The Soviet Union In The Third World

Carol R Saivetz

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367296179
• eBook ISBN: 9781000305890
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

This book examines the crucial role that Soviet policy toward the Third World played in Soviet efforts to influence the development of the international system in competition with the United States. It traces the evolution of Soviet policy toward the Third World.

Chapter 1
The Evolution of Soviet Policy Toward the Third World

Roger E. Kanet

At the beginning of the 1980s, many observers maintained that the Soviet Union had achieved such dramatic successes in its policies in the Third World¹ in the preceding decade as to mark a qualitative shift in the relative positions of the USSR and the United States in their competition for influence throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A listing of only the most important Soviet "victories" included the unification of Vietnam under a Soviet-backed communist regime; the establishment of Soviet-oriented communist governments in Laos and Kampuchea; the creation of self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist states (in most cases with at least some Soviet military support) in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan; the development of Marxist regimes in Benin, Congo, and Madagascar; and the increasing influence that Cuba and other Soviet dependents were able to play in the so-called Nonaligned Movement.² From the Soviet perspective, these successes were but evidence of the "changing international correlation of forces" and resulted from both the growing nuclear and conventional military capabilities of the USSR and the insoluable conflicts between the interests of the industrialized West and the developing countries.

The Soviet accomplishments of the 1970s, however, have not been matched by comparable gains in the 1980s. In fact, from the perspective of Moscow, the roster of "losses" and disappointments suffered since the beginning of the decade must be disconcerting. In the Middle East serious setbacks had occurred already in the 1970s, when the Soviets lost their major ally, Egypt, and were frozen out of the peace process and forced to focus their efforts increasingly on peripheral actors such as South Yemen, the PLO, and Libya. Following Egypt's foreign policy reorientation, even their major client, Syria, complicated the Soviets' position in the 1980s by attempting to eliminate Yasir Arafat's wing of the PLO. Although the Soviets welcomed the collapse of the US position in Iran when the Shah was overthrown, the implacable hostility of Khomeini toward the USSR has prevented the latter from benefitting substantially from past US failures.³ And, after more than eight years of direct military intervention in Afghanistan, Moscow is withdrawing its troops, without leaving the local clients firmly in control.⁴

In Sub-Saharan Africa the dramatic Soviet gains of the 1970s in countries such as Angola and Ethiopia have been followed by a less dramatic, but still significant, decline in Soviet relations—even with some of its closest Marxist-Leninist allies.⁵ In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Soviet expectation that the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the leftward shift in Jamaica and Grenada would be precursors of the further undermining of US influence in the region have yet to be fulfilled—in part because of the US intervention in Grenada and changes in the political and military situation in El Salvador resulting from a shift in Washington's policy.⁶ And in Southeast Asia the efforts of their Vietnamese allies to pacify Kampuchea remained a major impediment to renewed Soviet efforts to normalize relations with China, although the expansion of Soviet military facilities in Vietnam is an important component of the growing military strength of the USSR in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Yet, Soviet political influence in the Far East has not matched the dramatic extension of its military power.

In outlining the negative side of Soviet relations with the Third World since the beginning of the decade, Harry Gelman has stated:

. . . there is evidence of a variety of Soviet disappoinments and frustrations in the Third World, particularly over the last five years and in some cases going much further back, and there is also evidence that at least a somewhat more sour and chastened mood has evolved in Soviet thinking in response to this experience.⁷

However, the problems and disappointments of Soviet policy in the Third World in recent years deals with only one side of the relationship. It is essential to recall, as well, the shift that has occurred over the past three decades in the Soviet role in the Third World. The power base from which Mikhail Gorbachev and his colleagues operate is immeasurably stronger than that which Nikita Khrushchev inherited from Stalin in 1953 or that which Leonid Brezhnev took over from Khrushchev eleven years later. The Soviet Union in the late 1980s is a global power with interests that stretch across most of the developing world. It has also managed to create a power projection capability—primarily of a military nature—that enables it to affect developments in regions where, only a short time ago, Soviet behavior was irrelevant to the outcome of events.

In this chapter, we shall be interested especially in examining the crucial role that Soviet policy toward the Third World played in Soviet efforts to influence the development of the international system in competition with the United States. As a part of that examination we shall trace the evolution of Soviet policy toward the Third World, with special consideration given to the factors that appear to have been most important in determining Soviet policy, of the relevance of the Third World to overall Soviet policy, and of the influence that Third World allies/clients have apparently exercised on the evolution of Soviet policy.

