Introduction
The end of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) was accompanied by some notable changes of the economy, the rising tide of nationalism in the republics, the revelations concerning the past history of the CPSU, the rise of splinter parties and the growing importance of state structures - in particular, the role of the presidential office. The mechanisms of self-destruction, or the processes of disintegration, are threefold. The bottom-up process is defined by the collapse of local organizations. The centrifugal process means that ethnic groups use party organizations to propagate their independence, or dismantle party’s branches in the peripheral republican states. The top-down process is the split of the core organization at the centre.
Will these three processes unfold in China? Will the CCP maintain its rule? What are the strategic choices the party has to make in order to sustain its political control? What direction will China take? These are speculations on post-Deng scenarios, ranging from a kind of muddled confusion in the country under the guise of neo-authoritarianism or neo-conservatism, political fission, military intervention, democratization (breakthrough from above and/or revolution from below) - to a neo-Maoist revival (for a detailed discussion, see Baum, 1996).
The answer to all the above questions lies beyond the scope of this essay. The focus of this paper will be instead on the question of whether the CCP will collapse, or whether it will initiate a partial democratization programme to maintain its rule. The paper will further discuss the party system of China as with its characteristic domination of the CCP, the absence of free political civil society and opposition, the dependence of so-called democratic parties on the CCP and the lack of genuine power competition and power-sharing. The paper will go on to describe certain aspects of the transformation of the CCP and China’s political system: the replacement of the chairman system for the general-secretary system, the introduction of inner-party democratization, the transition from the party’s opposition to private ownership to its support for privatization and capitalism, and from being a revolutionary party to becoming a conservative ruling party. In particular, one needs to concentrate on the decline of the party’s influence and the increasing roles of the National People’s Congress (NPC), and finally the introduction of the direct elections for people’s deputies at the county and township levels and the direct election for village chiefs since 1987. Finally, the paper will argue that because the CCP is in decline and faces serious crises of legitimacy, the reform faction within the party might initiate a partial democratization programme to ensure its political survival.
The Political System in China
The main characteristics of the political system Unlike the military rule in Burma where political parties play an insignificant role, China is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which has hitherto dominated and controlled all the military forces. The Chinese military have been a decisive force in the politics of succession, have exercised great influence and will continue to do so in post-Deng politics. However, there is an implicit rule that no military leader can be a successor through coups. Military coups or military governments are illegitimate and unacceptable.1 Unlike the federal system of Malaysia, China is an unitary system where the central leaders appoint and control local leaders.2 The categories of the presidential system such as that in the Philippines and South Korea or of the parliamentary system such as that in Japan are not applicable to China.
The basic party system of China is the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CCP. The system incorporates the integration of Marxism-Leninism with authoritarian Chinese traditions and China’s practical experience of revolution. In the eyes of the party, the system can be justified by following the history of the republican period, when the multiparty competition system led to civil war and chaos in the 1920s (Xiao Chaoran, 1991, ch. 1).
The role and the function of the CCP The constitution stresses the hegemonic position of the CCP in political life. The party does not allow the democratic parties to take turns to be in power (Ding Guangen, 1991, pp. 11–2). Although the democratic parties are encouraged to participate in, and supervize, state and government affairs, they are under the leadership of the CCP. All these efforts aim at strengthening and improving the leadership of the CCP, maintaining the stability of the country and society, and at establishing reforms and opening China to the outside world (Ding Guangen, 1991, pp. 11–2).
The CCP holds the top positions in government and dominates national and local politics. While a party’s domination in democratic countries can be figured out by the percentage of votes won in elections, or the percentage of seats won in parliament, the Chinese party’s domination can be easily seen from the fact hat the politburo of the party commands and controls the government and that the party’s organizations are established nationwide, with membership reaching 55 million in 1994.
The party controls formal state organizations and selects the candidates for the positions of top state leaders (for the structure of the state, see Saich, 1981). Since members of the State Council are concurrently members of the CCP Central Committee and the general policy, adopted by the State Council must be approved by the CCP, the party’s leadership is instrumental in formulating this policy. The State Council is at the top of the state’s organization. The premier is its chairman. The State Council’s membership is composed of the premier, (who acts as head of the council), vice-premiers, state councillors (who are mostly the former vice-premiers or elder leaders on their way out) and ministers. All ministries, commissions, special agencies, and centrally administered banks report to the State Council. In theory, it is responsible to the National People’s Congress (whose delegates are elected by lower level people’s congresses) and its Standing Committee. The Standing Committee is supposed to enact the constitution and the laws. In practice, however, until the early 1980s, the National People’s Congress acted as a rubber stamp for decisions reached in the State Council (Ogden, 1992, p. 236).
The requirements for forming a new party China does not have a party law to regulate the formation of a new party. She has only the Regulations Governing Registration and Administration of Social Organizations (1989), or something like a Society Act, in which the requirements to form a political organization are discussed. In practice, forming a political opposition is difficult enough; forming a new party would be well-nigh impossible.
The party/state has regulated and controlled various social and political organizations by means of the Regulations Governing Registration and Administration of Social Organizations (1989).3 This system of compulsory registration by departments of Civil Affairs was an attempt to discipline and monitor social and political organizations and to structure them in the form of corporate state. According to Article 7 of the regulations, each social organization is required to obtain formal approval by registering with the appropriate Department of Civil Affairs. It is also required to ‘link up’ with a specific government agency which acts as its ‘superior department’ or official sponsor. The regulations specify the procedures required for establishing associations across the provinces and cities: they must first be approved by relevant departments of the central government before they submit their applications for registration to the Department of Civil Affairs (Yie Ti et al., 1991, pp. 251–2). This is called ‘fenji shuangceng guanli tixi’, a hierarchical control system with two controlling agencies. The rationale for this dualcontrolling system is that the Department of Civil Affairs does not have specialist knowledge of associations to be founded. A specific and related government agency is thus required to act as a ‘superior department’ or official sponsor.
Furthermore, the regulations prohibit a category of so-called ‘counterrevolutionary organizations’, which attempt to ‘overthrow the socialist system and endanger the interests of the nation’ (Yie Ti et al., 1991, pp. 246). In the case of a dispute over the granting of registration or interpretation of the articles of the Regulations ...