crisis, and the pattern of Syrian actions in Lebanon.

1
Introduction: Origins of the Syrian Involvement in Lebanon

Historical Origins of the Concept of the Unity of Syria and Lebanon

In Arab-Muslim historical geography, the Syria and Lebanon of today formed part of a region called bilad al-Sham, or "the land of the north"— that is, the area to the north of the Arabian Peninsula, whose boundaries were the Taurus Mountains to the north, the Hejaz, the Gulf of Eilat, and the Sinai Peninsula to the south, the Tigris and Euphrates to the east, and the Mediterranean to the west. This region constituted a separate territorial-political unit under the rule of the House of Ummayya (661-750), and from then until the beginning of the twentieth century was part of various empires whose centers lay outside its boundaries. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a handful of young Christians in Beirut and Damascus, progenitors of the Arab national movement, gave the term bilad al-Sham and the ancient name Syria (whose origin was Hellenistic) a new, political significance. Following the massacre of Christians in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860, these people saw the solution to the problem of the Christian community in the replacement of the religious communal allegiances which fragmented the population with a secular Syrian patriotism based on language, culture, history, and an allegiance to the Syrian motherland. They regarded Lebanon as forming part of a larger Syrian entity, and the first Arab political platform, which was drawn up by a secret society of young Christians in Beirut in 1875, spoke specifically of "the grant of independence to Syria, in union with Lebanon"¹ (italics added). The idea of the unification of Syria and Lebanon was unacceptable, however, to the vast majority of the Christian population in Mount Lebanon, which preferred to continue to remain segregated from the Muslims by the communal framework and foreign protection which were embodied in the transformation of Mount Lebanon in 1861 into an autonomous province of the section of the Ottoman Empire controlled by the European powers.

The idea of the creation of a unified and independent Arab state in the Fertile Crescent gained a new actuality with the breakup of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. Feisal ibn-Hussein, who ruled Syria for a short period (1918-1920), and the activists of Arab societies who surrounded him² demanded the unification of Syria within its "natural frontiers," which the first Pan-Syrian Congress, held in Damascus on July 2,1919, defined as extending from the Taurus Mountains in the north to Rafiah and Aqaba in the south, and from the Mediterranean in the west to the Euphrates and the Khabur in the east.³ The Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan of today are all included within the boundaries of this territoiy, which the Syrian nationalists regard as a single entity or Greater Syria. Within this framework, Lebanon constitutes the western part of Syria,⁴ "Filastin" is the southern part,⁵ and Jordan the southeastern part.⁶ The idea underlying this concept of the Syrian nationalists is that all the Arab inhabitants of Greater Syria—or, at any rate, the great majority— belong to the same national group, and the religious and communal differences dividing the population have no political significance and ought not to be accorded any.

The political arrangements in the Middle East as they crystallized in the years 1918-1923 divided up the Ottoman Empire into separate parts and prevented the emergence of a unified Arab state in accordance with the aspirations of the Syrian nationalists. France received the mandate over Syria and Lebanon, and sought to strengthen the Lebanese entity, where it traditionally enjoyed the sympathy of the Maronite Christians, and to weaken Syria, where it met with opposition. The French therefore acceded to the request of the Maronite leaders, and on August 13,1920 founded the "State of Greater Lebanon," which consisted of the previously autonomous province of Mount Lebanon plus some other areas of a Muslim character: i.e., the city of Beirut, Tripoli and the north, Sidon and the south, and the Bekaa Valley. As against this, the French divided Syria into separate political entities: the "state" of Damascus, the "state" of Aleppo, the Jabal Druze, the Alawite province, the Jezira area, and Alexandretta. Whereas all these political entities with the exception of Alexandretta were finally incorporated into the Syrian state, Lebanon, which the Syrian nationalists classed in the same category as these "statelets,"⁷ developed into a separate entity under the rule of the French Mandate and afterward. It is hardly surprising that the Syrian nationalists and a large part of the Muslim population in the provinces annexed to Mount Lebanon refused to acquiesce in the existence of that entity, which they regarded as a product of "Western imperialism," and saw their separation from Syria as an arbitrary and unjustifiable act.

