The Cuban Revolution

25 Years Later

Georges A Fauriol, Juan Carlos Weiss, Hugh Thomas Of Swynnerton, Hugh S. Thomas

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367291112
• eBook ISBN: 9781000315738
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

January 1984 marked the 25th anniversary of Fidel Castro's emergence to power. The Cuban Revolution: 25 Years Later is a product of the CSIS Cuba Project, a long-term effort to focus public as well as policymaker's attention on Cuba-related affairs. The lead author, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, is the dean of political-historical studies on Cuba, and author of the encyclopedic Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. A great deal of myth surrounds the evolution of Cuba since Castro's emergence to power over 25 years ago. Some of this myth is the product of official Cuban propaganda; some of it is also due to a generally misinformed American public. Sifting through available data to distinguish between fact and fiction, this book evaluates broadly the impact of Castro's regime on Cuba itself. Based on the findings of the CSIS Cuba Project, the book draws on the assessments of 18 top Cuban specialists on the political, economic, cuiturai, and social development of Cuba since 1959. In contrast to democracies such as Costa Rica, the equalization of society that has taken place under Castro's leadership has been accomplished by redistributing existing resources, not by creating new wealth. Moreover, the authors conclude that in politics, culture, and the economy, Cuba under Castro has become and remains rigid, stagnant, enormously militarized, and ideologically absolutist.

1
Background

Since 1959 and under the leadership of Fidel Castro, Cuba has become the first Communist state in the Western Hemisphere. To the tragic surprise of many, who before 1959 had looked favorably upon Castro and the struggle against Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista, the Cuban revolution changed direction abruptly soon after Batista fell. Promised social and democratic reform based on the Cuban Constitution of1940 never materialized. Instead, Cuba was radically and systematically transformed into a self-styled Marxist-Leninist dictatorship, closely allied with and dependent upon the Soviet Union for survival—a model for the promotion of international revolutions.

Yet in the first few days of 1959, amid the confusion following the collapse of Batista’s government, few could have predicted Cuba’s ensuing transformation. Indeed, prior to Batista’s fall there is little evidence that even the leaders of the various anti-Batista groups, including Fidel Castro, understood the precise nature of coming events.

Cuban Nationalism

The major motivating factors in the anti-Batista revolution were, undoubtedly, nationalism and the sense that only by violent means would Batista either reform his government or step down. Nationalism was a vibrant force in Cuba stemming back to the long period under Spanish colonialism. Cuba’s greatest heroes, including many well remembered today—for example, José Marti—were all great nationalists who fought for independence from Spain. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, Cuba received its independence from Spain but then became in effect a dependency of the United States. Although the more onerous terms of U.S.-Cuban relations were discarded by Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United States has remained, by and large, the focus of Cuban nationalism during most of the twentieth century.

At one time relatively popular in Cuba, Batista lost much domestic and international support after he overthrew the democratically elected Cuban government in 1952. His corrupt practices cost him support, and his position was further eroded by underestimating the strength of his opposition while overestimating his own popular appeal. Thus in 1954, Batista committed a crucial error by granting general amnesty for political crimes. Fidel Castro was among those released. When Batista finally realized the threat to his government his responses were too little, too late, and generally self-defeating. Repressive measures drove great numbers into the opposition’s camps and discredited the regime. This cycle ultimately led to Batista’s collapse, but was resumed once again after Castro seized power and installed an even more efficient dictatorship.

The Influence of Communism

For the most part then, formal ideology played a minor role in motivating the “anti-Batistianos.” There is little evidence that communism, for example, had a significant role in Batista’s overthrow. Few of the many guerrilla groups, including Castro’s 26 July Movement, were clearly ideologically oriented toward communism 01* supported by either the well-organized Cuban Communist party—known as the Popular Socialist Party (PSP)—01* the Soviet Union.

Although in 1961 Castro claimed he had long been a Marxist-Leninist, on many occasions prior to 1961 he had made contrary claims. In fact, until 1958, he and the PSP were.frequently at odds with each other. Castro condemned the PSP for selling out and participating in Batista’s government. The PSP in turn opposed what they termed the “putschist” tactics and bourgeois objectives of the 26 July Movement. Furthermore the Soviet Union, backing the PSP, demonstrated no interest in Castro’s group.

Castro: Perceptions and Deception

Castro and his followers were perceived in generally positive terms in the United States. As as result of highly favorable media coverage and his formidable public relations skills, Castro became something of a folk-hero in the United States and elsewhere. Although vague in specifics, the tone of Castro’s proposed policies prior to 1959 gave no indication that traditionally close U.S.-Cuban relations would deteriorate under a Castro regime. Among his promises, Castro proposed early elections, diversification of Cuba’s economy with U.S. assistance, and moderate social and political reforms based on the Cuban Constitution of 1940: opening up the political system, eliminating illiteracy, raising health and welfare standards, and curbing corruption and governmental repression. The only mention he made of nationalizing industry was to point out its impracticality. These promises allowed Castro to gather the support necessary to obtain power, which once obtained was quickly turned against many who had helped him achieve it.

