The Threat Of Terrorism

Combating Political Violence In Europe

Juliet Lodge

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9781000306361
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book is concerned with terrorism in West European liberal democratic states and with the way in which they react, as a group in the European Community, to international terrorism. It interprets terrorism as a means of attempting to effect political change by the indiscriminate use of violence.

1 Introduction—Terrorism and Europe: Some General Considerations

Juliet Lodge

Although terrorism is as old as the hills, the upsurge in indigenous and international terrorism in Western Europe since the late 1960s has been regarded as particularly threatening both to those who govern the liberal democratic states within which terrorism is perpetrated or against whom it is aimed, and to the populations at large.¹ It has been argued that terrorism challenges liberal democratic values and endangers the very states which, by their comparative openness, permit the discussion of potentially destabilising ideas on the one hand, and on the other, react to the commission of terrorist acts in a manner that might be interpreted as endangering the very essence of the values they purport to uphold. Indeed, this is a recurrent theme in much of the literature on terrorism. This introductory chapter will examine briefly some of the issues raised in the literature on terrorism and will then sketch in the background to regional attempts within Western Europe to combat terrorism.

Problems of Definition

There have been numerous attempts to define terrorism. For some, terrorism is a process comprising several phases.² For others, it is strategy; for others still, a form of political violence³ approximating insurrection, rebellion, anarchy or political protest⁴ or revolution.⁵ Much has been made of the idea that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Some authors have tried to isolate precisely those characteristics of political violence in given societies that may be said to typify terrorism. Attention is afforded to the effects, psychology and behaviour of terrorists, their motives, ideologies (however crude), purposes, actual rather than aspirational goals, and their politics. Many authors point out that terrorism is a moral problem,⁶ and highlight the fact that because terrorism is not the exclusive preserve of the politically motivated but may be used by criminals and psychopaths, the issue of defining and identifying terrorism is rendered more complicated.⁷

Behaviour, the type and scope of violent acts involved, the nature of their targets—whether specific or indiscriminate—and the purported objectives of those committing terrorist acts have all been investigated. People have deliberated on whether or not terrorism is perpetrated by anarchist groups, by' out-groups' or by those claiming spurious legitimacy and having pretentions to act on behalf of the allegedly oppressed masses; on behalf of those not so much denied representation in the sense of being enfranchised but denied an effective voice in contemporary politics.⁸ As Merkl observes, there are some groups who can legitimately claim to speak for an identifiably oppressed group—ethnic nationalists may be one such group. ETA could for a long time claim to represent the Basques' interests against the Spanish state, for example, whereas the Red Army Faction could not credibly do so in the Federal Republic of Germany. Ethnic nationalists are also believed to be distinguishable from other violent collectivities by the more precise nature of their targets—they aim at the state, its symbols and law enforcement agencies: representatives of industrial capitalism and civilians are secondary targets only.⁹ Moreover, it seems that ethnic nationalism when combined with regionalism and the existence of competing national loyalties (for instance in Spain between the central state and the Basques) rather than coexisting national loyalties (as in France where Bretons may perceive themselves as both Breton and French) can indeed result in terrorist groups credibly claiming to speak on behalf of an identifiably repressed group unable to translate political demands and aspirations into action on an immediate and direct basis. The very logic behind such ideas is, however, questionable in Western democracies where representation is indirect and government is not simply about representing the interests of the masses (however they may be defined) but the attempt to organise and administer complex socio-political and economic entities in the face of competing demands and ideologies. Conspiracy theories may explain the operation of a part of the whole on occasion but it is often far more difficult for outgroups practising terrorism (or more precisely indiscriminate violence on a tactical and strategic basis) to persuade the public of the validity of their cause.

The apparent lack of public support for terrorist groups in Western Europe has been investigated by various authors including those who have argued that elitism within the terrorist groups themselves is alienating.¹⁰ Whatever the reasons for the lack of willing public support for terrorist groups on the European continent, there can be little doubt that the terrorists themselves endeavour to render their causes legitimate by referring to themselves and their 'struggles' in terms that recall past battles between repressors and the repressed that the latter won. Hence the imagery of colonial warfare. However, some authors use the term colonial terrorism to mean colonial wars where the colonised use political violence to oust the foreign regime. The notion of 'struggle' is central to many analyses of terrorism. Thus, terrorism has been portrayed as surrogate class struggle.¹¹

Terrorism has also been depicted as a major symptom of the dysfunctions of a socio-political system afflicted by immobilism, a Marxist sub-culture, weak institutions of authority, a decline in religious beliefs, and resurgent radical neo-fascism.¹² In this view, terrorism is symptomatic of social disorganisation associated with urbanisation and secularisation.¹³ From this follows the argument that terrorism, especially that on the right, is undertaken by alienated, marginalised (predominantly male) under 25-yearolds predisposed towards violence. However, this use of demographic, socio-psychological attributes to identify terrorists is inadequate, as it quickly subsumes hooliganism and other forms of domestic violence (both political and nonpolitical) whose incidence far exceeds the occurrence of politically motivated acts of indiscriminate violence associated with terrorist incidents in most Western democracies.¹⁴

Trying to differentiate terrorism from political violence in general presents analysts with numerous problems. For some, generalisations lead to the view that terrorism is simply 'extreme, deviant, political behaviour'.¹⁵ Others see left-wing terrorism as being qualitatively different from right-wing terrorism inasmuch as, in Western Europe, the two tendencies may employ the same general method while selecting somewhat different targets and incurring different penalties from the authorities on occasion. For example, Italy is notorious for having agents of the state involved in right-wing terrorism. Generally, however, Merkl argues that the distinguishing feature of right-wing, neo-fascist terrorism is its racial target.¹⁶

While socio-psychological interpretations and explanations of the incidence of terrorism (notably indigenous terrorism) seem fashionable, they supplement rather than supplant other attempted explanations. Many authors have attempted to draft typologies of terrorism which also attempt to locate its contemporary manifestations on a historical matrix. Germane to such attempts is the initial question of state and non-state terrorism.

