Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi

Tiang Boon Hoo

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138366046
• eBook ISBN: 9781317242666
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica asiatica

There has been a discernable calibration of Chinese foreign policy since the ascension of Xi Jinping to the top leadership positions in China. The operative term here is adjustment rather than renovation because there has not been a fundamental transformation of Chinese foreign policy or "setting up of a new kitchen" in foreign affairs. Several continuities in Chinese diplomacy are still evident. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has not wavered from its overarching strategy of rising through peaceful development. The PRC is still an active participant and leader in, or shaper of, global and regional regimes even as it continues to push for reforms of the extant order, towards an arrangement which it thinks will be less unjust and more equitable. It seeks to better "link up with the international track", perhaps even more so under Xi's stewardship. Yet amidst these continuities, it is clear that there have been some profound shifts in China's foreign policy. From the enunciation of strategic slogans such as the "Asian security concept" and "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics"; the creation of the China-led and initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; the pursuit of Xi's signature foreign policy initiative, the One Belt One Road; to a purportedly more assertive and resolute defense of China's maritime territorial interests in East Asia—examples of these foreign policy calibrations (both patent and subtle) abound.

In short, this has not been a complete metamorphosis but there are real changes, with important repercussions for China and the international system. The burning questions then are What, Where, How and Why: What are these key foreign policy adjustments? Where and how have these occurred in Chinese diplomacy? And what are the reasons or drivers that inform these changes? This book seeks to capture these changes. Featuring contributions from academics, think-tank intellectuals and policy practitioners, all engaged in the compelling business of China-watching, the book aims to shed more light on the calibrations that have animated China's diplomacy under Xi, a leader who by most accounts is considered the most powerful Chinese numero uno since Deng Xiaoping.

1 Xi Jinping’s calibration of Chinese foreign policy

Hoo Tiang Boon

There has been a discernable calibration of Chinese foreign policy since the ascension of Xi Jinping to the top leadership positions in China. The operative term here is adjustment rather than renovation because there has not been a fundamental transformation of Chinese foreign policy or ‘setting up of a new kitchen’ in foreign affairs.¹ Several continuities in Chinese diplomacy are still evident. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has not wavered from its overarching strategy of rising through peaceful development. It still recognises the importance of fostering a stable external milieu for China’s domestic development. The language of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence – respect, non-aggression, equality, peaceful coexistence and non-interference – continues to permeate Chinese foreign policy documents and speeches. It continues to oppose what it calls ‘Cold War era’ frameworks and ‘hegemonism’. China is still an active participant and leader in, or shaper of, global and regional regimes even as it continues to push for reforms of the extant order, towards an arrangement which it thinks will be less unjust and more equitable. It seeks to better ‘link up with the international track’, perhaps even more so under Xi’s stewardship.

Yet amid these continuities, it is clear that there have been some profound shifts in China’s foreign policy. From the enunciation of strategic slogans such as ‘a new type of international relations’, ‘Asian security concept’ and ‘major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics’; the creation of the China-led and initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); the pursuit of Xi’s signature foreign policy initiative, the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and Maritime Silk Road (collectively known as the One Belt, One Road or OBOR); to a more ‘assertive’ and resolute defence of the PRC’s maritime territorial interests in East Asia – examples of these foreign policy calibrations (both patent and subtle) abound. Even the compilation of Xi’s ideas on China’s foreign and security policy, detailed in six sections of The Governance of China and published unusually early in his tenure, is unprecedented.²

In short, this has not been a complete metamorphosis but there are real changes, with important repercussions for China and the international system. The burning questions then are What, Where, How and Why. What are these key foreign policy adjustments? Where and how have these occurred in Chinese diplomacy? And what are the reasons or drivers that inform these changes? This book seeks to capture these changes. Featuring contributions from academics, think-tank intellectuals and policy practitioners, all engaged in the compelling business of China-watching, the book aims to shed more light on the calibrations that have animated China’s diplomacy under Xi, a leader who by most accounts is considered the most powerful Chinese numero uno since Deng Xiaoping.

Contribution

In addressing the aforementioned questions, we are contributing to a presently sparse and unsatisfactory body of work. It is sparse because there is little available academic literature that specifically and holistically analyses and explains the calibration of Chinese foreign policy since the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 2012 leadership renewal. It is unsatisfactory because a lot of the work on Xi’s steering of China’s diplomatic locomotive thus far has mostly been brief writings in commentaries, opinion-editorials and policy journals.³ This is not to suggest that these writings are subpar analyses. But there is clearly a need for more comprehensive, in-depth and thorough assessments on the current incarnation of Chinese foreign policy. To be sure, we are starting to see more scholarly journal articles that examine aspects of Chinese diplomacy under Xi.⁴ But in terms of broader and richer book-length works, the score has been dire. In that sense, this volume is a pioneering study.

