Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China

Baogang He

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138634312
• eBook ISBN: 9781351794121
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

This title was first published in 2000:  This text aims to provide a clear understanding of the complex relationship that exists between nationalism, national identity, the state, the direction and trend of China's transition and the subsequent prospects for democratization. While describing the rise of Chinese nationalism and the accompanying discourse on Chinese national identity, it focuses on the national identity question and its impact on democratization. The text argues that Chinese nationalism is not monolithic and that popular Chinese nationalism attempts to exclude the role of the party-state in defining national identity. Most importantly, it has the potential to demand democratic reform and push for democratization in China. Nevertheless, the alliance between nationalism and democracy will expedient. Chinese nationalism, whether official or popular, comes into conflict with democracy when it confronts the national identity/boundary problem. They clash with each other where territoriality is involved. The Chinese nationalist solution to the problem is logically and inherently opposed to the contemporary trend towards democracy.

1 Conceptual Introduction

This chapter aims to define key concepts, explore their implications in a Chinese context, and spell out the linkages between nationalism, national identities, the national identity question, the nation-state system, and the relationship between the national boundary/identity question and democratization. It also aims to outline the central questions and themes of the book, as well as its theoretical and analytical framework. In short, the chapter serves as a conceptual foundation for the book as a whole and provides a brief preview of its central concerns.

1. Nationalism and its Four Forms

According to Anthony Smith, nationalism refers to the whole process of the growth of nations and nation states, sentiments of attachment to and pride in the nation, an ideology and language (or discourse) extolling the nation, and a movement with national aspirations and goals.¹ The components of the ideology of nationalism can be briefly summarized in the following way: the world is divided into nations, each with its own character and destiny; the nation is the sole source of political power, and loyalty to it overrides all other loyalties; everyone must belong to a nation, if everyone is to be truly free; to realize themselves, nations must be autonomous; and nations must be free and secure if there is to be peace and justice in the world. The goals of nationalist movements are national identity, national unity and national autonomy.²

We would like to emphasize that Chinese nationalism provides legitimation for the Chinese nation-state, and stresses individual loyalty to the state and the priority of the political community over individual rights. To Chinese nationalists, the most important human unit is the nation; all others, especially individuals, are insignificant, and national interests can even be carried out at the cost of personal sacrifice. Chinese nationalism can be seen as a special way of organizing and distributing political power in a way which favors Han nationality.

The core goal of Chinese nationalism is not only to promote and protect the national interests of China, but also to restore its ‘greatness’. Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin are all nationalists in the sense that they were, or are, ambitious for China to regain pre-eminence in power and influence as quickly as possible. ‘This was restoration nationalism at its most romantic and Nietzschean, and it has not been wholly discarded’, as Wang Gungwu puts it.³ In the 1990s, Chinese nationalism reflects a growing national confidence that, as a result of the economic development of the ‘big dragon’ and the spread of the concept of ‘Greater China’, China can provide a successful model for developmental states.

Nationalism takes many forms. Snyder classifies nationalism into fissiparous nationalism in Europe, black nationalism in Africa, anticolonial nationalism in Asia, politico-religious nationalism in the Middle East, popular nationalism in Latin America, melting-pot nationalism in the US, and messianic nationalism in the former Soviet Union.⁴ Chinese intellectuals distinguish assertive, aggressive and narrow nationalism from rational, responsible and constructive nationalism. Lucian Pye praises the Shanghai-type nationalism that was buried by Mao’s anti-imperialist nationalism but has risen again in recent years.⁵

For the purpose of this book, we classify nationalism into state versus popular nationalism; and super versus ethno nationalism. Chinese nationalism can be divided into two categories: state and popular. State (or official) nationalism refers to any doctrine, ideology or discourse in which the Chinese Party-state strives to identify itself as the nation, or claims that its goals embody those of the nation and are essential to its nationhood. It also denotes a process whereby the Chinese state sponsors, controls, and invents the content of patriotism and cultural symbols of the Chinese nation (chapter 2). Another interpretation of state nationalism is that the interests of the state are identical with those of the nation, and therefore the state is an instrument to represent and protect national interests in international relations.⁶

Popular nationalism comes from ‘below’ and represents unsystematic, popular national sentiments. Popular nationalism is reflected in, for instance, folk music and literature. While the formation of popular nationalism is always a natural process, the ideas and beliefs of state nationalism must be actively promoted. A concrete example of popular nationalism is the massive protest against a group of right-wing Japanese who built a lighthouse in the disputed Diaoyu Islands. Ordinary Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan organized mass demonstrations in response to what was perceived as an aggressive action by the Japanese. By contrast, the Chinese government did not actively protest, and university officials at Shanghai’s Fudan University in Mainland China, ripped down posters critical of Japan.⁷

One version of popular nationalism in China is cultural nationalism, whose carriers and interpreters are mostly intellectuals. They may have close relations with the government, but they also attempt to represent the will of the people. Cultural nationalists see the Chinese nation and Chinese people as being rooted in Confucian tradition and philosophy. Cultural nationalism emphasizes the ideological function of traditional Chinese culture in maintaining political order.⁸ While state nationalism and cultural nationalism overlap and influence each other in practice, they may however also undermine each other with conflicting hidden agendas. The complex relationship between them will be explored in our discussion of the politics of national identity (chapters 2–4).