Several typologies of terrorism have been constructed: 'enforcement terror' has been described as typifying state terrorism, and 'agitational terror' non-state terrorism.¹⁷ By contrast, Wilkinson isolates three main kinds of terrorism: revolutionary terrorism, sub-revolutionary terrorism, and repressive terrorism.¹⁸ However, typologies over-generalise; they stress characteristics typical of some but not all groups. Some differentiate between internal terrorism perpetrated by the state (e.g. the Spanish Inquisition, vigilantism, the OAS) and that pursued by small groups in pursuit of 'revolution' (the usual examples of this are the Tupamaros and the Red Army Faction). A second category is international terrorism—under which are confusingly subsumed by various authors imperialism, colonialism, freedom fights motivated by nationalism, wars of independence and state-sponsored external terrorism. For the purposes of this book, international terrorism refers to acts of terrorism which transcend the boundaries of one state either by virtue of where, against whom and by whom they were committed or sponsored; or by virtue of the search for safe havens by fugitive terrorists.

Attempts have also been made to distinguish terrorism types by the nature of their goals: terrorism may, in such a view, be seen simply as an end in itself or as a means to a given end. It may equally have either a tactical or a strategic perspective. Terrorism has a place among the means employed by extremist Muslim fundamentalist factions but, as Capitanchik has argued, what might loosely be termed 'Islamic' terrorism and terrorism emanating from the Middle East (where extreme violence is part of political intercourse) differ in their ideological inspiration and in their ultimate goals.¹⁹ The aims of terrorists may be expressed clearly or incoherently by their perpetrators but the resort to terrorist methods often means that their goal is not seen as legitimate by the authorities, the public and the international community. So long as terrorism was seen principally as a means of securing publicity for 'causes', observers tended to argue that revenge and the induction of fear were obvious leitmotifs. Terrorism produces fear, and is intended both to destroy public confidence in the authorities and to offend, since civilised societies aim to reject the resort to violence as a means of settling disputes.

It is generally agreed by Western observers of terrorism that terrorism is an abhorrent and unacceptable means of pursuing political ends.²⁰ For those who are responsible for protecting individuals against terrorism and for apprehending and/or punishing its perpetrators, the various typologies of terrorism and the multiplicity of terrorist goals are less important than the need to devise a workable legal standard that 'will distinguish between permissable revolutionary activity and prohibited criminality in public international law'.²¹ This is no easy matter.

However, West European liberal democratic governments do equate terrorism with criminal violence against which legal remedies are to be invoked in the first instance. As will become clear, it is not without reason that the rule of law is given particular prominence in the Federal Republic of Germany, and by members of the European Community intent on devising and invoking legal remedies against terrorism—both that committed within its own boundaries (wherever it may originate) and that against its citizens abroad. How the various states respond to domestic, indigenous terrorism depends largely upon historical factors. These may lead a state to develop a battery of anti-terrorist instruments (and most West European states have GSG-9 type forces) that rely primarily on legal remedies and military and security provisions. These may be complemented by measures that stop short of repression but which potentially or actually curtail individual liberties, especially if abused. In liberal democracies the aim is to balance military-security anti-terrorism measures by judicial and political controls.²²

Legislative provisions against terrorism may also be developed²³ which seek to curb its incidence and, at a minimum, ensure that members of the international community uniformly treat terrorism as a criminal activity that cannot be 'excused' by the 'political defence'. The emphasis then is on the apprehension and prosecution of those suspected of committing terrorist acts. A battery of associated legal provisions has been devised to facilitate this. Its attainment is fraught with difficulties even in the European Community where, arguably, the possibilities of concerted regional action have been tested and might, theoretically, be thought to stand the greatest chance of successful implementation. There is, of course, another legalistic response to potential indigenous terrorism which can complement existing international provisions and attempt to legislate away indigenous terrorism by somehow co-opting potentially violent dissent. As Schmid shows below, this tactic has been usefully employed by the Dutch authorities, who arguably have the most liberal way of reacting to groups that might have or seek to develop a terrorist potential (see Chapter 6). The state's rapid response to their existence is a way of directly responding to them by non-violent state means. Whereas the political culture of the Netherlands may facilitate the emasculation of potential sources of political violence and indigenous terrorism (which Wilkinson terms liberal democracy's Trojan Horse), it...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• 1. Introduction—Terrorism and Europe: Some General Considerations
• 2. British Policy on Terrorism: An Assessment
• 3. Terrorism in West Germany
• 4. Terrorism in Italy
• 5. Dictatorship, Democracy and Terrorism in Spain
• 6. Politically-Motivated Violent Activists in the Netherlands in the 1980s
• 7. The Evolution of Belgian Terrorism
• 8. Terrorism in France
• 9. The European Community and Terrorism: From Principles to Concerted Action
• Select Bibliography
• Index