A striking expression of this sentiment of the Syrian nationalists is to be found in a newspaper interview given in the summer of 1985 by Dr. Georges Jabbour, an adviser to Hafez al-Assad and head of the "research bureau" in the presidential palace:

Syria and Lebanon, and—more than that—the whole bilad al-Sham, were a single area and to a certain extent still are a single area. I think that a Lebanese cannot be a true Lebanese if he does not recognize that Syria has a special task.... I am from the small town of Safita.⁸ The large town nearest to it is Tripoli and not Latakia, which is the center of its district. ... [One] of the strangest days in history was the day when Syria was cut off from Lebanon—economically cut off. The people of Safita did not understand this cutting off. The people of Safita and all the people of Syria used the Syrian pound and the Lebanese pound as if they were a single pound. I remember how my relatives worked together with the late Abd al-Hamid Karami⁹ to join northern Lebanon to Syria, for Syria was unified in 1936 and the states of Aleppo, Latakia, etc., were abolished. In that same year, a unified Syria was founded on the remnants of the states created by French imperialism. At that time, Christians and Muslims in northern Lebanon worked for the return of that region to its original condition— There can be no doubt that the two states are really one state, and, together with them, Jordan and Palestine.¹⁰ (italics added)

Under the French Mandatory regime, the Syrian nationalists refrained from turning the Lebanese problem into a bone of contention with France in order not to jeopardize their struggle to liberate Syria, and because they believed that, when Syria and Lebanon had gained independence, that would in any case lead to the disappearance of the "artificial frontiers" between them and to their reunification through a natural process. The irredentist aspiration (i.e., the desire for annexation) with regard to Lebanon still remained deeply rooted in the consciousness of the Syrian nationalists after both Syria and Lebanon had achieved independence, despite the fact that the Lebanese were careful to preserve their independence from Syria, and despite the fact that Lebanon's independence had been officially recognized by all the Arab states, including Syria, already in 1944.¹¹ The irredentism found expression in the inclusion of Lebanon within the political boundaries of Syria in maps printed in Syria in the 1940s and '50s,¹² and in the stubborn refusal of the Syrians to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon as is usual between two independent states, out of a fear that it might be interpreted as a recognition of the existence of Lebanon as a separate political entity. The official Syrian explanation for the refusal to establish diplomatic ties was that the relations between them were so close that there was no need to set up embassies in the two countries, as such an action could only imply a weakening in their relationship. This claim, of course, did not correspond to the reality since the relationship between the two countries since Lebanon received independence had been characterized by endless friction.

Since the Baath Party came to power (1963) and especially under the Assad regime, many Syrian leaders have laid emphasis on the special closeness between Lebanon and Syria, over and above the routine declarations about Arab unity. A remarkable expression of this theme is to be found in Hafez al-Assad's speech of July 20,1976 justifying the Syrian intervention in Lebanon. The Syrian president said:

Historically, Syria and Lebanon have constituted one state and one people. And for that reason they have genuine common interests and close relationships ... and this gives rise to a common security. This also gives rise to a close relationship between the peoples of the two countries. Thousands of families in Syria have branches in Lebanon, and thousands of families in Lebanon have branches in Syria.¹³

The Syrian foreign minister, Abd al-Halim Khaddam, however, gave a more specific expression of the Syrian annexational intentions toward Lebanon. When, at the height of the civil war, the country seemed to the Syrians to be in danger of splitting up,¹⁴ Khaddam told the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Ray al-Aam:

We shall not allow Lebanon to be divided. Any such step would necessitate our immediate intervention. Lebanon was part of Syria, and we shall reclaim it as soon as it actually attempts to split up. It should be made clear that we are referring to the four provinces¹⁵ and not only to the coast, and, furthermore, we are referring also to Mount Lebanon. Lebanon should either be a single state or else it should return to Syria.¹⁶

The Syrian Interests in Lebanon

The Syrian ambition of dominating Lebanon also derives from the mass of vital interests—security, military, and economic—which Syria has in that country. It could be said that the thirty years which passed from the time when Syria and Lebanon received their independence until Syria's intervention in the Lebanese civil war were one long series of frictions and disagreements, even if Syria, because of its weakness, did not make any real effort to carry out its ambitions in Lebanon, and Nasserist Egypt and not Syria was the country which played the key role there.