Soviet Policy from Stalin to Brezhnev

Soviet policy in the developing world in the years since the Second World War can be divided into at least three sub-periods, based on the Soviet capabilities and behavior.⁸ Almost immediately after the end of World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States found themselves in a struggle for influence that focused initially on Europe. Within a few years the Soviets managed to create along their Western borders a zone of dependent states which they effectively dominated; in Asia, communist parties allied to Moscow came to power in North Korea, China, and North Vietnam prior to Stalin's death. Despite the increase in influence in the regions bordering Soviet territory and the growth of Soviet military power during the decade after World War II, when Stalin died in 1953, the USSR was still substantially inferior to the United States in its ability to influence events in the international system. It remained a regional power whose major international competitor commanded far superior resources and, with its allies, dominated the international system politically, militarily, and economically.

Postwar Soviet expansion had played a prominent role in stimulating the creation of an American-centered system of alliances in Europe and Asia oriented toward containing the further extension of Soviet power and influence. As a result of this alliance system, US military forces were stationed around virtually the entire periphery of the Soviet-dominated communist world, from Germany in the West, through the Middle East, to Korea and Japan in the East. Not only had the United States greatly expanded its political, economic and military role in international affairs in the years since the Second World War, but its British and French allies remained global powers with interests and capabilities scattered throughout most of Asia and Africa.

With the exception of its political and economic contacts with other recently-established communist states, the Soviet Union remained isolated from the remainder of the international community. Thus, in the eyes of its leaders the Soviet Union was still a beleaguered bastion of socialism surrounded by a hostile, and militarily superior, capitalist world dominated by the United States.

During this same period, the last eight years of Stalin's rule, the Soviets were preoccupied with reconstruction of their war-ravaged economy and consolidation of their control over areas that had come under the domination of the Red Army in 1945. With only few exceptions, little attention was given to the colonial areas of the world that were soon to evolve into what we now refer to as the Third World.

In the second period, the post-Stalin leadership initiated significant changes in the overall policy of the Soviet state toward the outside world. In Europe efforts were made to reestablish relations with Yugoslavia and to reduce the level of tension in East-West relations. "Peaceful coexistence" replaced the "two-camp" thesis as the foundation of Soviet relations with the members of the NATO alliance in part, at least, to reduce the isolation of the Soviet Union and as a prelude to an eventual Western recognition of the existing political realities in postwar East-Central Europe. In its policies toward the developing world, the new Soviet leadership introduced comparable innovations. No longer were countries such as India and Egypt viewed as mere appendages of Western imperialism, but rather as independent states whose interests overlapped in many areas with those of the Soviet Union and the other members of the redefined "Socialist Community."⁹

Under Khrushchev's leadership the Soviets initiated their attempt to expand their overall role in international affairs. In the Middle East, for example, the beginnings of Soviet military and economic support in Afghanistan, Egypt, and later in other radical Arab states, effectively challenged Western dominance and reduced Soviet isolation in that region of strategic significance for Soviet security. The wave of decolonization that swept over Africa in the decade after Ghanaian independence in 1957 found the Soviets willing to provide assistance to a variety of new African states. The attempted deployment of missiles in Cuba in the fall of 1962 was probably the high point of Khrushchev's efforts to challenge directly the dominant position of the United States in the international system; however, it also indicated most dramatically the continuing inferiority of the position from which the Soviet Union was operating.

In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union still lacked the economic, military, and political capabilities necessary to compete effectively in most regions of the world. The United States commanded substantial strategic superiority, and this superiority forced the Soviets to move especially cautiously—and even to retreat—in situations of direct conflict such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. Moreover, the absence of an effective Soviet capability to project conventional military power outside its own area of control meant that Soviet leaders had great difficulty in supporting clients or allies in areas outside the core region of Soviet power. In 1956, for example, it was primarily US opposition to the joint British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt—not Soviet threats to intervene—that brought the Suez War to a conclusion. In 1960, the closing of the airport in Leopoldville by U.N. officials in the Congo effectively cut off Soviet support for the forces of Patrice Lumumba. In the mid- to late 1960s Soviet-oriented political leaders in several African countries were overthrown with virtual impunity. In sum, in this period, the Soviet Union was unable to provide the type of effective support that would permit it to stabilize the Third World regimes that it viewed as friendly and generally supportive of Soviet interests.

The Khrushchev era in Soviet politics witnessed a major break from the past in terms of the expansion of Soviet interests and the attempt of the USSR to play a greater role in the international system. However, the results of this change in orientation were mixed. Even though the Soviet Union had begun to close the military gap between itself and the United States and had established the foundations for the development of relations with a number of Third World countries—and was, therefore, no longer isolated—these relations remained fragile and provided the Soviets with few concrete returns on their investment of support. Moreover, the Soviet empire itself was beset with serious internal fissures. The Albanians and Chinese had already withdrawn completely from the Soviet-oriented "Socialist Community"; in addition, the Romanians successfully resisted Soviet pressures to follow a joint line in foreign affairs, and other East European countries were experimenting with their domestic political and economic systems. The accession of Cuba to the Soviet network of states and the reduction of the Western monopoly of contacts with the Third World states, though clearly beneficial to Soviet interests, did not balance these losses.