Castro’s enormous popularity rested on his charismatic role as the articulate guerrilla leader who, from his mountain headquarters, led the anti-Batista struggle. Yet Castro’s strength was not as a military leader, but as a shrewd politician. He defeated Batista through political rather than military maneuvers—a public relations defeat. Batista was hurt more by the several well-publicized desertions of officers and enlisted men than by the few military engagements that actually took place. There were no major confrontations between the rebel forces and Batista’s army in the period leading to the collapse of his government. Batista’s army, in fact, was still largely intact, though demoralized, when he fled Cuba with most of his senior officers on New Year’s Eve 1958.

1959: The Emerging Dictatorship

In January 1959, Castro quickly emerged as the most powerful and popular leader. Immediately thereafter the social-democratic nature of the movement began to erode while Castro’s character became increasingly clear. In the first days of the Castro regime, his political power rested both in his substantial popularity and his control of the rebel army. Using both power bases Castro consolidated his position cautiously but systematically. Moderate members of the early “provisional” revolutionary government were totally powerless, and they either resigned in protest over the charade of authority or they were dismissed.

It did not take long for the extremist character of Castro’s machinations to become clear. A ruthless but effective political opportunist with demonstrated ideological fluidity, Castro’s primary passions were, and remain, unchallenged personal power, a sense of historical self-importance, and extreme Cuban nationalism.

Under Castro’s guidance Cuban society was shaken violently, executions of political suspects became frequent, show trials of former government officials were televised, censorship was imposed, and dissent was crushed. The role of Cuban Communists in Castro’s government increased greatly. Contacts were established with the Soviet Union while threats and polemics were exchanged with the United States. The Bay of Pigs invasion afforded the Castro regime an opportunity to generate military and political capital. Castro was then able to eliminate much of the remaining opposition in Cuba and consolidate his ties with the USSR.

The record of Cuban-U.S. relations inevitably encouraged Castro to redress, at least partially, some of Cuba’s many historical grievanees against the United States. Anti-American nationalism, although a potent force in Cuba as elsewhere in Latin America, failed to provide a strong enough justification for his goals of unchallenged authority. Nor was it a powerful enough platform to achieve historical greatness. Castro therefore moved steadily toward the only ideology that could help him achieve his goals and the only country able to prop him up once he made that decision.

Marxism-Leninism and the USSR: A Formula for Dictatorship

In Marxism-Leninism and Soviet support, Castro found a formula that could satisfy his objectives as well as a justification for obliterating all U.S. influence in Cuba. Moreover, by turning to the Soviet Union Castro embraced the arch political, military, and philosophical rival of the United States, thus taking nationalist revenge in extreme terms. More important, the USSR was the only country capable of providing Castro and Cuba with the resources and support necessary to play a major role on the world stage.

The argument that the United States somehow forced Castro to adopt Marxism-Leninism and align Cuba with the USSR is a historical fallacy. Although it is likely that U.S. policy made the transition easier, there was nothing the United States or any other country could have done to prevent Castro from moving toward the Soviet Union. Given Castro’s objectives of absolute power, a global role for Cuba, and a radical transformation of society, his options were limited.

The initial Soviet reaction to events in Cuba was decidedly cautious and unenthusiastic. By all accounts the Cuban revolution fit poorly into the Soviet strategy of fostering international communism through the cultivation of well established Communist parties, particularly those in Western Europe, while at the same time seeking peaceful coexistence with the West. The Soviet strategy in Europe had borne little fruit, however, and Soviet policy had begun to move toward the competing Chinese strategy of supporting Third World revolutions. The Chinese, for their part, though unable to provide large-scale support, nevertheless enthusiastically embraced the Cuban cause. This recognition increased the likelihood that the Soviet Union, fearing a challenge to its role as the leading world Communist party, would be far more responsive to Castro’s overtures seeking Soviet support.

The Crucial Years

The determining stage in Cuba’s radical transformation ran from approximately January 1959 to 1962. During this period the full impact of the Cuban revolution occurred. (To refer to the Cuban revolution as still taking place in, say, 1970 is as inappropriate and incorrect as it is to refer to the Bolshevik revolution as still taking place in 1935.) The Cuban revolution began in earnest with Batista’s flight from Cuba and ended soon after Castro’s consolidation of power, his declaration of allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, and Cuba’s full admission to the Soviet bloc. The tacit U.S. agreement not to invade Cuba, made after the 1962 Missile Crisis, virtually guaranteed the survival of Castro’s regime. This allowed him to concentrate fully on strengthening his personal power, implementing radical domestic policies, and exporting revolution.

