Terrorism

Lewis M Alexander

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367289935
• eBook ISBN: 9781000314427
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The study of terrorism has now "arrived" internationally, as evidenced by the birth of a new international multidisciplinary journal, Terrorism; the proliferation of scientific conferences and papers; and the growth of university research and teaching on the subject. Historians, social scientists, lawyers, criminologists, administrators, and political leaders are showing an increasing awareness of the need for more informed scholarly analysis of the growing international incidence of acts of terrorism perpetrated by extremist groups of almost every ideological hue and in every continent.

Part 1
Overview

1
Out-Inventing the Terrorist

Charles Α. Russell Leon J. Banker, Jr. Bowman H. Miller

"What to do until the terrorist comes": in an unpublished paper so entitled, Robert H. Kupperman and Harvey A. Smith discuss a threefold plan of action involving an improvement in and acceleration of intelligence collection, the development and implementation of adequate physical security safeguards in critical areas, and above all the creation of a crisis management capability focused specifically upon the terrorist problem. Looking toward new and qualitatively significant changes in future terrorist operations, motivations, group structure, and tactics, these authors also argue "some continuing research and development expended on the invention of new terrorist schemes (and their counters) by imaginative official pseudoterrorists would appear to be a worthwhile effort."¹ It is toward this goal of "out-inventing the terrorist" that the present discussion is dedicated.

In examining the problem of terrorism as it may develop in the future, we approach the subject from three separate but interrelated points of view. The first, termed traditional analytical, is essentially that used in intelligence analysis. Utilized to examine the contemporary terrorist phenomenon, it proceeds from known capabilities to possible intentions, operates on and from an established data base, and is essentially pragmatic in nature. It focuses on the increasingly transnational aspects of terrorism, the groups involved in such activity, their capabilities, known intergroup linkages, motivations, and finally targets. From this springboard of relatively hard data, the second approach, termed speculative, reverses the capabilities-to-intentions progression and begins with an evaluation of optimum terrorist targets. It moves from this point into the areas of future terrorist motivation, capabilities, and finally the possible configuration of terrorist groups themselves. The final approach, called crisis management: nontechnical threat assessment, probes those informational areas wherein data must be sought and rapidly provided to the individuals responsible for decision making in the face of a stated terrorist threat to inflict high-order (nationally significant) disruption or destruction.

In applying the threefold methodology outlined above, the authors are aware of shortcomings inherent in each of the three approaches. From the traditional analytical point of view, the methodology tends to assume that "past is prologue." It is factbound in orientation, conservative in outlook, and tends to be nonpredictive. Recognizing, however, that the terrorists of the future may not be the same as they have been in the past, the speculative technique is used to counterbalance traditional analysis. But it, too, has drawbacks. Among these are its inability to prove conclusions based on hard data and a tendency toward "worse case" scenarios. The final approach poses questions as yet unanswered. These are, nonetheless, questions and avenues of exploration that must be addressed and carefully considered if we are ever to be successful in countering terrorism. Cognizant of the potential problems in these three approaches, yet desirous that this discussion be of some practical consequence, we have endeavored to meld the three approaches while intentionally weighing the scales toward reasoned analysis and away from creation of purely imaginative scenarios. In the final analysis, however, the discussion anticipates that significant qualitative changes will occur in future terrorist activity. In this light, it offers some basic guidelines as we begin the challenge of out-inventing the terrorist.

The Contemporary Phenomenon: A Traditional Analytical Assessment

Terrorist Groups

The roots of modern terrorism (we define terrorism as the threatened or actual use of force or violence to attain a political goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation,²) appear to lie largely in the rising tide of student and radical unrest so evident in most nations of the world during the early 1960s. From this almost international groundswell of dissatisfaction with then extant political establishments, various antiestablishment organizations formed, splintered, and eventually spawned elements dedicated to destruction of "the system." Terrorism, a means to an end, was the tactic primarily and sometimes exclusively employed.

National in composition, political orientation, and scope of operations (which are generally limited to the geographic confines of a single state), these "national" terrorist groups are epitomized today by organizations such as the Armed Proletarian Nuclei and the Red Brigades in Italy; the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Movement (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna—ETA) and the First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group in Spain; and the People's Strugglers and People's Sacrifice Guerrillas in Iran, among others. Also included in this category are the numerous terrorist elements in Latin America as well as those in Greece, Turkey, and South Asia and such groups as the Weather Underground and New World Liberation Front in the United States.³