Syria's most vital interest in Lebanon, at least until Hafez al-Assad came to power, was its security interest. In view of the continuous struggle for power and the chronic instability which characterized Syria's political life until the period of Assad, the primary aim of all regimes which came to office was to preserve their existence and prevent the formation of an effective opposition against them. Their attention was therefore repeatedly focused on Lebanon and on its capital Beirut, which had always served as a center of conspiracy and subversion against the Syrian regimes. There were many reasons for this: Lebanon's proximity to Syria, the Lebanese tradition of political freedom and of granting asylum to political exiles, the relative freedom enjoyed by the Lebanese press, Lebanon's political weakness which facilitated the political activities of Arab states within its borders, and its pro-Western orientation which allowed the activities of the Western security services. All these factors created a situation in which rumors, intrigues, and machinations against the Syrian regimes had always flourished,¹⁷ and the latter tried to neutralize this center of subversion both by acts of violence against their opponents in Lebanon¹⁸ and by exerting pressures on the Lebanese governments (most usually threats and warnings, economic sanctions, and closing the Syrian-Lebanese frontier).

Syria also had vital military interests in Lebanon. Essentially, Syria aimed to change Lebanon from an "auxiliary front" whose practical involvement in the Arab-Israeli dispute was limited to the spheres of politics and propaganda, into a "direct front" which would form part of "a single front extending from Ras Naqoura on the coast of Lebanon to the port of Aqaba in Jordan."¹⁹ As a Syrian spokesman declared on April 9,1974, at the time of the war of attrition on the Golan: "Lebanon cannot be neutral in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Those who would ascribe such a character to Lebanon desecrate the will of the Lebanese people which regards itself as part of the Arab nation... and believes that what harms Syria harms itself and what harms Lebanon harms Syria, and the two states constitute a natural extension of each other."²⁰

From a practical point of view, the Syrians were especially concerned about the military weakness of Lebanon, which in their opinion was fraught with potential dangers for Syria in time of war with Israel. The Syrians feared that in a war the Israeli forces might outflank the Golan Heights from the west via "Fatahland" and the Bekaa Valley, or reach the Syrian industrial centers in the north (Homs, Hama) via the Bekaa. These fears grew stronger after the October War and the (Solan war of attrition and became real in the Lebanese War. In the introduction to the book The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, which appeared in Damascus after the Peace for Galilee operation under the auspices of Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass, the military advantages of the Bekaa for Israel were enumerated: "The Bekaa region permits the Golan Heights to be cut off from more than one direction, allows military efforts to be transferred to other fronts, and prevents the Syrian forces from attempting to strike at the Israeli forces in the Golan from Lebanon," Moreover, the Bekaa region "easily permits the war to be shifted to deep within the Syrian-Lebanese Arab territories without it constituting a genuine threat to the economic and military depth of Israel." In addition, from the lookout posts at Jebel el-Sheikh (Mount Hermon), and at Jebel Barouk and Mount Sarmine—which command the Bekaa—one can "directly monitor Arab movements on land, sea, and air through a combination of observation and listening."²¹

Until Assad came to power, Syria's weakness and the mutual suspicions and endless frictions between Syria and Lebanon prevented an ef...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Chapter 1: Introduction: Origins of the Syrian Involvement in Lebanon
• PART ONE: The Syrian Involvement in the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1976
• PART TWO: Syria's Failure to Turn Military Achievement to Political Advantage, 1977-1981
• PART THREE: Syria and the Lebanese War, 1981-1985
• PART FOUR: The Effects of the Lebanese Crisis on the Assad Regime
• Bibliography
• Index