Although the fundamental nature of the regime was well established by the end of 1962, it continued to evolve after this time. Some changes have occurred in style, some in substance—few have been dramatic. A number of these transformations have reflected Cuban initiative, although others have been reactions to external pressures.

Since coming to power Castro’s priorities remain unchanged: maintaining undiluted power; making Cuba a world class actor with major international influence; and, transforming Cuban society—in that order of priority. These themes must be kept in mind when considering the evolution of Cuba under Castro’s rule.

2
Political Dimensions

Introduction

In the aftermath of the revolution that brought Fidel Castro to power in 1959, Cuba’s political system was quickly transformed. Though the fundamental nature of Castro’s regime was well established by about 1962, several features continued to evolve long after, the most notable involving changes in the structure and organization of Cuba’s political system and foreign policies.

As these evolved, however, other characteristics remained relatively unchanged. Included among those are the nature of Castro’s leadership, the role and makeup of Cuba’s ruling elite, and the military’s relationship to the rest of society. This section will focus both on those aspects that have evolved significantly and those that have remained static. Both sets of features will be assessed with a view toward their contemporary as well as their future implications for Cuba’s political system.

Setting the Stage: Early Changes

Initial changes in Cuba’s political system were rapid and largely in response to Castro’s improvisations rather than to well-laid plans. As Castro consolidated his position further and the regime’s survival became more secure, the pace of change slowed as the regime responded in a more measured manner to internal and external pressures.

Cuba in the 1960s was characterized not only by improvisation, but more important by radical sociopolitical and economic change and by the preeminence of Castro’s charismatic leadership. The regime expanded its control of economic activities to an extent unprecedented in pre-1959 Cuba or elsewhere in Latin America. Newly created revolutionary organs—the militia, mass people’s organizations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), the Ministry of Interior (MININT), and eventually the new Cuban Communist Party (PCC)—all penetrated society and mobilized it for defense, for economic purposes, or other tasks designated by the regime. One of the most radical changes that has occurred, however, is the total obliteration of Cuba’s democratic infrastructure. To understand this transformation, one must begin with the Constitution of 1940.

The Destruction of Cuba’s Democratic Infrastructure

In pre-Castro Cuba, the legal system was based essentially on the Constitution of 1940—considered by many as one of the most progressive in Latin America—as well as an Electoral Law and Penal Code that followed the French tradition prevalent throughout most of Latin America. These laws emphasized individual rights and clearly defined criminal and punishable actions. Protected by lifetime tenure, the judiciary was fairly independent.

From 1940 to 1952, despite irregularities in the use of power by the executive, the system functioned remarkably well. Although democratic Cuba had many problems, the violation of human rights was not one of them. Batista’s 1952 military coup, however, changed the situation. Batista tried to minimize the impact of his illegal seizure of power by restoring normality, but the legitimacy of the regime was rejected by numerous sectors of Cuban society who insisted on a return to “true democracy.” Soon, more radical opponents appeared. By 1957 Castro was fighting in the mountains, and the Revolutionary Student Federation had resorted to urban terrorism. The regime responded with increasing brutality, although the violations of human rights, illegal arrests, torture, and the killing of prisoners remained sporadic. Batista never organized the systematic elimination of the opposition nor did he impose total control over the press. Articles criticizing the regime were published and many political prisoners—most notably Fidel Castro and his followers—were allowed to go free in a general amnesty.

On December 31, 1958, Batista fled Cuba. The following day Castro entered Santiago de Cuba, announced the restoration of the 1940 constitution and proclaimed, to the surprise of many, “The revolution begins today!” The real meaning of that announcement unfolded rather rapidly. On January 13, the first five amendments, which radically modified the restored constitution, were enacted. One of them gave constitutional powers to the Council of Ministers. On February 7, the Council of Ministers repealed the Constitution of 1940 and replaced it with a Fundamental Law that considerably expanded the regime’s capacity to override its own legal system. Article 38, for example, stated: “Every act which prohibits or limits the participation of citizens in the political life of the nation is declared punishable.” This shining democratic principle was rendered hollow by the addition of a transitory provision that declared: “Laws may be promulgated to limit or prohibit the participation in the poli...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• Introduction
• 1. Background
• 2. Political Dimensions
• 3. Economic Dimensions
• 4. Cultural Dimensions
• 5. The Social Dimensions
• 6. Epilogue
• 7. Revolution in Cuba: A Brief Chronology
• Appendix: Project Participants