In the late 1960s, terrorist group activities took a quantum leap from those purely national in scope to those involving operations across national boundaries, virtually anywhere in the world, often at great distance from the terrorists' homelands. Characterized by many authors as "transnational" terrorist groups, these small, highly professional and disciplined, tightly compartmented, and highly dedicated cadres capitalized quickly on the mobility afforded them by expanding international transportation and communication systems. Exploiting the absence of international agreement⁴ concerning the legitimacy of terrorism, such groups have operated literally at will throughout the Western world, utilizing sympathetic safe-haven states from which to launch and terminate their operations. In contrast with "national groups," they have no standard modus operandi and vary their techniques from aircraft hijacking and kidnapping to assassination, hostage-taking, stand-off attack, arson, and bombing.⁵ In brief, transnational terrorist groups have increased significantly the problems and frustrations of security and police agencies worldwide; it is all but impossible to determine with assurance where, when, why, or against whom their next assault may be launched. This unhappy realization in the first line of defense (intelligence) and the resulting complications in the security and crisis resolution phases of counterefforts coalesce to make the consequence of terrorism international.

Although the origins of terrorism itself probably antedate recorded history, the beginning of contemporary transnational operations can be traced directly to 1968 and a conscious decision by certain Palestinian elements to move the focus of their attacks outside Israel proper—to Israeli targets abroad where risks were least and Israeli vulnerability greatest. Thus, the 23 July 1968 hijacking of an El Al flight from Rome to Tel Aviv⁶ by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) represents the first application of the transnational "third country operation" concept in modern terrorism. Although a careful assessment of the potential available to terrorists through an expansion of their operations into an international arena of noncombatant nations should have been anticipated, few analysts foresaw the full impact of this development and the truly qualitative change it brought to the terrorist operational capacity.

Following the PFLP lead, the Black September Organization and other less well publicized Palestinian groups—as well as various non-Arab entities—moved into transnational activity. Among these were the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and remnants of the West German Baader-Meinhof group and Movement Two June. Almost all other transnational terrorists—working either as individuals or within their respective groups—have been affiliated operationally with the PFLP. The September 1977 presumably Iranian operation in France directed at the shah's sister may mark yet another entry into the transnational category.

In considering both national and transnational terrorist groups, most authors estimate there are approximately fifty such groups active today. Total action cadre⁷ ranges from one to three thousand persons. Within the purely transnational category, however, there are only seven to nine groups with total membership in the hundreds. In general, these entitites include the PFLP and its operational partners: the JRA, Baader-Meinhof/Movement Two June successor elements, and the apparatus directed by Venezuelan-born Ilich Ramirez Sánchez (Carlos). Also included are other Palestinian elements such as the PFLP-General Command, the Black September Organization, the Iraqi-based Black June and its Syrian counterpart Saiqa, as well as the IRA, the only group with no known firm operational tie to the Palestinians.

The worldwide mobility of transnational groups and the absence of significant international restraints on their activities has facilitated their operational capability. There is no hard evidence as yet of any formalized coordination of terrorist operations by the equivalent of an international board of directors—despite the inferences and conclusions of some commentators that behind the malady lies Moscow, which would appear to benefit from terrorism in the West. The existence of shared support apparats, the use of certain specialists and their expertise by more than one group, and occasional interchange of personnel are established facts. Thus, in 1970, handguns stolen from a U.S. Army facility in Butzbach, Federal Republic of Germany, subsequently found their way into the hands of Baader-Meinhof group members and ultimately were used by Japanese Red Army terrorists in the September 1974 takeover of the French embassy in The Hague. In a similar manner, explosives stolen in West Germany during 1971 apparently were used in the May 1972 Baader-Meinhof operations against U.S. Army facilities in West Germany. Grenades known to be in the hands of Baader-Meinhof members during 1971 later found their way into the possession of both JRA and PFLP cadres and were also used by the JRA in the September 1974 barricade operation in The Hague. Additionally, similar grenades moved from the hands of Baader-Meinhof members to the Venezuelan terrorist Carlos and were used in the 14 September 1974 attack on Le Drugstore in Paris.⁸

Cooperation among terrorist cadres in West Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Latin America also is a matter of record. During early 1974, ETA, a revolutionary Basque organization, dispatched one of its members to Argentina where he was trained in terrorist tactics and the construction of "people's jails" by the Revolutionary People's Army (ERP). That same year, the ERP loaned the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) 5 million of the 14.2 million dollars obtained from the kidnap ransom of ESSO Argentina executive Victor Samuelson.⁹ Countless other examples of limited but attested cooperation among similar groups can be cited. An examination of the Carlos apparatus alone sheds substantial light on the nature and extent of such intertwined linkages.