In late 1964, as the Brezhnev leadership team came to power in the Soviet Union, the position of the USSR in the noncommunist international system was significantly stronger than it had been a decade earlier. Still, the USSR remained primarily a regional power. Its interests and, in some cases, its commitments had expanded beyond the confines of Stalin's empire, but inadequate capabilities severely limited its ability to affect significantly events in other areas of the world. It was not until the 1970s that the third phase began.

Even prior to Khrushchev's overthrow, several developments had occurred that would prove to have a major impact on the growth of the role of the Soviet Union in the international system in the 1970s. The first of these which would prove to be of great importance for the expansion of the Soviet role in international affairs related to the collapse of the European colonial empires and the "radicalization" of many of the newly independent states. Conflicts of interest between the industrial West and the less-developed countries provided the Soviet leadership with possibilities to expand their involvement in countries or regions that earlier were closed to them. Related to this was the reduction of Western power—and involvement—in much of the Third World, as evidenced by the British withdrawal from the regions "East of Suez."

More important was the initiation by the early 1960s—reinforced by the debacle of the Cuban Missile Crisis—of a program of military buildup in both the nuclear and conventional arenas and the Soviet military expansion into areas that until that time were outside the range of Soviet military capabilities. Initially the Soviets emphasized their strategic nuclear capabilities, in order to offset the superiority of the United States that still existed at the beginning of the 1960s. During the early years of that decade efforts were made to assure the survivability of Soviet nuclear forces with the construction of reinforced missile silos, the placing of missiles at sea, and the development of a first-generation missile defense system. By the mid-1960s, the Soviets were making progress in increasing their own strike capabilities and at the end of the decade had reached something approximating strategic parity with the United States.¹⁰ Since the beginning of the 1970s, therefore, the strategic nuclear power of the United States has been largely neutralized by countervailing Soviet strategic capabilities. This "balance of terror" has provided the Soviets with an international strategic environment in which they have been able to employ their expanded conventional military—as well as political and economic—capabilities in ways that they view as conducive to the protection and expansion of their own state interests. Far from making conventional military capabilities obsolete, as some Western commentators had argued during the 1960s, the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers has in fact reestablished an environment in which conventional weapons can be employed—at least in certain circumstances.

Besides the expansion of Soviet strategic capabilities begun in the Khrushchev era and continued until the present, the Soviets have also built up their conventional military capabilities—both in Europe and throughout Asia and Africa and even Latin America—to the point where they are now capable of projecting power throughout a substantial portion of the world. Among the most important aspects of this development has been the construction of both an ocean-going navy and a worldwide merchant fleet that also engages in military-related reconnaissance. Although the development of the Soviet fleet became most visible only after Khrushchev's fall from power, the decision to develop a surface fleet was made prior to the Cuban missile crisis.¹¹ By the 1970s, the Soviets had created a naval capability that permitted them to play an important military role in various international crisis situations, such as the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the Middle East War of 1973, and other conflicts.¹²

Moreover, they had also created a network of agreements with a number of less developed countries (LDCs) that gave them access to the naval facilities necessary for the maintenance of this new ocean-going fleet. The production of long-range transport aircraft and the signing of agreements for overflight rights and the use of landing facilities provided an important complement to the expanded naval power.¹³

Another important aspect of the expansion of the Soviet Union as a global power in the post-1970 period has been the continuing commitment of the Soviet leadership to the extension of the Soviet role in world affairs. In the mid-1970s, for example, the Soviet minister of defense enunciated the broadened view of the role of the Soviet military when he stated that "the historic function of the Soviet armed forces is not restrict...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1 The Evolution of Soviet Policy Toward the Third World
• 2 The Soviet Union and the National Liberation Movements
• 3 The Role of Soviet Military and Economic Aid in the Third World Under Gorbachev
• 4 Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East from the Invasion of Afghanistan to the Rise of Gorbachev
• 5 Soviet Policy in Latin America Compared to Other Regions: Trends, Opportunities, and Constraints
• 6 The Soviet Union and the War in Afghanistan
• 7 The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa: A Balance Sheet
• 8 The Soviet Union and Northeast Asia
• 9 The Future of Soviet Policy in the Third World
• 10 Conclusion: The Soviets in the Third World
• About the Contributors
• Index