We may also better learn about the nexus between China’s domestic political context and its foreign policy – a question that now has greater clarity but no clearer answers – because of developments in the evolving power structure. Xi Jinping has defied earlier expectations and has consolidated power in China at an unprecedented pace. Aided by his predecessor’s ‘naked exit’ of relinquishing all formal positions, and bolstered (directly or indirectly) by a relentless anticorruption campaign, Xi is today the PRC’s indisputable ‘paramount leader’. In addition to his occupation of the traditional power levers of the CCP General Secretary, State President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Xi sits on top of an increased number of, and the most important, supra-ministry Leading Small Groups, vesting in him unrivalled institutional authority to assert control. Newly created ones include: the Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform, the Leading Group for National Defense and Troop Reform, and the National Security Commission. He has also acquired an unprecedented title, Commander-in-Chief of Joint Battle Command Centre. All these mean that the Party may be ‘returning’ from a collective leadership model (exemplified by Hu Jintao’s tenure) to a more strongman style of political governance, which suggests that the top Chinese leader will have a greater direct impact on the foreign policymaking process.

This volume is thus a timely addition. Approaching the 19th CCP Party Congress at the time of writing, Xi is close to completing his first term in power. More importantly, sufficient developments have taken place to warrant an extended and focused investigation of the emerging new patterns in Chinese diplomacy. Understanding these changes may help shed more light on the longer term trajectory of Chinese diplomacy under Xi, who is expected to remain in power for at least another full term.

These calibrations also hold clues to specific puzzles in the scholarship on Chinese foreign policy. We currently do not know enough of the answers to several salient questions in the field. To what extent has Xi’s China moved away from Deng’s strategic guideline of Tao Guang Yang Hui (‘hide brightness, cherish obscurity’), the PRC’s putative foreign policy strategy of ‘keeping a low profile’ in the post-Cold War era? How does Xi’s signature foreign policy initiative, the OBOR, factor into China’s grand strategy of rising peacefully? How has China pursued its ‘new type of major power relations’, and what does that mean for US–China relations? And how should we interpret China’s perceived more assertive diplomacy in recent times?

Along with illuminating these puzzles, the answers, we suggest, can serve as a reference point to comparatively assess China’s current policies with those of the previous regime, and in doing so, better locate the key sources and drivers of change in China’s foreign policy. These insights also speak to the growing debate on Chinese assertiveness in international relations (IR). For many scholars and policymakers, Xi has presided over the emergence of a more muscular brand of Chinese diplomacy. This is the idea that a ‘more confident, assertive … anti-status quo [China] is pushing back against the West, promoting its own alternative norms policies … and generally seeking to test the leadership capacity of the United States’.⁵ Alastair Iain Johnston suggests this idea has dominated external perceptions of China, likening it to a ‘meme’ that has gone ‘viral’.⁶

The volume engages this debate. While recognising that aspects of Chinese diplomacy have been assertive or increasingly assertive, the book also shows that characterisations of a newly ‘assertive’ China under Xi oversimplify the complexity of Chinese thinking and conduct. Such characterisations not only overlook past instances of Chinese assertiveness, they also – as several of the volume’s chapters point out – discount the several occasions when China has acted in more cooperative and constructive ways.⁷ Some examples include China’s positive role in the historic nuclear deal between Iran and the P5 + 1, and its copursuit of global development frameworks/institutions such as the OBOR, the AIIB and the New Development Bank.

At the same time, we are not suggesting here that Xi’s China has become a more ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system, or that it is becoming a more accommodative, non-threatening power. What this volume shows is that Chinese diplomacy goes beyond simplistic generalisations, requiring more nuanced and more contextual understandings to take stock of its full complexities. China’s sometimes ‘contradictory’ foreign policy conduct becomes more coherent once we make better sense of the shades and contexts that colour its diplomacy.⁸

The multifaceted Chinese diplomacy

In Greek mythology, the Hydra is a fearsome, multi-headed creature that will regrow one or several heads whenever one of its heads gets chopped off. China is often anthropomorphised as a dragon but in foreign policy, the Hydra may be more apposite – Chinese diplomacy is multifaceted and resilient, and when faced with challenges, its responses are not necessarily single-tracked.

These evolving facets of Chinese foreign policy under Xi are explored in depth by the contributors to this volume. It brings together the assessments of academics, think-tank scholars and policy practitioners (both former and current) engaged in China-watching. This intellectual diversity is helpful and allows the book to draw on both the rigour and real-world relevance of academic scholarship and policy literature respectively.