Terrorist Capabilities

Among national and transnational terrorist groups, the most crucial area of cooperation is in the training sector. It is here, in the shared instruction provided to various terrorist elements by the PFLP and previously by the Fatah, that a truly cohesive catalyst emerges, binding together otherwise seemingly diverse groups. In short, Palestinian training and its outgrowth provide what might well be called the glue holding together many of today's transnational and national terrorist elements. In a very real sense, these terrorists studied with the same faculty and are graduates of the same academy. Some first met one another in these schools. Here, directly or indirectly, they have learned their basic skills along with the sophisticated PFLP modus operandi, organizational structure, excellent security practices, and clandestine tradecraft.

Since its inception in approximately 1968, Palestinian instruction has been provided at least to the IRA, JRA, West German personnel from at least three groups, and to Turkish and Iranian terrorist cadres.¹⁰ In 1976, training also was given to at least fifteen members of the Dutch Red Help (Rode Hulp) in the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen.¹¹ Coupled with this group-level instruction has been training for various single terrorists including a number of Latin Americans. Notable among these have been the self-styled "super terrorist" Ilich Ramirez Sánchez and Patricio Arguello, a Nicaraguan killed in the September 1970 attempted hijacking of an El Al airliner by a PFLP team, which included Leila Khaled.

While shared training experiences have been an instrumental ingredient in the mortar binding together the various national and transnational terrorist groups, also important is the similarity in social, political, and philosophical backgrounds of these individuals. With few exceptions, these individuals conform closely to a relatively consistent profile.¹² They are, in the main, single, male, 22 to 25 years old (an increasing tendency toward younger recruits is evident of late), university-trained, reared in an urban environment, middle to upper class in social origin, and anarchist/Marxist in ideology (with a steadily increasing nihilist ingredient). While variations from this basic pattern obviously exist (among German groups, approximately one-third of the operational cadre are female while both German and Japanese terrorists are somewhat older than the 22- to 25-year-old norm), the pattern is remarkably consistent for virtually all groups regardless of national origin. Even in terms of education—a notable exception is the IRA—the vast majority of terrorists with university backgrounds have studied in the humanities or nontechnical fields. Minor exceptions occur, for example, among Iranian and Turkish terrorists where a number are technicians, engineers, and physical scientists.

Terrorist Motivation

Although separatist and nationalist objectives are important motivators for the Palestinians, the IRA, and ETA, almost all terrorist groups active today either find or rationalize their raison d'être in Marxist ideology or anarchist schools of thought. Also evident in many groups is an accelerating trend toward nihilism.¹³ The few operative right-wing organizations such as Creation nationalists, Ordine Nero and Ordine Nuovo in Italy, and counterterrorist forces of the right in Spain and Latin America are the obvious exceptions.

If the sociological profile outlined above is representative, the link between Palestinian "national liberation" objectives and the political aims of like-thinking non-Arab groups is obvious. As a result, the close relationships that have grown between George Habbash's PFLP and the groups or individuals it has trained and used in operations are not difficult to understand. Suffice it to say that groups receiving PFLP training have benefited significantly. In return, the PFLP has increased its pool of personnel available for use in transnational operations while at the same time raising the level of terrorist activity generally. In keeping their end of the bargain—and probably as a form of quid pro quo—shortly after completion of their training, the JRA, Turkish groups, Latin Americans, and Germans all have attacked targets selected purely from a Palestinian viewpoint. The May 1971 assassination of Israeli Consul General Ephraim Elrom in Istanbul by Turkish terrorists, the JRA May 1972 assault at Lod Airport, and German terrorist attacks on Israeli facilities in Frankfurt and Berlin are all evidence of this "payment" procedure.¹⁴

In addition to the abovementioned "proxy type" operations carried out by PFLP-trained national groups, a joint PFLP cadre of terrorists (joint in the sense of nationality) also has developed. This cadre can consist of separate groups performing various phases of an operation as in the Baader-Meinhof/Carlos/JRA cooperation in the September 1974 assault on the French embassy in The Hague or the late 1976 Dutch Red Help intelligence-gathering operation conducted for the PFLP against the Air France route between Paris, Tel Aviv, and Bombay.¹⁵ The cooperative cadre also can take the form of mult-national operational teams. Since 1970, when the Nicaraguan Patricio Arguello and PFLP member Leila Khaled worked together in the attempted hijacking of an El Al flight, the following joint operations involving the PFLP have taken place:

• May 1972: JRA/PFLP/German collaboration in attacking Lod Airport, Israel.
• July 1973: PFLP/JRA/Latin American cooperation in hijacking a Japan Airlines 747 in Europe.
• January 1974: PFLP/JRA operation against Shell Oil facilities in Singapor...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• The Contributors
• Part 1 Overview
• Part 2 The Causes
• Part 3 The Perpetrators
• Part 4 The Issues
• Part 5 The Future
• Selected Bibliography
• Index