Russia's Security and the War on Terror

Mikhail Tsypkin

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2007
• Print ISBN: 9780415390552
• eBook ISBN: 9781136761676
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

This book discusses and provides examples of Russia's need to reshape its security and military policies in order to meet the global challenges of fighting terrorism and counterinsurgency. It addresses some of the problems facing Russia's national security and military power, including: military reformUS-Russian relationsthe political economy of Rus

US-Russian Relations and the Global Counter-Terrorist Campaign

Alexander A. Belkin

With the election of George W. Bush in 2000, the Kremlin had its reservations about the newly elected US president and his administration. For a time, mutual criticism between the two countries seemed to be the rule of the day. Among other things, the US pulled out of the 1972 ABM treaty unilaterally, and Russia prosecuted its war against the Chechen separatists. Then came 9/11, and the two countries found solid ground for mutually advantageous cooperation – the global war on terrorism. But with NATO/Yugoslavia still clearly in the rear-view mirror, and the war against Iraq still ahead, the course of future relations remained unclear. The author examines US-Russian relations as they evolved before and after the war in Iraq and offers conclusions and lessons learned for both sides.

Russia is an important partner in the war on terror and is reaching toward a future of greater democracy and economic freedom. As it does so, our relationship will continue to broaden and deepen.¹

Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Throughout 2001 scholars of US-Russian relations on both sides of the Atlantic closely watched the foreign policies of the White House and the Kremlin. Many expected that President George W. Bush and his foreign and security policy team would implement a tough, possibly Reaganite-style hard line toward Russia led by a former KGB colonel. Their policy line toward Russia had less to do with a disdain for Putin, and was more indicative of an embrace of a ‘market correction’ to US-Russian relations. The administration had not permanently written off Russia, but preferred to downgrade the priority accorded to the relationship, waiting to re-invest in Russia at the bottom of the market. It was determined to conduct a serious dialogue with Russia, but only after expectations were lowered and relations had been re-balanced.

The first indications of such a posture surfaced during the election campaign and the early formation of the new administration’s personnel and foreign policy. Those symptoms included: downgrading Russia in the US list of foreign policy priorities; the administration’s harsh statements declaring its intention to withdraw unilaterally from the 1972 ABM treaty and to end strategic arms control negotiations with Russia; leveling charges against Russia as an active proliferator of critical WMD technologies (meaning mostly its cooperation with Iran in the nuclear energy sector); persistent criticism of Russia’s method of resolving the domestic crisis in Chechnya (identified by President Vladimir Putin in 1999 as ‘an anti-terrorist operation’); and accusing Moscow of suppressing freedom of speech (regarding the awkward use of legal and economic instruments to deprive the notorious oligarchs Gusinsky and Berezovsky of their media assets).

Top Russian policymakers, in their turn, accused the new US leadership of adventurous unilateralism in the world arena, of breaking down the structure of international treaties on strategic arms control and starting a new nuclear arms race, of interference in Russia’s domestic affairs and of double-standards in the treatment of Russia.

Despite the fact that President Bush tried to establish, in his words, a ‘frank and honest relationship’ with the ‘trustworthy’ President Putin during the summits in Brdo and Genoa in June and July 2001, public opinion and the political and economic elites of the two nations were distressed. Americans experienced ‘Russia fatigue’, while Russians were disillusioned in their hopes for US expertise and help. Both nations were psychologically preparing for a disengagement, or even for another round of confrontation.

It seemed that US-Russian affairs reached a turning point on September 11, 2001, when Vladimir Putin placed a telephone call to George W. Bush to convey the Russians’ condolences to the victims of the terrorist attacks against the Americans, and to assure the US president of Russia’s full support for anti-terrorist counteractions.

Presidents Bush and Putin achieved further successes in encouraging a counter-terrorist coalition and securing the success of the fight against bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan, avoiding a crisis over the US abrogation of the 1972 ABM treaty, and steadily improving Russia’s overall relations with the West. It looked like the presidents had managed to end a dangerous deterioration of the bilateral relations that occurred during the 1990s and to change the course of US-Russian affairs from a series of nervous ups and downs to a stable, mutually beneficial ascent.

Yet the new US-Russian rapprochement rests on a very delicate basis: the personal relationship of the two national leaders. While this is very important for a genuine trust and better understanding, it cannot be sufficient for building a stable structure of bilateral relations. The Putin-Bush interaction cannot substitute for US-Russian relations. In this case, President Reagan’s formula that ‘It takes two to tango’ should be read as a concert of nations, of political and business elites, not only of leading individuals.

During the year after 9/11, US-Russian relationships were in the ‘courting’ phase, as the two leaders cheered each other up with rhetorical bolstering. At the same time, the elites and the public were lagging behind the presidents in their visions, assessments and actions.

It appeared that the presidents had drawn certain lessons from the bilateral relations of the past two decades. The primary message was that each of the nations should learn to avoid Cold War-style harsh responses to any disagreements or contradictions, because emotional rhetoric prompted by instincts left over from the old days could seriously damage the fragile fabric of the new relationship. The Russian leadership demonstrates as much by its attitude to the establishing of the US military presence in Central Asia and Georgia – the regions of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) that are most sensitive for Russia – prior to the US-led counter-terrorist coalition operation in Afghanistan against bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network, as well as by the Kremlin’s reserved reaction to the abrogation by the White House of the ABM Treaty and the decision to start deployment of a national missile defense. Moscow remained calm when Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia joined NATO. For its part, if the US administration had not acknowledged the difference between the first (1994–96) and the second (1999–2002) Chechen wars, it so far remained mum on the continued Russian ‘anti-terrorist operation’ in Chechnya.