There is a further distinction between super and ethno-nationalisms. In the process of maintaining the existing ‘empire’, a super or pan-Chinese nationalism invents and promotes the notion of da zhonghua minzu, a set of shared values and cultural identities that could hold the Chinese peoples (including 55 ethnic minorities as well as the Han) together.⁹ It emphasizes a Chinese national identity which is beyond any modern political ideological differences, and attempts to overcome the narrow definition of the Chinese as Han.

One particular version of Chinese super-nationalism is overseas Chinese nationalism, or a borderless nationalism that is common among overseas Chinese. Overseas Chinese patriots are regarded as a constructive force for China’s economic development, and as a ‘bridge’ across the Taiwan Strait that will lead toward political unification.¹⁰ At various international conferences, in recent years, Chinese scholars overseas have presented many more papers on Chinese nationalism than on Chinese democracy.¹¹ Many Chinese students have become more nationalistic than democratic, as shown by the decrease in students’ participation in overseas democratic movements and the increase in their defense and protection of China’s international image.¹² Many overseas Chinese students were angry and disappointed at NBC’s negative coverage of the Chinese Team in 1996. A committee of Chinese engineering and science graduate students at Harvard and Berkeley has through the Internet gathered more than 3,500 e-mailed ‘signatures’ in order to wage a cyberspace campaign against the television reporting of the Chinese Team. They have also raised over $36,000 from supporters in the U.S.¹³ This reflects heightened overseas Chinese nationalism.

By contrast, in China in the process of moving from ‘empire’ to nation ethno-nationalism has emerged.¹⁴ Ethno-nationalisms always emphasize one ethnic nationality, based on a unique culture and history, and always stress identity difference, as in the now-familiar claim that, ‘We are different from the Han (Hanren)’. Ethno-nationalism reflects the cultural reconstruction of ethnic identities as, for example, in Tibet and Xinjiang. Ethno-nationalism has been greater during the 1980s and 1990s than in any previous decade, with some significant exceptions, such as Xinjiang in the 1930s and 1940s.¹⁵ The rise of ethno-nationalism and the resurgence of feelings of national cultural identity among minorities was, in part, a reaction against the savage assimilation with China and the Han that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. It was also the result of the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist governments in Eastern Europe and of a worldwide culture in which indigenous people everywhere have begun to play an increasingly prominent role.¹⁶

Nationalism can also be characterized as either ‘hot’ or ‘cool’. ‘Hot’ nationalism is more emotional and irrational, while ‘Cool’ nationalism is more rational and less emotional. Chinese liberal-minded scholars, including those overseas, propose a rational nationalism in which China would maintain its openness and compete with other nation-states in a civilized and cooperative way.¹⁷ It is argued that Chinese industrialization requires a strong nationalism and that if nationalism is related to capitalism, it is more likely to be rational and cooperative, as shown in the case of today’s South Korea and Japan.¹⁸ For Chinese nationalists, Chinese nationalism was and still is weak and defensive when compared with Western nationalism. As Wang Gungwu has observed:

This form of nationalism [a constructive face of nationalism in the post-colonial states] was used to rally disparate peoples to create new nations. It was often highly defensive, but over time, it has matured considerably in most of these new nation-states. The word can still arouse some enthusiasm but now rarely produces the violent emotions that had originally been such an essential part of it. Why does it still remind us of fearsome power when it applies to China?¹⁹

2. National Identities

As noted above, nationalism consists, in part, of a sense of belonging to the nation, a sense of security, a feeling of national pride and attachment to the nation. All of these are inextricably linked to national identity. The...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Tables
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Conceptual Introduction
• 2 State Nationalism in Post-4th June China
• 3 Patriotic Villains and Patriotic Heroes: New trends in literary nationalism
• 4 Reimagining the Nation: The ‘Zeng Guofan phenomenon’
• 5 The National Identity Question, Nationalism and Democratization in China and Taiwan
• 6 Nationalism, National Identity, Elites, and Democratization in Russia and China
• 7 The Clash between State Nationalism and Democratization over the National Identity Question
• 8 Concluding Remarks
• Bibliography
• Index