Domestic context

The first part focuses on changes in the domestic complex, in particular, the developments in both the civilian and security contexts that shape China’s foreign policy. On the former, as mentioned, the most influential foreign policymaking ‘civilian’ has been indisputably CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping even as the power consolidation process is still evolving and ‘Big Daddy Xi’ (as he is affectionately known colloquially in China) continues to grapple with various political forces in the system. This increasingly dominant role of Xi informs in part why Huiyun Feng and Kai He, in the next chapter, suggest it may be time to ‘bring leaders back in’ IR scholarship, examining in particular the role of leaders’ belief systems in foreign policy. It is true that Chinese foreign policy-making is pluralistic and involves multiple actors, but as Feng and He rightly point out, ‘China’s top leaders still play the most vital role’ in this process. And in the present era, the centrality of Xi’s leadership role has grown even more salient; he is now described as the ‘core of the party’s leadership’.⁹

Existing IR theories – realism, liberalism, constructivism – also suffer from certain theoretical inadequacies that reduce their explanatory power of Chinese foreign policy. Realism and liberalism tend to treat states as atomistic entities with similar internal assumptions, while also conflating state actions with its nature. Constructivism takes the particularity of the state into greater account but tends to treat the ideas and norms that inform this particularity as exogenous in nature.

Ergo, Feng and He recommend paying more attention to leaders’ beliefs, in particular, their operational code beliefs as alternative lenses to understand change in China’s diplomacy. Engaging a series of key questions to appraise a leader’s ‘philosophical’ and ‘instrumental’ beliefs, they reconstruct the operating code maps of Xi and his predecessor, Hu Jintao, in relation to their foreign policy orientation. Feng and He’s research reveals a number of interesting and potentially counterintuitive insights, including the findings that as compared to Hu, Xi appears to have a more ‘optimistic’ view of the nature of the political universe, may be a stronger and more decisive leader, and may be more inclined to use ‘cooperative’ approaches towards the outside world.

Chapter 3 takes a leadership-centric approach as well, this time examining the extent and impact of Xi’s ‘imprint’ on the key security institution in China’s foreign policy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As Chairman of the CMC, Xi has overseen arguably the ‘most far-reaching’ military reforms since Deng’s initiatives 30 years ago. Xi has had the key advantage of taking over the CMC Chair from Hu immediately, as opposed to his predecessor who had to wait two years before Jiang Zemin handed over the post.

Ka Po Ng rightly counsels that we should assess Xi’s military reforms in terms of both the changes and continuities in the PLA, but it has been evident that developments have been tremendous. The push for a ‘good work style’ in the PLA has translated to a ‘deadly’ anti-corruption campaign that has nabbed scores of high-ranking former military officials, including General Xu Caihou and General Guo Boxiong, the two CMC vice-Chairmen. There has been more intensive and extensive political work, with some reminiscent of a style more normally seen in the Maoist era; examples include the reinstatement of a policy that calls for senior military officers to serve as ordinary soldiers for a prescribed period. But arguably the key move consolidating Xi’s ‘command of the gun’ has been the structural reform of the PLA, which among other things, further empowers the CMC to directly control the military. The General Department system, for instance, is now reorganised as a functional organ directly under the CMC.

In terms of military policy, the PLA has paid greater attention to war preparation and readiness, in line with Xi’s call for building a PLA ‘capable of fighting and winning wars’. This has been matched by a concerted effort to enhance jointness in operational capabilities, exemplified by the reorganisation of the military regions system into theatre commands and the establishment of the Joint Battle Command Centre (led incidentally by ‘Commander-in-Chief’ Xi). These changes are aimed at promoting greater synergy and balance among the services, ‘breaking through the traditional [PLA] thinking of placing the land above the sea’. Hence Air Force and Naval modernisation programmes, particularly the latter, have accelerated. If these reforms come to fruition, they will mean a much more formidable PLA, one more capable of backing up China’s foreign policy and actualising its ‘strong nation dream’.

New type of major power relations

The notion of a ‘new type of major power relations’ was already articulated by Xi when he was the Party’s heir apparent in 2012. But it was only after the 2013 Obama-Xi Sunnyland Summit when the Chinese leader proposed the concept again that it became more recognised as Xi’s signature framework for managing China’s relations with the big powers, particularly the United States (to be sure, former State Councillor Dai Bingguo had evoked similar terms in 2010).¹⁰ At base, the concept conveys the message that major powers like China and the US should work together to avoid the ‘historical’ confrontations that seem to accompany great power affairs in the past. Yet the more substantive questions surrounding the concept – e.g. what are its components and how should it be realised? – remain unclear. The concept and its meatier details continue to be debated by Chinese scholars and policymakers (as well as observers elsewhere).

It is those fundamental ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Introduction
• 1 Xi Jinping’s calibration of Chinese foreign policy
• Part I The domestic context
• Part II New type of major power relations
• Part III Regions
• Part IV Global issues
• Index