All that time Putin was facing some domestic opposition to his policy of ‘appeasing’ Washington. Exploiting the widespread public anti-Americanism, certain groups among the Russian national security and foreign policy bureaucracy were cherishing their xenophobic suspicions towards the US and growing dissatisfied with the fact that Russia thus far had received little reward for its support of the domineering role of the US. They argued that Russia had shared vital intelligence with the CIA concerning North Korea, had withdrawn from the communication facilities in Cuba, and from the naval base at Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam, but had received very little in return.

‘The perpetuation of the antiterrorist war is fully in line with the new military doctrine of the United States, which centers on preemptive strikes against adversaries arbitrarily made up by the US itself’, as Evgeny Primakov, former Russian prime minister, foreign minister and director of foreign intelligence, wrote in his recently published book.²

Critical voices were heard not only from the left flank, but from the conservative realists as well. Thus, leading political expert Vyacheslav Nikonov, summing up the diplomatic year 2002, stated that:

... the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty was a failure of the Russian foreign policy. In fact, we had no reason to support that decision, just as we had no reason to support NATO’s expansion. Of course, this [NATO enlargement] is not a direct threat to the Russian security, but it is a creation of a European security system without our full participation in it.³

The dissent was heard even among Putin’s men. ‘The discussion of key military threats would be incomplete without mentioning the US invalidation of the 1972 ABM Treaty and the ongoing expansion of NATO’, asserted Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov in an interview in December 2002. ‘These steps do not pose an immediate threat to Russia’s national security, [although] they undermine the existing strategic stability system’.⁴

However, President Putin managed to control the situation at least within his own ranks. The same Defense Minister, Sergey Ivanov, was quoted as saying that:

.. .the main threat to Russia’s security is posed by terrorist groups active in the North Caucasus and Central Asia. To counter terrorist threats, we are maintaining close international ties within the antiterrorist coalition. We are ready for active ties with any country combating this evil.⁵

The Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergey Lebedev, sounded even more in line with his president:

The main threats [to Russia] today come from international terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also a major threat because we cannot be sure that maniacs will never assume control of such weapons. Ecological security is another vital task. No country in the world, not even the powerful USA, can stand up against these threats single-handed. We need to join forces.⁶

Skeptics within the Bush administration, while in retreat, rather than remain silent had precipitated a nuanced debate over the significance of Russia’s contribution to the war on terrorism. They argued that Russia’s support was inevitable because the US was doing Russia’s bidding in rooting out terrorists in Central Asia.

Those voices were balanced in part by reasonable thinkers in the Capitol and in the White House. ‘US-Russian cooperation in the war on terrorism’ – in Condoleezza Rice’s opinion – ‘has been path-breaking in its breadth, depth, and openness. The passing of the ABM [1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty and the signing of the Moscow Treaty reducing strategic arms by two-thirds make clear that the days of Russian military confrontation with the West are over.’⁷

In all, US-Russian relations were on an obvious ascent in 2002. Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin carried out successful summit meetings in Moscow and St. Petersburg in May and managed to sign a groundbreaking strategic arms reduction agreement. In addition, Russia was welcomed into NATO and given a seat on a council (though with a non-decisive voice). The US also was behind the pledge by the G-7 nations to contribute $20 billion over ten years to nonproliferation programs in Russia and the former Soviet republics and to give Russia a permanent seat at future G-8 meetings. The Bush administration lobbied Congress hard to grant Russia the status as a free-market economy; this was finally granted on 6 June 2002. Most important, the US and Russia have continued their cooperation in the war on terrorism.

As the US Ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, admitted:

The new NATO-Russia Council set up last year [2002] is another good example of how much the security environment has changed, and it underscores Russia’s importance to meeting today’s challenges. The NRC is off to an impressive start. Russia held a joint civil-emergency exercise with NATO Allies and Partners last fall in Noginsk, and also hosted a NATO-Russia seminar in Moscow two months ago on the military’s role in combating terrorism. NATO and Russian military authorities in Brussels have completed joint assessments of the threat posed by Al Qaeda to our troops in the Balkans and to civil aviation, and they have begun an assessment of the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁸

The Fo...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Introduction
• 1. US-Russian Relations and the Global Counter-Terrorist Campaign
• 2. Military Reform in Russia and the Global War Against Terrorism
• 3. The US Military Engagement in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus: An Overview
• 4. Prospects for Russia-US Cooperation in Preventing WMD Proliferation
• 5.Prospects for US-Russian Cooperation in Ballistic Missile Defense and Outer Space Activities
• 6. The Anti-Oligarchy Campaign and its Implications for Russia’s Security
• 7. The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains
• 8. ‘The War in Iraq’: An Assessment of Lessons Learned by Russian Military Specialists Through 31 July 2003
• About the Contributors
• Index